MOTION TO CHALLENGE THE PRIVILEGE LOG AND ORDER FULL COMPLIANCE WITH THE COURT ORDER
the loan makes Staiton’s documents regarding the loan constitutes a slander of title when the loan has not been voided.
She fails to establish that the Financial Code is applicable to the loan. The portion of the Financial Code that Goger attempts to apply to Staiton only applies to those making more than five loans in a 12-month period. (Financial Code § 22050(e).) The only evidence to support that the Financial Code applies to Staiton is that on a website an individual with the same name as Richard Staiton, identified himself as an investor interested in property acquisitions in the Palm Desert area. It is unclear when this post was made and whether it was made by Staiton.
Additionally, it is unclear how this shows that Staiton’s conduct is covered by the Financial Code. This printout appears to indicate that an individual is looking to connect with buyers to invest or buy property. It indicates that this person is in “Property Acquisitions.” There is no language indicating that this individual is a lender. This evidence does nothing to establish that Staiton made more than 5 loans in a 12-year time period. Additionally, Goger provides no evidence that any of Staiton’s conduct was willful.
As such, she has failed to meet her burden to establish that there is a triable issue of material fact as to the second cause of action.
While Goger contends that she is likely to prove at trial that the loan was fake, she again provides no evidence in the supplemental opposition to support this assertion. She argues that it is possible that Staiton may have worked for Bent. Again, she does not provide any evidence that there was any working relationship between Staiton and Goger. Even if she did establish this, this does not establish that the loan was fake. As such, the motion is granted as to the second cause of action. It is denied as to the first and third causes of action because there are triable issues of material fact as to these causes of action.
3. CASE # CASE NAME HEARING NAME MOTION TO CHALLENGE THE DINH VS COUNTY OF PRIVILEGE LOG AND ORDER FULL
RIVERSIDE COMPLIANCE WITH THE COURT ORDER Tentative Ruling:
Plaintiff moves to challenge the adequacy of the privilege log served by the County in response to Plaintiff’s document demands described in her deposition notices of two County employees, Olivia Serna and Matthew Thompson, and to compel the County’s compliance with the Court’s previous November 12, 2025, order compelling production of such documents. Plaintiff noticed the depositions of the County’s employees, Olivia Serna (Asst. Director) and Matt Thompson (Senior Investigator), who Plaintiff alleges were tasked with pretextually investigating Plaintiff during her employment with the County.
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Plaintiff contends that these deponents failed to produce certain emails and records which were demanded in Plaintiff’s deposition notices. Plaintiff contends that despite the Court’s order compelling production of records, the County has intentionally withheld discoverable emails and communications while standing on the objections to production of some 221 entries described in its privilege log. Plaintiff contends the objections are meritless.
On May 11, 2026, the Court continued the hearing on this motion, ordering County to revise its privilege log to provide additional information sufficient for the Court to evaluate its privilege claims stated in the entries placed at issue in Plaintiff motion. The County was also required to identify the specific request number to which the entries respond. On June 01, 2026, the County filed an amended opposition, reasserting that the motion is deficient for being filed without a properly prepared separate statement and raising a new challenge that the motion is untimely.
The amended opposition is ordered stricken for reason it was not authorized by the Court. On June 09, 2026, the County filed an amended privilege log, which provides very little additional information, along with the number of the specific requests to which each document is responsive. In summary, Plaintiff’s motion is granted in part and denied in part.
Analysis
I. The motion was properly made.
“If a deponent fails to answer any question or to produce any document, electronically stored information, or tangible thing under the deponent’s control that is specified in the deposition notice or a deposition subpoena, the party seeking discovery may move the court for an order compelling that answer or production.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 2025.480(a).) On November 12, 2025, the Court granted Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel Further Deposition of County Employees and to Produce Documents at Deposition, seeking an order compelling Olivia Serna and Matthew Thompson to appear at deposition with responsive records for further testimony. The Court clarified that the County may use a privilege log.
Plaintiff now moves to compel compliance with the Court’s order requiring production and challenging the County’s refusal to produce certain documents under the deliberative process privilege and the attorney-client/work production privilege. Such motion is properly brought under subdivision (k) of Code of Civil Procedure section 2025.480, which provides that, if a deponent fails to obey the order compelling answer or production, the court may make those “orders that are just against the disobedient party, or against the party with whom the disobedient deponent is affiliated, including the imposition of an issue sanction, an evidence sanction, or a terminating sanctions under Chapter 7 (commencing with Section 2023.010).” (Code Civ.
