Latonia Vaughan vs. Karma Apartments

A Stipulation and Appointment of Official Reporter Pro Tempore (CV/E-206) is required to be signed by each party, the private court reporter, and the Judge prior to the hearing, if not using a reporter from the Court’s Approved Official Reporter Pro Tempore list.

Once the form is signed it must be filed with the clerk. If a litigant has been granted a fee waiver and requests a court reporter, the party must submit a Request for Court Reporter by a Party with

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a Fee Waiver (CV/E-211) and it must be filed with the clerk at least 10 days prior to the hearing or at the time the proceeding is scheduled if less than 10 days away. Once approved, the clerk will forward the form to the Court Reporter’s Office and an official reporter will be provided.

TENTATIVE RULING:

*** NOTICE: EFFECTIVE APRIL 13, 2026, THIS DEPARTMENT HAS MOVED TO THE TANI G. CANTIL-SAKAUYE COURTHOUSE LOCATED AT 500 G STREET IN SACRAMENTO, CA. ALL MOTIONS NOTICED FOR DEPARTMENT 53 WILL BE HEARD IN DEPARTMENT 16D OF THE NEW COURTHOUSE. ALL PAPERS FOR THIS DEPARTMENT MUST BE FILED AT THIS NEW LOCATION AND WILL NOT BE ACCEPTED AT THE HALL OF JUSTICE. ALL HEARINGS WILL TAKE PLACE AT THIS NEW LOCATION. PARTIES MAY CONTINUE TO APPEAR REMOTELY IN DEPARTMENT 16D UNLESS SPECIFICALLY ORDERED OTHERWISE. ***

Plaintiff Latonia Vaughan’s motion for summary judgment as against defendants Karma Apartments, LLC (“Karma”) and Blvd Residential, Inc. (“BRI”) is ruled upon as follows.

*** If oral argument is requested, the parties must at the time oral argument is requested notify the clerk and opposing counsel about which of moving plaintiff’s Undisputed Material Facts, which of defendant BRI’s Additional Material Facts, and/or which of defendant BRI’s written objections to evidence will be addressed at the hearing. Counsel shall be prepared to discuss the specific evidence already in the record which is claimed to show the existence or non-existence of any triable issue of material fact. Counsel are also reminded that pursuant to local rules, only limited oral argument is permitted on law and motion matters. ***

Although the notice of motion provides notice of the Court’s tentative ruling system as required by Local Rule 1.06, the notice does not comply with the specific provisions of Local Rule 1.06(D). Moving counsel directed to review the Local Court Rules, effective 1/1/2026.

Both plaintiff’s and defendant BRI’s counsel failed to comply with CRC Rule 3.1110(b)(3)-(4).

Plaintiff’s counsel failed to comply with CRC Rules 2.111(3) and 3.1350(d).

Defendant BRI’s counsel failed to comply with CRC Rule 3.1354(b)(3), expressly requiring written objections to evidence to quote or set forth the objectionable statements claimed to be inadmissible, so the Court need not expend its

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finite resources searching for the specific statements to which these objections are directed to in order to rule on such objections.

Factual Background

This action arises out of plaintiff’s prior tenancy at an apartment complex in Sacramento. Plaintiff commenced this action on 2/2/2023, filing against defendants Karma and BRI a complaint purporting assert causes of action for Negligence, Breach of Implied Warranty of Habitability, Private Nuisance, Breach of Contract, Breach of Covenant of Good Faith, Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress, Wrongful Eviction, Constructive Eviction and Uncured Building Violations, seeking inter alia both compensatory and “punative [sic] damages.” Notably, the complaint alleges in Paragraph 2 that defendant Karma “is the legal owner of the subject property” and “owned, operated, managed, and/or controlled the subject residence and acted as such as when Plaintiff was a tenant,” while Paragraph 3 asserts that defendant BRI was merely “the property manager of the subject property and acted as such as when Plaintiff was a tenant.”

On 9/22/2025, defendant Karma filed a cross-complaint against plaintiff and in its amended cross-complaint filed on 11/3/2025, Karma purports to allege causes of action for breach of contract and fraud.

This matter has not yet been set for trial.

