Martin vs. FCA US LLC

Leave to Amend

Plaintiff requests leave to amend to add a claim for negligence.

In ruling on a motion to strike, the court employs the same liberality to amend as used for demurrers. It is an abuse of discretion to deny leave to amend if there is any reasonable possibility the plaintiff can cure the defect. (See Grieves v. Superior Court (1984) 157 Cal.App.3d 159, 168; Price v. Dames & Moore (2001) 92 Cal.App.4th 355, 360.)

Plaintiff here proposes amending the complaint to add a negligence claim. Because a negligence claim may support punitive damages (see, e.g., Taylor v. Superior Court (1979) 24 Cal.3d 890), the court finds it appropriate to grant Plaintiff leave to amend to add the proposed negligence claim.

Should Plaintiff desire to file an amended complaint that addresses the issues in this ruling, Plaintiff shall file and serve the amended complaint within 30 days of service of the notice of ruling.

Moving Defendant to give notice.

2 Martin vs. FCA TENTATIVE RULING: US LLC For the reasons set forth below, Defendant FCA US, LLC’s Demurer to Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint is OVERRULED as to the 1st through 6th Causes of Action.

Defendants FCA US, LLC shall file an answer or other pleading in response to the First Amended Complaint for Violation of Statutory Obligations within 30 days of service of the notice of ruling. (See Cal. Rules of Court rule 3.1320(j).)

Legal Standard on Demurrer

A demurrer presents an issue of law regarding the sufficiency of the allegations set forth in the complaint. (Lambert v. Carneghi (2008) 158 Cal.App.4th 1120, 1126.) The challenge is limited to the “four corners” of the pleading (which includes exhibits attached and incorporated therein) or from matters outside the pleading which are judicially noticeable under Evidence Code §§ 451 or 452. Although California courts take a liberal view of inartfully drawn complaints, it remains essential that a complaint set forth the actionable facts relied upon with sufficient precision to inform the defendant of what

plaintiff is complaining, and what remedies are being sought. (Leek v. Cooper (2011) 194 Cal.App.4th 399, 413.)

On demurrer, a complaint must be liberally construed. (Code Civ. Proc., § 452; Stevens v. Superior Court (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 594, 601.) All material facts properly pleaded, and reasonable inferences, must be accepted as true. (Aubry v. Tri-City Hospital Dist. (1992) 2 Cal.4th 962, 966-67.)

A pleading is adequate if it contains a reasonably precise statement of the ultimate facts, in ordinary and concise language, and with sufficient detail to acquaint a defendant with the nature, source and extent of the claim. The degree of detail required depends on the extent to which the defendant in fairness needs such detail, which can be conveniently provided by the plaintiff. Less particularity is required when the defendant ought to have co-extensive or superior knowledge of the facts. Under normal circumstances, there is no need for specificity in pleading evidentiary facts.

However, bare conclusions of law are insufficient. (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 425.10(a), 459; Doe v. City of Los Angeles (2007) 42 Cal.4th 531, 549-50; Zelig v. County of Los Angeles (2002) 27 Cal.4th 1112, 1126; Doheny Park Terrace HOA v. Truck Ins. Exchange (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 1076, 1098-99; Berger v. California Insurance Guarantee Assn (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 989, 1006.)

Civil Procedure Code Section 871.21(b)

Defendant first contends that the 1st through 3rd Causes of Action are barred by Civil Procedure Code section 871.21(b), which states that “an action covered by Section 871.20 shall not be brought later than six years after the date of original delivery of the motor vehicle.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 871.21, subd. (b).) Section 871.20, in turn, states that “this chapter applies to an action seeking restitution or replacement of a motor vehicle pursuant to subdivision (b) or (d) of Section 1793.2, Section 1793.22, or Section 1794 of the Civil Code, or for civil penalties pursuant to subdivision (c) of Section 1794 of the Civil Code, where the request for restitution or replacement is based on noncompliance with the applicable express warranty.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 871.20, subd. (a).)

Plaintiff contends that its 3rd Cause of Action is brought pursuant to Sections 1793.2(a), which is not mentioned in Section 871.20. Section 1794, however, is expressly included in Section 871.20. Section 1794 is the procedural vehicle by which warranty claims under Section 1791.1, 1792, 1793.2(a), and 1795.5 are brought. (See Civil Code § 1794 [Any buyer of consumer goods who is damaged by a failure to

comply with any obligation under this chapter or under an implied or express warranty or service contract may bring an action for the recovery of damages and other legal and equitable relief.”].) Thus, the 1st through 3rd Causes of Action are controlled by Sections 871.20 and 871.21(b).

