STEPHENS v. LAUB LAW PLCC, ET AL.
Case Information
Motion(s)
Defendant Morgenstern’s Demurrer; Defendant Morgenstern’s Motion to Strike
Motion Type Tags
Demurrer · Motion to Strike
Parties
- Plaintiff: Jon C. Stephens
- Defendant: Jordan Morgenstern
- Defendant: Joey Max Laub
- Defendant: Lori London
Ruling
LAW AND MOTION CALENDAR MAY 1, 2026
3. STEPHENS v. LAUB LAW PLCC, ET AL., 25CV1050
(A) Defendant Morgenstern’s Demurrer
(B) Defendant Morgenstern’s Motion to Strike
Defendant Morgenstern’s Demurrer
Pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 430.10, subdivisions (a), (e), and (f),
defendant Jordan Morgenstern (“demurring-defendant”) generally demurs to the entire
third amended complaint (“TAC”) filed by plaintiff Jon C. Stephens (“plaintiff”) on
November 3, 2025, and specially demurs to the first, second, and fourth causes of action
alleged therein on the grounds that each of these causes of action is barred by the
applicable statute of limitations and is uncertain.
Defense counsel declares she met and conferred with plaintiff on
November 26, 2025, and again on December 18, 2025. (Cullinane-Smith Decl., ¶¶ 6, 10
& Exs. 5, 9.)
On February 20, 2026, plaintiff filed a single opposition to demurring-defendant’s
demurrer, as well as the motion to strike that defendant concurrently filed with the
demurrer.
Demurring-defendant filed no reply.
The hearing on this matter was continued from March 13, 2026, based upon a
stipulation of the parties filed March 10, 2026.
1.
Background
In May 2022, Reliance Standard Life Insurance Company (“RSLI”) suspended
plaintiff’s long-term disability benefits pending receipt of updated medical certification.
(TAC, ¶ 16.) In August 2022, plaintiff retained defendant Laub and Laub to represent
plaintiff concerning a spousal support modification and the disability benefits issue.
(TAC, ¶ 17.) In October 2022, having received no response on behalf of plaintiff, RSLI
suspended plaintiff’s benefits claim. (TAC, ¶ 19.)
LAW AND MOTION CALENDAR MAY 1, 2026
On April 5, 2023, demurring-defendant specially-appeared for defendant Joey Max
Laub (managing partner of Laub & Laub) on behalf of plaintiff for a readiness conference
in plaintiff’s family law case. (TAC, ¶¶ 11, 22.) During this hearing, the court suggested
that defendant Lori London act as judge pro tem for an upcoming settlement
conference. (TAC, ¶ 23.) However, defendant London had previously represented
plaintiff’s ex-wife. (TAC, ¶ 23.) Plaintiff immediately objected. (TAC, ¶ 23.) Demurring-
defendant advised plaintiff to “just agree,” assuring him that any settlement conference
proceedings before defendant London would be non-binding. (TAC, ¶ 24.) Plaintiff
reluctantly consented on the record but later informed demurring-defendant he would
not sign a written waiver. (TAC, ¶ 25.)
Nevertheless, on May 23, 2023, defendant London presided over the settlement
conference. (TAC, ¶ 26.) Plaintiff alleges he suffered harm.
2. Request for Judicial Notice
Pursuant to Evidence Code section 452, subdivision (d), the court grants demurring-
defendant’s unopposed2 request for judicial notice of (1) the reporter’s transcript in the matter of Stephens v. Stephens (El Dorado Super. Ct., Case No. SFL20110189) dated
April 5, 2023; and (2) the court docket for Stephens v. Stephens.
3. Legal Principles
“[A] demurrer challenges only the legal sufficiency of the complaint, not the truth or
the accuracy of its factual allegations or the plaintiff’s ability to prove those allegations.”
(Amarel v. Connell (1998) 202 Cal.App.3d 137, 140.) A demurrer is directed at the face of
the complaint and to matters subject to judicial notice. (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.30,
subd. (a).) All properly pleaded allegations of fact in the complaint are accepted as true,
however improbable they may be, but not the contentions, deductions or conclusions of
2 Plaintiff does not oppose the request for judicial notice; however, he claims
demurring-defendant misidentified the case number and date of the transcript. (Opp. at 3:22–26.) Plaintiff asks the court to use the correct information. The court will use the case number and date reflected on the judicially-noticed transcript.
