Matthew Stern v. The Regents of the University of California et al

On May 22, 2019, the court ordered a stay of this case pending Signa's exhaustion of administrative remedies. The court lifted the stay on January 21, 2021. On September 17, 2021, the court adopted its tentative ruling on the motion of the Regents to transfer to this department and consolidate with this case (the Signa Action) for pre-trial purposes only, the following matters: (1) Santa Barbara Superior Court case no. 19CV01431 entitled Michael Little, et al. v. The Regents of the University of California, et al. (the Little Action); (2) Santa Barbara Superior Court case no. 19CV04418 entitled Matthew Stern v.

The Regents of the University of California, et al. (the Stern Action); (3) Santa Barbara Superior Court case no. 19CV02586 entitled Jonathan Lee Reyes v. The Regents of the University of California, et al. (the

Reyes Action); (4) Santa Barbara Superior Court case no. 19CV01625 entitled John Doe v. The Regents of the University of California Santa Barbara, et al. (the Smith Action); and (5) Santa Barbara Superior Court case no. 21CV01256 entitled Ryan Hashimoto v. The Regents of the University of California, et al. (the Hashimoto Action). On February 26, 2025, the court entered judgment in favor of the Regents, the UCSB-PD, and the University of California Santa Barbara, and against plaintiff Ryan Hashimoto, as to the complaint filed in the Hashimoto Action.

The lengthy procedural history of these actions reflects that on January 22, 2026, the Regents filed a motion for summary judgment or adjudication against the Signa FAC (the Regents Signa Motion), and separately filed a motion for summary judgment or adjudication against the complaint filed by plaintiff Matthew Stern (Stern) in the Stern Action (the Regents Stern Motion). The Regents Signa Motion and the Regents Stern Motion were calendared for hearing on April 24, 2026. On January 26, the Regents filed a motion for summary judgment or adjudication against the complaint of plaintiff Tiffany Little (T Little) in the Little Action, and separately filed a motion for summary judgment or adjudication against the complaint of plaintiff Michael Little (M Little) in the Little Action (collectively, the Regents Little Motions).

The Regents Little Motions were calendared for hearing on May 1, 2026. T Little and M Little have filed opposition to the Regents Little Motions. On February 10, Olson filed a motion for summary judgment, or in the alternative summary adjudication, against the Signa FAC (the Olson Motion). On February 11, the Regents filed a motion for summary judgment or adjudication against the complaint filed by plaintiff Ryan Smith (Smith) in the Smith Action (the Regents Smith Motion). On February 13, the Regents filed a motion for summary judgment or adjudication against the complaint filed by plaintiff Jonathan Lee Reyes (Reyes) in the Reyes Action (the Regents Reyes Motion).

On February 19, defendant David Millard (Millard) filed a motion for summary judgment, or in the alternative summary adjudication, against the complaint filed by Stern in the Stern Action (the Millard Motion.) The Olson Motion, the Regents Smith Motion, the Regents Reyes Motion, and the Millard Motion were calendared for hearing on May 15, 2026. On March 16, the Regents filed an ex parte application for an order to set the hearing on the Regents Smith Motion to May 8, 2026, to allow that motion to be heard no later than 30 days before trial.

On March 18, the court signed and entered an order granting that application, moving the hearing on the Regents Smith Motion to May 8, 2026. On April 3, Stern filed their opposition to the Regents Stern Motion. On April 11, the court signed, and on April 13 filed, an order approving a stipulation by the parties to continue the hearing on the Regents Stern Motion to May 8, 2026, and the hearing on the Regents Signa Motion to May 15, 2026. The Regents Smith Motion remained calendared for hearing on May 8.

The Olson Motion, the Regents Reyes Motion, and the Millard Motion remained calendared for hearing on May 15, 2026. On April 17, Smith filed their opposition to the Regents Smith Motion. On April 21, Signa filed their opposition to the Regents Signa Motion. On April 24, Signa filed opposition to the Olson Motion, Reyes filed opposition to the Regents Reyes Motion, and Stern filed opposition to the Millard Motion. On May 1, the court issued a minute order (the May 1 Order), continuing the hearing on the Regents Little Motions to June 12, 2026, due to the lodging by the Regents of material submitted as a basis for adjudication of those motions conditionally under seal without having filed an appropriate motion to seal those materials, or the entry of a sealing order.

Pursuant to the May Order, the court set a hearing on any motion for an order to file those lodged materials under seal on May 29, 2026. The court also set a briefing schedule, requiring that any sealing motion be filed and served on or before May 11, among other things. On May 8, the court issued a minute order (the May 8 Order), continuing the hearing on the Regents Smith Motion to May 29, 2026, and the hearing on the Regents Stern Motion to June 12, 2026, also due to the lodging by the Regents of material submitted as a basis for adjudication of those motions conditionally under seal without

filing an appropriate motion to seal those materials. Among other things, the court ordered that any motion for an order sealing materials lodged conditionally under seal as a basis for adjudication of the Regents Smith Motion must be filed and served on or before May 11, 2026, and calendared any such motion for hearing on May 22, 2026. As to the Regents Stern Motion, the court ordered that any motion for an order sealing any material lodged conditionally under seal as a basis for adjudication of that motion be heard on May 29, 2026.

On May 11, the Regents separately filed: (1) a motion for an order to file under seal exhibits lodged in support of the Regents Signa Motion (the Signa Motion to Seal); (2) a motion for an order to file under seal exhibits lodged in support of the Regents Reyes Motion (the Reyes Motion to Seal); (3) a motion for an order to file under seal exhibits lodged in support of the Regents Little Motions (the Little Motion to Seal); (4) a motion for an order to file under seal exhibits lodged in support of the Regents Smith Motion (the Smith Motion to Seal); and (5) a motion for an order to file under seal exhibits lodged in support of the Regents Stern Motion (the Stern Motion to Seal).

The Signa Motion to Seal, and the Reyes Motion to Seal are calendared for hearing on May 29, 2026. Analysis: (1) The Regents Signa Motion and Regents Reyes Motion As the materials which are the subject of the Signa Motion to Seal and the Reyes Motion to Seal were lodged conditionally under seal by the Regents as a basis for adjudication of the Regents Signa Motion and the Regents Reyes Motion, the court will need to resolve the Signa Motion to Seal and the Reyes Motion to Seal first. For these reasons, and to allow sufficient time to resolve those motions, the court will continue the hearing on the Regents Signa Motion and the Regents Reyes Motion to June 5, 2026. (2) The Olson Motion "A party may move for summary judgment in an action or proceeding if it is contended that the action has no merit or that there is no defense to the action or proceeding." (Code Civ.

Proc., Sec. 437c, subd. (a)(1).) "A party may move for summary adjudication as to one or more causes of action within an action, one or more affirmative defenses, one or more claims for damages, or one or more issues of duty, if the party contends that the cause of action has no merit, that there is no affirmative defense to the cause of action, that there is no merit to an affirmative defense as to any cause of action, that there is no merit to a claim for damages, as specified in Section 3294 of the Civil Code, or that one or more defendants either owed or did not owe a duty to the plaintiff or plaintiffs.

A motion for summary adjudication shall be granted only if it completely disposes of a cause of action, an affirmative defense, a claim for damages, or an issue of duty. [P.] A motion for summary adjudication may be made by itself or as an alternative to a motion for summary judgment and shall proceed in all procedural respects as a motion for summary judgment. " (Code Civ. Proc., Sec. 437c, subd. (f)(1)-(2).) "The purpose of the law of summary judgment is to provide courts with a mechanism to cut through the parties' pleadings in order to determine whether, despite their allegations, trial is in fact necessary to resolve their dispute." (Aguilar v.

Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 843 (Aguilar).) The party moving for summary judgment "bears the burden of persuasion that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that he is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." (Id. at p. 845.) Relevant here, a defendant meets that burden by showing "that one or more elements of the cause of action, even if not separately pleaded, cannot be established, or that there is a complete defense to the cause of action." (Code Civ. Proc., Sec. 437c, subd. (p)(2).) "In reviewing a defense summary judgment, we apply the traditional three-step analysis ..., that is, we (1) identify the pleaded issues, (2) determine if the defense has negated an element of the plaintiff's case or established a complete defense, and if and only if so, (3) determine if the plaintiff has raised a triable issue of fact." (Meddock v.

County of Yolo (2013) 220 Cal.App.4th 170, 175, fn. omitted.) The notice of the Olson Motion identifies four issues of which adjudication is sought by Olson. (Notice at pp. 3-4.) "Issue One" is stated as "Signa's first cause of action under Government Code [section] 8547.10 ... fails because these claims are based upon personnel management decisions that Olson undertook, which cannot lead to individual liability as a matter of law." (Notice at p. 3, ll. 20-23.) "Issue Two" is stated as "Signa's second cause of action under Labor Code [section] 1102.5 ... fails because these claims are based upon personnel management decisions that Olson undertook, which cannot lead to individual liability as a matter of law." (Notice at p. 3, ll. 24-26.)

believed their actions were justified, that the evidence is sufficient to suggest an intent to retaliate. (Scheer, supra, 76 Cal.App.5th at pp. 917-918 [general discussion].) For these and all further reasons discussed above, the court will deny the Olson Motion to the extent that motion seeks summary adjudication of the second cause of action asserted in the Signa FAC. The court will also, for all reasons discussed above, deny the Olson Motion to the extent it seeks summary judgment as to entirety of the Signa FAC. (Code Civ.

Proc., Sec. 437c, subds. (c), (f)(1); Aguilar, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 845; Gov. Code, Sec. 8547.10, subd. (e).) (c) Evidentiary Objections Olson has filed objections to material contained in the Signa declaration filed in support of Signa's opposition to the Olson Motion. "In granting or denying a motion for summary judgment or summary adjudication, the court need rule only on those objections to evidence that it deems material to its disposition of the motion." (Code Civ. Proc., Sec. 437c, subd. (q).)

As the Olson Motion fails, for all reasons discussed above, to shift the burden to Signa, the court need not consider the material to which Olson has asserted objections. Furthermore, written objections to evidence must follow the format set forth in California Rules of Court, rule 3.1354(b). Though the written objections of Olson identify the document at issue, cite the location of each of the matters to which Olson asserts an objection, and quote or set forth the objectional material, the same objections are asserted to multiple statements appearing in each paragraph of the Signa declaration objected to by Olson.

