LINDBLOOM vs PEACH TREE HEALTHCARE, et al.

25CV006421: LINDBLOOM vs PEACH TREE HEALTHCARE, et al. 01/05/2026 Hearing on Demurrer in Department 25

Tentative Ruling

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25CV006421: LINDBLOOM vs PEACH TREE HEALTHCARE, et al. 01/05/2026 Hearing on Demurrer in Department 25

a Fee Waiver (CV/E-211) and it must be filed with the clerk at least 10 days prior to the hearing or at the time the proceeding is scheduled if less than 10 days away. Once approved, the clerk will forward the form to the Court Reporter’s Office and an official reporter will be provided.

TENTATIVE RULING:

The demurrer of Defendant Peach Tree Healthcare, Inc. (“Defendant”) to the complaint of Plaintiff Amira Lindbloom (“Plaintiff”) is ruled upon as follows.

Background/Factual Allegations

On March 18, 2025, Plaintiff filed her verified complaint alleging six causes of action: (1) Associational Discrimination: Gov. Code § 12940(a); Gov. Code. § 12926(o); (2) Associational Harassment: Gov. Code § 12940(j); Gov. Code. § 12926(o); (3) FEHA Retaliation: Gov. Code § 12940(h); (4) Labor Code § 1102.5 Retaliation; (5) Failure to Prevent Harassment, Discrimination and Retaliation: Gov. Code § 12940(k); (6) Wrongful Termination in Violation of Public Policy.

Plaintiff alleges that she was hired by Defendant on July 1, 2021, as a Patient Advocate. (Compl., ¶ 6.) On March 2022, Plaintiff was promoted to Director of Community Health. (Compl., ¶ 7.) Plaintiff regularly advocated for diversity, equity, and inclusion (“DEI”) in the workplace, and made multiple complaints to Defendant’s leadership and human resources about the lack of DEI in the workplace. (Compl., ¶¶ 9-10.) Plaintiff’s complaints included, but were not limited to, employees being mistreated, misgendered, and discriminated against in the workplace. (Compl., ¶ 11.)

As alleged, Defendant did little to nothing to address Plaintiff’s complaints, to remedy the hostile work environment, or to promote DEI in the workplace. (Compl., ¶ 21.) In response to Plaintiff’s complaints and DEI advocacy and efforts, Defendant terminated Plaintiff’s employment on or about November 19, 2024. (Compl., ¶ 24.)

Legal Standard

The function of a demurrer is to test the sufficiency of the pleading it challenges by raising questions of law. (Salimi v. State Comp. Ins. Fund (1997) 54 Cal.App.4th 216, 219; Nordlinger v. Lynch (1990) 225 Cal.App.3d 1259, 1271.)

A demurrer “tests the pleadings alone and not the evidence or other extrinsic matters.” (SKF Farms v. Superior Court (1984) 153 Cal.App.3d 902, 905.) The purpose of a demurrer is to test the legal sufficiency of a claim. (Donabedian v. Mercury Ins. Co. (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 968, 994.) For the purpose of determining the effect of a complaint, its allegations are liberally

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

25CV006421: LINDBLOOM vs PEACH TREE HEALTHCARE, et al. 01/05/2026 Hearing on Demurrer in Department 25

construed, with a view toward substantial justice. (Code Civ. Proc., §452; Amarel v. Connell (1988) 202 Cal.App.3d 137, 140-141; Quelimane Co. v. Stewart Title Guaranty Co. (1998) 19 Cal.4th 26, 43, fn. 7.)

In this respect, the Court treats the demurrer as admitting all material facts properly pleaded, but not contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or law, and considers matters which may be judicially noticed. (Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318; Poseidon Development, Inc. v. Woodland Lane Estates, LLC (2007) 152 Cal.App.4th 1106, 1111-1112.) Extrinsic evidence may not properly be considered on demurrer or on a motion to strike. (Ion Equipment Corp. v. Nelson (1980) 110 Cal.App.3d 868, 881; Hibernia Savings & Loan Soc. v. Thornton (1897) 117 Cal. 481, 482.)