LAW AND MOTION CALENDAR MAY 1, 2026
facts or law. (Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318; Del E. Webb Corp. v. Structural
Materials Co. (1981) 123 Cal.App.3d 593, 604.) A judge gives “the complaint a
reasonable interpretation, reading it as a whole and its parts in their context.” (Blank,
supra, 39 Cal.3d at p. 318.)
4. Discussion
“An action against an attorney for a wrongful act or omission, other than for actual
fraud, arising in the performance of professional services shall be commenced within
one year after the plaintiff discovers, or through the use of reasonable diligence should
have discovered, the facts constituting the wrongful act or omission, or four years from
the date of the wrongful act or omission, whichever occurs first.” (Code Civ. Proc.,
§ 340.6, subd. (a).) “It is well settled that the one-year limitations period of [Code of Civil
Procedure] section 340.6 ‘ “is triggered by the client’s discovery of ‘the facts constituting
the wrongful act or omission,’ not by his discovery that such facts constitute
professional negligence, i.e., by discovery that a particular legal theory is applicable
based on the known facts.” (Peregrine Funding, Inc. v. Sheppard Mullin Richter &
Hampton LLP (2005) 133 Cal.App.4th 658, 685.)
Here, as demurring-defendant argues, the one-year statute of limitations under
Code of Civil Procedure section 340.6, subdivision (a) applies to all three causes of action
alleged against demurring-defendant: professional negligence, IIED, and breach of
fiduciary. (See Stoll v. Superior Court (9 Cal.App.4th 1362, 1366–1369.) That is because
for each of these causes of action, the TAC alleges that demurring-defendant advised
plaintiff to waive a conflict of interest, concealed conflicts, and/or compelled plaintiff to
appear before his “former adversary” acting as judge pro tem. (TAC, ¶¶ 37, 42.)
Therefore, each cause of action arises from demurring-defendant’s performance of
professional legal services.
Based on the allegations in the TAC, plaintiff knew demurring-defendant advised him
to waive the conflict of interest – the alleged conflict being that defendant London, who
LAW AND MOTION CALENDAR MAY 1, 2026
previously represented plaintiff’s ex-wife, was the proposed judge pro tem for an
upcoming settlement conference – during the readiness conference on April 5, 2023.
April 5, 2023, is the only date upon which the TAC alleges demurring-defendant to have
acted. (TAC, ¶¶ 14, 22.)
Therefore, the one-year statute of limitations ran on April 4, 2024. Plaintiff did not
file his original complaint until April 21, 2025.
Plaintiff argues that he did not reasonably discover that “appreciable harm”
occurred until his disability benefits were reinstated in May 2024. (Opp. at 6:24–7:1,
7:8–10.) However, the court rejects this argument. The alleged fact constituting
demurring-defendant’s wrongdoing was that demurring-defendant advised plaintiff to
waive the conflict of interest. The TAC clearly alleges this occurred on April 5, 2023.
Additionally, plaintiff argues that additional wrongdoing occurred in May 2023 and
May 2024. However, there are no allegations in the TAC alleging that demurring-
defendant committed any wrongdoing in May 2023 or May 2024.
Because each cause of action alleged against demurring-defendant is time-barred,
the demurrer is sustained. Because plaintiff has had a previous opportunity to amend,
and it does not appear reasonably likely that plaintiff can further amend the pleading to
cure the statute of limitations defect (it is the court’s understanding that demurring-
defendant’s involvement in this case was limited to the April 5, 2023, readiness
conference), the court denies further leave to amend.
Defendant Morgenstern’s Motion to Strike
Having sustained the demurrer without leave to amend, the motion to strike is
denied as moot.
TENTATIVE RULING # 3: THE DEMURRER IS SUSTAINED WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND. THE MOTION TO STRIKE IS DENIED AS MOOT. NO HEARING ON THIS MATTER WILL BE
HELD (LEWIS v. SUPERIOR COURT (1999) 19 CAL.4TH 1232, 1247), UNLESS A NOTICE OF
LAW AND MOTION CALENDAR MAY 1, 2026
INTENT TO APPEAR AND REQUEST FOR ORAL ARGUMENT IS TRANSMITTED
ELECTRONICALLY THROUGH THE COURT’S WEBSITE OR BY TELEPHONE TO THE COURT
AT (530) 573-3042 BY 4:00 P.M. ON THE DAY THE TENTATIVE RULING IS ISSUED.
NOTICE TO ALL PARTIES OF AN INTENT TO APPEAR MUST BE MADE BY TELEPHONE OR
IN PERSON. PROOF OF SERVICE OF SAID NOTICE MUST BE FILED PRIOR TO OR AT THE
HEARING.