However, in order for Sections 871.20 and 871.21(b) to apply, a manufacturer must “elect to be governed by this chapter.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 871.29, subd. (a)(1); see also Code Civ. Proc., § 871.30 [“Within 30 days of the effective date of the act adding this section, a manufacturer may elect to be governed by this chapter for all actions described in subdivision (a) of Section 871.20 with respect to all of its motor vehicles sold in the year 2025 and in all prior years by providing written notice of that election to the Arbitration Certification Program within the Department of Consumer Affairs.”].)

In this case, Defendants point to no allegations within the FAC showing that they have opted in. In addition, Defendants have not asked this court to take judicial notice of the fact that they have opted in. Thus, the court will overrule the demurrer on this basis. However, even if the Defendant had opted in, Section 871.21 would not bar the 1st through 3rd Causes of Action.

Here, the FAC alleges that Plaintiffs and Defendant entered into a warranty contract on December 1, 2018. (See FAC, ¶ 7). It can be reasonably inferred from this allegation that the subject vehicle was delivered on that date and Plaintiff does not argue to the contrary. Therefore, under Section 871.21(b), this action had to be filed within six years of delivery or no later than December 1, 2024.

However, Section 871.21 did not become effective until January 1, 2025. (See Stats. 2024, c. 938 (A.B.1755), § 1.) Thus, when it became effective, Section 871.21, if applied retroactively, would bar the 1st through 3rd Causes of Action as of December 1, 2024.

Section 871.21 is a statute of repose and neither Plaintiff nor Defendant cited to any cases involving the retroactive application of statutes of repose, nor is the court aware of any.

However, in the context of statutes of limitations, the Court of Appeal has held that “retrospective application of a shortened limitations period is permissible provided the party has a reasonable time to avail himself of his remedy before the statute cuts off his right.” (Aronson v. Superior Court (1987) 191 Cal.App.3d 294, 297.)

This holding is “one of constitutional dimension” because: In California, statutes of limitations, being procedural, are normally retroactively applied to accrued causes of action; but the court must inquire whether, in a given case, that retrospective application may violate due process by in effect eliminating the plaintiff's right. If the time left to file suit is reasonable, no such constitutional violation occurs, and the statute is applied as enacted. If no time is left, or only an unreasonably short time remains, then the statute cannot be applied at all.” (Ibid.)

This rationale applies to statutes of repose even more than statutes of limitations because a statute of repose “does not cut off an existing right of action, but rather provides that nothing which happens thereafter can be a cause of action.” (Inco Development Corp. v. Superior Court (2005) 131 Cal. App. 4th 1014, 1020, italics original). Thus, a statute of repose does not “in effect” eliminate a right; it directly eliminates a right.

Other states apply a similar rule to the retroactive application of statutes of repose where the cause of action accrues before the date of the statute of repose. (See Mega v. Holy Cross Hosp. (1986) 111 Ill.2d 416, 422 [where cause of action accrues prior to effective date of statute of repose, plaintiffs are entitled to reasonable period of time following effective date in which to bring their actions]; Groch v. General Motors Corp. (2008) 117 Ohio St. 3d 192, 226 [where cause of action has accrued before effective date of statute of repose and statute of repose gives plaintiff unreasonably short period of time in which to file suit, application of statute of repose is unconstitutionally retroactive].)

One Central District decision on section 871.21 held: “["Applying that standard, Section 871.21 cannot be invoked here. Defendant's argument would necessarily involve a retroactive application of Section 871.21 because it would use a statute effective on January 1, 2025, to dismiss claims after June 2024. But Defendant does not point to any legislative history indicating that Section 871.21 was intended to apply retroactively." ((Galdamez v. FCA US LLC (C.D. Cal., Mar. 23, 2026, No. 2:25-CV-10618-HDV-MAR) 2026 WL 1047004, at *3).