Moving Papers. According to the original Notice of Motion filed on 11/17/2025, plaintiff Vaughn now moves for summary judgment on the grounds that “there is no triable issue of material fact and Plaintiff is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” (11/17/2025 Not. of Mot., p.1:17-22.) Curiously, plaintiff also filed on 11/17/2025 an additional document labelled as “Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment” which indicates that she “moves for summary judgment, or in the alternative summary adjudication, pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure §437c, against Defendants Karma and [BRI] on the grounds that there is no triable issue of material fact and Plaintiff is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” (11/17/2025 Mot., p.1:17-22 (underline added for emphasis).)

The moving separate statement filed on 11/17/2025 fails to comply with the express requirements of CRC Rule 3.1350(d)(3) [“separate statement must be in the two-column format” and “[c]itation to the evidence in support of each material fact must include reference to the exhibit, title, page, and line numbers” (underline added for emphasis)] but otherwise purports to set forth 15 separate Undisputed Material Facts (“UMF”) claimed to entitled plaintiff to summary judgment against defendants Karma and BRI.

The moving points & authorities filed on 11/17/2025 consists of just two pages and in this Court’s view, fails to demonstrate that plaintiff is entitled to summary judgment against defendants Karma and BRI.

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Just a few days later, plaintiff Vaughn filed a variety of “supplemental” papers including but not limited to a “Supplemental Brief in Support of Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment” (consisting of five pages, purporting to address defendant Karma’s own cross-complaint against plaintiff) and a “Supplemental Separate Statement” which (aside from again failing to comply with CRC Rule 3.1350(d)(3)’s express requirements) sets forth in “Part I” 31 UMF and in “Part II,” an additional 31 UMF, concluding with the following:

The undisputed material facts set forth above demonstrate that Defendants had repeated notice of long-standing habitability defects, failed to timely repair them, and never alleged that Plaintiff caused any property damage in either of their two unlawful detainer actions. The Stipulated Move-Out Order and subsequent dismissal confirm that no damages were owed, and Defendants’ insurance policy provides coverage for the alleged losses. Accordingly, these undisputed facts defeat each element of Defendants’ First Amended Cross-Complaint and support the granting of Plaintiff’s Supplemental Motion for Summary Judgment.

On 11/24/2025 and 11/26/2025, plaintiff filed several additional documents which appear to have been filed in support of the present motion for summary judgment but several documents filed on these dates do not specifically refer to the present motion for summary judgment or its 5/5/2026 hearing date.

On 12/1/2025, plaintiff again filed several additional documents in support of the present motion for summary judgment including but not limited to another “Supplemental Brief in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment” (consisting of eight pages), which purports to address defendant Karma’s amended cross-complaint against plaintiff and evidence claimed to contradict the amended cross-complaint’s allegations, as well as another “Supplemental Separate Statement” (consisting of six pages), which likewise purports to address defendant Karma’s amended cross-complaint against plaintiff and which (aside from again failing to comply with CRC Rule 3.1350(d)(3)’s express requirements) sets forth 29 UMF claimed to preclude defendant Karma from prevailing on its amended cross-complaint against plaintiff.

Opposition. Defendant BRI opposes, arguing that plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment must be denied for several reasons including that notwithstanding the complaint’s allegations, BRI was not the property manager of the subject apartment complex at the time plaintiff reported the alleged uninhabitable conditions in February 2022 and the only evidence plaintiff claims to show she gave notice of these conditions to defendant BRI is dated after this suit was commenced in February 2023. The opposition adds that plaintiff’s own evidence indicates she reported the conditions to an entity identified as “DJA Properties, LLC,” not BRI, but regardless, as a mere property

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manager of the apartments, defendant BRI cannot as a matter of law be liable for to plaintiff based on the causes of action alleged in the complaint. Such liability, if any, is properly attributable solely to the owner of the apartments, defendant Karma. In support of its opposition, defendant BRI filed not only a separate statement responding to the 15 UMF set forth in the original moving separate statement which plaintiff filed on 11/17/2025 but also several written objections to the evidence plaintiff cited in support of her motion.

Defendant Karma filed its own opposition papers but not until 4/29/2026, just four (4) court days prior to the 5/5/2026 hearing date. These papers were not considered by the Court because they were not timely, having been due no later than 4/15/2026. (See, Code Civ. Proc. §437c(b)(2).) In fact, Karma’s opposition papers were so late as to be filed well after the 4/24/2026 deadline set forth in Code of Civil Procedure §437c(b)(4) for plaintiff’s own reply papers.

