CESENA VS LEE

3. CASE # CASE NAME HEARING NAME CVRI2505828 CESENA VS LEE MOTION TO CONSOLIDATE Tentative Ruling: Plaintiffs’ Motion to Consolidate Case No.s CVRI2505828 and CVRI2506361 is granted; CVRI2505828 is designated as the lead case.

Consolidation is a procedure for uniting separate lawsuits for trial, where they involve common questions of law or fact and are pending in the same court. See CCP § 1048. Code of Civil Procedure section 1048, subdivision (a), allows a court discretion to consolidate pending actions if they involve a common question of law or fact. This provision provides: “When actions involving a common question of law or fact are pending before the court, it may order a joint hearing or trial of any or all the matters in issue in the actions; it may order all the actions consolidated and it may make such orders concerning proceedings therein as may tend to avoid unnecessary costs or delay.” (Code Civ.

Proc., § 1048(a).) Consolidation is within the discretion of the trial court and not a matter of right. (Fisher v. Nash Bldg. Co. (1952) 113 Cal.App.2d 397, 402.) When ruling on a motion for consolidation the issues are whether the proposed to be consolidated have common issues and whether undue confusion or prejudice is likely to result from the consolidation. (Todd-Stenberg v. Dalkon Shield Claimants Trusts (1996) 48 Cal.App.4th 976, 978, 979-980.)

In short, all that the moving party need show is that the issues in each case are basically the same, and that “economy and convenience” would be served by a joint trial. See Jud Whitehead Heater Co. v. Obler (1952) 111 CA2d 861, 867, 245 P2d 608, 610.The granting or denial of the motion to consolidate rests in the sound discretion of the trial court, and will not be reversed except upon a clear showing of abuse of discretion. Fellner v. Steinbaum (1955) 132 CA2d 509, 511, 282 P2d 584, 586. The judge should consider whether a consolidation order would prejudice any party, e.g., whether a party might be prejudiced by having to argue contradictory positions on the same evidence against other parties, or whether the character or conduct of a party or attorney might prejudice the rights of another party. See State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co. v Superior Court (1956) 47 C2d 428, 430–432.

The Negrete Plaintiffs opposed the motion on procedural grounds, noting that the motion was not filed in both cases as required by California Rule of Court 3.350(a)(1)(C). However, the Court finds that the Cesena Plaintiffs substantially complied with the notice requirements. The Negrete Plaintiffs received actual notice of the motion, were served with the moving papers, and filed a comprehensive opposition, thereby fulfilling the intent of the statute to ensure all parties have an opportunity to be heard.

Here, The central issue of liability—specifically, the conduct of Defendant Kennedy Lee and the circumstances leading to the multi-vehicle collision—is identical in both actions. While the Negrete Plaintiffs correctly note that their damages differ from the wrongful death damages sought by the Cesena Plaintiffs, the underlying facts regarding negligence and causation overlap completely. Maintaining separate actions would require the Court, counsel, and witnesses to duplicate discovery and trial efforts in two

different departments (Department 7 and Department 10). Consolidation permits a single court to resolve these common issues once, reducing the burden on the Court and the public.

The Negrete Plaintiffs argue that consolidation will result in unfair prejudice and jury confusion because they wish to distance themselves from Seth Cesena, whom they allege was street racing at the time of the crash. They also raise concerns regarding the status of Edwardo Cesena as a party following reports of his death. The Court finds that any risk of prejudice or confusion can be adequately addressed through appropriate jury instructions.

Ultimately, the efficiency gained by a single trial on liability far outweighs the potential for confusion. (Regarding the status of Plaintiff Edwardo Cesena, the Court expects counsel to follow proper procedures for substitution of parties if necessary, but this does not bar consolidation of the actions themselves).