Aguilar v. JIB Central LLC, et al.

TENTATIVE RULINGS 7-22-26 Department R17- Judge Gilbert G. Ochoa

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AGUILAR

v.

JIB CENTRAL LLC, et al.

Motion: Motion to Compel Arbitration

Movant: Defendant JIB Central, LLC

Respondent: Plaintiff Gloria Aguilar

DISCUSSION

A. Evidentiary Objections In support of her Opposition, Plaintiff also files seventeen objections to statements made

in the declaration of Velasco and six objections to Exhibits A-E attached to the declaration.

As to the objections to Exhibits A-E, the court overrules Plaintiff’s objections in their

entirety. Velasco testifies that in his position he oversee the company’s operations in California,

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including, but not limited to, human resource issues, and the company’s employment-related

policies and practices, such as the subject restaurant’s application and onboarding processes.

Velasco further attests that he is the custodian of records to these documents and provides

information as to the mode of the preparation of the subject records. Based on the foregoing, the

court finds the subject records satisfy the business records exception under Evidence Code section

1271. Velasco’s declaration further provides sufficient information to establish the authenticity of

the subject documents as required under Evidence Code section 1400 and 1401.

Plaintiff objects to Valasco’s entire declaration and statements made in paragraphs 3-23 on

the grounds that these statements are irrelevant, lack foundation and personal knowledge,

speculative/conclusory or based on hearsay/records that are not authenticated. The court overrules

Plaintiff’s objections in their entirety.

B. Motion to Compel Arbitration

i. Relevant Legal Principles

a. State Law The California Code of Civil Procedure sections 1280 et seq. provide a procedure for the

summary determination of whether a valid agreement to arbitrate exists, and such summary

procedure satisfies both state and federal law. (Rosenthal v. Great Western Fin. Securities Corp.

(1996) 14 Cal.4th394, 413.)

Under section 1281.2 of the Code of Civil Procedure, a party to an arbitration agreement

may move to compel arbitration if another party to the agreement refuses to arbitrate, and the

court shall order the parties to arbitrate if it determines an agreement to arbitrate exists, unless it

determines:

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(a) The right to compel arbitration has been waived by the petitioner;

(b) Grounds exist for the revocation of the agreement; or

(c) A party to the arbitration agreement is also a party to a pending court action or special proceeding with a third party, arising out of the same transaction or series of related transactions and there is a possibility of conflicting rulings on a common issue of law or fact.

California law favors the enforcement of valid arbitration agreements. (Ericksen,

Arbuthnot, McCarthy, Kearney & Walsh, Inc. v. 100 Oak Street (1983) 35 Cal.3d 312, 320; In re

Tobacco I (2004) 124 Cal.App.4th 1095, 1103.) Any doubts to arbitration will be resolved

against the party asserting a defense to arbitration, whether the issue is construction of contract

language, waiver, delay or any like defense to arbitrability. (Erickson, supra, 35 Cal.3d at p. 320;

In re Tobacco I, supra, 124 Cal.App.4th at p. 1103.)

The court must determine when a petition to compel arbitration is filed and accompanied

by prima facie evidence of a written arbitration agreement whether the agreement exists, if any

defense to its enforcement is raised, and whether the agreement is enforceable. (Rosenthal,

supra, 14 Cal.4th at p. 413.) The petitioner bears the burden of proving the existence of the

arbitration agreement by preponderance of the evidence. (Id.) If the party opposing the petition

raises a defense to enforcement, then he bears the burden of producing evidence and proving by

preponderance of the evidence any fact necessary to the defense. (Id.) The trial court’s role is to

resolve these factual issues. (Id. at p. 414.)

The party may also seek a stay of pending litigation either by itself or in conjunction with

a petition to compel arbitration. (Code Civ. Proc., §1281.4; see also 9 U.S.C. §3.)

b. Federal Law

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The Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), at 9 U.S.C. §1, et seq., also authorizes enforcement

of arbitration clauses unless grounds exist in law or equity for the revocation of any contract. (9

U.S.C. § 2). The enforcement language of the FAA is almost identical to Code of Civil

Procedure section 1281. In situations governed by the FAA, conflicting state law is preempted

in either state or federal courts. (Volt Info. Sciences, Inc. v. Board of Trustees of Leland Stanford

Junior University (1989) 489 U.S. 468, 477 [“The FAA contains no express pre-emptive

provision, nor does it reflect a congressional intent to occupy the entire field of arbitration . . . .

But even when Congress has not completely displaced state regulation in an area, state law may

nonetheless be pre-empted to the extent that it actually conflicts with federal law . . . .”].)

To compel arbitration under the FAA, the court must find an agreement exists for

arbitration between the parties and the agreement covers the dispute. (AT&T Technologies, Inc.

v. Communications Workers of America (1986) 475 U.S. 643, 648-649.)

