Laura Geiser v. FCA US, LLC, et al.

“In determining whether the complaint is sufficient as against the demurrer’ if on consideration of all the facts stated it appears the plaintiff is entitled to any relief at the hands of the court against the defendants the complaint will be held good although the facts may not be clearly stated.” (Gressley v. Williams (1961) 193 Cal.App.2d 636, 639.)

? A demurrer for uncertainty is strictly construed, even where a complaint is in some respects uncertain, because ambiguities can be clarified under modern discovery procedures.” (Khoury v. Maly’s of Cal., Inc. (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 612, 616.) Such demurrers “are disfavored, and are granted only if the pleading is so incomprehensible that a defendant cannot reasonably respond.” (Mahan v. Charles W. Chan Insurance Agency, Inc. (2017) 14 Cal.App.5th 841, 848.)

A demurrer should not be sustained without leave to amend if the complaint, liberally construed, can state a cause of action under any theory or if there is a reasonable possibility the defect can be cured by amendment. (Schifando v. City of Los Angeles, supra, 31 Cal.4th at p. 1081.) The demurrer also may be sustained without leave to amend where the nature of the defects and previous unsuccessful attempts to plead render it probable plaintiff cannot state a cause of action. (Krawitz v. Rusch (1989) 209 Cal.App.3d 957, 967.)

A. STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS

Defendant FCA US, LLC and Glendale Chrysler Jeep Dodge Ram (“Defendants”) argue that the first through fourth and sixth causes of action under the Song Beverly Act are time-barred. (Demurrer at pp. 6?13.)

Code of Civil Procedure § 871.21 states as follows: “n action covered by Section 871.20 shall not be brought later than six years after the date of original delivery of the motor vehicle.” (Code Civ. Proc. § 871.21, subd. (b).) Section 871.20 covers actions brought against manufacturers who have opted into certain lemon law litigation procedures, as Defendant has done here. (Code Civ. Proc. § 871.20, subd. (a).

Under this statute of repose, Plaintiff’s Song Beverly claims would be time barred six years after delivery of the vehicle, which the Complaint alleges took place on January 3, 2019. (Complaint ¶ 7.) Thus under this six-year rule, the claims would be time-barred by January 3, 2025. Plaintiff filed the present action on June 30, 2025, beyond the six-year limit.

However, as Plaintiff notes in opposition, Plaintiff benefits from a 178-day tolling of statutes of limitations and repose enacted during the COVID-19 pandemic. (Opposition at p. 4), which extends their time to file the action from January 3, 2025, to June 30, 2025. (See CRC Appendix I, Emergency Rule 9, subd. (a).) Plaintiff’s June 30, 2025 complaint is timely when this rule is applied. Accordingly, the claims are not time-barred under the statute of repose.

B. FRAUD

Defendants demurrer to the fifth cause of action for negligent repair and sixth cause of action for fraudulent concealment alleged by Plaintiff on the grounds that the claims are pleaded in a conclusory manner, fail to allege a transactional relationship with the relevant defendants, and are barred by the economic loss rule. (Demurrer at pp. 14?17.)

??The required elements for fraudulent concealment are (1) concealment or suppression of a material fact; (2) by a defendant with a duty to disclose the fact to the plaintiff; (3) the defendant intended to defraud the plaintiff by intentionally concealing or suppressing the fact; (4) the plaintiff was unaware of the fact and would not have acted as he or she did if he or she had known of the concealed or suppressed fact; and (5) plaintiff sustained damage as a result of the concealment or suppression of the fact. [Citation.]? [Citation.]? (Hambrick v. Healthcare Partners Medical Group, Inc. (2015) 238 Cal.App.4th 124, 162.)

Fraud causes of action must be pleaded with particularity, meaning that the plaintiff must allege “how, when, where, to whom, and by what means the representations were tendered.” (Lazar v. Superior Court (1996) 12 Cal.4th 631, 645.) The specificity standard is less stringent “when “it appears from the nature of the allegations that the defendant must necessarily possess full information concerning the facts of the controversy.”? (Committee on Children’s Television, Inc. v. General Foods Corp. (1983) 35 Cal.3d 197, 217, superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in Californians for Disability Rights v. Mervyn's, LLC (2006) 39 Cal.4th 223, 227, quoting Bradley v. Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co. (1973) 30 Cal.App.3d 818, 825.)

Here, Defendants argue that the fraud cause of action is not pled with sufficient specificity because Plaintiff failed to name the persons who made the alleged representations and what misrepresentations they made. But while there is authority for the proposition that fraud claims against a corporation must identify the individuals who made the representations and their position in the company (Tarmann v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. (1991) 2 Cal.App.4th 153, 157), Plaintiff’s claim is in the nature of a concealment claim, in which it would be impracticable to allege the negative fact of the identity of the persons who did not disclose the defect.

