Motion Attorney Fees
directors, and/or managing agents with sufficient authority within Target's corporate structure to determine corporate policy. Each of these individuals had sufficient authority and discretion to view the surveillance footage of the June 2021 incident to help determine the exact cause or, at a minimum, location of the June 2021 incident." (PUMF No. 35.)
"Neither Target nor Mitsubishi ever contacted any state regulatory agency, such as city inspectors or Cal/OSHA, following the June 2021 incident." (PUMF No. 37, emphasis omitted.)
"Both Target and Mitsubishi admit that they never determined the exact cause of the June 2021 incident." (PUMF No. 42.)
"Despite never having identified the explicit cause of the June 2021 incident or confirming that the necessary repairs were made, corporate officers Fournier and Tellez authorized the escalator to be turned back on." (PUMF No. 46.)
"Though Fournier knew that Target's contract with Mitsubishi required Mitsubishi to prepare an incident report identifying the cause of the incident and subsequent repairs addressing that cause, Fournier never reviewed let alone requested such an incident report to be prepared following the June 2021 incident." (PUMF No. 47.)
"On November 15, 2021, Dr. Moore notified the Santa Barbara City Inspector's Office regarding his son's injury. Given the fact that a child had been reported injured, Santa Barbara City Inspector Blackwell was given an " 'emergency assignment' " and was immediately dispatched to the Target location to investigate the complaint. When he arrived at the Target that same day, Blackwell visually inspected the escalators and noted the lower portion of the down escalator was " 'out of adjustment, so that it would allow either a pet or small child to put an extremity in there somehow.' " (PUMF No. 54.)
"Blackwell immediately spoke to the store manager, shut the power off to the escalator, and then barricaded the escalators so they could no longer be used. The Target store manager did not provide any explanation to Blackwell as to why the escalators were still running after such an incident." (PUMF No. 56.)
"On November 16, 2025, Phelan inspects the escalator again following Target's work order request. In Mitsubishi's internal records, Phelan wrote: " 'I did inspections on both escalators today and they are cleared to run by me and the state of California.' " (PUMF No. 58, emphasis omitted.)
"Again, there is no evidence that either Target or Mitsubishi reported this entity to any state agency, let alone had any state agency present on this date." (PUMF No. 59, emphasis omitted.)
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These PUMFs, and others, create conflicting inferences that must be resolved in favor of the party opposing summary adjudication. While the court renders no opinion regarding their ability to eventually prove their arguments, by clear and convincing evidence at trial, plaintiffs have submitted evidence that would tend to show managing agents, of both Mitsubishi and Target, engaged in actions, or lack of actions, that a reasonable trier of fact could conclude constitutes conscious disregard for the safety of others. The motion for summary adjudication of punitive damages will be denied.
Tentative Ruling: Troy Fraser et al vs Ford Motor Company Tentative Ruling: Troy Fraser et al vs Ford Motor Company Case Number
Case Type Civil Law & Motion Hearing Date / Time Fri, 05/15/2026 - 10:00 Nature of Proceedings Motion Attorney Fees Tentative Ruling For the reasons set forth below, attorneys fees are awarded in favor of plaintiffs, and against defendants, in the reduced amount of $33,340.62 payable no later than June 26, 2026, by defendants to counsel for plaintiffs. The court declines to rule on plaintiff's request for litigation costs. Any claimed costs are to be recovered by the procedure set forth in the California Rules of Court.
Background: Plaintiffs' complaint, filed November 16, 2022, alleges that plaintiffs entered into a warranty contract with defendant Ford Motor Company (Ford) regarding a 2021 Ford Mustang which Ford had manufactured and distributed. Plaintiffs allege that defects and nonconformities to the warranty manifested within the express warranty period, including, but not limited to, transmission defects, that the defects substantially impair the use, value, or safety of the vehicle, and the value of the vehicle is therefore worthless or de minimis.
