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25CV112071·alameda·Civil·Personal Injury
Hearing about 2 months agoDENIED

NEWELL, AN INDIVIDUAL vs OJEDA, AN INDIVIDUAL

Motion for Leave to Intervene

Hearing date
Jun 30, 2026
Department
16
Prevailing
Opposing Party

Motion type

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Causes of action

Parties

PlaintiffLeroy Newell
DefendantDio Niso Ojeda
OtherBenchmark Insurance

Ruling

25CV112071: NEWELL, AN INDIVIDUAL vs OJEDA, AN INDIVIDUAL 06/30/2026 Hearing on Motion for Leave to Intervene filed by Benchmark Insurance (Non- Party) + CRS# 705472069349 in Department 16

Tentative Ruling - 06/29/2026 Victoria Kolakowski

Benchmark Insurance’s Motion for Leave to Intervene is denied.

I.

Background

In February 2025, Plaintiff Leroy Newell filed a Complaint against Defendant Dio Niso Ojeda arising from an accident on Interstate 580 in April 2023. (Compl. Attach. GN-1, Feb. 25, 2025.)

In June 2025, Ojeda’s insurance carrier (Progressive West Insurance Company) agreed to settle the action. (Opp’n at Salazar Decl. ¶ 4, Apr. 16, 2026.) The following month, Newell’s counsel spoke with a claims supervisor at Benchmark about the pending settlement. (Id. ¶ 5.) Shortly after that call, Progressive issued a check payable to Newell and Benchmark, among others, as a “full and final settlement of all bodily injury claims.” (Id. Ex. 3 (capitalization removed); see also id. Ex. 2 (providing copy of check).)

In August 2025, Newell notified the Court of the unconditional settlement. (Notice Settlement, Aug. 5, 2025.) A few days later, the Court set an order to show cause re dismissal for the following month. (See Notice Hr’g, Aug. 8, 2025.)

In November 2025, Benchmark moved to file a complaint-in-intervention against Ojeda. (Mot., Nov. 25, 2025.) Benchmark partly argued that it had a direct interest in this action because it has paid Newell’s workers’ compensation benefits arising from the accident. (Mem. Supp. Mot. 1:25–2:5, Nov. 25, 2025; see also Matthews Decl. Supp. Mot. ¶ 4, Nov. 25, 2025.)

Newell opposed the Motion. (Opp’n.) Newell argued that Benchmark’s Motion was untimely as it had known of the existence of this action and the pending settlement as early as mid-July 2025 but failed to act before Newell filed the notice of settlement. (Id. 7:25–8:24.) Newell further argued that this four-month delay was unreasonable in the circumstances and that permitting intervention after the settlement was finalized would be prejudicial. (Id. 9:2–14:10.)

II.

Legal Standard

A court may permit a nonparty to intervene “upon timely application” where they have “an interest in the matter in litigation, or in the success of either of the parties, or an interest against both).” (Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 387(d)(2).) “If proper procedures are followed, the court has discretion to permit a nonparty to intervene in litigation pending between others, provided: [¶] The nonparty has a direct and immediate interest in the litigation; and [¶] The intervention will not enlarge the issues in the case; and [¶] The reasons for intervention outweigh any opposition by the existing parties.” (Truck Ins.

Exch. v. Super. Ct. (Transco Syndicate No. 1) (1997) 60 Cal. App. 4th 342, 346) (quoting Weil & Brown, Cal. Prac. Guide: Civ. Proc. Before Trial § 2:414 25CV112071: NEWELL, AN INDIVIDUAL vs OJEDA, AN INDIVIDUAL 06/30/2026 Hearing on Motion for Leave to Intervene filed by Benchmark Insurance (Non- Party) + CRS# 705472069349 in Department 16 (Rutter Grp. 1996).)

