CITY OF SACRAMENTO, A MUNICIPAL CORPORATION, AND THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA vs SINGH, et al.

A Stipulation and Appointment of Official Reporter Pro Tempore (CV/E-206) is required to be signed by each party, the private court reporter, and the Judge prior to the hearing, if not using a reporter from the Court’s Approved Official Reporter Pro Tempore list.

24CV022594: CITY OF SACRAMENTO, A MUNICIPAL CORPORATION, AND THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA vs SINGH, et al. 06/11/2026 Hearing on Motion - Other for Appointment of a Receiver Pursuant to CCP 564(b) in Department 16D

Once the form is signed it must be filed with the clerk. If a litigant has been granted a fee waiver and requests a court reporter, the party must submit a Request for Court Reporter by a Party with a Fee Waiver (CV/E-211) and it must be filed with the clerk at least 10 days prior to the hearing or at the time the proceeding is scheduled if less than 10 days away. Once approved, the clerk will forward the form to the Court Reporter’s Office and an official reporter will be provided.

*** NOTICE: EFFECTIVE APRIL 13, 2026, THIS DEPARTMENT HAS MOVED TO THE TANI G. CANTIL-SAKAUYE COURTHOUSE LOCATED AT 500 G. ST. SACRAMENTO, CA. ALL MOTIONS NOTICED FOR DEPARTMENT 53 WILL BE HEARD IN DEPARTMENT 16D OF THE NEW COURTHOUSE. ALL PAPERS FOR THIS DEPARTMENT MUST BE FILED AT THIS NEW LOCATION AND WILL NOT BE ACCEPTED AT THE HALL OF JUSTICE. ALL HEARINGS WILL TAKE PLACE AT THIS NEW LOCATION. PARTIES MAY CONTINUE TO APPEAR REMOTELY IN DEPARTMENT 16D UNLESS SPECIFICALLY ORDERED OTHERWISE. ***

TENTATIVE RULING: Plaintiff City of Sacramento’s unopposed motion for appointment of receiver is denied without prejudice.

On November 5, 2024, Plaintiff filed the instant action to abate a public nuisance. Plaintiff alleges that Defendants Navdeep Singh and Maninder Kaur Saini are the owners of real property at 1800 Vinci Avenue in Sacramento. (“Subject Property”). Plaintiff alleges that it has had an open and pending Code Compliance Division case at the Subject Property since November 22, 2021. Plaintiff alleges that the Subject Property is a 7.14 acre vacant lot where there has been a history of business activity, including major truck repair, servicing, and storage without Plaintiff’s approval.

Plaintiff also alleges that the Subject Property is the subject of ongoing Fire Code violations. Plaintiff indicates that it has issued Defendants one Notice of Alleged Violation, two preliminary letters, three Notice and Orders, five administrative penalties, and one Stop Work order based on violations of the Sacramento City Code.

On December 19, 2024, Defendants, in pro per, filed what constitutes (despite its erroneous title) an answer to Plaintiff’s complaint, including specific denials of Plaintiff’s allegations and also asserted affirmative defenses. Thus, Defendants are not in default in this action but rather, this action remains at issue on the merits awaiting trial which is currently set for March 15, 2027. Plaintiff served a Notice of Trial on December 1, 2025 and according to the Register of Actions, Plaintiff has not sought from the Presiding Judge advancement of this trial date for good cause.

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

24CV022594: CITY OF SACRAMENTO, A MUNICIPAL CORPORATION, AND THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA vs SINGH, et al. 06/11/2026 Hearing on Motion - Other for Appointment of a Receiver Pursuant to CCP 564(b) in Department 16D

On October 29, 2025, this Court granted Plaintiff’s motion for a preliminary injunction prohibiting the maintenance of the Subject Property as a nuisance in addition to mandating certain immediate corrective action. Despite their continuing denial of Plaintiff’s allegations as set forth in their answer, Defendants did not oppose Plaintiff’s request for the Court’s issuance of the preliminary injunction.

Although to date, there has been no disposition of this action on its merits and the case remains at issue, Plaintiff now moves for the appointment of a receiver over the Subject Property pursuant to CCP § 564(b)(9) primarily on the basis that Defendants have not complied with the preliminary injunction.

In California, “a receiver may be appointed only as permitted by Code of Civil Procedure section 564.” (Barclays Bank of California v.Superior Court (1977) 69 Cal.App.3d 593, 599.) CCP § 564(b)(9) provides that a Court may appoint a receiver “[i]n all other cases where necessary to preserve the property or rights of any party.” (CCP § 564(b)(9).) “Because the appointment of a receiver transfers property—or, in this case, a business—“out of the hands of its owners” and into the hands of a receiver, the appointment of a receiver is a very “drastic,” “harsh,” and costly remedy that is to be “exercised sparingly and with caution.” Due to the “extraordinary” nature of this remedy and the special costs it imposes, courts are strongly discouraged—although not strictly prohibited—from appointing a receiver unless the more intrusive oversight of a receiver is a “necessity” because other, less intrusive remedies are either “‘inadequate or unavailable.’” (Medipro Medical Staffing LLC v.

Certified Nursing Registry, Inc. (2021) 60 Cal.App.5th 622, 628 [citations omitted].)

As noted above, Plaintiff contends that the nuisance conditions remain at the Subject Property. Plaintiff now seeks the appointment of a receiver to abate the nuisance conditions and bring Defendants in compliance with the preliminary injunction issued on October 29, 2025. Plaintiff asserts that absent the appointment of a receiver, the dangers posed to the community will continue. Plaintiff indicates that since the injunction was issued, a fire occurred at the Subject Property as a result of the unabated nuisance conditions.