While Ford had an affirmative duty to promptly offer to repurchase or replace the vehicle when it failed to conform the vehicle to the terms of the express warranty after a reasonably number of repair attempts, it has failed to do so. The complaint alleges causes of action against Ford for (1) violation of Civil Code section 1793.2(d), (2) violation of Civil Code section 1793.2(b), (3) violation of Civil Code section 1793.2(a)(3), and (4) breach of the implied warranty of merchantability. The statutory violations alleged are violations of the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act.
On February 28, 2025, the parties settled the case by way of Settlement Conference. On March 27, 2025, plaintiffs filed a notice of settlement of entire case. On January 6, 2026, plaintiffs filed the present motion seeking attorneys' fees and costs in the total amount of $74,228.80, consisting of (1) $44,976.50 in attorney fees, (2) a 1.35 multiplier enhancement of $15,741.78, (3) $9,510.52 in costs, and (4) $4,000.00 for plaintiffs' counsel to review defendants' opposition, draft a reply, and attend the hearing on this motion. Defendants oppose the motion, arguing that it should be denied entirely or reduced to no more than $16,294.13. No timely reply to the opposition was filed by plaintiffs.
ANALYSIS: As an initial matter, plaintiffs filed a request for judicial notice that asks the court to judicially notice multiple other trial court rulings. Not blameless, defendants also reference other trial court rulings. While judicial notice may be taken of the rulings, pursuant to Evidence Code section 452, subdivision (d), "we cannot take judicial notice of the truth of hearsay statements in other decisions or court files [citation], or of the truth of factual findings made in another action. [Citations.]" (Johnson & Johnson v.
Superior Court (2011 192 Cal.App.4th 757, 768.) "Thus, the rulings of other courts in purportedly similar matters are not relevant or helpful . . .." (Ibid.) Further, the rulings of other trial courts have no precedential value and are not binding on this court. The court will take judicial notice of the existence of the rulings but not of the truth of the matters asserted therein. Each case stands on its own and the rulings are of little relevance here.
"California follows the 'American rule,' under which each party to a lawsuit ordinarily must pay his or her own attorney fees." (Musaelian v. Adams (2009) 45 Cal.4th 512, 516.) "[A] court has no discretion to award costs not statutorily authorized." (Ladas v. California State Auto. Assn. (1993) 19 Cal.App.4th 761, 774.) However, attorneys' fees are allowable as costs if authorized by "contract," "statute," or "law." (Code Civ. Proc., Sec. 1033.5, subd. (a)(10)(A)-(C).) "If the buyer prevails in an action under this section [Song-Beverly], the buyer shall be allowed by the court to recover as part of the judgment a sum equal to the aggregate amount of costs and expenses, including attorney's fees based on actual time expended, determined by the court to have been reasonably incurred by the buyer in connection with the commencement and prosecution of such action." (Civ.
Code, Sec. 1794, subd. (d).)
" 'Prevailing party' includes the party with a net monetary recovery, a defendant in whose favor a dismissal is entered, a defendant where neither plaintiff nor defendant obtains any relief, and a defendant as against those plaintiffs who do not recover any relief against that defendant. If any party recovers other than monetary relief and in situations other than as specified, the 'prevailing party' shall be as determined by the court, and under those circumstances, the court, in its discretion, may allow costs or not and, if allowed, may apportion costs between the parties on the same or adverse sides pursuant to rules adopted under Section 1034." (Code Civ. Proc., Sec. 1032, subd. (a)(4).)
Defendants do not dispute, in theory, that plaintiffs are entitled to attorneys' fees. However, Defendants request that the court deny awarding them, or reducing them to no more than $16,294.13, because: "(1) the hourly rates sought by Plaintiffs' counsel are excessive and outpace the prevailing hourly rates for Song-Beverly Act litigation in Southern California; (2) Plaintiffs' use of 19 different timekeepers for this run-of-the-mill matter is the very definition of unreasonable and unnecessary; (3) the time entries of Plaintiffs' counsel reflect excessive and inefficient work; (4) a lodestar multiplier is not justified; and (5) Plaintiffs provided no documentation to show that their costs were 'reasonably incurred.' " (Opp., p. 6, ll. 7-13.)
