PADILLA vs SHERRILL, et al.

23CV003404: PADILLA vs SHERRILL, et al. 04/13/2026 Hearing on Motion to Strike in Department 8D

Tentative Ruling

****NOTICE: EFFECTIVE APRIL 13, 2026, THIS DEPARTMENT WILL MOVE TO THE TANI G. CANTIL-SAKAUYE COURTHOUSE LOCATED AT 500 G. ST. SACRAMENTO, CA. MOTIONS NOTICED FOR DEPARTMENT 25 WILL BE HEARD IN DEPARTMENT 8D OF THE NEW COURTHOUSE. ALL HEARINGS WILL TAKE PLACE AT THIS NEW LOCATION****

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23CV003404: PADILLA vs SHERRILL, et al. 04/13/2026 Hearing on Motion to Strike in Department 8D

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TENTATIVE RULING: Self-represented Defendant Joseph Sherrill’s (“Defendant”) demurrer and motion to strike portions of the First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) are ruled upon as follows.

BACKGROUND

This action arises out of Plaintiff Joseph Padilla’s (“Plaintiff”) operation of a machine shop business known as Precision Machine & Engine out of premises located at approximately 3100-B Elkhorn Boulevard, North Highlands, California (the “Premises”). Plaintiff leased the Premises from Defendant, who owns, controls, and/or manages the real property commonly known as 3100 Elkhorn Boulevard, North Highlands, California (the “Property”), including the Premises.

On June 20, 2023, Plaintiff filed the Complaint, which alleged causes of action for breach of lease, negligence, intentional interference with contractual relations, harassment, and defamation. At the time the Complaint was filed, Plaintiff was operating his business at the Premises. (See, e.g., Compl. 9:9-26.)

After filing an Answer and Cross-Complaint, on November 13, 2025, Defendant moved

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

23CV003404: PADILLA vs SHERRILL, et al. 04/13/2026 Hearing on Motion to Strike in Department 8D

for judgment on the pleadings on the Complaint. On December 10, 2025, the Court granted in part and denied in part the motion. The Court granted the motion with leave to amend as to Plaintiff’s causes of action for breach of contract (lease agreement), intentional interference with contractual relations, and harassment. The Court denied the motion as to Plaintiff’s causes of action for negligence and defamation.

Plaintiff filed the operative FAC on December 17, 2025, The FAC alleges causes of action for (1) breach of lease, (2) negligence, (3) intentional interference with prospective economic advantage, (4) interference with quiet enjoyment/statutory landlord harassment (Civ. Code, § 1940.2), and (5) defamation. The FAC adds allegations concerning Plaintiff’s vacancy of the Premises and Defendant’s postvacancy conduct towards Plaintiff. (See, e.g., FAC ¶¶ 20-27.) The FAC also adds a prayer for punitive damages. (FAC 7:5-8.)

Defendant now demurs to the FAC and moves to strike portions of the FAC, including its post-tenancy allegations, prayer for injunctive relief, and prayer for punitive damages.

FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS

Pertinent to the instant motion, the FAC alleges as follows:

The Lease and Its Legal Effect

5. On or about September 1, 2019, Plaintiff and Defendant entered into a written Commercial Lease with Purchase Agreement (the “Lease”) for the Premises.

6. The Lease granted Plaintiff the right to use not only the interior shop space, but also the common areas of the Property reasonably necessary for business operations, including access routes, driveways, parking areas, and loading and unloading areas.

7. By its legal effect, the Lease obligated Defendant, as landlord, to maintain, repair, and insure the roof, roof structure, exterior envelope, and structural components of the building, and to provide Plaintiff with quiet

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

23CV003404: PADILLA vs SHERRILL, et al. 04/13/2026 Hearing on Motion to Strike in Department 8D

enjoyment of the Premises. Plaintiff’s obligations were limited to routine interior maintenance and did not include roof repair, roof replacement, or remediation of latent structural defects.

8. Plaintiff performed all obligations required of him under the Lease, or performance was excused by Defendant’s prior material breaches.