The manner in which the purportedly objectionable material is set forth forces the court to effectively guess whether Olson objects to the cited matters as a whole or only in part, and which objection is directed to which statement within each stated paragraph number. For these reasons, there exists sufficient grounds for the court to disregard those objections. (Hodjat v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co. (2012) 211 Cal.App.4th 1, 8 [a trial court may decline ruling on improperly formatted objections].) (3) The Millard Motion The Millard Motion is directed to the complaint filed by Stern in the Stern Action (the Stern Complaint), which asserts the same two causes of action against Millard for violation of the Act and for violation of Labor Code section 1102.5.

The Millard Motion also identifies four issues of which adjudication is sought. (Notice at pp. 3-4.) "Issue One" is stated as "Stern's first cause of action under [sic] fails because these claims are based upon personnel management decisions that Millard undertook, which cannot lead to individual liability as a matter of law."(Notice at p. 3, ll. 20-22.) "Issue Two" is stated as "Sterns's second cause of action for whistleblower retaliation under [Labor Code section] 1102.5 fails because these claims are based upon personnel management decisions that Millard undertook, which cannot lead to individual liability as a matter of law." (Notice at p. 3, ll. 23-25.) "Issue Three" is stated as "Stern's first cause of action for whistleblower retaliation under [Government Code section] 8547.10 fails because even if Stern could state a prima facie case, clear and convincing evidence confirms that Millard reasonably believed that all personnel actions he took in relation to Stern were justified by the evidence they had before him so he is entitled to judgment pursuant to [section] 8547.10, [subdivision] (d)". (Notice at p. 3, l. 26-p. 4, l. 2.) "Issue Four" is stated as "Stern's second cause of action for whistleblower retaliation under [Labor Code section] 1102.5 fails because this claim cannot be asserted against Millard defendant as a matter of law." (Notice at p. 4, ll. 3-4.)

As a threshold matter, the court notes that the appendix of evidence filed by Millard in support of the Millard Motion also includes redactions, without an unredacted copy of the appendix having been lodged or any motion to seal having been filed as to that evidence. For the reasons further discussed above, the court does not consider redacted material. Based on the supporting and responding separate statements, respectively, of Millard and Stern, it is undisputed that Stern was employed as a law enforcement officer at the UCSB-PD from May 2005 to the present. (Resp.

Sep. Stmt., UMF no. 1 & evidence cited therein.) Millard began his employment with UCSB-PD on January 16, 2001, and served as Lieutenant at UCSB-PD from October 2013 to March 22, 2021. (Resp. Sep. Stmt., UMF no.

4 & evidence cited therein.) Stern's past and current managers and supervisors at UCSB-PD include Millard. (Resp. Sep. Stmt., UMF no. 2 & evidence cited therein.) As to Issue Two and Issue Four stated in the Millard Motion and described above, the same reasoning and analysis apply. For the same reasons discussed above, the second cause of action for violation of Labor Code section 1102.5 asserted in the Stern Complaint against Millard in an individual capacity, fails as a matter of law. Therefore, the court will grant the Millard Motion as to the request for summary adjudication of the second cause of action for violation of Labor Code section 1102.5 asserted in the Stern Complaint as against Millard, only. (Code Civ.

Proc., Sec. 437c, subd. (f)(1).) As to Issue One and Issue Three, there exist triable issues of material fact precluding summary adjudication as to those issues. The material facts set forth in the Millard supporting separate statement include that "Millard played no role in the March 2017 process for the selection of officers for the corporal specialty assignments and instructor positions, including the Taser Instructor." (Sep. Stmt., UMF no. 32.) In support, Millard states that they "played no role in evaluation and ranking of the letters of interest for the Corporal specialty assignment", that "Sergeants reviewed the letters of interest and made their recommendations to ...

Olson", and that Millard "played no role in the evaluation and ranking of the letters of interest for the taser instructor position...." (Millard Dec., P.P. 24-25.) Stern presents evidence showing that Millard compiled scores of applicants for corporal specialty assignments on August 15, 2017. (Olson Dec., P. 22.) That evidence is sufficient to give rise to a competing inference as to whether Millard played a role in process of selecting officers for corporal specialty assignments prior to that date.

The same reasoning and analysis apply in regard to UMF nos. 33 and 38 contained in Millard's supporting separate statement. The available information and evidence also indicates or suggests that when or after Stern reported alleged officer misconduct, among other things, and reported what Stern alleges to be retaliatory conduct towards Stern, the UCSB-PD initiated an internal investigation of Stern; placed Stern on administrative leave; and suspended Stern. (Sep. Stmt., UMF nos. 10-25.) There is also information or evidence which shows or suggests that, after a union meeting led by Stern during which concerns about Millard's leadership were raised, Millard publicly berated Stern and accused him of being out of uniform. (Sep.

Stmt. UMF nos. 58 & 60; Resp. Sep. Stmt., Additional Material Fact no. 4 & evidence cited therein.) "We view the evidence in a light favorable to the party opposing summary judgment or summary adjudication, liberally construing that party's evidence while strictly scrutinizing the moving party's showing, and we resolve all doubts concerning the evidence in favor of the opposing party." (Bakos v. Roach (2025) 108 Cal.App.5th 390, 396.) The same or similar reasoning and analysis apply. Though the above is not provided as an exhaustive list, for all reasons discussed above, the evidence offered by the parties is sufficient to give rise to a triable issue, based on competing or conflicting inferences, in regard to whether there existed a retaliatory motive.

For these and all further reasons discussed above, the court will deny the Millard Motion to the extent it seeks summary adjudication of the first cause of action for violation of the Act alleged in the Stern Complaint. (Code Civ. Proc., Sec. 437c, subd. (c).) The same reasoning and analysis applies to the request for summary judgment as to the Stern Complaint. Evidentiary objections: Millard has filed objections to material contained in the Stern declaration and attorney Keeton's declaration. The same reasoning and analysis apply. (4) Procedural Matters Court records reflect that, pursuant to the court's minute order dated September 17, 2021, this case (the Signa Action) is consolidated with the Little Action, the Stern Action, the Reyes Action, and the Smith Action, for pre-trial purposes only, with all documents to be separately filed in any case files to which they might relate.

The court further ordered that, "[f]or the motions or other matters requiring hearings, the moving party is directed to include the following language below the document title: [P.] 'This matter is being calendared and heard in the lead case only. Cases are consolidated for pretrial and not all purposes.'" (Sept. 17, 2021, Minute Order.) The court's minute order dated August 8, 2025, reflects that, at the trial confirmation conference held on that day,

defendant's counsel informed the court that they have contemplated consolidating the cases in which the plaintiffs are represented by the Dre Law firm. The court also noted in that minute order, that the cases were consolidated for pretrial purposes only, and that no documents have been submitted to make it a true consolidation for trial. Based on the parties' agreement, the court set the Smith Action for jury trial to commence on June 8, 2026, and the Signa Action for a 15 day jury trial to commence on June 18, 2026.

Court records reflect that, though the matters described above were consolidated for pretrial purposes only, no party has filed a motion to consolidate the matters for all purposes, including trial. (See Villa Zinfandel, LLC v. Bearman (2025) 116 Cal.App.5th 848, 862-863 [general discussion].) As a result, there appears to be some confusion as to what cases, apart from the Smith Action and the Signa Action, will proceed to trial and when. For these and all further reasons discussed above, the court will order the parties to appear at the hearing to discuss the status of trial.

Tentative Ruling: Mark Signa et al vs The Regents of the University of CA et al Tentative Ruling: Mark Signa et al vs The Regents of the University of CA et al Case Number 18CV05728 Case Type Civil Law & Motion Hearing Date / Time Fri, 06/12/2026 - 10:00 Nature of Proceedings Mark Signa vs The Regents of the University of California et al Tentative Ruling (1) For the reasons stated herein, the motion of defendant The Regents of the University of California for summary judgment, or in the alternative, summary adjudication against Matthew Stern's complaint is denied. (2) For the reasons stated herein, the motion of defendant The Regents of the University of California for summary judgment, or in the alternative, summary adjudication against plaintiff Tiffany Little's complaint is denied. (3) For the reasons stated herein, the motion of defendant The Regents of the University of California for summary judgment, or in the alternative, summary adjudication against plaintiff Michael Little's complaint is denied. (4) For the reasons stated herein, the motion of defendants The Regents of the University of California and University of California, Santa Barbara Police Chief Dustin Olson, to dismiss plaintiff Mark Signa's action is denied. (5) For the reasons stated herein, the motion of defendants The Regents of the University of California, Dusin Olson, Cathy Farley, David Millard, Robert Romero, Gregory Pierce, and Gregory Smorodinsky to dismiss plaintiffs Michael Little and Tiffany Little's action is denied. (6) For the reasons stated herein, the motion of defendants The Regents of the University of California, David Millard and Gregory Smorodinsky to dismiss plaintiff Jonathan Lee Reyes' action is denied. (7) For the reasons stated herein, the motion of defendants The Regents of the University of California and David Millard to dismiss plaintiff Matthew Stern's action is denied.

Background: Pursuant to a minute order entered on May 29, 2026 (the May 29 Order), this case no. 18CV05728 (the Signa Action) is consolidated with Santa Barbara Superior Court case no. 19CV01431 entitled Michael Little, et al. v. The Regents of the University of California, et al. (the Little Action); Santa Barbara Superior Court case no. 19CV04418 entitled Matthew Stern v. The Regents of the University of California, et al. (the Stern Action); and Santa Barbara Superior Court case no. 19CV02586 entitled Jonathan Lee Reyes v.

The Regents of the

University of California, et al. (the Reyes Action) (collectively, the Actions). For convenience of writing and to preserve judicial efficiency, the court addresses only those procedural matters that are relevant to the present proceeding. On November 21, 2018, plaintiff Mark Signa (Signa) filed in the Signa Action, a complaint (the Signa Complaint) against defendants The Regents of the University of California (the Regents) and University of California Santa Barbara Police Chief Dustin Olson (Olson).