The enforcement of an arbitration clause is a matter of ordinary state-law contract

principles. (AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion (2011) 131 S.Ct. 1740, 1745 (Concepcion); First

Options v. Kaplan (1995) 514 U.S. 938, 944.) Arbitration agreements are on equal footing with

other contracts and should be enforced according to their terms. (Concepcion, supra, 131 S.Ct. at

p. 1745.) The section in the FAA, 9 U.S.C. §2, providing arbitration agreements can be declared

unenforceable on grounds of law or equity for revocation permits invalidating such agreement on

contract defenses of fraud, duress, or unconscionability. (Id. at p. 1746.)

State rules of procedure, including those governing petitions to compel arbitration, apply

in state court proceedings except where such rules would defeat the purpose of the federal law.

(Rosenthal, supra, 14 Cal.4th at p. 409-410.)

Here, the subject agreement states, in pertinent part, as follows:

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This binding arbitration shall be conducted by a retired judge or such other person as jointly selected by the parties, and the procedure governed by the Federal Arbitration Act (9 U.S.C. Sections 1-16).

JIB cites to cases such as Tuufuli v. West Coast Dental Administrative Services, LLC

(2026) 117 Cal.App.5th 1048 for authority that the FAA applies as the subject agreement

expressly states so.

Plaintiff does not address the issue of the applicable law.

As the subject agreement provides for the FAA to govern, then it governs. (Cronus

Investments, Inc. v. Concierge Services (2005) 35 Cal.4th 376, 394; Aviation Data, Inc. v.

American Express Travel Related Services Co., Inc. (2007) 152 Cal.App.4th 1522, 1534-35.)

ii. Contractual Relationship Between Plaintiff and JIB

In its Motion, JIB contends a valid agreement exists between Plaintiff and JIB.

Specifically, JIB contends Plaintiff electronically signed the Arbitration Agreement (the

Agreement) using the process set forth by Velasco in his declaration filed in support of the

instant Motion. JIB contends Plaintiff used a private and password-protected account to sign the

Agreement on March 8, 2021, at 10:28 p.m. PST. JIB further argues Plaintiff also completed

other documents with this private and identifying information, such as her bank account number

(for direct deposit), contact and emergency contact information, social security number, and

USCIS permanent resident card number.

In her Opposition, Plaintiff argues, as set forth in California Uniform Electronic

Transactions Act, an electronic signature is attributable to a person only if “it was the act of the

person.” Here, as set forth in the declaration of the Plaintiff, Plaintiff told her manager she was

unable to complete the online application and she was instructed to have someone else complete

the application. Plaintiff states she asked her nephew, Medina, to help her. Medina’s declaration

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states he primarily speaks Spanish and while he can understand English a little bit, he cannot

speak or read English fluently. Medina further states he did not understand he was entering into

the Agreement on his aunt’s behalf and was not asked to enter into an arbitration agreement for

her. Plaintiff argues the facts here are analogous to those in Banister v. Marinidence Opco, LLC

(2021) 64 Cal.App.5th 541 (Bannister), where the Court of Appeals affirmed a denial of a

motion to compel where the evidence shows the human resources manager had completed

onboarding for employees who had difficulty using computers. Plaintiff contends like the facts

here, the evidence in Bannister did not compel a finding that plaintiff signed because it did not

establish she was the only person who could have accessed the onboarding portal and signed the

agreement. Plaintiff argues while the facts here indicate Plaintiff had a unique username and

password, the facts here show that Plaintiff did not personally use the system to knowingly agree

to arbitration and Plaintiff’s manager told her to use a third party to complete her application.

Further, Plaintiff argues Medina was not authorized to agree to arbitration on her behalf and he

was instead simply asked to assist her with submitting the online application to transfer stores.

Plaintiff argues the facts here are comparable to Harrod v. Country Oaks Partners, LLC (2024)

15 Cal.5th 939, 959-962, 966 (Harrod) where the California Supreme Court held that an agent's

limited authority to make health care decisions did not include authority to execute a separate

arbitration agreement as the arbitration agreement concerned legal rights and forum, not the

delegated health care decisions. Finally, Plaintiff argues Medina cannot be argued to have had

ostensible authority as there were no actions by the Plaintiff that would have led JIB to conclude

that Medina had authority to waive arbitration rights on Plaintiff's behalf.

JIB replies, citing cases such as Iyere v. Wise Auto Group (2023) 87 Cal.App.5th 747,

759 for authority that Plaintiff cannot fail to read the Agreement and then seek to benefit from

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the same. Further, citing Caballero v. Premier Care Simi Valley, LLC (2021) 69 Cal.App.5th

512, 518-19, JIB argues Plaintiff cannot avoid enforcement simply because she has “limited

proficiency in the English language” and that it is incumbent upon the party who does not speak

or understand English to have a contract read or explained to her. JIB further raises concerns

about the credibility of Plaintiff and Medina’s declarations, specifically, that Plaintiff chose

Medina to assist her when he states that, in his opinion, he cannot read English sufficiently.

