PEREZ vs S J QUICKBITE, INC., A CALIFORNIA CORPORATION, et al.

25CV156867: PEREZ vs S J QUICKBITE, INC., A CALIFORNIA CORPORATION, et al. 07/22/2026 Hearing on Motion to Compel Arbitration filed by S J QUICKBITE, INC., a California corporation (Defendant) + CRS# 514638385032 in Department 18

Tentative Ruling - 07/21/2026 Patrick McKinney

The Motion to Compel Arbitration filed by LPL QUICKBITES INC, a California corporation, S J QUICKBITE, INC., a California corporation on 06/24/2026 is Granted.

BACKGROUND:

Plaintiff Consuelo Perez (“Plaintiff”) worked for Defendant S J Quickbite, Inc. (“SJ”) from August 2020 through May 2026. Plaintiff filed this action on November 26, 2025 and a First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) on February 24, 2026 against SJ and another entity, LPL Quickbites, Inc. (“LPL”) (collectively “Defendants”). Plaintiff’s FAC includes a Private Attorney General Act (“PAGA”) claim and also alleges a variety of violations of the California Labor Code as well as violation of California’s Unfair Competition Law. The FAC’s first eight claims are brought individually and as a class action. (FAC, ¶ 2.) The PAGA claim is brought as a representative action on behalf of similarly aggrieved workers. (Id. at ¶ 3.)

Plaintiff contends that on or about September 21, 2024, Plaintiff was asked by her store manager to sign a stapled packet of employment documents including an arbitration agreement. (Perez Decl., ¶ 3.) Plaintiff signed the documents shortly thereafter. Defendants assert that employees were asked to sign these documents as part of a company-wide effort to update employment documentation for its existing workforce. Defendants now move to compel arbitration under this agreement.

LEGAL STANDARD:

If a party moving to compel arbitration demonstrates the existence of a valid arbitration clause, the burden shifts to the party opposing arbitration to demonstrate that the agreement cannot be interpreted to require arbitration of the dispute (e.g., that it is unenforceable or some exception to arbitrability exists). (McIsaac v. Foremost Ins. Co. Grand Rapids, Michigan (2021) 64 Cal.App.5th 418, 422; Code Civ. Proc., § 1281.2.) Arbitration agreements are “valid, enforceable and irrevocable, save upon such grounds as exist for the revocation of any contract.” (Dougherty v. Roseville Heritage Partners (2020) 47 Cal.App.5th 93, 101; Code Civ. Proc., § 1281.)

DISCUSSION:

The parties do not dispute the existence of an agreement to arbitrate, signed by Plaintiff in September 2024. (See Chhaddva Decl., ¶ 9, Exh. B.) The parties also do not appear to dispute that the terms of the agreement are intended to apply to the present dispute. The agreement 25CV156867: PEREZ vs S J QUICKBITE, INC., A CALIFORNIA CORPORATION, et al. 07/22/2026 Hearing on Motion to Compel Arbitration filed by S J QUICKBITE, INC., a California corporation (Defendant) + CRS# 514638385032 in Department 18 reads, in pertinent part:

“This Agreement applies to any claim or dispute arising out of or relating to your hiring by, employment with, or separation from employment with the Company or one of its affiliates, subsidiaries or parent corporations or entities, and their successors and assigns. Except as otherwise provided herein, this Agreement requires all such disputes that have not otherwise been resolved internally within the Company to be resolved only by an Arbitrator through final and binding arbitration and not in court by way of a court or jury trial.

This Agreement is governed by the Federal Arbitration Act (‘“FAA”), 9 U.S.C. § 1 et seq. and evidences a transaction involving commerce. To the full extent allowable by law, this Agreement is intended to apply to the resolution of all disputes that otherwise would be resolved in a court of law or before a forum other than arbitration. This Agreement requires all such disputes to be resolved only by an arbitrator through final and binding arbitration and not by way of court or jury trial.”

(Deming Decl., ¶ 6, Exh. A.)

The agreement also contains a class action waiver, which states in part: “Both the Company and you agree to bring any dispute in arbitration on an individual basis only, and not on a class or collective action basis on behalf of others. There will be no right or authority for any dispute to be brought, heard or arbitrated as a class or collective action, or as a member in any such class or collective action proceeding.” (Ibid.) The agreement includes a PAGA waiver as well.