On February 4, 2019, Signa filed a first amended complaint against the Regents and Olson. On March 19, 2019, plaintiffs Michael Little (M Little) and Tiffany Little (T Little) (collectively, the Little Plaintiffs) filed a complaint in the Little Action (the Little Complaint) against the Regents, Olson, Cathy Farley (Farley), David Millard (Millard), Robert Romero (Romero), Gregory Pierce (Pierce), and Gregory Smorodinsky (Smorodinsky). On May 17, 2019, plaintiff Jonathan Lee Reyes (Reyes) filed a complaint in the Reyes Action against the Regents, Millard, and Smorodinsky.

On May 22, 2019, the court signed and filed an order, upon a joint motion or stipulation, staying the proceedings in the Signa Action; and separately signed and filed an order, also upon a joint motion or stipulation, staying the proceedings in the Little Action. On July 23, 2019, the court signed and filed an order upon a joint motion or stipulation, staying the proceedings in the Reyes Action. On August 20, 2019, plaintiff Matthew Stern (Stern) filed a complaint in the Stern Action (the Stern Complaint) against the Regents and Millard.

On October 3, 2019, the court signed and filed an order, upon a stipulation by the parties, staying the proceedings in the Stern Action. On January 15, 2021, the court entered a minute order granting the motion of Signa for an order lifting the stay of the Signa Action; and entered a separate minute order granting the motion of the Little Plaintiffs for an order lifting the stay of the Little Action. On January 19, 2021, the court entered a minute order granting the motion of Stern for an order lifting the stay of the Stern Action.

On January 25, 2021, the court entered a minute order granting the motion of Reyes for an order lifting the stay of the Reyes Action. On February 16, 2021, the Regents filed an answer to the Little Complaint, generally denying its allegations and asserting twenty-seven affirmative defenses, and separately filed an answer to the Stern Complaint, generally denying its allegations and asserting twenty-seven affirmative defenses. On that same date, Olson, Farley, Romero, Pierce, and Smorodinsky separately filed their answer to the Little Complaint, generally denying its allegations and asserting twenty-seven affirmative defenses.

On July 8, 2021, the Regents filed in the Signa Action, an unopposed motion (the Regents Consolidation Motion) to transfer and consolidate with that action, the Little Action, the Reyes Action, the Stern Action, and Santa Barbara Superior Court case no. 19CV01625 entitled John Doe v. The Regents of the University of California Santa Barbara, et al. (the Smith Action), for pretrial purposes. On September 17, 2021, the court entered a minute order granting the Regents Consolidation Motion. On March 29, 2023, Millard filed an answer to the Little Complaint, and separately filed an answer to the Stern Complaint.

On August 8, 2025, after a trial confirmation conference (TCC), the court entered a minute order (the TCC Order) setting the Smith Action for a seven day jury trial to commence on June 8, 2026; and setting the Signa Action "and those considered in consolidation" for a fifteen day jury trial to commence on June 18, 2026. On October 2, 2025, a trial call order was entered in the Signa Action, ordering that case to start trial on the date certain of June 18, 2026. On January 22, 2026, the Regents filed a motion for summary judgment, or in the alternative, motion for

summary adjudication against the Stern Complaint (the Regents Stern Motion). The Regents Stern Motion was calendared for hearing on April 24, 2026. On January 26, 2026, the Regents filed a motion for summary judgment, or in the alternative summary adjudication, against the complaint of T Little in the Little Action (the Regents T Little Motion), and separately filed a motion for summary judgment, or in the alternative, summary adjudication, against the complaint of M Little in the Little Action (the Regents M Little Motion).

The Regents T Little Motion and M Little Motion (collectively, the Regents Little Motions) were calendared for hearing on May 1, 2026. On April 3, Stern filed an opposition to the Regents Stern Motion. On April 10, T Little and M Little separately filed their respective oppositions to the Regents Little Motions. On April 11, the court signed, and on April 13 filed, an order approving a stipulation by the parties to continue the hearing on the Regents Stern Motion to May 8, 2026. On May 1, the court entered a minute order continuing the Regents Little Motions to June 12, 2026, due to the lodging by the Regents of materials conditionally under seal in support of those motions without the filing of an appropriate motion for the entry of an order to place those materials under seal.

On May 8, the court entered a minute order continuing the Regents Stern Motion to June 12, 2026, also due to the lodging by the Regents of materials conditionally under seal in support of that motion without the filing of an appropriate motion for the entry of an order to place those materials under seal. On May 11, the Regents filed a motion for an order to file under seal the materials lodged conditionally under seal in support of the Regents Little Motions (the Little Motion to Seal), and a motion for an order to file under seal the materials lodged conditionally under seal in support of the Regents Stern Motion (the Stern Motion to Seal).

On May 18, the Little Plaintiffs filed an opposition to the Little Motion to Seal, and Stern filed an opposition to the Stern Motion to Seal. On May 29, the court entered the May 29 Order described above, pursuant to which the court also granted, in part, the Little Motion to Seal as to exhibits 4, 6 through 13, 16 through 25, and 30 through 37 to the amended appendix of evidence filed by the Regents on February 4, 2026, in support of the Regents T Little Motion (the T Little Amended Appendix), only; and as to exhibits 3 through 5, 7, 8, 11 through 16, 18, and 22 through 29 to the amended appendix of evidence also filed on February 4, 2026, in support of the Regents M Little Motion (the M Little Amended Appendix).

Further, the court granted the Stern Motion to Seal as to exhibits 3, 4, 7 through 9, and 16, only, to the amended appendix of evidence filed by the Regents on February 4, 2026, in support of the Regents Stern Motion (the Stern Amended Appendix). The May 29 Order otherwise denied the Little Motion to Seal and the Stern Motion to Seal, and ordered the Regents to, no later than 5 p.m. on June 3, 2026, file public versions of the T Little Amended Appendix, the M Little Amended Appendix, and the Stern Amended Appendix, with redactions to only those exhibits described above for which the court granted the Little Motion to Seal and Stern Motion to Seal.

On June 1, the Regents filed an ex parte application (the application) for an order shortening time to hear forthcoming motions to dismiss the Smith Action, the Little Action, the Signa Action, the Stern Action, and the Reyes Action. On that same date, Olson, Farley, Millard, Romero, Pierce, and Smorodinsky (collectively, the Individual Defendants) filed a joinder to that application; and plaintiff Ryan Smith (Smith) filed an opposition to the application. On June 2, after a hearing, the court issued a minute order (the Ex Parte Order) granting the application; specially setting a hearing on the forthcoming motion to dismiss the Smith Action for June 8, 2026; and ordering that any opposition to that motion be filed and served by 12 p.m. on June 4, with any reply to be filed and served by 10 a.m. on June 5.

The Ex Parte Order also set a hearing on the forthcoming motions to dismiss the Little Action, the Signa Action, the Stern Action, and the Reyes Action, for June 12, 2026, to be heard at the same time as the pending Regents Stern Motion and Regents Little Motions, and ordered that any opposition to those motions to dismiss be filed

and served no later than 3 p.m. on June 4, with any replies to be filed and served no later than 3 p.m. on June 5. On June 1, the Regents and the University of California Santa Barbara Police Department (UCSB-PD) filed a motion for an order dismissing the Smith Action (the Motion to Dismiss Smith Action). On that same date, the Regents and Olson filed a motion for an order dismissing the Signa Action (the Motion to Dismiss Signa Action); the Regents and the Individual Defendants filed a motion for an order dismissing the Little Action (the Motion to Dismiss Little Action); the Regents and Millard filed a motion for an order dismissing the Stern Action (the Motion to Dismiss Stern Action); and the Regents, Millard, and Smorodinsky filed a motion for an order dismissing the Reyes Action (the Motion to Dismiss Reyes Action).

Also on June 1, Olson filed a notice of joinder and joinder to the Motion to Dismiss Signa Action; the Individual Defendants filed a notice of joinder and joinder to the Motion to Dismiss Little Action; Millard filed a notice of joinder and joinder to the Motion to Dismiss Stern Action; and Millard and Smorodinsky filed a notice of joinder and joinder to the Motion to Dismiss Reyes Action. Each of the motions to dismiss described above is made on the ground that, pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 583.310, and emergency rule 10(a), the Actions are subject to mandatory dismissal pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 583.360.

On June 3, the Regents filed a public redacted version of the Stern Amended Appendix, which consists of six volumes of exhibits; and separate filed public redacted versions of the T Little Amended Appendix, which consists of three volumes of exhibits, and the M Little Amended Appendix, which consists of five volumes of exhibits. On June 4, Smith, the Little Plaintiffs, Stern, Reyes, and Signa separately filed and served their respective oppositions to the motions to dismiss described above. Replies to those oppositions, joinders to those replies, and supplemental replies were filed with the court on June 5 as further discussed herein.

On June 8, the court entered a minute order adopting its tentative ruling denying the Motion to Dismiss Smith Action. Analysis: (1) The Regents Stern Motion "A party may move for summary judgment in an action or proceeding if it is contended that the action has no merit or that there is no defense to the action or proceeding." (Code Civ. Proc., Sec. 437c, subd. (a)(1).) "A party may move for summary adjudication as to one or more causes of action within an action, one or more affirmative defenses, one or more claims for damages, or one or more issues of duty, if the party contends that the cause of action has no merit, that there is no affirmative defense to the cause of action, that there is no merit to an affirmative defense as to any cause of action, that there is no merit to a claim for damages, as specified in Section 3294 of the Civil Code, or that one or more defendants either owed or did not owe a duty to the plaintiff or plaintiffs.

A motion for summary adjudication shall be granted only if it completely disposes of a cause of action, an affirmative defense, a claim for damages, or an issue of duty. [P.] A motion for summary adjudication may be made by itself or as an alternative to a motion for summary judgment and shall proceed in all procedural respects as a motion for summary judgment. " (Code Civ. Proc., Sec. 437c, subd. (f)(1)-(2).) "The purpose of the law of summary judgment is to provide courts with a mechanism to cut through the parties' pleadings in order to determine whether, despite their allegations, trial is in fact necessary to resolve their dispute." (Aguilar v.

Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 843 (Aguilar).) The party moving for summary judgment "bears the burden of persuasion that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that he is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." (Id. at p. 845.) Relevant here, a defendant meets that burden by showing "that one or more elements of the cause of action, even if not separately pleaded, cannot be established, or that there is a complete defense to the cause of action." (Code Civ. Proc., Sec. 437c, subd. (p)(2).) "In reviewing a defense summary judgment, we apply the traditional three-step analysis ..., that is, we (1) identify the pleaded issues, (2) determine if the defense has negated an element of the plaintiff's case or established a complete defense, and if and only if so, (3) determine if the plaintiff has raised a triable issue of fact." (Meddock v.