Reasonable Attorney Rates: There were 19 individuals that claim they performed work for plaintiffs in this case. While defendants object that this constitutes overstaffing the case, resulting in unreasonable and unnecessary fees, the court has carefully reviewed the time entries, and it does not appear that there was redundant work performed. The rates sought by plaintiffs for those individuals range from $325 per hour to $650 per hour. "To determine the reasonable hourly rate, the court looks to the " 'hourly rate prevailing in the community for similar work.' " [Citation.]" (Bernardi v.
County of Monterey (2008) 167 Cal.App.4th 1379, 1394.) In reviewing this specific matter, and having knowledge of its progression through litigation, the court notes that this is not a complicated or otherwise unique case. The court has carefully reviewed the credentials of the timekeepers, contained in the Chandy declaration, and has determined the following hourly rates are reasonable and based on the prevailing hourly rates in Santa Barbara County for similar work by similarly skilled attorneys and legal staff: Mani Arabi: $500 per hour; Nicholas Calabia: $425 per hour; Tionna Carvalho: $500 per hour; Dhara Chandy: $300 per hour; Aylana Dias: $300 per hour; Mark Gibson: $400 per hour; Aarushi Khanna: $250 per hour; Daniel Law: $400 per hour; Regina Liou: $500 per hour; Jacob Lister: $495 per hour; Jami Littles: $500 per hour; Ian McCallister: $500 per hour; Mirwais Mohammad: $350 per hour; Tyson Smith: $400 per hour; Brian Tan: $450 per hour; Rabiya Tirmizi: $300 per hour; Sanam Vaziri: 500 per hour; and Desiree Washington: $500 per hour.
Applying the reasonable hourly rates to the hours claimed by plaintiffs, before any further reductions, results in a claim of $38,484.00 in current attorneys' fees.
Specific Time Entries Challenged: "Civil Code section 1794, subdivision (d) requires the attorney fees to be based on " 'actual time expended" ' " and to have been " 'reasonably incurred.' " In Robertson v. Fleetwood Travel Trailers of California, Inc. (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 785, 818-819 (Robertson), the court concluded, " 'the statutory language of section 1794, subdivision (d), is reasonably compatible with a lodestar adjustment method of calculating attorney fees' " because " 'the lodestar adjustment method is based on actual, reasonable attorney time expended as the objective starting point of the analysis [citation], it is compatible with this statutory provision.' " The lodestar method is applicable to calculating attorney fees under section 1794, subdivision (d), the court reasoned, because " 'the lodestar adjustment method is the prevailing rule for calculation of statutory attorney fees unless the statute expressly indicates a contrary intent, and no such contrary intent is apparent.' " (Robertson, supra, 144 Cal.App.4th at p. 821, 50 Cal.Rptr.3d 731.)
We agree. (Doppes v. Bentley Motors, Inc. (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 967, 997.) "[T]he verified time statements of the attorneys, as officers of the court, are entitled to credence in the absence of a clear indication the records are erroneous." (Horsford v. Board of Trustees of California State University (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 359, 396.) "[T]rial courts must carefully review attorney documentation of hours expended" in assessing reasonable and necessary attorney fees. (Ketchum v. Moses (2001) 24 Cal.4h 1122, 1132.)