FCA argues that there was no transactional relationship between the manufacturer and Plaintiffs such that Defendants owed a duty to disclose the alleged defect. (Demurrer at pp. 15?16; s ee Bigler-Engler v. Breg, Inc. (2017) 7 Cal.App.5th 276, 312 [transaction giving rise to duty to disclose “must necessarily arise from direct dealings between the plaintiff and the defendant; it cannot arise between the defendant and the public at large”].) But such a relationship exists here. Although Plaintiffs do not allege that they purchased their vehicle from Defendant, it was Defendant that provided them with the warranty that they are here alleged to have breached. (Complaint ¶ 7.) Thus a transactional relationship is alleged.

Defendants finally argue that the negligent repair claim fails because only conclusions are alleged, and because the economic loss rule bars seeking tort damages for a contract negligently performed. (Demurrer at pp. 16?17.) But the argument based on the conclusory pleading of negligence fails, as it has long been recognized that negligence can be pleaded “in general terms.” (Barber v. Chang (2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 1456, 1469 fn. 2.)

Moreover, the economic loss rule does not bar a negligence claim based on the negligent provision of contractual services: “A contract to perform services gives rise to a duty of care which requires that such services be performed in a competent and reasonable manner. A negligent failure to do so may be both a breach of contract and a tort. [Citation.] In such a hybrid circumstance, the plaintiff is entitled to pursue both legal theories until an occasion for an election of remedies arises.” (Stop Loss Ins. Brokers, Inc. v. Brown & Toland Medical Group (2006) 143 Cal.App.4th 1036, 1056.) Negligent repair claims fit into the rubric described. The demurrer is therefore OVERRULED.

I. MOTION TO STRIKE

Any party, within the time allowed to respond to a pleading, may serve and file a notice of motion to strike the whole or any part thereof. (Code Civ. Proc., § 435(b)(1)). The notice of motion to strike a portion of a pleading shall quote in full the portions sought to be stricken except where the motion is to strike an entire paragraph, cause of action, count or defense. (California Rules of Court Rule 3.1322.)

The grounds for a motion to strike shall appear on the face of the challenged pleading or form any matter of which the court is required to take judicial notice. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437(a)). The court then may strike out any irrelevant, false, or improper matter inserted in any pleading and strike out all or any part of any pleading not drawn or filed in conformity with the laws of this state, a court rule, or an order of the court. (Code Civ. Proc., § 436.) When the defect which justifies striking a complaint is capable of cure, the court should allow leave to amend. (Perlman v. Municipal Court (1979) 99 Cal.App.3d 568, 575.)

Here, Defendants move to strike the Complaint’s prayer for punitive damages on the grounds that Plaintiff has not pleaded sufficient facts to justify them. (Motion at pp. 2?4.) Punitive damages are allowed in non-contract cases when a defendant is guilty of “oppression, fraud, or malice . . . .” (Civ. Code § 3294, subd. (a).)

The terms are defined as: 1. “Malice’ means conduct which is intended by the defendant to cause injury to the plaintiff or despicable conduct which is carried on by the defendant with a willful and conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others. 2. “Oppression’ means despicable conduct that subjects a person to cruel and unjust hardship in conscious disregard of that person's rights. 3. “Fraud’ means an intentional misrepresentation, deceit, or concealment of a material fact known to the defendant with the intention on the part of the defendant of thereby depriving a person of property or legal rights or otherwise causing injury. (Civ. Code § 3294, subd. (c).)

Something more than the mere commission of a tort is always required for punitive damages. (Taylor v. Superior Court (1979) 24 Cal.3d 890, 894.) Proof of negligence, gross negligence, or recklessness is insufficient to warrant an award of punitive damages. (Dawes v. Sup.Ct. (Mardian) (1980) 111 Cal.App.3d 82, 88?89.)

Punitive damages may be recovered in an action for negligence or other nonintentional torts if the plaintiff pleads and proves that the defendant acted with the state of mind described as “conscious disregard’ of the potential dangers to others. (Pfeifer v. John Crane, Inc. (2013) 220 Cal.App.4th 1270, 1299.) When malice is based on a defendant’s conscious disregard of Plaintiff’s rights, the conduct must be both despicable and willful. (College Hospital v. Superior Court (1994) 8 Cal.4th 794, 713 (? College Hospital ”).)

As discussed above in relation to Defendants’ demurrer, the Complaint contains adequate allegations of fraud, and as such states a basis for punitive damages under section 3294. The Motion to Strike is therefore DENID.

Superior Court of California County of Los Angeles Department 732 Laura Geiser., Plaintiff v. FCA US, LLC et al., Defendants. Case No.:

Hearing Date: May 17, 2026 [TENTATIVE] RULING RE: Defendant FCA US, LLC?s Demurrer and Motion to Strike Portions of the Complaint

Defendant FCA US, LLC?s Demurrer and Motion to Strike Portions of the Complaint is OVERRULED and DENIED. Defendant to give notice.

Dated: May 17, 2026 __________________________________________ Hon. Richard S. Kemalyan Judge of the Superior Court

Case Number: 25STCV21457 Hearing Date: May 18, 2026 Dept: 732 Maribel Aceveda Jacinto v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc., et al. Monday, May 18, 2026