County of Yolo (2013) 220 Cal.App.4th 170, 175, fn. omitted.) "The pleadings delimit the issues to be considered on a motion for summary judgment. [Citation.] The defendant

must present facts to negate each claim as framed by the complaint or establish a defense." (Turner v. State of California (1991) 232 Cal.App.3d 883, 891.) Further, "[a] defendant moving for summary judgment need address only the issues raised by the complaint; the plaintiff cannot bring up new, unpleaded issues in his or her opposing papers." (Government Employees Ins. Co. v. Superior Court (2000) 79 Cal.App.4th 95, 98.) The Stern Complaint alleges that Stern has been employed by the Regents from May 2005 through the present. (Stern Complaint, P. 9.)

Stern's job title is "Police Officer". (Ibid.) Stern worked under Police Chief Olson, Assistant Chief Farley, Lieutenant Millard, Sergeant Romero, Sergeant Smorodinsky, Sergeant Rory Sheehey (Sheehey), Sergeant Pierce, and Sergeant Smith. (Ibid.) The Stern Complaint further alleges that, after Stern raised concerns to Millard, who is Stern's direct supervisor, regarding safety risks posed by a new employee who was failing to do their job properly, Smith's threats to Stern, other officer's fears of Smith, and retaliation, and after Stern supervised a union meeting regarding concerns about Millard, Stern was investigated, threatened with discipline, lost his position as a corporal, denied a Taser Instructor position, removed from a Field Training Officer position, refused awards for Stern's efforts during riots at UC Berkeley, and berated and threatened by Millard. (Stern Compl., P.P. 10-26.)

The Stern Complaint asserts two causes of action against the Regents and Millard: (1) violation of the California Whistleblower Protection Act; and (2) violation of California Labor Code section 1102.5. The Regents Stern Motion seeks an order granting summary judgment in favor of the Regents and against Stern or, alternatively, summary adjudication of 12 issues which are set forth in the notice of that motion. (Notice at pp. 4-6.) The separate statement filed by the Regents in support of the Regents Stern Motion sets forth 104 facts that the Regents concedes relate to "all causes of action" asserted in the Stern Complaint, to each issue that is the subject of the Regents Stern Motion, and "that could make a difference in the disposition of the motion." (Sep.

Stmt. at pp. 4-23 [setting forth material fact nos. 1 through 104 as to "all causes of action"] & pp. pp. 23-29 [incorporating material fact nos. 1 through 114 as to each issue]; see also Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1350(a)(2).) As a threshold matter, and for reasons further discussed in the May 29 Order, the court considers only the Stern Amended Appendix. The May 29 Order authorizes the filing of a public redacted version of the Stern Amended Appendix that redacts exhibits 3, 4, 7 through 9, and 16, only.

Pursuant to that order, no other exhibit or material contained in any other exhibit may be redacted from the public redacted version of the Stern Amended Appendix. The Stern Amended Appendix filed unsealed by the Regents on June 3 includes six volumes of exhibits, and contains redactions to material appearing in exhibits other than exhibits 3, 4, 7 through 9, and 16. (See, e.g., Stern Amended Appendix Vol. 1 at pdf p. 388; Vol. 2 at pdf pp. 11-55 & 58-85; Vol. 3 at pdf pp. 8-13, 18-35, 38-39, & 45-47; Vol. 4 at pdf pp. 9, 12-16, 19-22, 28, 29, & 32-47; Vol. 5 at pdf pp. 8-23& 25-45; Vol. 6 at pdf pp. 8-25, 32-35, 37-57, 62, 64, 68, 70, 72, 76, 78, 85, 86, 95-100, 103, 106, 110, & 112-118.)

For these reasons, the Regents has failed to comply with the May 29 Order. Furthermore, apart from exhibits 3, 4, 7 through 9, and 16, the court does not consider any material that is redacted from the public version of the Stern Amended Appendix. The issues that are the subject of the Regents Stern Motion include that the reports of Stern at issue in these proceedings "did not disclose "improper government activity'" because those reports failed to identify or establish "that any state or federal laws or regulations were violated..."; because Stern has not shown "any conduct that violated any Executive order of the Governor, a California Rule of Court, or any policy or procedure mandated by the State Administrative Manual or State Contracting Manual" or conduct that "was economically wasteful, involves gross misconduct, incompetency, or inefficiency"; and because those reports "merely disclosed possible violations of internal policies, which in one instance did not exist, and which are not protected even if the policies are of a government entity." (Notice at p. 4, P.P. 1, 2.)

The issues also include that Stern's reports to the Regents did not involve a "protected disclosure" or "good faith communication" because those reports "did not involve disclosures of an 'improper governmental activity' and the disclosures were not intended for the purposes of remedying any condition that threatened the health or safety of employees or the public as the activities [Stern] reported did not threaten such things"; that Stern "objectively could not have a reasonable belief that illegal conduct was occurring, as [Stern] did not witness most of the alleged conduct reported and could not reasonably believe those facts constituted illegal conduct"; that Stern "did

not have reasonable cause to believe the reported activities disclosed 'improper government activity' or violated any law"; and that Stern "reported publicly known or already known information which does not constitute a protected disclosure ...." (Notice at pp. 4-5, P.P. 3, 4 & 9; p. 6, P. 12.) Based on the issues described above, the Regents Stern Motion argues, the first cause of action for violation of Government Code section 8547 et seq. (the California Whistleblower Protection Act or Act) and the second cause of action for violation of Labor Code section 1102.5 asserted in the Stern Complaint, lack merit. (See also Notice at p. 5, P. 8.)

For the reasons further discussed above, the Regents Stern Motion concedes that each of the 104 material facts set forth in the supporting separate statement relate and are material to the issues described above. (Sep. Stmt. at p. 23 [incorporating "undisputed material facts numbered one ... through 104" as to issue "B"], p. 24 [same as to issues "C" & "D"], p. 25 [same as to issue "F"], p. 27 [same as to issues "J" and "K"], & p. 28 [same as to issue "O"].) " '[T]he separate statement effectively concedes the materiality of whatever facts are included.

Thus, if a triable issue is raised as to any of the facts in [the Regents'] separate statement, the motion must be denied!' [Citation.]" (Nazir v. United Airlines, Inc. (2009) 178 Cal.App.4th 243, 252 (Nazir), original italics.) Pursuant to Government Code section 8547.2, a "protected disclosure" is "a good faith communication, including a communication based on, or when carrying out, job duties, that discloses or demonstrates an intention to disclose information that may evidence either of the following circumstances: "(A) An improper governmental activity. "(B) A condition that may significantly threaten the health or safety of employees or the public if the disclosure or intention to disclose was made for the purpose of remedying that condition." (Gov.

Code, Sec. 8547.2, subd. (e)(1)(A), (B).) Under Government Code section 8547.2, "'[i]mproper governmental activity' means an activity by a state agency or by an employee that is undertaken in the performance of the employee's duties, undertaken inside a state office, or, if undertaken outside a state office by the employee, directly relates to state government, whether or not that activity is within the scope of their employment, and that meets any of the following criteria: "(A) The activity is in violation of any state or federal law or regulation, including, but not limited to, corruption, malfeasance, bribery, theft of government property, fraudulent claims, fraud, coercion, conversion, malicious prosecution, misuse of government property, misuse of state expenditures, including allocations, loans, or grants, or willful omission to perform duty. "(B) The activity is in violation of an executive order of the Governor, a California Rule of Court, or any policy or procedure mandated by the State Administrative Manual or State Contracting Manual. "(C) The activity is economically wasteful, involves gross misconduct, incompetency, or inefficiency." (Gov.

Code, Sec. 8547.2, subd. (c)(1)(A)-(C).) "Complaints made 'in the context of internal administrative or personnel actions, rather than in the context of legal violations' do not constitute protected whistleblowing. [Citations.] 'To exalt these exclusively internal personnel disclosures with whistleblower status would create all sorts of mischief. Most damagingly, it would thrust the judiciary into micromanaging employment practices and create a legion of undeserving protected "whistleblowers" arising from the routine workings and communications of the job site.' [Citation.]" (Levi v.

Regents of University of California (2017) 15 Cal.App.5th 892, 904.) The Regents Stern Motion asserts that Stern "appears to allege four instances where he claims he made a protected disclosure. Two reports appear to involve concerns about the performance and behavior of three officers. One report involved [Stern's] claim that officers in the department were 'legitimately in fear' of a Sergeant who had left [the Regents'] employment nine months before the report was made. The final report consists of comments made by other officers at a union meeting [Stern] led that disclosed in front of others and supervisors (the only 'supervisor' identified was Corporal Brad Prows) that Lieutenant [Millard] made unethical decisions and was aware of a culture of retaliation in the department but refused to take any action." (Memorandum at p. 10, ll. 11-18.)

The opposition of Stern asserts that the protected disclosures at issue include: in late 2015, Stern verbally reported to Smith, who was Stern's direct supervisor, that Officers Rothermel and Savaglio were refusing to

respond to backup calls, turning off their radios, and failing to answer phone calls during shifts, which Stern believed to be a violation of Penal Code section 832; in June 2016, in his capacity as corporal and "FTO" (which the court understands to mean Field Training Officer), Stern reported to Smith that officer Siegel had been released from the FTO program prematurely and lacked the competency to exercise full arrest authority, which Stern also believed to be a violation of Penal Code section 832; on August 15, 2018, Stern led a union meeting in his capacity as "FUPOA" local leader during which officers disclosed to the assembly, a purported pattern of retaliation at the UCSB-PD, specific adverse actions they attributed to protected conduct, and their fear of continuing to work in an environment where disclosures led to discipline; and on August 19, 2018, Millard called a three-hour squad meeting where Stern disclosed to Millard, retaliation within the department, officers' ongoing fear of former Sergeant Smith; and concerns about Millard's leadership. (Opp. at pp. 2-3.)