Here, the FAC alleges a failure by Defendants to repair the subject vehicle under the warranty as early as October 22, 2019, and through to July 26, 2024, and beyond. (See FAC, ¶¶ 14-20.) Thus, Plaintiffs’ causes of action accrued before the effective date of Section 871.21. Further, the statute of repose provides no reasonable time period for Plaintiffs to bring their claims after its effective date. In other words, on January 1, 2025, the day it became effective, Section 871.21, if

applied retroactively, eliminated Plaintiff’s right to bring their 1st through 3rd Causes of Action. Such an application violates Plaintiffs Due Process rights. Nor was the failure to provide for a reasonable period of time harmless, as it eliminated Plaintiff’s claims before the statute was even effective.

Therefore, the court will overrule the demurrer on this basis.

Statute of Limitations

Defendant next asserts that the 4th and 6th Causes of Action are barred by the statute of limitations.

“A demurrer based on a statute of limitations will not lie where the action may be, but is not necessarily, barred. In order for the bar of the statute of limitations to be raised by demurrer, the defect must clearly and affirmatively appear on the face of the complaint; it is not enough that the complaint shows that the action may be barred.’” (Geneva Towers Ltd. Partnership v. City and County of San Francisco (2003) 29 Cal.4th 769, 781, quoting Marshall v. Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 1397, 1403, citations omitted.)

A. Fourth Cause of Action for Breach of Implied Warranty of Merchantability

FCA argues that Plaintiffs’ fourth cause of action fails because Plaintiff failed to file this claim within four years.

Implied warranty claims are subject to a four-year statute of limitations. Comm. Code, § 2725; Montoya v. Ford Motor Co. 46 Cal.App.5th 493, 495 (2020).

The implied warranty of merchantability, however, may be breached by a latent defect undiscoverable at the time of sale. (Mexia v. Rinker Boat Co., Inc. (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 1297, 1304). Indeed, “[u]ndisclosed latent defects ... are the very evil that the implied warranty of merchantability was designed to remedy.” (Id. at 1305). “In the case of a latent defect, a product is rendered unmerchantable, and the warranty of merchantability is breached, by the existence of the unseen defect, not by its subsequent discovery.” (Id.) “Thus, although a defect may not be discovered for months or years after a sale, merchantability is evaluated as if the defect were known.” (Id.)

Here, the court finds that Plaintiffs have adequately alleged that latent defects that breached the implied warranty of merchantability existed

at the time of the purchase—even if discoverable later. Plaintiffs allege:

• “Plaintiff purchased the Subject Vehicle as manufactured with FCA’s defective engine.” (FAC, ¶ 29).

• “Plaintiff is informed, believes, and thereon alleges that FCA knew since prior to Plaintiffs purchasing the Subject Vehicle, that the 2019 Ram 1500 vehicles equipped with the 5.7L engine have one or more defects that can result loss of power, stalling, engine running rough, engine misfires, failure or replacement of the engine (the “Engine Defect”).” (FAC, ¶ 30).

• “Plaintiff is informed, believes, and thereon alleges that prior to Plaintiff acquiring the Vehicle, FCA was well aware and knew that the Vehicle was defective but failed to disclose this fact to Plaintiffs at the time of sale and thereafter.” (FAC, ¶ 32).

• “The subject vehicle was sold with one or more latent defect(s) set forth above. The existence of the said latent defect(s) constitutes a breach of the implied warranty because the Vehicle (1) does not pass without objection in the trade under the contract description, (2) is not fit for the ordinary purposes for which such goods are used, (3) is not adequately contained, packaged, and labelled, and (4) does not conform to the promises or affirmations of fact made on the container or label.” (FAC, ¶ 86).

These allegations, therefore, allege that the defects existed at the time of the sale. Plaintiff, therefore, sufficiently alleged a latent defect existed within the time period of the implied warranty of merchantability. Plaintiff alleges that he took the vehicle in for repair between October 22, 2019, and July 26, 2024. (FAC, ¶ 14-19). Plaintiff also alleges “Plaintiff discovered Defendants' wrongful conduct alleged herein shortly before the filing of the complaint, as the Vehicle continued to exhibit symptoms of defects following FCA's unsuccessful attempts to repair them.” (FAC, ¶ 52).