Proc., § 2025.480(k).) As the Court has previously noted, contrary to the County contention, such motion need not be filed with a separate statement pursuant to California Rules of Court, rule 3.1245. Further, contrary to the County’s contention, the motion was not untimely made. The instant motion seeks compliance with a prior order on requests for production described in deposition notices (Code Civ. Proc., § 2025.480(k)), which is not bound by the 45-day time limit applicable to a motion to compel further responses to request for production of documents (Code Civ.
Proc., § 2031.310(c)).
II. The motion is granted in part and denied in part.
Plaintiff noticed the depositions of the County’s employees, Olivia Serna (Asst. Director) and Matt Thompson (Senior Investigator), who Plaintiff alleges were tasked with pretextually investigating Plaintiff during her employment with the County. Plaintiff contends that these deponents failed to produce certain emails and records which were demanded in Plaintiff’s deposition notices.
As a general rule, discovery may be obtained as to any nonprivileged information “that is relevant to the subject matter involved...” (Code Civ. Proc., §2017.010.) In employment discrimination and retaliation cases under FEHA, the courts rely on a burden shifting test under which the employer must first show that there was a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for its decision to terminate the employee. (See Morgan Regents of University of California (2000) 88 Cal.App.4th 52, 68.) Once an employer makes this showing, the employee “must produce ‘substantial responsive evidence’ that the employer’s showing was untrue or pretextual.” (Martin v.
Lockheed Missiles & Space Co. (1994) 29 Cal.App.4th 1718, 1735.) Therefore, the communications which Plaintiff seeks to discover are directly relevant to Plaintiff’s claims of pretextual motive and Defendant’s legitimate motive defense. Such records must be produced unless Defendant can establish that a privilege exists.
Plaintiff contends that despite the Court’s order compelling production of records, the County has intentionally withheld discoverable emails and communications while standing on the objections to production of some 221 entries described in its privilege log. Specifically, Plaintiff challenges the County’s objections stated in Entry Nos. 6-44, 55-60, 64, 73-77, 79-92, 95-121, 125-147, 154-169, 181-186, 188-194, 196-198, 201- 203, 207, 209-210, 212-214, 217-219 of the privilege log based on the ground of the “deliberate process privilege.” Plaintiff also challenges the County’s objections stated in Entry Nos. 1, 2, 3, 5, 174, and 187 of the privilege log on the ground of attorney-client privilege and work product doctrine.
Here, the motion is granted in part, ordering Defendant County to comply with the Court’s November 12, 2025, order by producing all records responsive to the document requests described in Plaintiff’s deposition notices to Olivia Serna and Matthew Thompson for which County fails to establish that a privilege exists under the “deliberative process privilege.” These records include Entry Nos. 6-44, 55-60, 64, 73- 77, 79-92, 95-121, 125-147, 154-169, 181-186, 188-194, 196-198, 201-203, 207, 209- 210, 212-214, 217-219 of the County’s privilege log. “ ‘Under the deliberative process privilege, senior officials of all three branches of government enjoy a qualified, limited privilege not to disclose or to be examined concerning not only the mental processes by which a given decision was reached, but the substance of conversations discussions, debates, deliberations and like materials reflecting advice, opinions, and recommendations by which government policy is processed and formulated.’ ” (Citizens for Open Government v.
City of Lodi (2012) 205 Cal.App.4th 296, 307, citing Regent of University of California v. Superior Court (1999) 20 Cal.4th 509, 540 (conc. opn.).) Nevertheless, the government body asserting the “deliberative process privilege” bears the burden of showing that a public interest in nondisclosure exists and that such public interest of nondisclosure clearly outweighs the public interest in disclosure. (Citizens for Open Government v. City of Lodi (2012) 205 Cal.App.4th 296, 307.) Here, the County’s amended privilege log fails to show, and the County has failed to explain in its opposition, whether there is a public interest specific to the matters at issue which justifies the privilege.
Merely invoking the general policy behind the privilege is not sufficient to establish the conditions for the creation of the privilege, and the governmental agency must explain the public’s specific interest in nondisclosure of the documents in question in this case. (Ibid.)