Roof Failure, Water Intrusion, and Independent Engineering Findings

9. The building is more than sixty years old. The roofing systems over the Premises included aged asphalt composition shingles and metal roofing panels that had exceeded their useful life prior to Plaintiff’s tenancy.

10. Beginning no later than early 2023, repeated rain events resulted in water intrusion through multiple roof penetrations, failed seams, and deteriorated framing, causing water to enter the Premises and damage machinery, tools, customer engine components, inventory, and work areas.

11. Plaintiff repeatedly notified Defendant of the roof leaks, wood rot, and interior damage. Defendant undertook only temporary, inadequate patching, which failed to stop ongoing leaks.

12. In February 2023, an independent forensic engineering firm retained by Plaintiff’s commercial insurer inspected the Premises and determined that the roof system and supporting wood framing had suffered long-term deterioration, rot, and deferred maintenance; that the roof had exceeded its useful life and required replacement; that patchwork and sealant repairs were improper and ineffective; and that active microbial growth posed a health

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

23CV003404: PADILLA vs SHERRILL, et al. 04/13/2026 Hearing on Motion to Strike in Department 8D

hazard.

13. The engineer further concluded that the water intrusion and roof failures were not caused by Plaintiff’s operations, were not attributable to any single storm event, and were not caused by a vent penetration installed by Plaintiff.

Insurance Denial and Business Harm

14. Based on the engineering findings and review of the Lease, Plaintiff’s insurer determined that Defendant, as landlord, was responsible for maintaining and insuring the building and roof, and denied coverage for building damage on the ground that the losses resulted from deferred maintenance and deterioration for which Defendant was responsible.

15. As a direct and foreseeable result of Defendant’s failure to repair or replace the roof, Plaintiff’s commercial insurance policy was nonrenewed, and multiple insurers thereafter declined to provide replacement coverage due to the condition of the roof, impairing Plaintiff’s ability to operate his business and causing substantial economic harm.

Harassment, Obstruction, and Interference During Tenancy

16. Rather than remedy the unsafe conditions, Defendant engaged in a pattern of hostile, harassing, and obstructive conduct toward Plaintiff during the tenancy.

17. Defendant repeatedly blocked access routes to the Premises with vehicles, heavy equipment, debris, and materials, interfered with deliveries and forklift unloading, and obstructed ingress and egress necessary for Plaintiff’s business operations.

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

23CV003404: PADILLA vs SHERRILL, et al. 04/13/2026 Hearing on Motion to Strike in Department 8D

18. Defendant verbally attacked Plaintiff in the presence of customers, vendors, and others, falsely accusing Plaintiff of being a drug addict, a “doper,” dishonest, unethical, and untrustworthy, and making disparaging statements about Plaintiff’s business.

19. Defendant surveilled and videotaped Plaintiff’s business activities, deliveries, and access to the Premises, confronted individuals on site, and asserted false claims of “harassment” against Plaintiff while Defendant himself continued to interfere with operations.

Constructive Eviction and Forced Vacatur

20. By mid-to-late 2023, the Premises were unsafe and untenantable due to roof failure, water intrusion, mold, blocked access, and Defendant’s ongoing harassment and obstruction.

21. Defendant’s acts and omissions substantially interfered with Plaintiff’s use and enjoyment of the Premises and forced Plaintiff to vacate in order to protect his safety, property, and business.

Post-Tenancy Retaliation and Interference

22. Defendant’s harassing conduct did not cease after Plaintiff vacated the Premises, but instead continued and escalated. Defendant repeatedly drove by Plaintiff’s place of business and Plaintiff’s private residence, monitored activity at both locations, and photographed Plaintiff, Plaintiff’s residence, and individuals associated with Plaintiff.

23. Defendant circulated or transmitted photographs and information about Plaintiff and Plaintiff’s personal life to third parties, including family members and

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

23CV003404: PADILLA vs SHERRILL, et al. 04/13/2026 Hearing on Motion to Strike in Department 8D

other persons connected to Plaintiff, and made disparaging and intimidating statements about Plaintiff with no legitimate purpose.