Viewing Plaintiff’s allegations in a manner that is most favorable to Plaintiff, Plaintiff appears to allege that, as of July 26, 2024, the defects for which Plaintiff presented the vehicle could not have been repaired and, therefore, Plaintiff could not have discovered the latent defect until July 26, 2024. Assuming that a jury finds that Plaintiff’s conduct between October 22, 2019, and July 26, 2024, was reasonably diligent, then the same factfinder could also reasonably find that Plaintiff’s cause of action began to accrue on July 26, 2024, when Plaintiff

discovered the defect. Plaintiff’s filing the complaint on May 29, 2025, less than one year later, therefore, would meet the applicable statute of limitations.

The demurrer is, therefore, overruled as to the fourth cause of action for breach of the implied warranty of merchantability.

B. Sixth Cause of Action for Fraud

The limitations period for a fraud cause of action is three years. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 338, subd. (d).)

“The cause of action in that case is not deemed to have accrued until the discovery, by the aggrieved party, of the facts constituting the fraud or mistake.” (Ibid.) This means that “the statute of limitations begins to run when the plaintiff suspects or should suspect that her injury was caused by wrongdoing, that someone has done something wrong to her.” (Jolly v. Eli Lilly & Co. (1988) 44 Cal.3d 1103, 1110.)

When “[the] complaint shows on its face that [plaintiff’s] claim would be barred without the benefit of the discovery rule, [the plaintiff] must specifically plead facts to show (1) the time and manner of discovery and (2) the inability to have made earlier discovery despite reasonable diligence. . . . [C]onclusory allegations will not withstand demurrer.” (Fox v. Ethicon Endo-Surgery, Inc. (2005) 35 Cal.4th 797, 808.) Similarly, “[w]hen a plaintiff relies on a theory of fraudulent concealment, delayed accrual, equitable tolling, or estoppel to save a cause of action that otherwise appears on its face to be time-barred, he or she must specifically plead facts which, if proved, would support the theory.” (Mills v. Forestex Co. (2003) 108 Cal.App.4th 625, 641.)

”[A]s to accrual, ‘once properly pleaded, belated discovery is a question of fact.’” (E-Fab, Inc. v. Accountants, Inc. Services (2007) 153 Cal.App.4th 1308, 1320, quoting Bastian v. County of San Luis Obispo (1988) 199 Cal.App.3d 520, 527.) “However, whenever reasonable minds can draw only one conclusion from the evidence, the question becomes one of law.” (Snow v. A.H. Robins Co. (1985) 165 Cal.App.3d 120, 128.)

Here, the FAC alleges that “Defendant FCA committed fraud by allowing the Subject Vehicle to be sold to Plaintiffs without disclosing that the Subject Vehicle equipped with the 5.7L engine was defective, and which may result in loss of power, stalling, engine running rough, engine misfires, failure or replacement of the engine. It can suddenly affect the driver's ability to control the vehicle or cause a non-collision

vehicle fire. Even more troubling, the Engine Defect can cause the vehicle to fail without warning while the Vehicle is moving at highway speeds.” (FAC, ¶ 91.)

The FAC details that the Plaintiffs brought the subject vehicle in for repair on several occasions. (FAC, ¶ 14-19).

However, the FAC asserts that “Plaintiff discovered Defendants' wrongful conduct alleged herein shortly before the filing of the complaint, as the Vehicle continued to exhibit symptoms of defects following FCA's unsuccessful attempts to repair them.” (FAC, ¶ 52).

The FAC also includes allegations regarding why Plaintiffs did not discover the fraud earlier:

• Making it even more difficult to discover that the Subject Vehicle suffered from a safety defect was Defendant’s issuance of various TSBs (see below) and Recalls purporting to be able to fix various symptoms of the defects. (FAC, ¶ 53.)

• Defendant (and its agents, representatives, officers, directors, employees, affiliates, and/or dealerships) concealed the defects, minimized the scope, cause, and dangers of the defects with inadequate TSBs and/or Recalls, and refused to investigate, address, and remedy the defects as it pertains to all affected vehicles as set forth herein. (FAC, ¶ 64.)

• Furthermore, Defendant’s fraudulent concealment was ongoing. Defendant blamed the symptoms of the defects on other issues and not the actual defect itself and purported to be able to repair. (FAC, ¶ 65.)

The FAC adequately pleads that, although the subject vehicle was purchased some time ago, the discovery of the fraud did not occur until recently and why Plaintiffs were unable to make the discovery sooner.

Therefore, the court will overrule the demurrer to the 6th Cause of Action on this basis.

Specificity in Pleading

Defendants contend that the 6th Cause of Action is not plead with the requisite particularity.