Plaintiff opposes the motion on two primary grounds. First, Plaintiff contends that Defendant LPL is not a party to the arbitration agreement and thus cannot enforce its terms. Second, Plaintiff asserts that the agreement is procedurally and substantively unconscionable.

Defendant LPL’s Status

Plaintiff contends that LPL is not a party to the applicable arbitration agreement and cannot enforce it as to her claims. Defendant contends in reply that LPL may invoke the arbitration agreement because the agreement states that the agreement is that the agreement states that it applies to “SJ Quickbite Inc. (together with its affiliates, subsidiaries or parent corporations or entities, and their successors and assigns, the “Company”.)” Oddly, however, Defendant took the opposite position earlier in this litigation, requesting that Plaintiff dismiss LPL from the action because LPL “did not employ her” and “LPL is not a proper party to any potential claims asserted by Ms. Perez. LPL did not employ her, is not a in a joint employer relationship with SJ

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF ALAMEDA

25CV156867: PEREZ vs S J QUICKBITE, INC., A CALIFORNIA CORPORATION, et al. 07/22/2026 Hearing on Motion to Compel Arbitration filed by S J QUICKBITE, INC., a California corporation (Defendant) + CRS# 514638385032 in Department 18 Quickbite such that it could be considered her employer, and therefor would be dismissed from any complaint brought by Ms. Perez.” (Deming Decl., Exh. A [meet and confer email correspondence between counsel].) Defendants also point to the allegations in the FAC, which state that LPL is “the current employer of Plaintiff, and the current and/or former employer of the putative Class and the Aggrieved Employees.” (FAC, ¶ 11(f).)

Plaintiff also alleges on information and belief that each Defendant entity “was the principal, agent, partner, joint venturer, officer, director, controlling shareholder, subsidiary, affiliate, parent corporation, successor in interest and/or predecessor in interest of some or all of the other Defendants ” (Id. at ¶ 14.)

The court finds Defendant’s reasoning more persuasive. In Dryer v. Los Angeles Rams (1985) 40 Cal.3d 406, the California Supreme Court ordered an entire dispute to arbitration despite certain defendants not being signatory to an arbitration agreement, reasoning that “if, as the complaint alleges, the individual defendants, though not signatories, were acting as agents for the Rams, then they are entitled to the benefit of the arbitration provisions.” (Id. at 418.) The court focused on the allegations in the pleadings and did not require extrinsic evidence.

The scenario here is on all fours with the Supreme Court’s reasoning in Dryer. Thus, the court finds that LPL may invoke the arbitration agreement despite not being signatory and need not address the other contentions the parties make on this point. Additionally, as Defendants note in reply, the issue of LPL’s status can be determined by the arbitrator.

Unconscionability

Plaintiffs also assert that the arbitration agreement is unenforceable due to unconscionability. (OTO, L.L.C. v. Kho (2019) 8 Cal.5th 111, 125.) The unconscionability doctrine has both procedural and substantive elements, “the former focusing on oppression or surprise due to unequal bargaining power, the latter on overly harsh or one-sided results.” (Sonic-Calabasas A, Inc. v. Moreno (2013) 57 Cal.4th 1109, 1133.) One common formulation of unconscionability is that it refers to an absence of meaningful choice on the part of one of the parties together with contract terms which are unreasonably favorable to the other party. (Murrey v.

Superior Court (2023) 87 Cal.App.5th 1223, 1236.) Both procedural and substantive unconscionability must be shown for the defense to be established, but not necessarily in the same degree. (OTO, supra, 8 Cal.5th at p. 125.) The more substantively one-sided the contract term, the less evidence of procedural unconscionability is required to conclude that the term is unenforceable, and vice versa. (Id. at pp. 125–126.) When unconscionability is shown, the trial court has discretion either to refuse to enforce the contract or to strike the unconscionable provision and enforce the remainder of the contract. (Civ.

Code, § 1670.5, subd. (a); Armendariz, supra, 24 Cal.4th at p. 122.)

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF ALAMEDA

25CV156867: PEREZ vs S J QUICKBITE, INC., A CALIFORNIA CORPORATION, et al. 07/22/2026 Hearing on Motion to Compel Arbitration filed by S J QUICKBITE, INC., a California corporation (Defendant) + CRS# 514638385032 in Department 18 With respect to procedural unconscionability, Plaintiff contends that the arbitration agreement is an adhesion contract. (Opp. at 8:10-9:4.) Plaintiffs characterize the agreement as one of adhesion because it was presented as part of a packet, lending the impression that the terms were likely not open for negotiation. (Id. at 8:16-8:20.)

