CONDIT vs ALVARADO-GIL, et al.

If a litigant has been granted a fee waiver and requests a court reporter, the party must submit a Request for Court Reporter by a Party with a Fee Waiver (CV/E-211) and it must be filed with the clerk at least 10 days prior to the hearing or at the time the proceeding is scheduled if less than 10 days away. Once approved, the clerk will forward the form to the Court Reporter’s Office and an official reporter will be provided. *** EFFECTIVE APRIL 13, 2026, THIS DEPARTMENT HAS MOVED TO THE TANI G.

CANTIL-SAKAUYE COURTHOUSE LOCATED AT 500 G STREET IN SACRAMENTO, CA

24CV017664: CONDIT vs ALVARADO-GIL, et al. 07/21/2026 Hearing on Demurrer to Second Amended Cross-Complaint in Department 16D

95814. ALL HEARINGS NOTICED FOR DEPARTMENT 53 WILL BE HEARD IN DEPARTMENT 16D OF THE NEW COURTHOUSE. PARTIES MAY CONTINUE TO APPEAR REMOTELY IN DEPARTMENT 16D UNLESS SPECIFICALLY ORDERED OTHERWISE. ***

TENTATIVE RULING

The notice of demurrer again does not provide notice of the Court’s tentative ruling system, as required by Local Rule 1.06, and again does not provide the correct address for this Court’s Dept. 53, now designated as Dept. 16D. Moving counsel is directed to contact opposing counsel and advise him/her of Local Rule 1.06 and the Court’s tentative ruling procedure and the manner to request a hearing, along with the correct address for this Court’s Dept. 16D. If moving counsel is unable to contact opposing counsel prior to the hearing, moving counsel is ordered to appear at the hearing in person, by Zoom or by telephone.

Plaintiff/cross-defendant Condit’s demurrer to the Second Amended Cross-Complaint of Marie Alvarado-Gil and “Committee Alvarado Gil for Senate” (“Committee”) is ruled upon as follows.

Factual Background

This action arises out of plaintiff Condit’s employment with defendants Alvarado-Gil and the California State Senate. His complaint filed on 9/5/2024 asserts various causes of action for harassment, discrimination, retaliation as well as both injunctive and declaratory relief.

On 11/12/2024, the two named defendants each filed a separate answer to the complaint and defendant Alvarado-Gil, along with Committee, filed on the same date a cross-complaint against plaintiff Condit for assault, intentional infliction of emotional distress and conversion. On 2/27/2026, a Second Amended Cross-Complaint was filed, still alleging cause of action for assault, intentional infliction of emotional distress and conversion.

Plaintiff Condit now demurs to the amended cross-complaint’s second cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress on the grounds that defendant Alvarado-Gil “cannot state a claim for IIED because she has stipulated and admitted under oath, as confirmed by court order, that she only suffered ‘garden variety’ emotional distress” and therefore, “[s]he cannot meet the elements to state a claim for IIED as a matter of law. [Citations.]” (Not. of Dem., p.2:2-11.) Defendant Alvarado-Gil opposes.

Legal Standards for Demurrer

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

24CV017664: CONDIT vs ALVARADO-GIL, et al. 07/21/2026 Hearing on Demurrer to Second Amended Cross-Complaint in Department 16D

A demurrer tests the legal sufficiency of the pleadings, raising issues of law, not fact, regarding the form or content of the opposing party’s pleading. (Code of Civil Procedure §422.10, §589.) A demurrer may only challenge defects on the face of the complaint or from matters that are judicially noticeable. (Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318; Donabedian v. Mercury Ins. Co. (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 968, 994.) However, the face of the complaint includes facts contained in exhibits attached to the complaint. (Frantz v. Blackwell (1987) 189 Cal.App.3d 91, 94.) A demurrer can be utilized where a complaint itself is incomplete or discloses some defense that would bar recovery. (Guardian North Bay, Inc. v. Superior Court (Myers) (2001) 94 Cal.App.4th 963, 971-972.)

In reviewing the sufficiency of a complaint against a general demurrer, courts treat the demurrer as admitting all material facts properly pleaded, but not contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or law. Matters which may be judicially noticed may also be considered. The complaint is to be given a reasonable interpretation, reading it as a whole and its parts in their context. (Farmers v. Zerin (1997) 53 CaI.App.4th 445, 451.) Consideration of extrinsic evidence or facts asserted in the memorandum supporting or opposing the demurrer is improper. (Ion Equipment Corp. v. Nelson (1980) 110 Cal.App.3d 868, 881.)