“’Every element of the cause of action for fraud must be alleged in the proper manner and the facts constituting the fraud must be alleged with

sufficient specificity to allow defendant to understand fully the nature of the charge made.’” (Stansfield v. Starkey (1990) 220 Cal.App.3d 59, 73, quoting Roberts v. Ball, Hunt, Hart, Brown & Baerwitz (1976) 57 Cal.App.3d 104, 109.) “This particularity requirement necessitates pleading facts which ‘show how, when, where, to whom, and by what means the representations were tendered.’” Stansfield v. Starkey, supra, 220 Cal.App.3d at p. 73, quoting Hills Trans. Co. v. Southwest (1968) 266 Cal.App.2d 702, 707.)

In addition, “[c]oncealment is a species of fraud, and ‘[] must be pleaded with specificity.’” (Blickman Turkus, LP v. MF Downtown Sunnyvale, LLC (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 858, 878, quoting Linear Technology Corp. v. Applied Materials, Inc., supra, 152 Cal.App.4th at p. 132.) However, “the requirement of specificity is relaxed when the allegations indicate that ‘the defendant must necessarily possess full information concerning the facts of the controversy’ or ‘when the facts lie more in the knowledge of the opposite party.’” (Tarmann v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. (1991) 2 Cal.App.4th 153, 158, quoting Bradley v. Harford Acc. & Indem. Co (1973) 30 Cal.App.3d 818, 825 and Turner v. Milstein (1951) 103 Cal.App.2d 651, 658.)

This also is true when the claim is based upon fraudulent concealment rather than affirmative misrepresentations. As one court has aptly observed, “it is harder to apply [the requirement of specificity] to a case of simple nondisclosure. ‘How does one show “how” and “by what means” something didn't happen, or “when” it never happened, or “where” it never happened?’” (Jones v. ConocoPhillips Co. (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 1187, 1199, quoting Alfaro v. Community Housing Improvement System & Planning Assn., Inc. (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 1356, 1384.)

In Dhital v. Nissan North America, Inc., the Court of Appeal stated:

Nissan also contends plaintiffs did not provide specifics about what Nissan should have disclosed. But plaintiffs alleged the CVT transmissions were defective in that they caused such problems as hesitation, shaking, jerking, and failure to function. The SAC also alleged Nissan was aware of the defects as a result of premarket testing and consumer complaints that were made both to NHTSA and to Nissan and its dealers. It is not clear what additional information Nissan believes should have been included. . . . We conclude plaintiffs’ fraud claim was adequately pleaded.

(Dhital v. Nissan North America, Inc., supra, 84 Cal.App.5th at p. 845.)

Similarly, the FAC in this case alleges that:

• “Plaintiff alleges that prior to the sale of the Subject Vehicle to Plaintiff, FCA knew that the Vehicle and its Engine suffered from an inherent defect, was defective, would fail prematurely, and was not suitable for its intended use.” (FAC, ¶ 95). • “Plaintiff is informed, believes, and thereon alleges that FCA acquired its knowledge of the Engine Defect and its potential consequences prior to Plaintiff acquiring the Vehicle, through sources not available to consumers such as Plaintiff, including but not limited to preproduction testing data, early consumer complaints about the Engine Defect made directly to FCA and its network of dealers, aggregate warranty data compiled from FCA's network of dealers, testing conducted by FCA in response to these complaints, as well as warranty repair and part replacements data received by FCA from FCA's network of dealers, amongst other sources of internal information.” (FAC, ¶ 96(a)). • “FCA was in a superior position from various internal sources to know (or should have known) the true state of facts about the material defects contained in vehicles equipped with the 5.7L engine...” (FAC, ¶ 96(b)).

The FAC in this case is sufficiently specific pursuant to Dhital. The court finds that Plaintiff has sufficiently pled all elements of a cause of action for fraud, including reliance.

Defendants cite to Santana v. FCA US, LLC (2020) 56 Cal.App.5th 334, but the Court of Appeal in that case analyzed the sufficiency of the evidence to support a jury verdict and not the sufficiency of the pleadings as in Dhital. Defendants also point to non-binding federal authority that applied the federal pleading standard. (See, e.g., In re Ford Motor Co. DPS6 Powershift Transmission Products Liability Lit. (C.D. Cal. 2019) 2019 WL 3000646 at p. 7 [applying Federal Rule 9(b)].) Such decisions are not applicable here.