Plaintiff also contends that her supervisor, Laura Ortiz, informed her that she was “required” to sign the documents including the arbitration agreement. (Id. at 8:23-8:24.) As pointed out by Defendants, precedent in California holds that adhesion contracts are “indispensable facts of modern life [and] are generally enforced.” (Gentry v. Superior Court (2007) 42 Cal.4th 443, 469.) Moreover, there appears to be a factual dispute between the parties as to whether Plaintiff was in fact pressured to sign the agreement immediately or had the opportunity to review its terms.

Thus, while the court agrees with Plaintiff that this agreement appears to have characteristics of a contract of adhesion, that fact alone does not render it unenforceable on unconscionability grounds.

Plaintiff also contends that the agreement was procured by oppression and unfair surprise based on its failure to provide the applicable rules and procedures. Plaintiff points to the agreement’s reference to its adoption of JAMS Employment Arbitration Rules and Procedures in Sections 3-6 of the agreement. Plaintiff contends that, because the agreement does not make those rules and procedures readily available for her review, this constitutes oppression. However, the agreement does direct Plaintiff to www.jamsadr.com or Lisa Chhaddva.

Plaintiff does not cite authority establishing that the incomplete disclosure made by Defendants here is akin to “[f]ailure to provide the applicable arbitration rules” and supporting a finding of procedural unconscionability. Defendant also points out that both Spanish and English-language versions of the agreement were made available. (Chhadva Decl., ¶¶ 4-9; Perez Decl., ¶ 3.) Moreover, case law has held that arbitration agreements incorporating JAMS rules and procedures are enforceable. (See, e.g., Baltazar v.

Forever 21, Inc. (2016) 62 Cal.4th 1237, 1246.)

In sum, Plaintiff offers evidence of only very mild procedural unconscionability. Absent a showing of overwhelming substantive unconscionability, this does not suffice to render the agreement unenforceable.

Plaintiff’s evidence of substantive unconscionability focuses on a purported lack of mutuality and the indefinite term of the agreement. Plaintiff contends that the agreement focuses too much on claims likely to be brought by an employee against the employer and does not sufficiently describe claims that could be brought by an employer against an employee. Plaintiff does not cite any case law for the proposition that such an imbalance necessitates a finding of substantive unconscionability, only citing the definition of lack of mutuality found in Armendariz v.

Foundation Health Psychcare Services, Inc. (2000) 24 Cal.4th 83, 117. The court is not persuaded. The agreement expressly applies to “any claim or dispute arising out of or relating to” Plaintiff’s employment. More importantly, Plaintiff does not provide an example of a claim that could be brought by Defendants in court but that Plaintiffs would be forced to arbitrate. Thus, Plaintiff does not establish a substantively unconscionable lack of mutuality.

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF ALAMEDA

25CV156867: PEREZ vs S J QUICKBITE, INC., A CALIFORNIA CORPORATION, et al. 07/22/2026 Hearing on Motion to Compel Arbitration filed by S J QUICKBITE, INC., a California corporation (Defendant) + CRS# 514638385032 in Department 18 Finally, Plaintiff contends that the agreement’s indefinite term is substantively unconscionable. First, the court is not convinced that the cited language of the agreement renders it indefinite. Plaintiff cites the language stating that the agreement “will survive the termination of your employment and the expiration of any benefit, and it will continue to apply upon your transfer to any parent, subsidiary or affiliate of the Company or re-employment by the Company if your employment is ended but later renewed.” Unlike in the case cited by Plaintiff, Cook v.

University of Southern California (2024) 102 Cal.App.5th 312, 326, this agreement does not contain a clause stating that it can only be revoked or modified in a subsequent written agreement. The agreement in Cook also purported to cover disputes unrelated to the parties’ employment relationship, while the one here does not. The court is not convinced that the agreement’s term is indefinite as written, nor that it is substantively unconscionable.

The court thus finds that the agreement is enforceable and GRANTS Defendants’ motion to compel arbitration.

ORDER: For the foregoing reasons, Defendant’s motion to compel arbitration and stay proceedings is GRANTED. Plaintiff’s individual claims are to be resolved in arbitration. Plaintiffs’ representative PAGA claims are STAYED pending arbitration. Pursuant to AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion (2020) 563 U.S. 333, 348-352, Plaintiff’s class claims are DISMISSED.

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