The separate statement submitted by the Regents sets forth the following material facts: in late 2015, Stern informed Smith, Stern's direct supervisor, of unsafe and inappropriate conduct related to Officers Joash Rothermel and Jeff Savaglio, including that those officers had not responded to requests for backup, had turned off their radios, and did not answer phone calls after the officers had not responded on the radio; on or around June 8, 2016, Stern shared with Smith his concerns about Officer Amanda Siegel's performance and conduct as being unsafe, including that Siegel needed additional supervision, that Stern oftentimes saw her having difficulty responding to routine calls based upon the fact that she did not appear to ask for help and would freeze, and that Stern heard through others that they were concerned about responding to calls due to safety issues with respect to Siegel; on August 15, 2018, Stern led a union meeting during which unidentified officers disclosed in front of unspecified department supervisors who included Corporal Brad Prows, that Millard had made unethical decisions and was aware of a culture of retaliation in the department but refused to take any action; on August 19, 2018, Stern told Millard about retaliation, safety, fear of Smith in the workplace, and people being picked for promotion opportunities when they were not qualified or there were persons more qualified; that during a shift meeting, Stern informed Millard that Stern was retaliated against by Smith for raising safety issues; and that on September 5, 2018, and January 3 and February 26, 2019, respectively, Stern made a report to the Whistleblower Hotline, submitted a Whistleblower Retaliation Complaint, and supplemented that complaint. (Sep.

Stmt., Undisputed Material Fact [UMF] nos. 9, 10, 13-15, 19, 61, 62, 65, 66, 81 & 89-91; see also Memorandum at p. 19 [referring to those UMF].) Considering the nature and content of the disclosures ostensibly at issue as further described above, which on their face implicate or concern safety issues and purported retaliation for raising those concerns, a reasonable trier of fact could conclude that the disclosures of Stern at issue relate to or implicate activity in violation of law, or incompetency.

The Regents Stern Motion also fails to explain why a reasonable trier of fact could not conclude from the material facts set forth in the supporting separate statement, that any of the disclosures at issue were made by Stern for the purpose of remedying the purported conditions described Stern's reports. Instead, based on the material facts presented in this proceeding, a reasonable trier of fact could find that the disclosures of Stern at issue implicate or concern improper governmental activity under the Act, that Stern reasonably believed the conduct at issue constitutes or may constitute improper government activity notwithstanding any lack of personal knowledge of certain activities, and that the reports were made by Stern in good faith.

The issues that are the subject of the Regents Stern Motion also include that Stern's claims of retaliation did not involve, and that Stern cannot establish, any adverse employment action; that any purported adverse employment action was minor or trivial; that Stern cannot establish a causal link between the alleged protected activities of Stern and any adverse employment action; and that the alleged adverse employment action would have occurred for legitimate, independent reasons. (Notice at pp. 5-6, P.P. 5-7 & 10-11.)

As to those issues, the Regents Stern Motion argues that the first cause of action for violation of Government Code section 8547 et seq., and second cause of action for violation of Labor Code section 1102.5, asserted in the Stern Complaint lack merit. Government Code section 8547 et seq. (the California Whistleblower Protection Act or Act) "prohibits retaliation against state employees who 'report waste, fraud, abuse of authority, violation of law, or threat to public health' [Citation.] The Act authorizes 'an action for damages' to redress acts of retaliation. [Citation.]" (Miklosy v.

Regents of University of California (2008) 44 Cal.4th 876, 882.) The Act provides that "any person who

intentionally engages in acts of reprisal, retaliation, threats, coercion, or similar acts against a university employee, including an officer or faculty member, or applicant for employment for having made a protected disclosure shall be liable in an action for damages brought against him or her by the injured party." (Gov. Code, Sec. 8547.10, subd. (c).) "Government Code section 8547.10, subdivision (e), rather than [McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green (1973) 411 U.S. 792], provides the relevant framework for analyzing claims under Government Code section 8547.10." (Scheer v.

Regents of the University of California (2022) 76 Cal.App.5th 904, 916 (Scheer).) "In any civil action ... once it has been demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence that an activity protected by [the Act] was a contributing factor in the alleged retaliation against a former, current, or prospective employee, the burden of proof shall be on the supervisor, manager, or appointing power to demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that the alleged action would have occurred for legitimate, independent reasons even if the employee had not engaged in protected disclosures or refused an illegal order." (Gov.

Code, Sec. 8547.10, subd. (e).) "Both direct and circumstantial evidence can be used to show an employer's intent to retaliate. 'Direct evidence of retaliation may consist of remarks made by decisionmakers displaying a retaliatory motive. [Citation.]' [Citation.] Circumstantial evidence typically relates to such factors as the plaintiff's job performance, the timing of events, and how the plaintiff was treated in comparison to other workers." (Colarossi v. Coty US Inc. (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 1142, 1153.)

The separate statement shows that Stern began their employment with the UCSB-PD on March 2, 2005. (Sep. Stmt., UMF no. 1.) On January 27, 2017, Stern was notified of an internal investigation against him for engaging in inappropriate or unethical behavior including by using a personal communication device while on duty, and by failing to report inappropriate behavior by other officers. (Sep. Stmt., UMF no. 26.) As a result of that investigation, Stern was notified on April 12, 2017, that he was suspended from the UCSB-PD effective May 10 and 11, 2017. (Sep.

Stmt., UMF no. 27.) On February 9, 2017, UCSB-PD issued Administrative Order (AO) 2/9/17-01, pursuant to which Stern applied for the taser instructor position. (Sep. Stmt., UMF nos. 30 & 34.) On March 1, 2017, UCSB-PD issued notices announcing the selection of the taser positions, among others. (Sep. Stmt., UMF no. 36.) Stern was not selected for a taser position. (Sep. Stmt., UMF nos. 29 & 37.) Stern remained a corporal until April 22, 2017. (Sep. Stmt., UMF no. 38.) On July 20, 2017, UCSB-PD issued AO 7/20/17/01 which requested that all officers interested in a corporal specialty assignment, or in continuing their current assignment, submit a letter of interest and resume by a specified date. (Sep.

Stmt., UMF nos. 39-41.) The applications for the corporal specialty assignments were reviewed by a committee of six active sergeants who evaluated and scored the applicants. (Sep. Stmt., UMF no. 42.) Millard compiled the scores of applicants for the corporal specialty assignments on August 15, 2017, but "stayed out" of the process of reviewing applications and the selection of candidates "to avoid the appearance of interference or influence...." (Sep. Stmt., UMF no. 43.) Stern alleges that Millard later admitted he influenced the selection of officers in those positions. (Sep.

Stmt., UMF no. 67.) Stern's application scored thirteenth out of thirteen for the corporal specialty assignment, and Stern was not among the applicants selected for that assignment. (Sep. Stmt., UMF nos. 44 & 46.) On August 21, 2018, UCSB-PD announced the selection by Olson of officers for a corporal specialty assignment that was initiated on July 28, 2018, for which Stern had applied but was not selected. (Sep. Stmt., UMF nos. 50-60.) When evaluating the evidence presented by the parties on summary judgment, the court "must 'view the evidence in the light most favorable to plaintiff[] ...' and 'liberally construe plaintiff['s] evidentiary submissions and strictly scrutinize defendant's own evidence, in order to resolve any evidentiary doubts or ambiguities in plaintiff['s] favor.' " (Nazir, supra, 178 Cal.App.4th at p. 254.)

The court may not weigh the evidence to determine whose version is more likely true. (Binder v. Aetna Life Ins. Co. (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 832, 840.) Viewing the available evidence and information described above in the light most favorable to Stern, and considering the timing of those events in relation to, among other things, the concerns raised by Stern, the present record is sufficient to support competing or conflicting inferences as to whether there existed a retaliatory motive including in regard to the internal investigation of and denial of assignments to Stern, notwithstanding

whether the Regents can show the existence of a legitimate reason for its actions. (See Scheer, supra, 76 Cal.App.5th at pp. 917-918.) As the present record is sufficient to show, for all further reasons discussed above, the existence of triable issues of fact, including in regard to competing inferences which are reasonably deducible from the evidence presented by the parties, the court will deny the Regents Stern Motion. (Code Civ. Proc., Sec. 437c, subds. (c), (f)(1); Aguilar, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 845; Gov.

Code, Sec. 8547.10, subd. (e).) The Regents' request for judicial notice: The court will grant the request of the Regents for judicial notice of the Stern Complaint. (Regents RJN at p. 4, P. 1; Evid. Code, Sec. 452, subd. (d)(1).) Evidentiary objections: The Regents has submitted written objections to material contained in the declaration of Stern submitted in support of Stern's opposition to the Regents Stern Motion. "In granting or denying a motion for summary judgment or summary adjudication, the court need rule only on those objections to evidence that it deems material to its disposition of the motion." (Code Civ.

Proc., Sec. 437c, subd. (q).) As the Regents Stern Motion fails, for all reasons discussed above, to shift the burden to Stern to raise a triable issue of fact, the court need not rule on the objections raised by the Regents. Even if that motion was sufficient to shift the burden to Stern, the court does not deem the evidence to which the Regents has raised objections to be material to its disposition of the Regents Stern Motion. In addition, the written objections of the Regents fail to comply with court rules, which require that "[e]ach written objection must be numbered consecutively and must: "(1) Identify the name of the document in which the specific material objected to is located; "(2) State the exhibit, title, page, and line number of the material objected to; "(3) Quote or set forth the objectionable statement or material; and "(4) State the grounds for each objection to that statement or material." (Cal.

Rules of Court, rule 3.1354(b)(1)-(4).) "Written objections to evidence must follow one of the ... two formats" set forth in California Rules of Court, rule 3.1354. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1354(b).) Though the written objections of the Regents identify the document where the material objected to is located and quote the objectionable material, those objections fail to follow the format set forth in California Rules of Court, rule 3.1354. For example, the Regents raise the same multiple objections to multiple statements contained in each cited paragraph of the Stern declaration.

The manner in which those written objections are formatted effectively forces the court to guess whether the Regents contends that all or only some statements within each cited paragraph are objectionable, and why. For these reasons, the court may disregard those objections. (Hodjat v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co. (2012) 211 Cal.App.4th 1, 8 (Hodjat) [a trial court may decline to rule on improperly formatted objections].) (2) The Regents Little Motions The Little Complaint alleges that the Little Plaintiffs are employed by the Regents. (Little Complaint, P. 15.)