A demurrer may be sustained only if the complaint lacks any sufficient allegations to entitle the plaintiff to relief. (Financial Corp. of America v. Wilburn (1987) 189 Cal. App. 3d 764, 778.) “Plaintiff need only plead facts showing that he may be entitled to some relief, we are not concerned with plaintiff’s possible inability or difficulty in proving the allegations of the complaint.” (Highlanders, Inc. v. Olsan (1978) 77 Cal.App.3d 690, 696-697.) “[Courts] are required to construe the complaint liberally to determine whether a cause of action has been stated, given the assumed truth of the facts pleaded.” (Picton v.

Anderson Union High School Dist. (1996) 50 Cal.App.4th 726, 733.) Still, the plaintiff has the burden of showing that the facts pleaded are sufficient to establish every element of the cause of action. (See, e.g. Martin v. Bridgeport Community Assn., Inc. (2009) 173 Cal.App.4th 1024, 1031; Sui v. Price (2011) 196 Cal.App.4th 933, 938.) The allegations must be factual and specific, not vague or conclusionary. (Rakestraw v. California Physicians’ Service (2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 39, 43–44.)

A demurrer admits the truth of all material facts properly pled and the sole issue raised by a general demurrer is whether the facts pled state a valid cause of action - not whether they are true. (Serrano v. Priest (1971) 5 Cal.3d 584, 591.) Finally, a demurrer may only be sustained where it disposes of an entire cause of action. (See, e.g., Fremont Indemnity Co. v. Fremont General Corp. (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 97, 119.)

Discussion

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

24CV017664: CONDIT vs ALVARADO-GIL, et al. 07/21/2026 Hearing on Demurrer to Second Amended Cross-Complaint in Department 16D

A. At the outset, the Court declines to consider either the Parks Declaration filed on 5/1/2026 or the Witkin Declaration filed on 6/23/2026 beyond the sole purpose of demonstrating compliance with the statutorily applicable meet-and-confer requirements prior to the filing of the present demurrer. These two declarations purport to supply evidence in relation to the substantive issues raised by this demurrer. For instance, the Parks Declaration purports to attach a “Declaration of Marie Alvarado-Gil filed with this Court on August 1, 2025,” the “parties’ joint statement served and filed with this Court on or about January 30, 2026,” and a copy of “the Court’s minute order confirming Cross-Complainant’s stipulation.” (Parks Decl., ¶¶ 3-5.)

In turn, the Witkin Declaration purports to attach “this Court’s January 8, 2026 Minute Order on Defendant/Cross-Complainant’s Motion to Quash Subpoena of Dr. Shah.” (Witkin Decl., ¶ 2.) As explained above, the Court’s consideration in ruling on the present demurrer is necessarily limited to those facts alleged in the challenged pleading and those for which judicial notice was both requested or granted. (See, e.g., Blank v. Kirwan, supra, 39 Cal.3d at 318.) Consideration of extrinsic evidence or extrinsic facts in connection with a demurrer is improper. (Ion Equipment Corp., supra, 110 Cal.App.3d at 881.)

Notably, neither side timely filed any separate request for judicial notice in conformity with the requirements of CRC Rules 3.1113(l) and 3.1306(c) and it is now too late for either party to do so. Plaintiff’s mere statement within the moving memorandum of points & authorities that “[t]he Court can take judicial notice of the proceedings before it” (Mov. MPA, p.3:23) does not satisfy the requirements of CRC Rule 3.1113(l) which requires that “[a]ny request for judicial notice must be made in a separate document” or the separate requirements of CRC 3.1306(c).

Additionally, even if a code-compliant request for judicial notice had been timely filed by either or both parties, any grant of judicial notice would necessarily be limited to only those purposes appropriate for judicial notice. (See, Evid. Code §451, subd. (a); §452, sub. (b)-(d); see also, Johnson & Johnson v. Superior Court (2011) 192 Cal.App.4th 757, 768 [court may take judicial notice of the existence of court documents but not to the truth of the statements contained therein]; Kilroy v. State of California (2004) 119 Cal.App.4th 140, 145-148; Sosinsky v.

Grant (1992) 6 Cal.App.4th 1548, 1569-70.) As such, the contents of these two declarations by attorneys Parks and Witkin along with the various documents attached thereto still could not be properly considered by this Court in ruling on the present demurrer. Furthermore, to the extent plaintiff intended to obtain judicial notice of any filed documents (such as declarations) for the additional purpose of establishing some type of preclusive effect (such as judicial admission), plaintiff has also failed to address or establish the elements necessary for of any doctrine of preclusion.