As to the same entries for which the deliberative process privilege is being asserted, the County now also references Evidence Code section 1040. However, the County has not established that a privilege exists under this section. Evidence Code section 1040 provides in relevant parts: “A public entity has a privilege to refuse to disclose official information ... if the privilege is claimed by a person authorized by the public entity to do so and: [¶] (1) Disclosure is forbidden by an act of the Congress of the United States or a statute of this state; or [¶] (2) Disclosure of the information is against the public interest....” (Evid.
Code, § 1040(b)(1)(2).) Here, the County has not explained whether the official information privilege can be established under either basis. The burden lies with the government agency claiming the official information privilege to demonstrate the information it seeks to suppress falls within the scope of an applicable statutory privilege. (Los Angeles Unified School Dist. v. Trustees of Southern California IBEW-NECA Pension Plan (2010) 187 Cal.App.4th 621, 628.)
The motion is denied in part as to those documents described in the County’s privilege log for which it can be ascertained that a privilege does exist under the attorney-client privilege (Evid. Code, § 954). These records include Entry Nos. 1, 2, 3, 5, 174, and 187 of the privilege log. These entries describe the County’s internal communications regarding Plaintiff’s workers compensation claim. It is true that the privilege does not automatically attach to every report or statement by a corporate agent and subsequently furnished to the corporation’s attorney. (See D.I.
Chadbourne, Inc. v. Superior Court of City and County of San Francisco (1964) 60 Cal.2d 723, 732.) “[W]hether or not the privilege exist[] must be determined after first ascertaining the dominant purpose of requiring the ... report in the first instance, and ... the trial court must make that determination from the facts presented to it.” (Id. at 730.) Here, as described in the County’s privilege log, the entries challenged by Plaintiff pertain to the County’s internal communications between various County employees, including its claim adjuster and investigator regarding Plaintiff’s worker’s compensation claim filed with the County.
Based on general observation of the entire privilege log, it can be inferred that the dominant purpose of these communications was to assess the County’s potential liability and eventual transmission to outside counsel for legal advice as there are other entries in the privilege log describing correspondences with outside counsel regarding the same topic. (See Scripps Health v. Superior Court (2003) 109 Cal.App.4th 529, 534-35 [dominant purpose of “occurrence report” created by employees of self-insured hospital was to report incidents that might result in litigation to hospital self-insurance plan for use by attorney representing hospital].) “ ‘Where it is clear that the communication has but a single purpose, there is little difficulty in concluding that the privilege should be applied or withheld accordingly. ...’ ” [Citations.] (Gene Compton’s Corp. v.
Superior Court In and For City and County of San Francisco (1962) 205 Cal.App.2d 365, 373.)
Moreover, as the Court has previously noted, the motion is also denied as to Plaintiff’s request to compel the County’s compliance to its responses to Plaintiff’s Request for Production of Documents Sets 4 and 6. These written discovery requests were not the subject matter of the Court’s November 12, 2025, ruling or any prior motion filed in this case.
Ruling Grant in part and deny in part.
4. CASE # CASE NAME HEARING NAME MOTION TO QUASH SUBPOENAS CVRI2505151 FLORES VS PEKUN FOR BILLING RECORDS Tentative Ruling: The Motion to Quash is granted in part and denied in part. The Court agrees that the subpoena is overbroad in seeking 10 years of medical records. However, the limitation Plaintiff requested was not reasonable either. The Court orders that the subpoenas be limited to medical records from 2020 through the present. No sanctions are appropriate.
5. CASE # CASE NAME HEARING NAME DOUG WALL MOTION FOR LEAVE TO AMEND CONSTRUCTION, INC. VS CVRI2507121 COMPLAINT ON COMPLAINT FOR GREEN ROCK OTHER COLLECTIONS INVESTORS, LLC Tentative Ruling:
A stipulation allowing the filing of an amended pleading was signed by the Court on 5/20/2026.
6. CASE # CASE NAME HEARING NAME CORONEL-PAYAN VS CVRI2406513 MOTION FOR ATTORNEYS FEES GENERAL MOTORS LLC Tentative Ruling:
Grant motion and award a lesser amount of $11,444.50 in fees and $600.50 in costs.