M Little has been employed from approximately March 2014 through the present, and T Little has been employed from approximately November 2014 through the present. (Ibid.) The job titles of the Little Plaintiffs were "Police Officers", and the Little Plaintiffs worked under Olson, Farley, Millard, Romero, Smorodinsky, Pierce, and Smith. (Little Complaint, P. 17.) The Little Complaint alleges that M Little and T Little each raised or reported concerns regarding a subordinate officer spending an inexplicable amount of time in the freshman residence halls while on duty; suspicious behavior by that officer including that officer turning off his radio and refusing to respond to calls for service; the involvement of Smith in an intimate relationship with a subordinate officer; Smith's unauthorized use of emergency lights to evade traffic when traveling to a breakfast event; Smith's use of the employer's gas card and rental vehicle for non-job related purposes; Smith driving recklessly and hitting a parked car; the possible misappropriation of department funds by Smith; and concerns about potential retaliation by Smith. (Little

holiday, then that period is hereby extended to and including the next day that is not a holiday."]), the same reasoning and analysis apply. For the same reasons discussed above including as to the evidence, information, and arguments presented by the Individual Defendants who are represented by attorney Anneet, the court will deny the Motion to Dismiss Little Action. As to the Motion to Dismiss Reyes Action, that motion and the relevant procedural history also shows, without dispute, that, exclusive of any additional extensions of time, the Reyes Action filed on May 17, 2019, was required to be brought to trial no later than November 17, 2024, which is a Sunday. (Code Civ.

Proc., Sec. 583.310; Cal. Rules of Court, appen. I, emergency rule 10(a); see also Vassallo Dec., P. 10; Code Civ. Proc., Sec. 10, Sec. 12, & Sec. 12a.) For the same or similar reasons discussed above, the Motion to Dismiss Reyes Action and the procedural history of these matters show that the Reyes Action was stayed from July 23, 2019, until January 25, 2021, for a total of 552 days. (Vassallo Dec., P.P. 5, 7, 8, exhibit 3 [July 23, 2019, order] & exhibit 5 [Jan. 25, 2021, minute order].) Excluding those days from the time within which the Reyes Action is required to be brought to trial, the court's calculations show that the Reyes Action was required to be brought to trial no later than April 24, 2026. (Code Civ.

Proc., Sec. 12a.) As the Motion to Dismiss Reyes Action also does not dispute or effectively dispute that the Reyes Action was set for trial on June 18, 2026, pursuant to the TCC Order (memorandum at p. 9, l. 18), the same reasoning and analysis apply including as to the information, evidence, and arguments presented or advanced by Millard and Smorodinsky. For the same reasons discussed above, the court will deny the Motion to Dismiss Reyes Action. The Motion to Dismiss Stern Action also does not dispute that the trial of the Stern Action is, pursuant to the TCC Order, "currently scheduled for June 18, 2026...." (Memorandum at p. 9, l. 18.)

Even if the Regents or Millard, who is also represented by attorney Anneet, could present evidence and information showing why that date is beyond the statutory deadline, the same reasoning and analysis apply. For all reasons discussed above, the court will also deny the Motion to Dismiss Stern Action. The Little Plaintiffs, Reyes, and Stern's requests for judicial notice: For the same reasons discussed above, the court will grant the respective requests of the Little Plaintiffs, Reyes, and Stern, for judicial notice of the transcript of the TCC proceeding, the TCC Order, and the trial call order entered on October 2, 2025; and will deny the requests for judicial notice of the court records contained in exhibits C through J of the declarations of attorney Keeton separately filed in support of the oppositions of the Little Plaintiffs, Reyes, and Stern.

Tentative Ruling: Mark Signa et al vs The Regents of the University of CA et al Tentative Ruling: Mark Signa et al vs The Regents of the University of CA et al Case Number 18CV05728 Case Type Civil Law & Motion Hearing Date / Time Fri, 05/08/2026 - 10:00 Nature of Proceedings Motion for Summary Judgment Tentative Ruling (1) For the reasons stated herein, the motion of defendant The Regents of the University of California for summary judgment, or in the alternative summary adjudication, against plaintiff Ryan Smith's complaint is continued to May 29, 2026. (2) For the reasons stated herein, the motion of defendant The Regents of the University of California for summary judgment, or in the alternative summary adjudication, against Matthew Stern's complaint is continued to June 12, 2026.

continued to those dates. The Individual Defendant Motions remained calendared for hearing on April 24; the Regents Smith Motion remained calendared for hearing on May 8; and the Olson Motion, the Regents Reyes Motion, and the Millard Motion remained calendared for hearing on May 15, 2026. On April 24, the court issued a minute order adopting its tentative ruling granting the Individual Defendant Motions, in part as to the second cause of action for violation of Labor Code section 1102.5 as to the moving defendants only.

The Individual Defendant Motions were otherwise denied. On May 1, 2026, the court issued a minute order (the May Order), continuing the hearing on the Regents Little Motions to June 12, 2026, based on the lodging by the Regents of material in support of those motions conditionally under seal without filing any appropriate motion for an order sealing those materials. Pursuant to the May Order, the court set a hearing on any motion for an order to seal materials lodged conditionally under seal in support of the Regents Little Motions that may be filed in this case on May 29, 2026.

Further, the court ordered that any sealing motion be filed and served on or before May 11; that any opposition to that motion be filed and served on or before May 18; and that any replies be filed and served on or before May 22. Relevant here, Stern filed an opposition to the Regents Stern Motion on April 3, 2026. Smith filed their opposition to the Regents Smith Motion on April 17, 2026. Court records further reflect that Signa filed an opposition to the Regents Signa Motion on April 21, 2026; and that on April 24, Signa filed an opposition to the Olson Motion, Reyes filed an opposition to the Regents Reyes Motion, and Stern filed an opposition to the Millard Motion.

Analysis: The Regents Stern Motion: Court records reflect that on January 22, 2026, the Regents lodged conditionally under seal, an appendix containing seven volumes of evidence submitted by the Regents in support of the Regents Stern Motion. Court records further reflect that on February 4, the Regents filed an amended appendix of evidence in support of the Regents Stern Motion, stating that the Regents "lodged" a copy of the exhibits identified in that amended appendix "under seal pursuant to the protective order dated September 9, 2022." (Feb. 4, 2026, Amended Appendix at p. 4, ll. 2-6.)

On that same date, the Regents filed a notice of lodging of their amended appendix of evidence. On February 25, the Regents lodged under seal a document titled as a "lodging" of the Regents' amended appendix of evidence in support of the Regents Stern Motion. "The public has a First Amendment right of access to civil litigation documents filed in court and used at trial or submitted as a basis for adjudication." (Savaglio v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. (2007) 149 Cal.App.4th 588, 596.) "Unless confidentiality is required by law, court records are presumed to be open." (Cal.

Rules of Court, rule 2.550(c).) "A record must not be filed under seal without a court order. The court must not permit a record to be filed under seal based solely on the agreement or stipulation of the parties." (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 2.551(a).) "Unless the context indicates otherwise, 'record' means all or a portion of any document, paper, exhibit, transcript, or other thing filed or lodged with the court, by electronic means or otherwise." (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 2.550(b)(1).) Though the court acknowledges that on September 9, 2022, the court signed an order approving a Stipulation for Protective Order (the Protective Order) executed by the parties' respective counsel, the court has no record showing the entry of any court order permitting the evidence or materials submitted by the Regents in support of the Regents Stern Motion to be filed under seal.

Furthermore, and as noted in the May Order described above, the Protective Order provides that "[w]here any protected materials are included in any motion or other proceeding governed by California Rules of Court, Rules 2.550 and 2.551, the party shall follow those rules." (Protective Order, p. 18, ll. 6-8.) California Rules of Court, rules 2.550 and 2.551, "apply to discovery materials that are ... submitted as a basis for adjudication of matters other than discovery motions or proceedings." (Cal.

Rules of Court, rule 2.550(a)(3).) California Rules of Court, rule 2.551, provides that "[a] party requesting that a record be filed under seal must file a motion or an application for an order sealing the record. The motion or application must be accompanied by a

memorandum and a declaration containing facts sufficient to justify the sealing." (Cal Rules of Court, rule 2.551(b)(1).) "A copy of the motion or application must be served on all parties that have appeared in the case. Unless the court orders otherwise, any party that already has access to the records to be placed under seal must be served with a complete, unredacted version of all papers as well as a redacted version. Other parties must be served with only the public redacted version. If a party's attorney but not the party has access to the record, only the party's attorney may be served with the complete, unredacted version." (Cal Rules of Court, rule 2.551(b)(2).)

The court may not order that a record be filed under seal unless the court "expressly finds facts that establish: "(1) There exists an overriding interest that overcomes the right of public access to the record; "(2) The overriding interest supports sealing the record; "(3) A substantial probability exists that the overriding interest will be prejudiced if the record is not sealed; "(4) The proposed sealing is narrowly tailored; and "(5) No less restrictive means exist to achieve the overriding interest." (Cal.

Rules of Court, rule 2.550(d).) "Pending the determination of the motion or application, the lodged record will be conditionally under seal." (Cal Rules of Court, rule 2.551(b)(4).) "The burden ... is logically placed upon the party seeking the sealing of the documents ...." (H.B. Fuller Co. v. Doe (2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 879, 894.) The court also has no record showing that the Regents filed or served a motion for an order to seal any material submitted as a basis for adjudication of the Regents Stern Motion.

To the extent the Regents did not intend to request an order that any material be sealed, it is also unclear whether the Regents timely provided the written notice described in California Rules of Court, rule 2.551(b)(3)(A)(iii). As a result, the present record includes a voluminous amount of material which has been lodged conditionally under seal by the Regents as a basis for adjudication of the Regents Stern Motion, without the entry of any order setting forth appropriate express factual findings required by the court rules further discussed herein or permitting the sealing of that material in compliance with those rules.

Notwithstanding that the Stern Action is consolidated with the Signa Action for pretrial purposes only, it is the court's understanding that the parties expect to proceed with trial of the Stern Action on June 18, 2026, which is the date set for trial of the Signa Action. (See, e.g., Aug. 8, 2025, Minute Order [setting forth the parties' trial estimates as to those cases "considered in consolidation" and that the parties indicated the consolidated cases will follow the trial of the Smith Action].)