24. Defendant further contacted third parties connected to Plaintiff’s business and personal relationships, including neighboring businesses and persons associated with Plaintiff’s family, for the purpose of interfering with Plaintiff’s relationships, intimidating potential witnesses, and discouraging others from associating with Plaintiff.

25. Defendant also misused third-party complaints and governmental reporting mechanisms, including contacting local authorities regarding Plaintiff, as a means of harassment and retaliation.

26. Defendant’s post-tenancy conduct was intentional, served no legitimate purpose, and formed part of a continuing course of conduct designed to harass, intimidate, and interfere with Plaintiff’s personal and business relationships.

27. In furtherance of this course of conduct, Defendant contacted Plaintiff’s new business partner and sent a multi-page written “preservation of evidence” and legal notice letter asserting anticipated civil claims, threatening litigation, sanctions, and adverse inferences, and demanding immediate and expansive evidence preservation. Defendant sent this letter with the intent to intimidate the recipient, disrupt Plaintiff’s business relationship, and deter the recipient from continuing to associate or do business with Plaintiff.

(FAC 2:14-5:25 [underlining added].)

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SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

23CV003404: PADILLA vs SHERRILL, et al. 04/13/2026 Hearing on Motion to Strike in Department 8D

DISCUSSION

The Court will address Defendant’s demurrer and motion to strike separately.

As an initial matter, the Court notes that “[e]ach motion or demurrer should normally be set forth in a separate document.” (Weil & Brown, Cal. Practice Guide: Civ. Procedure Before Trial (The Rutter Group 2025 Update) ¶ 9:24.3.) Here, Defendant combined his demurrer and motion to strike in a single motion.

A. Request for Judicial Notice

Defendant’s unopposed request for judicial notice is granted as to Item Nos. 1-6 for the purposes appropriate for judicial notice. (See Evid. Code § 452, subd. (d); see also Johnson & Johnson v. Superior Court (2011) 192 Cal.App.4th 757, 768 [court may take judicial notice of the existence of court documents but not to the truth of the statements contained therein].) For example, although the Court takes judicial notice of Defendant’s Cross-Complaint, it will not consider the “Commercial Lease with Purchase Agreement” attached thereto since the Court cannot consider extrinsic materials in deciding a demurrer or motion to strike.

Defendant’s request for judicial notice is denied as to Item No. 7, as this document is not the proper subject of judicial notice.

B. Motion to Strike

1) Legal Standard

“The court may, upon a motion made pursuant to [Code of Civil Procedure] Section 435, or at any time in its discretion, and upon terms it deems proper: (a) Strike out any irrelevant, false, or improper matter inserted in any pleading, (b) Strike out all or any part of any pleading not drawn or filed in conformity with the laws of this state, a court rule, or an order of the court.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 436.)

The grounds for a motion to strike must appear on the face of the challenged pleading or from any matter of which the court is required to take judicial notice. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437, subd. (a).)

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

23CV003404: PADILLA vs SHERRILL, et al. 04/13/2026 Hearing on Motion to Strike in Department 8D

The use of the motion to strike should be cautious and sparing. It should not be a procedural “line item veto.” (PH II, Inc. v. Superior Court (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 1680, 1683.)

2) The Parties’ Arguments

Defendant moves to strike Plaintiff’s “new causes for post-tenancy harassment[,] . . . [p]ost-tenancy retaliation, constructive eviction and punitive damages[,]” arguing that their addition exceeds the scope of leave to amend given in the Court’s ruling on Defendant’s motion for judgment on the pleadings. (Demurrer & Mot. to Strike (“Demurrer”) 2:23-24.) Defendant also moves to strike “improper allegations, including conclusory claims of injunctive [sic] . . ., post tenancy [conduct] . . ., duty, breach, and the conclusory damages and inadequate prayer for relief.” (Demurrer 2:27-3:2.)

Plaintiff’s opposition does not address Defendant’s arguments made in support of the motion to strike, only the demurrer.

