SIMMS vs BMO BANK N.A., A CORPORATION, et al.

26CV001615: SIMMS vs BMO BANK N.A., A CORPORATION, et al. 07/16/2026 Hearing on Demurrer to Complaint in Department 16D

A Stipulation and Appointment of Official Reporter Pro Tempore (CV/E-206) is required to be signed by each party, the private court reporter, and the Judge prior to the hearing, if not using a reporter from the Court’s Approved Official Reporter Pro Tempore list.

Once the form is signed it must be filed with the clerk. If a litigant has been granted a fee waiver and requests a court reporter, the party must submit a Request for Court Reporter by a Party with a Fee Waiver (CV/E-211) and it must be filed with the clerk at least 10 days prior to the hearing or at the time the proceeding is scheduled if less than 10 days away. Once approved, the clerk will forward the form to the Court Reporter’s Office and an official reporter will be provided.

*** NOTICE: EFFECTIVE APRIL 13, 2026, THIS DEPARTMENT HAS MOVED TO THE TANI G. CANTIL-SAKAUYE COURTHOUSE LOCATED AT 500 G. ST. SACRAMENTO, CA. ALL MOTIONS NOTICED FOR DEPARTMENT 53 WILL BE HEARD IN DEPARTMENT 16D OF THE NEW COURTHOUSE. ALL PAPERS FOR THIS DEPARTMENT MUST BE FILED AT THIS NEW LOCATION AND WILL NOT BE ACCEPTED AT THE HALL OF JUSTICE. ALL HEARINGS WILL TAKE PLACE AT THIS NEW LOCATION. PARTIES MAY CONTINUE TO APPEAR REMOTELY IN DEPARTMENT 16D UNLESS SPECIFICALLY ORDERED OTHERWISE. ***

TENTATIVE RULING:

Defendants BMO Bank, N.A. and Jake Grillo’s demurrer to Plaintiff Shawana Simms’ complaint is ruled upon as follows.

In this action, Plaintiff alleges causes of action against Defendants for defamation, retaliation in violation of Labor Code § 1102.5, retaliation in violation of Labor Code § 6310(b), and wrongful termination in violation of public policy. Plaintiff alleges that she was terminated from her position as a Branch Manager on October 17, 2025 after Defendants accused her of lying and withholding information regarding an incident she reported.

Defendants demur to the first cause of action for defamation.

A demurrer “tests the pleadings alone and not the evidence or other extrinsic matters.” (SKF Farms v. Superior Court (1984) 153 Cal.App.3d 902, 905.) The purpose of a demurrer is to test the legal sufficiency of a claim. (Donabedian v. Mercury Ins. Co. (2004) 116 Cal. App. 4th 968,

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

26CV001615: SIMMS vs BMO BANK N.A., A CORPORATION, et al. 07/16/2026 Hearing on Demurrer to Complaint in Department 16D

994.) For the purpose of determining the effect of a complaint, its allegations are liberally construed, with a view toward substantial justice. (CCP § 452; Amarel v. Connell (1988) 202 Cal.App.3d 137, 140-141; Quelimane Co. v. Stewart Title Guaranty Co. (1998) 19 Cal.4th 26, 43, fn. 7.) The Court treats the demurrer as admitting all material facts properly pleaded, but not contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or law, and considers matters which may be judicially noticed. (Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d at 318; Poseidon Development, Inc. v.

Woodland Lane Estates, LLC (2007) 152 Cal.App.4th 1106, 1111-1112.) A general demurrer does not admit contentions, deductions, or conclusions of fact or law alleged in the complaint; facts impossible in law; or allegations contrary to facts of which a court may take judicial notice. (Blank, supra, 39 Cal. 3d at 318, William S. Hart Union High School Dist. v. Regional Planning Com. (1991) 226 Cal. App. 3d 1612, 1616 fn.2.) Extrinsic evidence may not properly be considered on demurrer or on a motion to strike. (Ion Equipment Corp. v.

Nelson (1980) 110 Cal. App. 3d 868, 881; Hibernia Savings & Loan Soc. v. Thornton (1897) 117 Cal. 481, 482.)

A demurrer may be sustained only if the complaint lacks any sufficient allegations to entitle the plaintiff to relief. (Financial Corp. of America v. Wilburn (1987) 189 Cal. App. 3d 764, 778.) “Plaintiff need only plead facts showing that he may be entitled to some relief . . ., we are not concerned with plaintiff's possible inability or difficulty in proving the allegations of the complaint.” (Highlanders, Inc. v. Olsan (1978) 77 Cal. App. 3d 690, 696-697.) “[Courts] are required to construe the complaint liberally to determine whether a cause of action has been stated, given the assumed truth of the facts pleaded.” (Picton v.

Anderson Union High School Dist. (1996) 50 Cal. App. 4th 726.) A demurrer admits the truth of all material facts properly pled and the sole issue raised by a general demurrer is whether the facts pled state a valid cause of action - not whether they are true. (Serrano v. Priest (1971) 5 Cal. 3d 584, 591.)

