Latonia Vaughan vs. Karma Apartments

A Stipulation and Appointment of Official Reporter Pro Tempore (CV/E-206) is required to be signed by each party, the private court reporter, and the Judge prior to the hearing, if not using a reporter from the Court’s Approved Official Reporter Pro Tempore list.

Once the form is signed it must be filed with the clerk. If a litigant has been granted a fee waiver

34-2023-00334089-CU-BC-GDS: Latonia Vaughan vs. Karma Apartments 01/08/2026 Hearing on Motion to Set Aside/Vacate Default and Default Judgment (CCP 473.5) in Department 53

and requests a court reporter, the party must submit a Request for Court Reporter by a Party with a Fee Waiver (CV/E-211) and it must be filed with the clerk at least 10 days prior to the hearing or at the time the proceeding is scheduled if less than 10 days away. Once approved, the clerk will forward the form to the Court Reporter’s Office and an official reporter will be provided.

TENTATIVE RULING The motion of Defendant BLVD Residential Inc. (“Defendant”) to set aside entry of default is GRANTED as set forth herein.

Overview

Plaintiff Latonia Vaughan (“Plaintiff”) brought this action arising from Plaintiff’s tenancy at a property managed by Defendant, alleging Defendant caused and/or refused to mitigate various breaches of habitability. To this end, Plaintiff asserted nine causes of action: (1) negligence; (2) breach of implied warranty of habitability; (3) private nuisance; (4) breach of contract; (5) breach of covenant of good faith and fair dealing; (6) negligent infliction of emotional distress; (7) wrongful eviction; (8) constructive eviction; and (9) building code violations under Civil Code section 1942.4.

According to the Court’s Register of Actions, Plaintiff served the Summons and Complaint on Defendant on April 17, 2023. Over two years later, Plaintiff filed requests for entry of default against Defendant on June 25, June 26, July 2, and July 29, 2025, each of which were rejected by the Court as deficient. Plaintiff filed a subsequent request for entry of default against Defendant on August 21, 2025. After the Court processed this request, the Court clerk entered default as being effective as of August 21, 2025; i.e., the same date the request was originally submitted.

During the time passage prior to the entry of default on the August 21, 2025 request, Plaintiff appears to have filed several more requests for entry of default against Defendant, which were not entered and were superfluous. Plaintiff has since submitted a default judgment package to the Court’s Default Judgment Unit, which remains pending.

Presently, Defendant moves to set aside entry of default under Code of Civil Procedure section 473, subdivision (b). In the moving papers, Defendant avers that, upon receiving the Summons and Complaint in the instant matter, its Chief Executive Officer Robert Talbott (“Talbott”) immediately contacted Travelers, Defendant’s insurer, who Talbott believed had retained counsel to represent Defendant in this matter. (Talbott Decl., ¶ 5, Exhibit A.) However, Travelers did not retain counsel on Defendant’s behalf or otherwise file an answer to the Complaint. (Id. at ¶ 7.)

Defendant asserts that it first learned of the possibility of default (and Travelers’ failure to file an answer or retain counsel) when it received Plaintiff’s request for entry of default on July 2, 2025, after which it immediately retained counsel to file the present motion. (Id. at ¶¶ 7-8.) Defendant moves that the default should be set aside and vacated under Code of Civil Procedure section

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

34-2023-00334089-CU-BC-GDS: Latonia Vaughan vs. Karma Apartments 01/08/2026 Hearing on Motion to Set Aside/Vacate Default and Default Judgment (CCP 473.5) in Department 53

473, subdivision (b) due to its own mistake, surprise, and excusable neglect. Alternatively, Defendant moves to set aside the default under the Court’s inherent equitable power.

Plaintiff opposes, arguing that Defendant admitted to receiving the Summons and Complaint and that its reliance on Travelers was unreasonable. Plaintiff argues that she will suffer prejudice if the motion is granted due to the substantial costs she has incurred in this matter.

Legal Standard

Code of Civil Procedure section 473, subdivision (b) provides, “[t]he court may, upon any terms as may be just, relieve a party . . . ‘from a judgment, dismissal, order, or other proceeding taken against him or her through his or her mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect. Application for this relief shall be accompanied by a copy of the answer or other pleading proposed to be filed therein, otherwise the application shall not be granted, and shall be made within a reasonable time, in no case exceeding six months, after the judgment, dismissal, order, or proceeding was taken.”

“‘[T]he provisions of section 473 of the Code of Civil Procedure are to be liberally construed and sound policy favors the determination of actions on their merits.’ [Citation.]” (Zamora v. Clayborn Contracting Group, Inc. (2002) 28 Cal.4th 249, 256.) “[B]ecause the law strongly favors trial and disposition on the merits, any doubts in applying section 473 must be resolved in favor of the party seeking relief from default.” (Elston v. City of Turlock (1985) 38 Cal.3d 227, 233.) In determining whether the default was entered against the defendant as a result of his or her reasonable mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect, the court must look at whether the mistake or neglect was the type of error that a reasonably prudent person under similar circumstances might have made. (Bettencourt v.

Los Rios Community College Dist. (1986) 42 Cal.3d 270, 276.) However, the court will not grant relief if the defendant’s default was taken as a result of mere carelessness or other inexcusable neglect. (Luz v. Lopes (1960) 55 Cal.2d 54, 62.)