“Normally, when a demurrer is sustained, or motion to strike [or motion for judgment on the pleadings] is granted, some material allegation of the prior pleading has to be changed.” (Weil & Brown, Cal. Practice Guide: Civ. Procedure Before Trial (The Rutter Group 2025 Update) ¶ 6:633.) However, “the scope of permissible amendment is limited to the cause(s) of action to which the demurrer has been sustained [or motion granted].” (Id. at ¶ 6:635.5 [citing cases]; see Harris v. Wachovia Mortgage, FSB (2010) 185 Cal.App.4th 1018, 1023 [“Following an order sustaining a demurrer or a motion for judgment on the pleadings with leave to amend, the plaintiff may amend his or her complaint only as authorized by the court’s order.”].) “The plaintiff may not amend the complaint to add a new cause of action without having obtained permission to do so, unless the new cause of action is within the scope of the order granting leave to amend.” (Harris, supra, at p. 1023.)

Here, the FAC includes causes of action for intentional interference with prospective economic advantage, interference with quiet enjoyment/statutory landlord harassment (Civ. Code, § 1940.2), and a prayer for punitive damages, none of which were alleged in the Complaint or within the scope of the Court’s order on Defendant’s motion for judgment on the pleadings. Similarly, the Complaint did not include factual allegations concerning Plaintiff’s vacancy of the premises or any post-vacancy conduct by

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

23CV003404: PADILLA vs SHERRILL, et al. 04/13/2026 Hearing on Motion to Strike in Department 8D

Defendant. Accordingly, the Court finds that these factual allegations, causes of action, and prayer for punitive damages should be stricken.

Should Plaintiff desire to allege these matters, he may move for leave to amend pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 473 and California Rules of Court, rule (“CRC”) 3.1324.

The remainder of Defendant’s motion to strike, which concerns Plaintiff’s request for injunctive relief and allegations of duty, breach, and damages is denied. None of these matters are new to the FAC and they are not alleged in such a conclusory manner to be the proper subject of a motion to strike. (See, e.g., Perkins v. Superior Court (1981) 117 Cal.App.3d 1, 430.)

For the stated reasons, Defendant’s motion to strike is granted in part and denied in part. It is granted as to the following matters, which are ordered stricken from the FAC: the third cause of action for intentional interference with prospective economic advantage, fourth cause of action for interference with quiet enjoyment/statutory landlord harassment (Civ. Code § 1940.2), prayer for punitive damages, and factual allegations concerning Plaintiff’s vacancy of the Premises and Defendants’ postvacancy conduct (FAC ¶¶ 20-27).

C. Demurrer

1) Legal Standard

The Court’s review is “governed by settled standards.” (SJJC Aviation Services, LLC v. City of San Jose (2017) 12 Cal.App.5th 1043, 1051.) The Court:

Review[s] the . . . complaint . . . “to determine whether it alleges facts stating a cause of action under any legal theory. [Citation.] [¶] Because the function of a demurrer is not to test the truth or accuracy of the facts alleged in the complaint, [the Court] assume[s] the truth of all properly pleaded factual allegations. [Citation.] Whether the plaintiff will be able to prove these allegations is not relevant; [the] focus is on the legal sufficiency of the complaint.” [Citations.] “Further, [the Court] give[s] the complaint a reasonable

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23CV003404: PADILLA vs SHERRILL, et al. 04/13/2026 Hearing on Motion to Strike in Department 8D

interpretation, reading it as a whole and its parts in their context.” [Citations.]

[The Court] also consider[s] matters that may be judicially noticed and facts appearing in any exhibits attached to the petition and complaint. [Citations.] We do not, however, assume the truth of “mere contentions or assertions contradicted by judicially noticeable facts.” [Citations.]

After reviewing the allegations of the petition, the accompanying exhibits, and the matters properly subject to judicial notice, [fn.] [the Court] determine[s] whether the petition states a cause of action as a matter of law.

(Id. at pp. 1051-1052.)