“Timeliness is determined by the totality of the circumstances facing would-be intervenors, with a focus on three primary factors: ‘(1) the stage of the proceeding at which an applicant seeks to intervene; (2) the prejudice to other parties; and (3) the reason for the delay.’” (Crestwood Behav. Health, Inc. v. Lacy (2021) 70 Cal. App. 5th 560, 574 (quoting Smith v. L.A. Unified Sch. Dist. (9th Cir. 2016) 830 F.3d 843, 854).) “Although the totality of the circumstances should be considered, ‘prejudice to existing parties is ‘the most important consideration in deciding whether a motion for intervention is timely.’” (Id. (quoting Smith, 830 F.3d at 857).)

III.

Discussion

At the threshold, the Court must address whether Benchmark’s Motion is timely where the entire action had settled and only an order to show cause re dismissal remained calendared.

The Labor Code provides that “an employer who pays, or becomes obligated to pay compensation, or who pays, or becomes obligated to pay salary in lieu of compensation, or who pays or becomes obligated to pay an amount to the Department of Industrial Relations pursuant to Section 4706.5, may likewise make a claim or bring an action against the third person.” (Cal. Lab. Code § 3852(a).) If the employee filed an action, the employer may join as a plaintiff “at any time before trial on the facts.” (§ 3853.)

The Court finds that permissive intervention is improper given the late stage of this proceeding, the prejudice that reopening this proceeding would have on Newell, and because Benchmark provided no explanation for its four-month delay. This action is unlike Mar v. Sakti International Corporation, where the parties had settled, the nonparty sought leave to intervene the day after it learned of the settlement, and a trial remained scheduled on another party’s complaint. ((1992) 9 Cal. App. 4th 1780, 1782–1785.)

Here, by contrast, Benchmark inexplicably waited about four months to seek leave to intervene after it learned of the settlement and there is no trial on the facts scheduled in this action. Accordingly, intervention is improper. (See also Aetna Cas. & Surety Co. v. Super. Ct. (1993) 20 Cal. App. 4th 1502, 1509 (finding no error in denying leave to intervene where the insurance company had been on notice of the case and made no effort to intervene for months even after it was notified that a settlement was imminent).)

IV. Order The Motion is denied.

***

The Motion for Leave to Intervene filed by Benchmark Insurance, Benchmark Insurance on 11/25/2025 is Denied.

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF ALAMEDA

25CV112071: NEWELL, AN INDIVIDUAL vs OJEDA, AN INDIVIDUAL 06/30/2026 Hearing on Motion for Leave to Intervene filed by Benchmark Insurance (Non- Party) + CRS# 705472069349 in Department 16

The Court orders counsel to obtain a copy of this order from the eCourt portal.

If a party does not timely contest the foregoing Tentative Ruling and appear at the hearing, the Tentative Ruling will become the order of the court.

How Do I Contest a Tentative Ruling? Find your case in eCourt at https://eportal.alameda.courts.ca.gov/ using “Case Search” or “Calendar Search” (after you log in) Select the Tentative Rulings Tab Select "Click to Contest this Ruling" Enter your name and briefly identify the issues you wish to argue. Select "Proceed"

You must also notify the department via email (Dept16@alameda.courts.ca.gov) and opposing parties by no later than 4:00 PM, one court day before the scheduled hearing.

Please provide this information to any opposing parties.

PLEASE TAKE NOTICE THAT THE HEARING/CONFERENCE WILL BE IN- PERSON WITH THE OPTION TO APPEAR REMOTELY.

COUNSEL AND PARTIES MAY APPEAR EITHER IN-PERSON IN DEPARTMENT 16 AT THE ADMINISTRATION BUILDING OR BY REMOTELY THROUGH THE ZOOM PLATFORM. ZOOM LOG-IN INFORMATION FOR DEPARTMENT 16 IS BELOW.

Join ZoomGov Meeting https://alameda-courts-ca-gov.zoomgov.com/j/16024053017 Meeting ID: 160 2405 3017

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