A demurrer may be sustained only if the complaint lacks any sufficient allegations to entitle the plaintiff to relief. (Financial Corp. of America v. Wilburn (1987) 189 Cal.App.3d 764, 778.) “Plaintiff need only plead facts showing that he may be entitled to some relief we are not concerned with plaintiff's possible inability or difficulty in proving the allegations of the complaint.” (Highlanders, Inc. v. Olsan (1978) 77 Cal.App.3d 690, 696-697.)

“[Courts] are required to construe the complaint liberally to determine whether a cause of action has been stated, given the assumed truth of the facts pleaded.” (Picton v. Anderson Union High School Dist. (1996) 50 Cal.App.4th 726.) A demurrer admits the truth of all material facts properly pled and the sole issue raised by a general demurrer is whether the facts pled state a valid cause of action – not whether they are true. (Serrano v. Priest (1971) 5 Cal.3d 584, 591.)

Discussion

Defendant demurs to the complaint on the following grounds:

1. First Cause of Action for Associational Discrimination (Gov’t Code 14940(a)): o The court lacks jurisdiction over alleged FEHA claims absent showing the Plaintiff exhausted administrative remedies. Code Civ. Proc. 430.10(a); o failure to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action per Code of Civ. Proc. § 430.10(e); and o uncertainty per Code of Civ. Proc. § 430.10(f).

2. Second Cause of Action Associational Discrimination (Gov’t Code 12940(j): o The court lacks jurisdiction over alleged FEHA claims absent showing the Plaintiff exhausted administrative remedies. Code Civ. Proc. 430.10(a); o failure to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action per Code of Civ. Proc. § 430.10(e); and

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

25CV006421: LINDBLOOM vs PEACH TREE HEALTHCARE, et al. 01/05/2026 Hearing on Demurrer in Department 25

o uncertainty per Code of Civ. Proc. § 430.10(f).

3. Third Cause of Action for FEHA Retaliation (Govt’ Code 12940(h)): o The court lacks jurisdiction over alleged FEHA claims absent showing the Plaintiff exhausted administrative remedies. Code Civ. Proc. 430.10(a); o failure to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action per Code of Civ. Proc. § 430.10(e); and o uncertainty per Code of Civ. Proc. § 430.10(f).

4. Fifth Cause of Action for Failure to Prevent Harassment (Gov’t Code 12940(k)): o The court lacks jurisdiction over alleged FEHA claims absent showing the Plaintiff exhausted administrative remedies. Code Civ. Proc. 430.10(a); o failure to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action per Code of Civ. Proc. § 430.10(e); and o uncertainty per Code of Civ. Proc. § 430.10(f).

(Ntc. Mot.)

Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies. Here, Defendant demurs to each of Plaintiff’s Fair Employment and Housing Act (“FEHA”) causes of action (first cause of action, second cause of action, third cause of action, and fifth cause of action), on grounds that Plaintiff failed to exhaust administrative remedies. Namely, Defendant contends that Plaintiff’s complaint is insufficient because the allegations fail to show that the statutory prerequisite for filing the associational discrimination claim under FEHA have been met. (See Mov. MPA, pp. 6:24-8:25.) Defendant maintains that the sole allegation pertaining to the exhaustion of administrative remedies (citing, Compl. at ¶ 30) is conclusory and insufficient to maintain Plaintiff’s FEHA claims.

In opposition, Plaintiff argues, inter alia, that Plaintiff need only plead sufficient facts to assert that she has completed the procedural requirement of timely obtaining a right-to-sue letter, which Plaintiff did. (Opp’n, p. 5:16-21, citing Compl., ¶ 30.)

Before suing for violation of the FEHA, a plaintiff must file a timely and sufficient administrative complaint with the Civil Rights Department (“CRD”) and receive a “right-to-sue” notice. (Gov. Code, §§ 12960, 12965(c).) What is submitted to the CRD is to be liberally construed in favor of the plaintiff and must also be construed in light of what might be uncovered by a reasonable investigation. (Nazir v. United Airlines, Inc. (2009) 178 Cal.App.4th 243, 268.) Claims in a civil complaint can proceed where they are fairly reflected in the administrative charge. (Jones v.