Reply. Plaintiff filed two (2) separate sets of reply papers on 5/1/2026 and on 5/4/2026. None of these papers were considered by the Court because they are not timely, having been due no later than 4/24/2026 (see, Code Civ. Proc. §437c(b)(4)) and because the Court has also declined to consider defendant Karma’s opposition papers filed on 4/29/2026.

Standards for Summary Judgment/Adjudication

In ruling on a motion for summary judgment/adjudication, the Court engages in a threestep process. First, the issues framed by the pleadings must be identified since the pleadings themselves define the scope of what may be addressed via a motion for summary judgment/adjudication (FPI Development Inc. v. Nakashima (1991) 231 Cal.App.3d 367, 381-382) and the evidence submitted in support of or in opposition to the motion must be addressed to the claims and defenses raised in the pleadings. The Court cannot consider an unpleaded issue in ruling on a motion for summary judgment/adjudication. (Roth v. Rhodes (1994) 25 Cal.App.4th 530, 541.) The papers filed in response to such a motion may not create triable issues beyond the scope of the pleadings, nor are they a substitute for filing amended pleadings. (Tsemetzin v. Coast Federal Savings & Loan Assn. (1997) 57 Cal.App.4th 1334, 1342.)

Next, the Court must determine whether the moving party has met its initial burden of production. Code of Civil Procedure §437c(p)(1) explains that a plaintiff moving for summary judgment/adjudication meets its “burden of showing that there is no defense to a cause of action if that party has proved each element of the cause of action entitling the party to judgment on the cause of action,” while §437c(p)(2) states that a defendant or cross-defendant meets its “burden of showing that a cause of action has no merit if the party has shown that one or more elements of the cause of action,

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even if not separately pleaded, cannot be established, or that there is a complete defense to the cause of action.” Both of these statutory provisions further specify that only when the moving party has met the applicable initial burden does the burden shift to the opposing defendant and/or opposing plaintiff or cross-complainant to “set forth the specific facts showing that a triable issue of material fact exists as to the cause of action or a defense thereto.” In other words, a party opposing summary judgment/adjudication has no evidentiary burden unless the moving party has first met its initial burden of production. (Binder v. Aetna Life Ins. Co. (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 832, 840; see also Rubenstein v. Rubenstein (2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 1131, 1151- 1152; Thatcher v. Lucky Stores, Inc. (2000) 79 Cal.App.4th 1081, 1085-1086.)

Only where the moving party makes the requisite initial showing does a court need to examine the opposition papers to determine if the latter demonstrate the existence of a triable issue of material fact which precludes summary judgment/adjudication. (Salazar v. Southern Cal. Gas Co. (1997) 54 Cal.App.4th 1370, 1376; Binder v. Aetna Life Ins. Co. (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 832, 840.) The opposing party must present admissible evidence and may not rely upon the allegations or denials of its pleading. (Id.)

As noted above, Code of Civil Procedure §437c(p)(1) and (2) clarify that the opposing party must “set forth the specific facts showing that a triable issue of material fact exists as to the cause of action or a defense thereto.” Additionally, in ruling on the motion, a court must construe the evidence of the opposing party liberally and that of the moving party strictly, resolving any doubts in the opposing party’s favor. (Miller v. Bechtel Corp. (1983) 33 Cal.3d 868, 874; Cortez v. Vogt (1997) 52 Cal.App.4th 917, 925-926; see also, Salazar v.

Southern Cal. Gas Co. (1997) 54 Cal.App.4th 1370, 1376; Brown v. FSR Brokerage, Inc. (1998) 62 Cal.App.4th 766, 773.)

While a summary adjudication motion is treated largely the same as one for summary judgment, there are a few important differences. One of these differences is found in CRC Rule 3.1350(b), which mandates that issues presented for summary adjudication be stated in the notice of motion and repeated verbatim in the separate statement. Another difference is that summary adjudication cannot be granted unless it “completely disposes” of a cause of action, affirmative defense, claim for punitive damages, or question of duty. Code of Civil Procedure §437c(f)(1) provides in its entirety:

A party may move for summary adjudication as to one or more causes of action within an action, one or more affirmative defenses, one or more claims for [punitive] damages, or one or more issues of duty, if that party contends that the cause of action has no merit or that there is no affirmative defense thereto, or that there is no merit to an affirmative defense as to any cause of action, or both, or that there is no merit to a claim for damages, as specified in Section 3294 of the Civil Code, or that one or more defendants either owed or did not owe a duty to the plaintiff or plaintiffs. A motion for

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summary adjudication shall be granted only if it completely disposes of a cause of action, an affirmative defense, a claim for [punitive] damages, or an issue of duty. (Underline added for emphasis.)