2) The Parties’ Arguments

Defendant demurs to each of the causes of action alleged in the FAC on the grounds that they fail to state sufficient facts to constitute a cause of action, are uncertain, and are barred by the statutes of limitations.

The Court limits its discussion to the first (breach of lease), second (negligence), and fifth (defamation) causes of action since it granted Defendant’s motion to strike as to the third and fourth causes of action.

a. Breach of Lease

Defendant argues that the first cause of action for breach of lease fails because “it relies on the Lease but fails to attach it, quote its terms verbatim, or plead its legal effect adequately, violating pleading requirements.” (Demurrer 4:22-24.) Defendant also argues that the FAC’s allegations are contradicted by the Lease’s terms, the FAC is uncertain, and Plaintiff’s damages allegations are conclusory. (Id. at 5:12-18.)

In order to plead a breach of contract cause of action, the plaintiff may either attach a copy of the agreement, set forth the material terms verbatim or plead the legal effect of the agreement. (McKell v. Washington Mutual, Inc. (2006) 142 Cal.App.4th 1457, 1489;

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

23CV003404: PADILLA vs SHERRILL, et al. 04/13/2026 Hearing on Motion to Strike in Department 8D

see also Perry v. Robertson (1988) 201 Cal.App.3d 333, 341 [“Usually, a written contract is pleaded by alleging its making and attaching a copy which is incorporated by reference. . . . However, a written contract can also be pleaded by alleging the making and the substance of the relevant terms.”].) “In order to plead a contract by its legal effect, [the] plaintiff must ‘allege the substance of its relevant terms. This is more difficult, for it requires a careful analysis of the instrument, comprehensiveness in statement, and avoidance of legal conclusions.’ [Citation.]” (Ibid.) For example, the plaintiff must identify the contractual provisions, which they allege the defendant breached. (Ibid. [stating “Plaintiffs have . . . failed to identify the . . . contractual provision under which Washington Mutual required them to pay underwriting and wire transfer costs”].)

Here, the Court finds that Plaintiff has adequately alleged the legal effect of Lease to support his first cause of action. (See, e.g., Construction Protective Services, Inc. v. TIG Specialty Insurance Co. (2002) 29 Cal.4th 189, 199 [stating “though the complaint could have been clearer, it satisfactorily alleged (1) that the insurance policy obligated TIG Insurance to defend and indemnify CPS against suits seeking damages, and (2) that under the terms of the policy, SHC’s setoff claim fell within the scope of that contractual obligation”].)

For example, Plaintiff alleges that the Lease “obligated Defendant . . . to maintain, repair, and insure the roof, roof structure, exterior envelope, and structural components of the building,” that Plaintiff “repeatedly notified Defendant of . . . roof leaks, wood rot, and interior damage[,]”that Defendant breached his obligations by “undert[aking] only temporary, inadequate patching, which failed to stop ongoing leaks[,]” and that “[a]s a direct and foreseeable result of Defendant’s failure to repair or replace the roof, Plaintiff’s commercial insurance policy was nonrenewed, and multiple insurers thereafter declined to provide replacement coverage due to the condition of the roof, impairing Plaintiff’s ability to operate his business and causing substantial economic harm.” (FAC ¶¶ 7-15.)

These allegations sufficiently state a breach of contract (lease) cause of action by the Lease’s legal effect.

Moreover, the Court rejects Defendant’s argument that Plaintiff’s allegations are contradicted by the Lease’s terms since the Lease is extrinsic evidence that cannot be considered on demurrer.

Finally, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s damages allegations are sufficiently pled and are not uncertain. (See Weil & Brown, supra, at ¶ 7:85 [“A demurrer for uncertainty will be sustained only where the complaint is so bad that defendant cannot reasonably

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

23CV003404: PADILLA vs SHERRILL, et al. 04/13/2026 Hearing on Motion to Strike in Department 8D

respond—i.e., defendant cannot reasonably determine what issues must be admitted or denied, or what counts or claims are directed against defendant.” (citing cases)].)