Further, in the declaration filed in support of JIB’s Reply, Avila states Plaintiff made no mention

of being unable to complete the application electronically or that she was unable to speak or read

English. Avila indicates she spoke to Plaintiff in a mix of Spanish and English. JIB further

points out while Plaintiff states she does not read English sufficiently to understand legal

documents, her declaration is not indicated to have required translation. JIB argues under Ruiz v.

Moss Bros. Auto Group, Inc. (2014) 232 Cal.App.4th 836, 846, JIB is not required to

authenticate Plaintiff’s signature “as a preliminary matter in moving for arbitration or in the

event the authenticity of the signature is not challenged.” JIB argues it satisfied its threshold

burden by providing the Agreement and Plaintiff’s evidence does not challenge the Agreement’s

authenticity, but instead merely argues that she did not read the Agreement, which is insufficient

as a matter of law. As to whether Medina qualifies as an agent of the Plaintiff, JIB argues

executing the Agreement was a condition of the employment, which Medina was supposedly

tasked with seeking to secure for Plaintiff. JIB distinguishes the facts here from Harrod, as in

that case the patient had a very clear and written “power of attorney” for “health care decisions”

and the arbitration agreement clearly fell out of scope of the power of attorney.

The court grant JIB’s Motion in its entirety. Plaintiff advances only one argument in her

Opposition and that is that she did not enter into the Agreement as the electronic signature was

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entered by her nephew, Medina, who did not have the authority to execute the Agreement on her

behalf. I disagree, the court finds JIB has met its burden of proof by a preponderance of the

evidence that the parties had a valid agreement to arbitrate (Code Civ. Proc., § 1281.2) because

JIB has proven that the electronic signature on the Agreement was an “act attributable” to the

Plaintiff (Civ. Code, § 1633.9, subd. (a)). As set forth in the declaration of Velasco, for the

subject application process, Plaintiff needed to create an account on a platform called

PeopleMatter. Velasco indicates on February 27, 2021, Plaintiff submitted an application for

employment with JIB. As pointed out by JIB in its Reply, however, the Agreement followed a

verbal offer for employment and an email with the subject offer. Velasco further states that after

receiving the email offer, Plaintiff needed to create a JIB-specific People Matter profile with a

unique username and password and that this was used to electronically sign her onboarding

documents, including the Agreement. Avila states in her declaration that on March 8, 2021,

Plaintiff verbally informed her that she was accepting her offer of employment and she would

submit the requested documents.

The Court agrees with JIB that Plaintiff fails to dispute that she did not electronically sign

the Agreement. Specifically, Plaintiff states in her declaration only that she had Medina, “fill out

the online application for me.” Medina confirms this in his declaration as he indicates he

understood he was helping his aunt “complete an online application.” Both declarations are

silent as to the fact that there had to have been two PeopleMatter accounts opened at two

separate times. Velasco’s declaration indicates Plaintiff’s application was submitted on February

27, 2021, but the employment offer was not accepted until March 8, 2021, a week later. As such,

the evidence proffered by the Plaintiff fails to dispute that she did not electronically sign the

Agreement. Instead, Plaintiff’s evidence only supports her contention that she did not

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understand the Agreement due to her limited knowledge of English. Generally, however, a party

may not avoid enforcement of an arbitration provision because the party has limited proficiency

in the English language. (Ramos v. Westlake Services LLC (2015) 242 Cal.App.4th 674, 687.)

To the extent that Plaintiff’s and Medina’s declarations could be construed as a dispute of

her electronic signature on the Agreement, the court finds them lacking in credibility.

Specifically, Plaintiff’s statement that she does not speak English is refuted by Avila, who

indicates she spoke to Plaintiff in a mix of Spanish and English. Further, Plaintiff’s and

Medina’s attestation that they do not read English fluently or sufficiently to understand legal

documents is in direct opposition to the fact that they signed the subject declarations in English,

with no translation to Spanish indicated to have been needed. Accordingly, the court finds JIB

has met its burden of proof that the parties had a valid agreement to arbitrate and grant JIB’s

Moton in its entirety.

III. RULING The court rules as follows:

(1) Overrule Plaintiff’s Evidentiary Objections in their entirety.

(2) Grant JIB’s motion to compel Plaintiff’s individual claims to arbitration, stay litigation of

Plaintiff’s representative PAGA claim and dismiss Plaintiff’s class action claims without

prejudice.

Movant to give notice.

Dated-

____________________________

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Judge

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