Under the circumstances present here, and for the reasons discussed above and in the May Order, the court will, for good cause, continue the hearing on the Regents Stern Motion to June 12, 2026, to allow for the filing and service of an appropriate motion for an order sealing any material lodged by the Regents conditionally under seal in support of and as a basis for adjudication of that motion. (Code Civ. Proc., Sec. 437c, subd. (a)(3).) The court will further order that any future motion to seal those materials shall be set for hearing on May 29, 2026.

In addition, the court will order that any motion for an order sealing the material lodged conditionally under seal by the Regents as a basis for adjudication of the Regents Stern Motion must be filed and served no later than May 11, 2026. Any opposition must be filed and served on or before May 18; and any reply to that opposition must be filed and served on or before May 22. If a motion for an order sealing the material lodged conditionally under seal by the Regents in support of the Regents Stern Motion is not filed by May 11, the court will order that material, which shall not be considered by the court, permanently deleted.

The Regents Smith Motion: On February 11, 2026, in support of the Regents Smith Motion, the Regents lodged an appendix of evidence conditionally under seal pursuant to the Protective Order, and filed a notice of that lodging. On February 13, the Regents lodged an amended appendix of evidence in support of the Regents Smith Motion conditionally under seal, and a notice of that lodging. On February 25, the Regents filed a document titled as a lodging of their amended appendix of exhibits in support of the Regents Smith Motion conditionally under seal.

(8) For the reasons stated herein, the motion of defendant The Regents of the University of California to seal exhibits in support of defendant's motion for summary judgment or, in the alternative, summary adjudication against the complaint of plaintiff Matthew Stern is granted as to exhibits 3, 4, 7 through 9, and 16, only. Except as herein granted, the motion is otherwise denied. (9) On or before 5 p.m. on June 3, 2026, defendant The Regents of the University of California shall file a public version of the amended appendix of evidence lodged conditionally under seal on February 25, 2026, in support of defendant's motion for summary judgment, or in the alternative, motion for summary adjudication in the Matthew Stern matter, that redacts exhibits 3, 4, 7 through 9, and 16, only.

No other exhibit, or material contained in any other exhibit, apart from exhibits 3, 4, 7 through 9, and 16, shall be redacted from that public redacted version of defendant's amended appendix of evidence. Further, exhibits 3, 4, 7 through 9, and 16 to the amended appendix of evidence lodged by defendant on February 25, 2026, shall remain lodged under seal pending the determination of defendant's motion for summary judgment, or in the alternative, summary adjudication in the Matthew Stern matter. (10) For the reasons stated herein, the motion of defendant The Regents of the University of California's motion for summary judgment, or in the alternative, motion for summary adjudication against plaintiff Ryan Smith's complaint is denied. (11) For the reasons stated herein, the motion of plaintiffs Mark Signa, Michael Little, Tiffany Little, Matthew Stern, and Jonathan Reyes to consolidate cases for all purposes including trial is granted.

This case no. 18CV05728, shall be consolidated with Santa Barbara Superior Court case no. 19CV01431 entitled Michael Little, et al. v. The Regents of the University of California, et al., Santa Barbara Superior Court case no. 19CV04418 entitled Matthew Stern v. The Regents of the University of California, et al., and Santa Barbara Superior Court case no. 19CV02586 entitled Jonathan Lee Reyes v. The Regents of the University of California, et al., for trial. This case is designated as the lead case.

The parties shall file all documents in the lead case. The parties are ordered to appear at the hearing to discuss future proceedings in accordance with this ruling. Background: On November 21, 2018, plaintiff Mark Signa (Signa) filed their original complaint in this case against defendants The Regents of the University of California (the Regents) and the University of California Santa Barbara Police Department (UCSB-PD) Chief Dustin Olson (Olson), asserting four causes of action: (1) violation of Title 42 United States Code section 1983 - denial of first amendment rights; (2) violation of the California Whistleblower Protection Act; (3) negligent infliction of emotional distress; and (4) violation of Labor Code section 1102.5.

Briefly, Signa alleges in their complaint that they have been employed as a police officer by the Regents since 1990, and that the Regents and UCSB-PD retaliated against Signa after Signa voiced concerns about purported misconduct within the UCSB-PD. On February 4, 2019, Signa filed their operative first amended complaint (the Signa FAC), alleging two causes of action: (1) violation of the California Whistleblower Protection Act and (2) violation of Labor Code Section 1102.5. On February 22, 2019, the Regents and Olson filed an answer to the Signa FAC, generally denying its allegations and asserting twenty-seven affirmative defenses.

On May 22, 2019, the court ordered a stay of this case pending the exhaustion of administrative remedies by Signa. The court lifted the stay on January 21, 2021. On September 17, 2021, the court adopted its tentative ruling on a motion of the Regents to transfer and consolidate with this case (the Signa Action) for pre-trial purposes only, the following matters: (1) Santa Barbara Superior Court case no. 19CV01431 entitled Michael Little, et al. v. The Regents of the University of California, et al. (the Little Action); (2) Santa Barbara Superior Court case no. 19CV04418 entitled Matthew Stern v.

The Regents of the University of California, et al. (the Stern Action); (3) Santa Barbara Superior Court case no. 19CV02586 entitled Jonathan Lee Reyes v. The Regents of the University of California, et al. (the Reyes Action); (4) Santa Barbara Superior Court case no. 19CV01625 entitled John Doe v. The Regents of the University of California Santa Barbara, et al. (the Smith Action); and (5) Santa Barbara Superior Court case no. 21CV01256 entitled Ryan Hashimoto v. The Regents of the University of California, et al. (the Hashimoto Action).

On February 26, 2025, the court entered judgment in favor of the Regents, the UCSB-PD, and the University of California Santa Barbara, and against plaintiff Ryan Hashimoto, as to the complaint filed in the Hashimoto Action. Relevant here, on January 22, 2026, the Regents filed a motion for summary judgment, or in the alternative, motion for summary adjudication against the Signa FAC (the Regents Signa Motion), and separately filed a motion for summary judgment, or in the alternative, motion for summary adjudication against the complaint of Matthew Stern (Stern) filed in the Stern Action (the Regents Stern Motion).

The Regents Signa Motion and the Regents Stern Motion were calendared for hearing on April 24, 2026. On January 26, the Regents filed a motion for summary judgment or adjudication against the complaint of plaintiff Tiffany Little (T Little) filed in the Little Action, and separately filed a motion for summary judgment, or in the alternative, motion for summary adjudication against the complaint of plaintiff Michael Little (M Little) in the Little Action (collectively, the Regents Little Motions).

The Regents Little Motions were calendared for hearing on May 1, 2026. T Little and M Little have filed opposition to the Regents Little Motions. On February 10, Olson filed a motion for summary judgment, or in the alternative summary adjudication, against the Signa FAC (the Olson Motion). On February 11, the Regents filed a motion for summary judgment or adjudication against the complaint filed by plaintiff Ryan Smith (Smith) in the Smith Action (the Regents Smith Motion). On February 13, the Regents filed a motion for summary judgment or adjudication against the complaint filed by plaintiff Jonathan Lee Reyes (Reyes) in the Reyes Action (the Regents Reyes Motion).

On February 19, defendant David Millard (Millard) filed a motion for summary judgment, or in the alternative summary adjudication, against the complaint filed by Stern in the Stern Action (the Millard Motion.) The Olson Motion, the Regents Smith Motion, the Regents Reyes Motion, and the Millard Motion were calendared for hearing on May 15, 2026. On March 16, the Regents filed an ex parte application for an order to set the hearing on the Regents Smith Motion on May 8, 2026, to allow that motion to be heard no later than 30 days before trial.

On March 18, the court signed and entered an order granting that application, and moved the hearing on the Regents Smith Motion to May 8, 2026. On April 3, Stern filed their opposition to the Regents Stern Motion. On April 11, the court signed, and on April 13 filed, an order approving a stipulation by the parties to continue the hearing on the Regents Stern Motion to May 8, 2026, and the hearing on the Regents Signa Motion to May 15, 2026. The Regents Smith Motion remained calendared for hearing on May 8.

The Olson Motion, the Regents Reyes Motion, and the Millard Motion remained calendared for hearing on May 15, 2026. On April 17, Smith filed their opposition to the Regents Smith Motion. On April 21, Signa filed their opposition to the Regents Signa Motion. On April 24, Signa filed opposition to the Olson Motion, Reyes filed opposition to the Regents Reyes Motion, and Stern filed opposition to the Millard Motion. On May 1, the court issued a minute order (the May 1 Order), continuing the hearing on the Regents Little Motions to June 12, 2026, as a result of the lodging by the Regents of material submitted as a basis for adjudication of those motions conditionally under seal without having filed an appropriate motion for an order placing those materials under seal, or the entry of any such order.

The court set a hearing on any motion for an order to file the materials lodged conditionally under seal in support of the Regents Little Motions on May 29, 2026, and a briefing schedule that requires any such motion to be filed and served on or before May 11, among other things. On May 8, after a hearing, the court issued a minute order (the May 8 Order), continuing the hearing on the Regents Smith Motion to May 29, 2026, and the hearing on the Regents Stern Motion to June 12, 2026, as a result of the lodging by the Regents of material submitted as a basis for adjudication of those motions conditionally under seal without having filed an appropriate motion for an order placing those materials under seal.

The May 8 Order also requires that any motion for an order to place under seal the materials lodged by the Regents as a basis for adjudication of the Regents Smith Motion be filed and served on or before May 11, 2026;

set a briefing schedule for oppositions and replies as to that motion; and set a hearing on any such motion on May 22, 2026. As to the materials lodged by the Regents conditionally under seal in support of the Regents Stern Motion, the May 8 Order set a hearing date for any motion to place those materials under seal on May 29, 2026. On May 11, the Regents separately filed: (1) a motion for an order to file under seal the exhibits lodged by the Regents in support of the Regents Signa Motion (the Signa Motion to Seal); (2) a motion for an order to file under seal the exhibits lodged by the Regents in support of the Regents Reyes Motion (the Reyes Motion to Seal); (3) a motion for an order to file under seal the exhibits lodged by the Regents in support of the Regents Little Motions (the Little Motion to Seal); (4) a motion for an order to file under seal the exhibits lodged by the Regents in support of the Regents Smith Motion (the Smith Motion to Seal); and (5) a motion for an order to file under seal the exhibits lodged by the Regents in support of the Regents Stern Motion (the Stern Motion to Seal).