For the stated reasons, Defendant’s demurrer to the first cause of action for breach of lease is overruled.

b. Negligence

Defendant demurs to Plaintiff’s second cause of action for negligence, arguing the allegation of duty is contrary to the Lease’s terms and that the cause of action is derivative of the breach of contract claim so fails with it. (Demurrer 5:20-26.) Defendant further argues that the negligence cause of action is futile because it does not add a legally distinct theory, the damages allegations are conclusory, and the FAC is uncertain.

Here too, the Court rejects Defendant’s argument that the FAC’s allegations are contradicted by the Lease’s terms since the Court cannot consider the Lease on demurrer. Defendant’s argument that the negligence cause of action is derivative of the breach of contract claim and fails with it is rejected since the Court overruled Defendant’s demurrer on the breach of contract claim. And Plaintiff’s allegations are neither uncertain nor conclusory. Finally, the negligence cause of action is not futile as a plaintiff may plead alternate theories of liability. (See Perry v. Robertson (1988) 201 Cal.App.3d 333, 341 [stating the same act “may be both a breach of contract and a tort” and “[w]hen such a hybrid cause of action arises, the plaintiff may pursue both legal theories of recovery until an occasion for an election of remedies arises”].)

Defendant’s demurrer to the second cause of action for negligence is overruled.

c. Defamation

Defendant argues “Plaintiff created a sham amendment without leave to amend this claim adding ‘malice’ and economic harm,” and Plaintiff insufficiently alleges the purported defamatory statements and context of the publication. (Demurrer 7:9-11.) Defendant also argues that the alleged defamatory statements are privileged and that the FAC is uncertain.

The Court rejects Defendant’s arguments and overrules the demurrer as to this cause of

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

23CV003404: PADILLA vs SHERRILL, et al. 04/13/2026 Hearing on Motion to Strike in Department 8D

action for the same reasons it denied Defendant’s motion for judgment on the pleadings on the Complaint as to the defamation cause of action. (See Minute Order, Dec. 10, 2025 at pp. 6-7.) in the December 10, 2025 Minute Order ruling on Defendant’s motion for judgment on the pleadings on the original complaint. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant “falsely accused Plaintiff of being a drug addict, a ‘doper,’ dishonest, unethical, and untrustworthy” in the “presence of customers[,]” that such statements “were false” and “unprivileged[,]” and that the statements caused “reputational and economic harm.” (FAC ¶¶ 18, 43-44.) These allegations are sufficient to survive the pleadings stage. (See, e.g., Smith v. Maldonado (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 637, 645 [stating elements of a defamation claim].)

Defendant’s demurrer to Plaintiff’s defamation cause of action is overruled.

d. Statutes of Limitation

Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s entire FAC is subject to demurrer on statute of limitations grounds. (Demurrer 1:24-26.) However, aside from arguing the FAC “is barred by statutes of limitations” (Demurrer 1:26, 2:21-22), Defendant does not support his position with legal argument or citations to authority.

“Where a point is merely asserted by [a party] without any argument of or authority for its proposition, it is deemed to be without foundation and requires no discussion.” (Fraley v. Allstate Ins. Co. (2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 1282, 1291.)

Accordingly, Defendant’s demurrer on statute of limitations grounds is overruled.

CONCLUSION

For the stated reasons, Defendant’s motion to strike is granted in part and denied in part. Where granted – the third cause of action for intentional interference with prospective economic advantage, fourth cause of action for interference with quiet enjoyment/statutory landlord harassment (Civ. Code § 1940.2), prayer for punitive damages, and factual allegations concerning Plaintiff’s vacancy of the Premises and Defendants’ post-vacancy conduct – Plaintiff may move for leave to amend pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 473 and California Rules of Court, rule (“CRC”) 3.1324 should he desire to allege the matters that were stricken.

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

23CV003404: PADILLA vs SHERRILL, et al. 04/13/2026 Hearing on Motion to Strike in Department 8D

Defendant’s demurrer is overruled as to Plaintiff’s first (breach of lease), second (negligence), and fifth (defamation) causes of action.

This minute order is effective immediately. No formal order or other notice is required. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1019.5; Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1312.)