Discussion

Here, Defendant filed the present motion on August 12, 2025, in response to Plaintiff’s request for entry of default judgment received on July 2, 2025. (Talbott Decl., ¶ 7.) As indicated above, the Court notes that the Register of Actions shows that default was not entered against Defendant until August 21, 2025. Thus, default technically had not yet been entered at the time Defendant filed its motion. Nonetheless, Plaintiff does not oppose Defendant’s motion on the grounds that it is premature, presumably because there is no question that default was subsequently entered against Defendant and remains so as of this date. The Court construes Plaintiff’s non-opposition to the motion on this particular ground as a concession thereof. (See, e.g., D.I. Chadbourne, Inc. v. Superior Court (1964) 60 Cal.2d 723, 728, fn. 4 [where nonmoving party fails to oppose a

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

34-2023-00334089-CU-BC-GDS: Latonia Vaughan vs. Karma Apartments 01/08/2026 Hearing on Motion to Set Aside/Vacate Default and Default Judgment (CCP 473.5) in Department 53

ground for a motion “it is assumed that [nonmoving party] concedes” that ground].) Although default was entered shortly—9 days—after Defendant filed the present motion, the Court otherwise considers the motion timely (and not premature) under Code of Civil Procedure section 473, subdivision (b), and addresses the merits of the motion as follows.

The moving papers include Talbott’s declaration attesting to Defendant’s communication with Travelers regarding Plaintiff’s Complaint and its assumption that Travelers would represent or otherwise retain counsel on Defendant’s behalf. (Talbott Decl., ¶¶ 5-6, Exhibit A.) Notwithstanding Talbott’s attestation that he “immediately” contacted Travelers after receiving the Complaint on April 18, 2023 (id. at ¶ 5), the Court notes that the correspondence from Travelers is dated August 21, 2023, which was well after Defendant’s deadline to file an answer to the Complaint had expired on or about May 19, 2023 (i.e., approximately 30 days after being served the Complaint on April 18, 2023). (See Code Civ.

Proc., § 412.20, subd. (a)(3).) The Court also notes that the correspondence from Travelers states that Travelers would “tender this matter to the attorney for Karma Apartments for defense of the Lawsuit” and that it was “likely that much of the Lawsuit would not be covered under the Policy.” (Talbott Decl., Exhibit A, p. 7.) However, even though Travelers did not expressly state that it would represent Defendant or retain counsel on Defendant’s behalf, it otherwise agreed to “investigate this matter and monitor the defense of [Defendant].” (Ibid.)

In light of the foregoing, the Court finds it was reasonable for Defendant to rely on Travelers to, at the very least, keep it apprised of Defendant’s defense in this matter, which it apparently did not do. (See Talbott Decl., ¶ 7.) Therefore, the Court finds it appropriate to grant the requested discretionary relief under Code of Civil Procedure, section 437, subdivision (b).

In opposition, Plaintiff argues that she will suffer prejudice due to the costs incurred in “preparing the default judgment” (Opp at 2:3.), which presumably, is a reference to preparing Plaintiff’s default judgment package that is currently pending. The Court is not persuaded. Rather, granting of Defendant’s present motion, at most, will require Plaintiff to continue this litigation possibly through trial on the merits. Plaintiff assumed such burden from the outset by filing this action. Indeed, the tasks that Plaintiff conducted in marshalling evidence to support her default judgment package are tasks that are mostly, if not entirely, required to prosecute and try this case in any event.

Setting aside entry of default would not render wasted the effort expended in preparing Plaintiff’s default judgment package. Further, the law strongly favors trial and disposition on the merits. (Elston v. City of Turlock, supra, Cal.3d 227, 233.)

Citing Hopkins & Carley v. Gens (2011) 200 Cal.App.4th 1401 (hereafter Hopkins), Plaintiff also argues that Defendant’s failure to participate in its defense in this case does not allow for relief under Code of Civil Procedure section 473, subdivision (b). However, the Court finds Hopkins distinguishable from the facts here. Namely, the movant in that case brought a motion to set aside default judgment obtained on an arbitration award after the movant voluntarily refused to attend his own arbitration hearing. (Hopkins, supra, 200 Cal.App.4th 1401 at p. 1407.) The

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

34-2023-00334089-CU-BC-GDS: Latonia Vaughan vs. Karma Apartments 01/08/2026 Hearing on Motion to Set Aside/Vacate Default and Default Judgment (CCP 473.5) in Department 53

movant also moved to set aside the judgment only after discovering a defense to the underlying claim. (Id. at p. 1408.) Importantly, the movant in Hopkins previously had the opportunity to present his defense to the underlying claim but failed to justify his reason for not doing so when moving to set aside the default judgment. (Id. at p. 1410.) The Court therefore finds Plaintiff’s reliance on Hopkins to be misplaced, as Defendant has yet to present its initial defense in this matter. The Court also declines to consider arguments raised in Plaintiff’s December 30, 2025 unauthorized sur-reply.

Disposition

Defendant’s motion to set aside the default entered against it is GRANTED. Defendant shall file and serve the proposed answer attached as Exhibit B to Defendant’s counsel’s declaration no later than January 23, 2026.

This minute order is effective immediately. No formal order or other notice is required. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1019.5; Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1312.)