First Cause of Action (Defamation)

“‘The elements of a defamation claim are (1) publication that is (2) false, (3) defamatory, (4) unprivileged, and (5) has a natural tendency to injure or causes special damages.’ [Citations.]” (John Doe 2 v. Superior Court (2016) 1 Cal.App.5th 1300, 1312; Shively v. Bozanich (2003) 31 Cal.4th 1230, 1247.) “Publication means communication to some third person who understands the defamatory meaning of the statement and its application to the person to whom reference is made.” (Smith v. Maldonado (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 637, 645.) “‘The general rule is that the words constituting an alleged libel must be specifically identified, if not pleaded verbatim, in the complaint.’ [Citations.]” (Medical Marijuana, Inc. v.

ProjectCBD.com (2020) 46 Cal.App.5th 869, 888, citing Kahn v. Bower (1991) 232 Cal.App.3d 1599, 1612, fn. 5.) The California Supreme Court has held that a cause of action for defamation is not defective “for failure to state

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

26CV001615: SIMMS vs BMO BANK N.A., A CORPORATION, et al. 07/16/2026 Hearing on Demurrer to Complaint in Department 16D

the exact words of the alleged slander” and that “slander can be charged by alleging the substance of the defamatory statement.” (Okun v. Superior Court (1981) 29 Cal. 3d 442, 458.)

Defendants argue that Plaintiff has failed to allege any defamatory statements with the requisite specificity. Defendants assert that Plaintiff has only alleged in vague terms that they published defamatory statement to third persons. They contend that the only fact alleged is that Defendants informed her that she was terminated on October 17, 2025.

Defendants, however, do not directly address the actual allegations of the defamation cause of action when making the above arguments. Indeed, Plaintiff alleged that Defendants published statements that Plaintiff was dishonest, failed to be truthful during an investigation, and violated company policy. (Comp. ¶¶ 25, 28.) Plaintiff alleges that Defendants published these statements to other employees and to the community. (Id.) Plaintiff has alleged the statements were made in October 2025. The Court finds that Plaintiff has adequately alleged the substance of the defamatory statements. In essence, Plaintiff has alleged that Defendants made false statements about her work performance and character. Statements that an employee lied during an investigation and violated company policy are provably false assertions.

While Defendants cite to Hearn v. Pacific Gas & Electric Co. (2025) 108 Cal.App.5th 301, 315 to argue that a defamation claim a “former employee may not recast their wrongful termination claim as one for defamation by simply pointing to their termination”, that case does not assist them. (Opp. 6:23-24.) Plaintiff is not simply pointing to her termination as a basis for her defamation claim. Indeed, Plaintiff has alleged that Defendants made statements to employees and third parties in the community which caused her reputational harm. Moreover, Hearn did not involve a pleading challenge and is also currently under review by the California Supreme Court. (Hearn v. Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. (2025) 332 Cal. Rptr. 3d 306, 307 [stating that pending review Hearn may be cited for persuasive value or to establish a conflict in authority].)

Defendants also appear to argue that the cause of action is deficient because Plaintiff does not identify any specific person to whom the statements were published. However, Plaintiff alleged that the statements were published to other employees and third parties in the community and Defendants cite no authority requiring any further level of specificity. Rather, Defendants’ cited authority, Medical Marijuana, Inc., supra, 46 Cal.App.5th at 884 simply states that “[p]ublication occurs when a defamatory statement is made to at least one third person.” Defendants cite no authority requiring that a plaintiff to allege at the pleading stage the specific person(s) to whom the statements were made.

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

26CV001615: SIMMS vs BMO BANK N.A., A CORPORATION, et al. 07/16/2026 Hearing on Demurrer to Complaint in Department 16D

The Court rejects Defendants’ attempt to argue for the first time in reply that Plaintiff did not allege malice or that the statements are subject to the common interest privilege available to employers. Arguments raised for the first time in a reply brief are not considered by the court. (St. Mary v. Superior Court (2014) 223 Cal.App.4th 762, 783; Campos v. Anderson (1997) 57 Cal.App.4th 784, 794, fn. 3.) Defendants failed to make any argument in their opening memorandum regarding the common interest privilege, or the allegations of malice required to overcome that privilege, and the Court will not consider those arguments raised in reply.

In any event, even if the Court considered Defendants’ new argument, it would be rejected. As seen from Defendants’ own authority, “[t]he malice necessary to defeat a qualified privilege is ‘actual malice’ which is established by a showing that the publication was motivated by hatred or ill will towards the plaintiff or by a showing that the defendant lacked reasonable ground for belief in the truth of the publication and therefore acted in reckless disregard of the plaintiff's rights.” (Taus v.

Loftus (2007) 40 Cal.4th 683, 722.) Here, Plaintiff alleged that the statements were made with “hatred and ill will” towards Plaintiff and that Defendants had “no reasonable basis to believe these statements, but they also had no belief in the truth of these statements, and in fact knew the statements to be false.” (Comp. ¶¶ 33, 34.) Plaintiff’s allegations are sufficient.

Defendants’ demurrer is overruled.

The Court did not consider Defendants’ discussion regarding how “the evidence” will disprove Plaintiff’s allegations. All of Plaintiff’s allegation are assumed to be true for the purposes of the demurrer and extrinsic evidence is not permitted on a demurrer. (Ion Equipment Corp., supra, 110 Cal. App. 3d at 881.)

No later than July 30, 2026, Defendants shall file and serve their answer to the complaint.

This minute order is effective immediately. No formal order pursuant to CRC Rule 3.1312 or other notice is required.