Defendants challenge several individual time entries, asking the court to completely disallow the fees or to reduce them. The court has carefully reviewed the challenged time entries and will reduce some of the claimed time as follows: January 23, 2023, entry claims 3.1 hours for Mirwais Mohammad to prepare discovery requests. Defendants request a 15 percent reduction. The court agrees with defendants that the discovery requests in these cases are primarily based on boilerplate and "copy and paste" templates. The court has, in fact, seen the discovery requests when ruling on a motion to compel further responses and notes that the requests are typical of many prior, and subsequent, cases. They are largely identical to the requests in other cases. The court will reduce the fee for this entry by 15 percent, using the reduced rate for the timekeeper of $350 per hour. (Minus $162.75)
March 21, 2023, entry claims 4.5 hours for Desiree Washington to draft a 31 page meet and confer letter regarding defendants' objections and responses to discovery. Defendants request a 45 percent reduction. The court agrees that the amount is excessive. The court addressed the meet and confer letter when ruling on a motion to compel further responses. In its tentative ruling, the court stated: "The court has reviewed the 31-page meet and confer letter. Plaintiffs' meet and confer letter is quite obviously a form letter, that is familiar to the court, primarily discussing the validity of objections in general, which has been slightly modified to address the responses in dispute." The court will reduce the fee for this entry by 45 percent, using the reduced rate for the timekeeper of $500 per hour. (Minus $1,012.50)
August 22, 2023, entry claims 2.9 hours for Nicholas Calabia to draft a further meet and confer letter regarding defendants' discovery response. Defendants request a 25 percent reduction, arguing that the time spent was unreasonable and excessive. Calabia's rate of $425 per hour was not reduced. The time spent on the meet and confer letter will be reduced by 25 percent to reflect a reasonable amount of time spent on the task, for the same reasons discussed above. (Minus $308.13)
October 18, 2023, entry claims 4.0 hours for Tyson Smith to draft a motion to compel further responses to requests for production of documents, proposed order, and points and authorities. Defendants argue the time spent was unreasonable and unnecessary. The court agrees with defendants that the motion was primarily based on boilerplate and copy and paste templates. The court has seen the same motions, with just a few facts modified, many times. Defendants request a 65 percent reduction. The court will reduce the time by 50 percent, using the reduced rate for the timekeeper, to reflect a reasonable amount of time spent on the task. (Minus $800)
October 18, 2023, entry claims an additional 5.0 hours for Tyson Smith to revise and finalize the motion to compel. Defendants request that the time be reduced by 65 percent. The court agrees, for the reasons stated above, and will reduce the time entry by 65 percent at Smiths reduced rate. (Minus $1,300)
January 10, 2024, entry claims 3.0 hours for Tyson Smith to draft reply in support of motion to compel. Defendants request that the time be reduced by 60 percent because the time claimed is unreasonable and excessive. The court agrees and will reduce the time by 50 percent at Smith's reduced rate. (Minus $600)
January 11, 2024, entry claims an additional 4.0 hours for Tyson Smith to revise and finalize the reply. Defendants request that the time be reduced by 60 percent. The court will reduce the time by the requested 60 percent, using Smith's reduced rate, to reflect a reasonable time spent on the task. (Minus $960)
The court does not find that it is proper to reduce any of the other claimed time for current fees. Applying the reductions to the $38,484.00 in current attorneys' fees results in current reasonable and necessary fees of $33,340.62.
Anticipated Fees: Plaintiffs, by way of the Notice of Motion, seek $4,000.00 for review of defendants' opposition, drafting of a reply, and attending the hearing on the motion. However, they do not address this request, at all, in the body of the motion or by way of declaration. The basis upon which plaintiffs seek to recover this amount is left entirely to speculation. Because plaintiffs have failed to meet their burden of establishing the reasonableness and necessity of these claimed fees, they will not be awarded.
Fee Enhancement: Plaintiffs seek a loadstar multiplier enhancement of 1.35, arguing that it is warranted because of: "(1) the excellent outcome achieved for Plaintiffs; (2) the substantial risks posed by this litigation; and (3) the delay in payment of fees." "[T]he trial court is not required to include a fee enhancement to the basic lodestar figure for contingent risk, exceptional skill, or other factors, although it retains discretion to do so in the appropriate case; moreover, the party seeking a fee enhancement bears the burden of proof." (Ketchum v. Moses, supra, 24 Cal.4th at p. 1138.) The court does not find that it would be appropriate to include a multiplier in the present matter. Plaintiffs request for a multiplier will be denied.