Therefore, the court will overrule the demurrer to 6th Cause of Action on this basis.

Duty to Disclose

Defendant also argues that the FAC fails to establish a duty to disclose because it does not allege the requisite transactional relationship for Plaintiff to allege a fraud claim.

The Court of Appeal has stated that “[a] duty to disclose facts arises only when the parties are in a relationship that gives rise to the duty, such as ‘seller and buyer, employer and prospective employee, doctor and patient, or parties entering into any kind of contractual arrangement.’” (Shin v. Kong (2000) 80 Cal.App.4th 498, 509, quoting Wilkins v. National Broadcasting Co. (1999) 71 Cal.App.4th 1066, 1082.)

As the Court of Appeal explained in Bigler-Engler v. Breg, Inc. (2017) 7 Cal.App.5th 276: Our Supreme Court has described the necessary relationship giving rise to a duty to disclose as a “transaction” between the plaintiff and defendant: “In transactions which do not involve fiduciary or confidential relations, a cause of action for non-disclosure of material facts may arise in at least three instances: (1) the defendant makes representations but does not disclose facts which materially qualify the facts disclosed, or which render his disclosure likely to mislead; (2) the facts are known or accessible only to defendant, and defendant knows they are not known to or reasonably discoverable by the plaintiff; (3) the defendant actively conceals discovery from the plaintiff.” (Id. at p. 311, quoting Warner Construction Corp. v.

City of Los Angeles (1970) 2 Cal.3d 285, 294, footnotes omitted.)

According to the Bigler-Engler v. Breg, Inc. Court, “[s]uch a transaction must necessarily arise from direct dealings between the plaintiff and the defendant; it cannot arise between the defendant and the public at large.” (Bigler-Engler v. Breg, Inc., supra, 7 Cal.App.5th at p. 312).

However, in Bigler-Engler v. Breg, Inc., “[the defendant] did not transact with [the plaintiff] in any way.” (Id. at p. 314.) Further, “[the plaintiff] obtained her Polar Care device from [one third-party], based on a prescription written by [another third-party], all without [the defendant’s] involvement.” (Ibid.) Under those circumstances, the Court of Appeal held that there was no duty to disclose. (See id. at pp. 314-315.)

This case, by contrast, does not involve a relationship between the manufacturer and the general public.

Instead, the FAC alleges that there was a relationship between Plaintiff and Defendant because Plaintiff and Defendant Ford entered into a warranty contract. Thus, unlike in Bigler-Engler v. Breg, Inc., there was a transaction directly between Plaintiffs and Defendant.

This reasoning was confirmed in Dhital. In that case, which was a Song-Beverly action similar to this one, the Court of Appeal held that a car buyer need not allege a contract with the manufacturer in order to allege a duty to disclose:

Nissan argues Plaintiff did not adequately plead the existence of a buyer-seller relationship between the parties, because Plaintiff bought the car from a Nissan dealership (not from Nissan itself). At the pleading stage (and in the absence of a more developed argument by Nissan on this point), we conclude Plaintiff’s allegations are sufficient. Plaintiff alleges that they bought the car from a Nissan dealership, that Nissan backed the car with an express warranty, and that Nissan’s authorized dealerships are its agents for purposes of the sale of Nissan vehicles to consumers. In light of these allegations, we decline to hold Plaintiff’ claim is barred on the ground there was no relationship requiring Nissan to disclose known defects.

(Dhital v. Nissan North America, Inc., supra, 84 Cal.App.5th at p. 844.)

Defendant further asserts that the FAC fails to plead that Defendant had exclusive knowledge of the defect and that it actively concealed the defect. However, the FAC alleges that Defendant knew the vehicle had one or more defects and that Defendant acquired that knowledge, prior to Plaintiff’s acquiring the Vehicle, through sources not available to consumers such as Plaintiff. (FAC, ¶ 95-97). The FAC, therefore, sufficiently alleges that Defendant has exclusive knowledge.

Thus, the court will overrule the demurrer to 6th Cause of Action on this basis.

Plaintiff to give notice.

3 Mattson vs. TENTATIVE RULING: General Motors LLC For the reasons set forth below, Defendant CarMax Auto Superstores, Inc.’s Motion to Strike Portions of Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint is GRANTED.