Given the absence of a timely and code-compliant request for judicial notice, the

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

24CV017664: CONDIT vs ALVARADO-GIL, et al. 07/21/2026 Hearing on Demurrer to Second Amended Cross-Complaint in Department 16D

contents of the declarations by attorneys Parks and Witkin as well as the exhibits attached thereto constitute “extrinsic evidence” which is beyond the limited scope of this Court’s permissible consideration in connection with this demurrer.

In the end, because the present demurrer is fundamentally premised on crosscomplainant Alvarado-Gil declaration in support of her earlier motion to quash subpoenas for medical records wherein she states she seeks “only garden-variety emotional distress damages” along with other related documents and because the contents of such declaration and the other related documents are not now properly before the Court, this demurrer to the amended cross-complaint’s second cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress must be and hereby is overruled in its entirety.

In light of the foregoing, the Court need not proceed further but it nevertheless does so in order to demonstrate additional reasons why this demurrer must be overruled.

B. The amended cross-complaint’s second cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress generally alleges in Paragraph 48 that “the actions of Cross- Defendant CHAD CONDIT were outrageous and demonstrated Cross-Defendant’s complete disregard for Cross-Complainant,” while Paragraph 49 then asserts the following:

Cross-Defendant CHAD CONDIT assaulted Cross-Complainant and threatened the life of Cross-Complainant, including, but not limited to, by causing Cross- Complainant to believe that Cross-Defendant was criminally culpable in the unsolved disappearance and murder of Chandra Levy and that Cross- Complainant would suffer the same fate as Ms. Levy, demonstrating that Cross- Defendant acted with intent to cause Cross-Complainant emotional distress and/or acted with conscious disregard of the reasonable probability that Cross- Complainant would suffer emotional distress. Cross-Defendant CHAD CONDIT’s conduct was so extreme as to go beyond the bounds of decency and be regarded as intolerable in a civilized society.

The subsequent paragraphs then add that “CONDIT’s conduct was taken with the purpose and design of causing injury to Cross-Complainant” and that such conduct actually and proximately caused cross-complainant Alvarado-Gil to “suffer[], and continue[] to suffer, emotional distress[,] pain, suffering, embarrassment, humiliation, shame, emotional distress, and mental anguish in an amount according to proof.” (¶¶50- 53.)

According to the moving papers, this demurrer to the second cause of action should be

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

24CV017664: CONDIT vs ALVARADO-GIL, et al. 07/21/2026 Hearing on Demurrer to Second Amended Cross-Complaint in Department 16D

sustained because “[s]worn pleadings, stipulations and the Court’s order confirm that Cross-Complainant’s sole emotional distress in this case is limited only to ‘garden variety emotional distress’” and as such, the alleged emotional distress is not “severe.” (Mov. MPA, p.3:3-7.) It is argued that because her alleged emotional distress is not “severe” but rather merely “garden variety,” Alvarado-Gil cannot show that her emotional distress is “severe” as required by So v. Shin (2013) 212 Cal.App.4th 652, 671 and CACI 1600.

Plaintiff Condit also cites CACI 1604, which defines “severe emotional distress” as “not mild or brief; it must be so substantial or long lasting that no reasonable person in a civilized society should be expected to bear it” and therefore, since Alvarado-Gil has waived “all but ‘garden variety’ emotional distress,” her second cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress fails as a matter of law. (Mov. MPA, p.5:17-28.)

There can be no genuine dispute that a valid claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress requires a plaintiff or cross-complainant to plead and prove several prima facie elements including that s/he suffered “extreme or severe emotional distress” as a proximate result of the defendant’s conduct (see, e.g. So v. Shin (2013) 212 Cal.App.4th 652, 671; Potter v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. (1993) 6 Cal.4th 965, 1001) or that pertinent California case law defines “severe emotional distress” as emotional distress “of such substantial quantity or enduring quality that no reasonable man in a civilized society should be expected to endure it” (see, e.g., Girard v. Ball (1981) 125 Cal.App.3d 772, 878-788; Fletcher v. Western National Life Ins. Co. (1970) 10 Cal.App.3d 376, 397).

However, none of the appellate authorities offered in the moving papers either holds or otherwise persuades this Court that a plaintiff or cross-complainant who has in connection with separate discovery proceedings attested s/he is claiming “only gardenvariety emotional distress damages” is as a matter of law either precluded from merely alleging a cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress. Indeed, aside from So v. Shin and Girard v. Ball cited in the preceding paragraph, the only appellate authorities identified in the “Argument” section of plaintiff’s moving papers are Wong v.