Finally, before turning to the specific issues raised by this motion and the opposition, the Court reminds the parties of the “Golden Rule” of summary judgment/adjudication: “If it is not set forth in the separate statement, it does not exist.” (See, Zimmerman, Rosenfeld v. Larson (2005) 131 Cal.App.4th 1466, 1477 (italics in original).) Moreover, according to Nazir v. United Airlines, Inc. (2009) 178 Cal.App.4th 243, a moving party’s inclusion of facts in its separate statement effectively concedes each fact’s “materiality,” whether intended or not, and if there is a triable dispute relating to any one of these facts, the motion must be denied. (Nazir, at 252 (citing Weil & Brown, Civil Procedure Before Trial, Ch.10:95.1).)

That said, the Court now turns to the specific contentions advanced in support of and opposition to this motion.

Request for Judicial Notice

Plaintiff’s original 11/17/2025 Request for Judicial Notice of her own complaint and two sets of records from “City of Sacramento Code Enforcement” (i.e., Case Nos. 23- 019890 and 022819) is granted but is limited to only those purposes appropriate for judicial notice. (See, Evid. Code §451(a); §452(b)-(d); see also, Johnson & Johnson v. Superior Court (2011) 192 Cal.App.4th 757, 768 [court may take judicial notice of the existence of court documents but not to the truth of the statements contained therein]; Kilroy v. State of California (2004) 119 Cal.App.4th 140, 145-148; Sosinsky v. Grant (1992) 6 Cal.App.4th 1548, 1569-70.)

Plaintiff’s “supplemental” Request for Judicial Notice filed on 11/21/2025 relating to various documents, identified as Exhibits A-N, is granted as to Exhibits I-M but is pursuant to the authorities listed above limited to only those purposes appropriate for judicial notice. Judicial notice is denied as to Exhibits A-J and N because none of these is a proper subject for judicial notice under Evidence Code §450 et seq.

Plaintiff’s “supplemental” Request for Judicial Notice filed on 11/24/2025 relating to various documents, identified as Exhibits 1-11, is granted as to Exhibits 4 and 8-10 but is pursuant to the authorities listed above limited to only those purposes appropriate for judicial notice. Judicial notice is denied as to Exhibits 1-3, 5-7 and 11 because none of these is a proper subject for judicial notice under Evidence Code §450 et seq.

Plaintiff’s “supplemental” Request for Judicial Notice filed on 12/1/2025 relating to various documents, identified as RJN-4 through RJN-12, is granted but is pursuant to

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the authorities listed above limited to only those purposes appropriate for judicial notice.

Written Objections to Evidence

Defendant BRI’s 11 written objections to certain evidence which plaintiff offered as support for this motion are sustained on the grounds advanced by BRI. As such, the Court is precluded from considering plaintiff’s Exhibit Nos. 2-10 in determining whether she is entitled to judgment as a matter of law as argued in the moving papers.

Discussion

At the outset, the Court finds that plaintiff’s filing of multiple documents in support of this motion (several of which beyond those identified in CRC Rule 3.1350(c)), including two separate sets of “supplemental” filings (some of which appear to relate primarily, if not exclusively, to just one of the two defendants against whom this motion is directed and purport to constitute an entirely new motion as against this defendant) not only was entirely unnecessary but also has caused an undue consumption of finite judicial resources, impacting the Court’s ability to address other matters on this crowded docket.

As such, this Court would have been within its inherent discretion to simply drop this motion from calendar (so that PL could re-file a properly organized and denominated motion) or even to deny this motion outright. Nevertheless, this Court declined these options and instead addresses herein the merits of this motion despite its haphazard presentation by plaintiff.

Summary Judgment and/or Summary Adjudication. As noted above, plaintiff’s original Notice of Motion filed on 11/17/2025 expressly states that plaintiff Vaughn is moving for “summary judgment” as against defendants Karma and BRI on the grounds that “there is no triable issue of material fact and Plaintiff is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” (11/17/2025 Not. of Mot., p.1:17-22.) There is in this 11/17/2025 Notice of Motion no explicit indication that plaintiff is in the alternative moving for “summary adjudication” of any individual cause of action, affirmative defense, issue of duty and/or claim for punitive damages as against either defendant Karma or defendant BRI. Thus, based on plaintiff Vaughn’s own original Notice of Motion filed on 11/17/2025, the Court construes this motion as one which seeks only “summary judgment” as against defendants Karma and BRI.