Los Angeles Community College District (1988) 198 Cal.App.3d 794, 810.) For example, a plaintiff that failed to check the “national origin” box on an administrative complaint was not precluded from pursuing such a discrimination claim in a civil action because the department’s investigation of a race discrimination claim set forth in the charge would likely

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

25CV006421: LINDBLOOM vs PEACH TREE HEALTHCARE, et al. 01/05/2026 Hearing on Demurrer in Department 25

have encompassed both race and national origin. (Sandhu v. Lockheed Missile & Space Co. (1994) 26 Cal.App.4th 846; see also Baker v. Children's Hospital Medical Ctr. (1989) 209 Cal.App.3d 1057 [plaintiff allowed to pursue harassment/retaliation claims as they were reasonably related to the race discrimination claim in the DFEH charge].)

Turning to the complaint, Plaintiff alleges: “[w]ithin the time provided by law, Plaintiff filed a complaint with the California Civil Rights Department, in full compliance with the California Fair Employment and Housing Act, and received a ‘right-to-sue’ letter.” (Compl., ¶ 30.) Construing this allegation (and the additional allegations in the complaint) broadly, as the Court must in the context of a demurrer, the Court determines that Plaintiff’s allegations are sufficient to satisfy, for pleading purposes, that Plaintiff has exhausted the necessary administrative remedies.

Indeed, as the Court of Appeal stated, an allegation that the plaintiff “timely filed a complaint with the Department” is sufficient to plead exhaustion. (Williams v. Housing Authority of Los Angeles (2004) 121 Cal.App.4th 708, 721 [“Williams alleged that he timely filed a complaint with the Department. This is sufficient to plead exhaustion.”] As such, Defendant’s demurrer on this ground is OVERRULED.

Uncertainty. Alternatively, Defendant contends that Plaintiff must make her claims more “certain” – Defendant argues that the FEHA allegations remain ambiguous as to specific claims, supporting facts, and timing of the prior FEHA Complaint, warranting an order requiring Plaintiff to plead specific ultimate facts and make more certain her alleged claims. (Mov. MPA, p. 9:2-11.)

Demurrers for uncertainty are disfavored and are only granted where the complaint is so muddled that the defendant cannot reasonably respond. The favored approach is to clarify theories in the complaint through discovery. (See Khoury v. Maly’s of California, Inc. (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 612, 616.) “A demurrer for uncertainty is strictly construed, even where a complaint is in some respects uncertain, because ambiguities can be clarified under modern discovery procedures.” (Ibid.) Generally, a demurrer for uncertainty will be sustained “only if the pleading is so incomprehensible that a defendant cannot reasonably respond.” (Lickiss v. Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (2012) 208 Cal.App.4th 1125, 1135.) The Court determines that Plaintiff’s allegations are not so uncertain that Defendant cannot frame a response. The demurrer on the ground of uncertainty is OVERRULED.

Disposition

In sum, Defendant’s demurrer is OVERRULED in its entirety as set forth herein.

If not already done, Defendant shall file and serve an answer to the complaint no later than

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

25CV006421: LINDBLOOM vs PEACH TREE HEALTHCARE, et al. 01/05/2026 Hearing on Demurrer in Department 25

January 15, 2026.

In light of the Court’s ruling, Defendant’s request for sanctions is DENIED.

Plaintiff’s request for judicial notice of the verified complaint if GRANTED for the limited purposes appropriate for judicial notice.

Defendant’s evidentiary objections are OVERRULED. Each of Defendant’s evidentiary objections appear to regard factual allegations in the complaint. (See, e.g., Objection No. 1 [stating, “Peach Tree objects to allegations cloaked as facts in the Opposition page 1:23-27 as supported by the filed Complaint paras 6-29.” Emphasis added.].) However, as stated above, in the context of a demurrer, the Court treats the demurrer as admitting all material facts properly pleaded.

This minute order is effective immediately. No formal order or other notice is required. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1019.5; Cal. Rules Court, rule 3.1312.)