Jing (2010) 189 Cal.App.4th 1354 and Hughes v. Pair (2009) 46 Cal.4th 1035 (see, Mov. MPA, p.6:6-19) but neither opinion purports to address the sufficiency of any pleading or the propriety of a ruling on any challenge to a pleading (e.g., demurrer or motion for judgment on the pleadings). Instead, the defendants in Wong were appealing the denial of their anti-SLAPP motion (see, Wong, at h 1359) while in Hughes, the plaintiff was appealing the grant of summary judgment in favor of the defendant (see, Hughes, at 1039).

As such, both of these authorities are plainly inapposite and neither controls the outcome of the present demurrer.

To be sure, the moving papers rely on Wong for the proposition that a plaintiff’s

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

24CV017664: CONDIT vs ALVARADO-GIL, et al. 07/21/2026 Hearing on Demurrer to Second Amended Cross-Complaint in Department 16D

declaration attesting to conduct which “was very emotionally upsetting” and “caused [her] to lose sleep, have stomach upset and generalized anxiety” was insufficient as a matter of law to constitute severe emotional distress. (See, Mov. MPA, p.6:6-9.) However, plaintiff overlooks the fact that the underlying motion at issue in Wong (i.e., anti-SLAPP motion) was not an ordinary challenge to the sufficiency of a pleading but rather was a motion which requires the opposing party to present evidence sufficient to support of the claims alleged (see, Wong, at 1368) and this is the only reason why the trial court was permitted to consider that declaration attesting to the nature of emotional distress being claimed in Wong.

In contrast, in the case at bar, the declaration of Alvarado-Gil on which this demurrer is explicitly premised is not properly before this Court for the reasons explained earlier, and even if it was, judicial notice of such declaration would not extend to the truth of the assertions in such declaration. And even if plaintiff Condit had made a proper request for judicial notice and had established that certain statements within the declaration qualify as judicial admissions (neither of which plaintiff has done), plaintiff still has not otherwise established by reference to relevant legal authorities that the current pleading of the second cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress is deficient as a matter of law.

Additionally, as explained in the ruling on Court’s plaintiff Condit’s demurrer to the original cross-complaint, a court ruling on a demurrer must liberally construe the challenged pleading “with a view to substantial justice between the parties” (Ivanoff v. Bank of America (2017) 9 Cal.App.5th 719, 726) and this rule of liberal construction means that the court draws inferences favorable to the pleading party, not the demurring party (Perez v. Golden Empire Transit Dist. (2012) 209 Cal.App.4th 1228, 1238.)

Moreover, the allegations of a challenged pleading are not to be read in isolation but rather construed as a whole in conformity with the rules found in Ivanoff and Perez. (See, e.g., Perkins v. Superior Court (1981) 117 Cal.App.3d 1, 6.) When such rules of law are applied here and especially in the absence of binding precedential authority support the argument advanced by the moving papers, the present challenge to the cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress remains inadequate.

Plaintiff Condit’s reliance on the decision of Hughes v. Pair, supra, fares no better. The moving papers cite Hughes for the proposition that assertions of “discomfort, worry, anxiety, upset stomach, concern, and agitation” do not constitute severe emotional distress (see, Mov. MPA, p.6:9-12) but such statement from Hughes does not, in and if itself, mandate the sustaining the present demurrer to the intentional infliction of emotional distress cause of action. Given that neither of the declarations filed in connection with this demurrer nor any of their attachments are properly considered here, this Court’s ruling is duly limited to the express allegations of the amended crosscomplaint and as noted above, Paragraphs 51 and 52 now assert that Alvarado-Gil has “suffered, and continues to suffer, emotional distress[,] pain, suffering,

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

24CV017664: CONDIT vs ALVARADO-GIL, et al. 07/21/2026 Hearing on Demurrer to Second Amended Cross-Complaint in Department 16D

embarrassment, humiliation, shame, emotional distress, and mental anguish in an amount according to proof.” These allegations are not the same as those which Hughes posits do not amount to severe emotional distress (i.e., “discomfort, worry, anxiety, upset stomach, concern, and agitation”) and thus, Hughes does not in and of itself compel the result Plaintiff Condit seeks here especially in light of the above-cited principles governing the Court’s consideration of a demurrer, including drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of the pleading party.

Disposition

For the reasons explained above, plaintiff Condit’s demurrer to the Second Amended Cross-Complaint is OVERRULED.

If not already done, plaintiff Condit may file and serve an answer to the Second Amended Cross-Complaint no later than 7/31/2026. Although not required by Court rule or statute, a copy of this order when the answer to cross-complaint is presented for filing.

This minute order is effective immediately. No formal order or other notice is required. (Code Civ. Proc. §1019.5; CRC Rule 3.1312.)