Although plaintiff did also file on 11/17/2025 an additional document, labelled as “Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment,” which indicates that she is also seeking “in the alternative summary adjudication” against defendants Karma and BRI, the Court finds that this is insufficient to entitle plaintiff to summary adjudication in this instance. First, Code of Civil Procedure §437c(f)(1) permits a party to “move for summary adjudication as to one or more causes of action within an action, one or more

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affirmative defenses, one or more claims for [punitive] damages, or one or more issues of duty” but plaintiff Vaughn has failed to identify in her 11/17/2025 “Motion for Summary Judgment” any specific cause of action, affirmative defense, claim for punitive damages, or issue of duty on which summary adjudication is sought. Critically, CRC Rule 3.1350(b) expressly requires that each issue presented for summary adjudication (i.e., cause of action, affirmative defense, issue of duty and/or claim for punitive damages) be stated in the notice of motion but plaintiff Vaughn’s original Notice of Motion does not comply with this requirement nor does her separate “Motion for Summary Judgment.”

Additionally, CRC Rule 3.1350(b) mandates that the moving separate statement repeat “verbatim” the specific issues identified in the notice of motion as being presented for summary adjudication but plaintiff Vaughn’s moving separate statement filed on 11/17/2025 identifies no specific cause of action, affirmative defense, issue of duty and/or claim for punitive damages on which summary adjudication is sought. The same is true for the “supplemental” separate statement filed by plaintiff Vaughn on 11/21/2025, which is divided into “Part I” and “Part II,” identified as “Timeline Narrative of Undisputed Material Facts” and “Formal Separate Statement Table,” respectively.

However, neither of these labels have any correlation to any specific cause of action, affirmative defense, issue of duty and/or claim for punitive damages which may be the proper subject for summary adjudication under Code of Civil Procedure §437c(f)(1).

Although plaintiff filed another “supplemental” separate statement on 12/1/2025, this too fails to comply with the CRC Rule 3.1350(b)’s requirement of repeating “verbatim” the specific issues identified in the notice of motion for summary adjudication. This 12/1/2025 “supplemental” separate statement does include various “headings” such as “Code Enforcement Evidence,” “Email Notice/Repair Requests,” “Cross-Complaint Allegations Contradicted” and “Legal Bars to the FACC [sic],” none of these “headings” reflect any obvious or direct relation to any specific cause of action, affirmative defense, issue of duty and/or claim for punitive damages on which summary adjudication may be granted pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure §437c(f)(1).

For these reasons and coupled with the fact that none of plaintiff Vaughn’s three different moving separate statements comply with CRC Rule 3.1350(d)(1)(a) independent requirement to “separately identify [e]ach cause of action, claim for damages, issue of duty, or affirmative defense that is the subject of the motion,” plaintiff Vaughn’s purported alternative motion for summary adjudication shall be denied in its entirety and the remainder of this ruling addresses plaintiff’s remaining request for summary judgment as against defendants Karma and BRI.

Plaintiff Failed to Satisfy Her Initial Burden of Production. Plaintiff Vaughn’s motion for summary judgment must be denied because the moving papers here are for several

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separate and distinct reasons not sufficient to satisfy her initial burden of production under Code of Civil Procedure §437c(p)(1) and thus, she has failed to successfully shift the burden of production to defendants.

First, while plaintiff Vaughn’s operative complaint filed on 2/2/2023 purports to assert nine (9) separate causes of action (i.e., Negligence, Breach of Implied Warranty of Habitability, Private Nuisance, Breach of Contract, Breach of Covenant of Good Faith, Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress, Wrongful Eviction, Constructive Eviction and Uncured Building Violations), the moving points & authorities and the various separate statements filed in support of this motion do not address meaningfully, if at all, each of these nine (9) separate causes of action but instead appear at best only plaintiff’s causes of action for Breach of Implied Warranty of Habitability, Breach of Contract, Constructive Eviction and Uncured Building Violations.

Even assuming arguendo plaintiff has made a showing sufficient for her to prevail on the aforementioned two causes of action, she has necessarily failed to show her entitlement to judgment as a matter of law on the entirety of the operative complaint including its separate causes of action for Negligence, Private Nuisance, Breach of Covenant of Good Faith, Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress and Wrongful Eviction. Consequently, this Court is precluded as a matter of law from entering judgment on the entirety of the complaint in favor of plaintiff regardless of whether any opposition has been filed.