Plaintiff additionally asks that the receiver “be authorized to fund the receivership estate with first priority liens used to pay property management and maintenance expenses, rehabilitation costs, the receiver’s fees, and the City’s costs, expenses, and attorneys’ fees.” (Mot.8:14-16.) Plaintiff also asserts that it is “entitled to recover its expenses, costs, and fees associated with the abatement action” (Id. 9:9-10.)

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

24CV022594: CITY OF SACRAMENTO, A MUNICIPAL CORPORATION, AND THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA vs SINGH, et al. 06/11/2026 Hearing on Motion - Other for Appointment of a Receiver Pursuant to CCP 564(b) in Department 16D

While the motion is unopposed, the Court finds that Plaintiff has not demonstrated that a receiver should be appointed over the Subject Property to essentially enforce the preliminary injunction. Initially, the order granting the preliminary injunction specifically stated that “[t]he Court reserves jurisdiction to modify this preliminary injunction as the ends of justice may require.” (Oct. 29, 2025 Order) Yet, Plaintiff has not brought any motion to modify the preliminary injunction to include as part of its mandatory injunctive relief, appointment of a receiver, nor has Plaintiff initiated any contempt proceeding asserting violation of the preliminary injunction. Instead, Plaintiff has brought this separate motion for direct appointment of a receiver, relying on arguments that the Subject Property is a nuisance and that the preliminary injunction has not been adequately complied with.

More importantly, when the Court issued the preliminary injunction, the Court made clear that “[i]n so ruling the Court would note that a preliminary injunction is merely a provisional or auxiliary remedy to preserve the status quo until final judgment. (See Kendall v. Foulks (1919) 180 Cal. 171, 173.) The order granting preliminary injunction is not a determination of the ultimate right to a permanent injunction; it is, as noted, based on a showing that it is desirable to maintain the status quo pending a determination of the merits. (See Continental Baking Co. v.

Katz (1968) 68 Cal.2d 512, 528; State Bd. of Barber Examiners v. Star (1970) 8 Cal. App.3d 736, 739, 740, [trial judge's purported ruling on constitutional question at hearing on preliminary injunction was not binding on court at trial]).” (Oct. 28, 2025 Minute Order].) This is not tantamount to a judicial determination that a nuisance actually exists on the Subject Property and must immediately be abated. The fact that the preliminary injunction was issued is not the equivalent of entry of judgment finding the existence of a nuisance has been established.

Indeed, the existence of a nuisance is one of the ultimate issues to be determined by Plaintiff's complaint and remains at issue as discussed earlier. By seeking appointment of a receiver to take over management of the 'nuisance' at the Subject Property at this juncture, Plaintiff is essentially seeking to obtain the ultimate relief the Complaint seeks without succeeding in a trial on the merits or a dispositive motion. Indeed, while receivers may be appointed in abatement actions, typically this is done after a judgment has been entered declaring the property a nuisance. (City and County of San Francisco v.

Daley (1993) 16 Cal.App.4th 734, 743-744.) No such judgment has been entered in Plaintiff’s favor in this case. As such, at this time Plaintiff has not shown that the Court can or should appoint a receiver to abate an as-yetunproven nuisance. Alternatively, to the extent Plaintiff intended to seek appointment of a receiver only as a form of provisional relief, Plaintiff’s current motion fails to do so, nor does it seek to modify the existing preliminary injunction as reference earlier.

While the Court need not proceed further, it will additionally note that the powers

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

24CV022594: CITY OF SACRAMENTO, A MUNICIPAL CORPORATION, AND THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA vs SINGH, et al. 06/11/2026 Hearing on Motion - Other for Appointment of a Receiver Pursuant to CCP 564(b) in Department 16D

Plaintiff seeks to have conferred upon the receiver appear to be those conferred when a receiver is appointed pursuant to Health and Safety Code § 17980.7(c) which permits appointment of a receiver in connection with substandard residential buildings. For example, the proposed order includes a provision which prohibits Defendants from claiming state tax deductions with respect to the Subject Property. (H&S § 17980.7(b)(1).) Plaintiff also did not seek appointment of a receiver pursuant to that section and cites no authority which would permit the inclusion of such a provision in the order when appointment is not sought pursuant to that section.

As set forth above, while it is true that a receiver may be appointed pursuant to CCP § 564(b)(9) “[i]n all other cases where necessary to preserve the property or rights of any party”, the requested order in this instance essentially seeks to expand the terms of the preliminary injunction without expressly seeking modification of the Court’s prior preliminary injunction. To that end, Plaintiff’s proposed order would not only appoint a receiver to enforce the preliminary injunction and abate conditions at the Subject Property, but would also order additional mandatory injunctive relief that would significantly alter the status quo, such as requiring Defendants to surrender all keys to the Subject Property, turn over possession of the Subject Property to the receiver, and to forward all income and rents to the receiver.

Plaintiff has made no showing that such relief, which would substantially expand upon the preliminary injunction previously ordered, may be granted through a motion to appoint a receiver pursuant to CCP § 564(b)(9), without addressing the standard for mandatory injunctive relief, or otherwise seeking to modify the previously granted preliminary injunction.

In conclusion, given the drastic nature of a receivership and the deficiencies in Plaintiff’s motion, the Court finds Plaintiff has not made the requisite showing for appointment of a receiver on the terms requested at this time.

The motion is denied without prejudice.

The minute order is effective immediately. No formal order pursuant to CRC Rule 3.1312 or further notice is required.