Second, even if plaintiff Vaughn’s moving papers had actually and adequately addressed each of the nine (9) separate causes of action asserted in plaintiff’s complaint, the present motion for summary judgment must still be denied insofar as the various separate statements filed in support fail to specify the actual amount of damages plaintiff claims she is entitled to recoup from defendants in this case in connection with any or all of the causes of action alleged. As noted above, the “Golden Rule” of summary judgment provides, “If it is not set forth in the separate statement, it does not exist.” (See, Zimmerman, Rosenfeld, supra, 131 Cal.App.4th at 1477 (italics in original).)

Because the moving separate statements fail to establish the precise amount of the judgment which plaintiff seeks or might otherwise be entitled to in this case, this Court is as a matter of law unable to enter an actual judgment in plaintiff’s favor pursuant to this motion. The Court is aware that the concluding prayer for relief in plaintiff’s complaint alleges inter alia “Future Medical Specials [sic]” of $1 Million, “General Damages” of $1 Million and “Punitive Damages” of $1 Million, the Court finds that none of these specific damages claims are adequately substantiated by the evidence included in the moving papers and thus, plaintiff Vaughn has necessarily failed to carry her initial burden of producing evidence sufficient to show her entitlement to judgment as a matter of law against defendants.

Third, notwithstanding the foregoing, plaintiff Vaughn has also failed to carry

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her initial burden of production under Code of Civil Procedure §437c(p)(1) insofar as all of defendant BRI’s written objections to evidence have been sustained. As a result, the Court cannot consider plaintiff’s Exhibit Nos. 2-10 and thus, all but three of the 15 UMF found in the initial 11/17/2025 moving separate statement are entirely devoid of competent, admissible evidentiary support. Likewise, to the extent that plaintiff’s UMF in her various moving separate statements rely on documents for which judicial notice was granted, plaintiff’s reliance is misplaced since, as explained above, plaintiff’s request for judicial notice was denied outright as to several of the documents/exhibits and for those where her request was granted, it is limited to only those purposes appropriate for judicial notice.

In short, even where judicial notice is granted, the Court does not necessarily accept the truth of the statements contained in these documents/exhibits and citation thereto does not necessarily provide adequate evidentiary support for any of the UMF advanced by plaintiff in her various separate statements.

Next, as pointed out by defendant BRI’s opposition, a property manager’s potential liability in a case such as this is not necessarily coextensive with the owner’s potential liability. For example, while plaintiff Vaughn’s operative complaint filed on 2/2/2023 includes a cause of action for Breach of Contract explicitly based on the lease agreement which plaintiff executed, this agreement (attached as Exhibit A to the complaint) is by its own terms between plaintiff and “The Regency Apartments” and there is no indication that defendant BRI is itself a party or a signatory to this lease agreement. As such, defendant BRI has as a matter of law no potential liability to plaintiff based on this Breach of Contract cause of action and this alone precludes the Court from granting summary judgment against defendant BRI on the entirety of the complaint.

Finally, although plaintiff alleges in her complaint that defendant BRI was “the property manager of the subject property and acted as such as when Plaintiff was a tenant,” the Court finds that plaintiff has failed to produce competent, admissible evidence which adequately demonstrates that defendant BRI was more likely than not the property manager for the subject apartments at the time she claims to have reported conditions affecting the habitability of her own apartment and indeed, plaintiff’s own evidence appears to indicate that the property manager at such time was “DJA Properties, LLC.” (See, 11/17/2025 Vol. of Evid., Ex. 5 (last two pgs. (11/11/2022 Ltr. to “DJA Properties, LLC” et al.)).) For this reason as well, plaintiff has failed to meet her initial evidentiary burden under Code of Civil Procedure §437c(p)(1) to show her entitlement to judgment on the entirety of her complaint as a matter of law.

In light of the foregoing, the Court need not proceed to address additional grounds mandating denial of the present motion for summary judgment.

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Disposition

For the reasons explained above, plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment shall be DENIED in its entirety.

The Court notes that except as provided in Code of Civil Procedure §437c(a)(5), “[a] party shall not bring more than one motion for summary judgment.” (See, Code Civ. Proc. §437c(a)(4) (underline added for emphasis).)

This minute order is effective immediately. No formal order or other notice is required. (Code Civ. Proc. §1019.5; CRC Rule 3.1312.)