On May 15, after a hearing, the court issued a minute order adopting its tentative ruling denying the Olson Motion and the Millard Motion. Further, the court continued the Regents Signa Motion and the Regents Reyes Motion to June 5, 2026, to allow time to resolve the Signa Motion to Seal and the Reyes Motion to Seal. Also on May 15, after the deadline prescribed in the May 8 Order, Smith filed an opposition to the Smith Motion to Seal. On May 18, M Little and T Little filed an opposition to the Little Motion to Seal; Stern filed an opposition to the Stern Motion to Seal; Signa filed an opposition to the Signa Motion to Seal; and Reyes filed an opposition to the Reyes Motion to Seal.

On May 20, Signa, M Little, T Little, Reyes, and Stern (collectively, Plaintiffs) filed an ex parte application for an order shortening time for a hearing on a forthcoming motion to consolidate the Signa Action, the Little Action, the Reyes Action, and the Stern Action (collectively, the Actions) for trial. On May 21, after a hearing, the court granted that application, set the hearing on that motion on May 29, 2026, and ordered that any opposition to that motion be filed no later than May 27. On May 21, 2026, Plaintiffs filed their motion for an order consolidating the Actions for all purposes including trial (the Motion to Consolidate).

On May 22, the court continued the hearing on the Smith Motion to Seal to May 29, 2026. On May 27, the Regents filed an opposition to the Motion to Consolidate with the court. Analysis: (1) Smith Motion to Seal California has "long recognized a common law right of access to public documents, including court records." (Overstock.com, Inc. v. Goldman Sachs Group, Inc. (2014) 231 Cal.App.4th 471, 483 (Overstock); see also McGuire v. Superior Court (1993) 12 Cal.App.4th 1685, 1687 ["Court records are open to the public unless they are specifically exempted from disclosure by statute or are protected by the court itself due to the necessity of confidentiality."].) "California law also recognizes a constitutional right of access, grounded in the First Amendment, to court proceedings and court documents. [Citation.] 'A strong presumption exists in favor of public access to court records in ordinary civil trials. [Citation.]

That is because "the public has an interest, in all civil cases, in observing and assessing the performance of its public judicial system, and that interest strongly supports a general right of access in ordinary civil cases."' [Citation.] Because orders to seal court records implicate the public's right of access under the First Amendment, such orders are subject to ongoing judicial scrutiny, including at the trial court level." (In re Marriage of Tamir (2021) 72 Cal.App.5th 1068, 1078.) California Rules of Court, rules 2.550 and 2.551 "apply to records sealed or proposed to be sealed by court order." (Cal.

Rules of Court, rule 2.550(a)(1).) Those rules "do not apply to records that are required to be kept confidential by law." (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 2.550(a)(2).) "[T]he rules do apply to discovery materials that are used at trial or submitted as a basis for adjudication of matters other than discovery motions or proceedings." (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 2.550(a)(3).) "A record must not be filed under seal without a court order. The court must not permit a record to be filed under

seal based solely on the agreement or stipulation of the parties." (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 2.551(a).) "A party requesting that a record be filed under seal must file a motion or an application for an order sealing the record. The motion or application must be accompanied by a memorandum and a declaration containing facts sufficient to justify the sealing." (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 2.551(b)(1).) "A copy of the motion or application must be served on all parties that have appeared in the case.

Unless the court orders otherwise, any party that already has access to the records to be placed under seal must be served with a complete, unredacted version of all papers as well as a redacted version." (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 2.551(b)(2).) The proofs of service submitted with the Smith Motion to Seal, and the filing by Smith of an opposition to that motion, indicate that a copy of that motion was properly served. "[A] reasoned decision about sealing . . . records cannot be made without identifying and weighing the competing interests and concerns.

Such a process is impossible without (1) identifying the specific information claimed to be entitled to such treatment; (2) identifying the nature of the harm threatened by disclosure; and (3) identifying and accounting for countervailing considerations. The burden of presenting information sufficient to accomplish the first two steps is logically placed upon the party seeking the sealing of the documents, who is presumptively in the best position to know what disclosures will harm him and how.

This means at a minimum that the party seeking to seal documents, or maintain them under seal, must come forward with a specific enumeration of the facts sought to be withheld and specific reasons for withholding them." (H.B. Fuller Co. v. Doe (2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 879, 894.) The Smith Motion to Seal seeks an order placing under seal "exhibits numbered 1-23 which were filed in support of the [Regents Smith Motion]." (Notice at p. 4, ll. 4-10 & P. 1.) In that motion, the Regents asserts that on February 13, 2026, it filed an Amended Appendix of Evidence (the Smith Amended Appendix) "which sought to lodge a copy of the exhibits numbered 1-23 under seal...." (Memorandum at p. 4, ll. 20-22.)

A copy of the Smith Amended Appendix filed by the Regents in the public record on February 13, 2026, is attached to the declaration of the Regents' counsel, Jaqueline Orozco (attorney Orozco), submitted in support of the Smith Motion to Seal. (Orozco Dec., P. 4 & exhibit 2.) As a threshold matter, though attorney Orozco's declaration, and the court's records, show that the Regents filed a public redacted version of the Smith Amended Appendix on February 13, 2026, the Regents did not lodge the Smith Amended Appendix conditionally under seal on that date, notwithstanding the filing by the Regents of a notice of lodging of that appendix on February 13.

Instead, court records reflect that the Regents lodged a complete, unredacted version of the Smith Amended Appendix conditionally under seal on February 25, 2026, by delivering a flash drive containing that record to the Clerk of the Court. In addition, the court's copy of the unredacted version of the Smith Amended Appendix lodged by the Regents conditionally under seal on February 25, 2026, does not include a proof of service. Therefore, the date on which the Regents served any party with a complete, unredacted version of the Smith Amended Appendix is unclear.

Absent a dispute, the court assumes without deciding that the Regents has timely and properly served the parties with a copy of the unredacted version of the Smith Amended Appendix. Court records also reflect that on February 11, 2026, the Regents filed a public redacted version of an appendix of evidence in support of the Regents Smith Motion that also identifies exhibits numbered 1 through 23. Though the Regents also filed a notice of lodging of that appendix on that same date, the court has no record showing that the Regents lodged an unredacted version of that appendix conditionally under seal.

Under the circumstances present here, and as the Smith Motion to Seal describes and is directed to only those exhibits that are identified and described in the public redacted version of the Smith Amended Appendix filed by the Regents on February 13, the court understands the Smith Amended Appendix to supersede and replace the prior appendix of evidence filed by the Regents on February 11, 2026. For these reasons, the court considers only the Smith Amended Appendix, and the exhibits attached to those documents, and not any prior version of that document.

The public redacted version of the Smith Amended Appendix identifies only 23 exhibits, and the title of each exhibit. (See also Orozco Dec., exhibit 2.) Therefore, the present record reflects, without dispute, that the Smith Motion to Seal seeks an order placing under seal all of the exhibits submitted by the Regents as a basis for adjudication of the Regents Smith Motion. The court's review of the unredacted version of the Smith Amended

Appendix shows that those exhibits include over 1,000 pages of material. (Feb. 25, 2026, Lodged Smith Amended Appendix at pdf pp. 9-1056.) "[T]he notice of a motion, other than for a new trial, must state when, and the grounds upon which it will be made, and the papers, if any, upon which it is to be based." (Code Civ. Proc., Sec. 1010.) "A notice of motion must state in the opening paragraph the nature of the order being sought and the grounds for issuance of the order." (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1110(a).) "The purpose of the notice requirements 'is to cause the moving party to "sufficiently define the issues for the information and attention of the adverse party and the court." ' [Citations.]" (Kinda v.

Carpenter (2016) 247 Cal.App.4th 1268, 1277 (Kinda).) "As a general rule, the trial court may consider only the grounds stated in the notice of motion." (Luri v. Greenwald (2003) 107 Cal.App.4th 1119, 1125.) Though the notice of the Smith Motion to Seal states the nature of the order sought by the Regents, and the papers on which that motion is based, wholly absent from that notice are the grounds for issuance of that order. For these reasons, the notice of the Smith Motion to Seal is deficient.

Though the court, generally, may not consider any grounds not stated in the notice of the Smith Motion to Seal for all reasons discussed above, "it may be sufficient that the supporting papers contain the grounds for the relief sought, even if the notice does not. [Citations.] It also may be sufficient if the omitted issue, or ground for relief, was raised without objection before the trial court." (Kinda, supra, 247 Cal.App.4th at p. 1277.) The opposition of Smith does not raise any objection to any deficiencies in the notice of the Smith Motion to Seal, including those described above.

In addition, the supporting memorandum contains the grounds for the order sought in that motion. For these reasons, the court will consider the grounds set forth in the memorandum submitted in support of the Smith Motion to Seal. The sole ground asserted in that memorandum is that the Regents Smith Motion addresses allegations that concern conduct of law enforcement personnel and subsequent workplace or internal affairs investigation files of peace officers which are confidential pursuant to Penal Code section 832.7, subdivision (a). (Memorandum at p. 4.)

In support, attorney Orozco states, in a conclusory manner, that the Regents Smith Motion "references and includes exhibits that are law enforcement personnel records or contain information from workplace investigations, including Internal Affairs investigations, performed by [the Regents] and maintained by the [UCSB-PD] all of which are designated as confidential." (Orozco Dec., P. 5; see also Memorandum at p. 4.) Attorney Orozco further states that those exhibits "are subject to Penal Code sections 832.5, 832.7, 832.8 and Evidence Code sections 1043, 1044, 1045." (Orozco Dec., P. 6; see also Memorandum at pp. 4 & 6.)

The court is "not obliged to accept the [Orozco] declaration[] as dispositive." (In re Providian Credit Card Cases (2002) 96 Cal.App.4th 292, 301 (Providian).) Though the Smith Motion to Seal includes a blanket request for an order sealing all of the exhibits submitted as a basis for adjudication of the Regents Smith Motion, the motion fails to present any information, evidence, or reasoned argument showing, on a point-by-point basis as to each specific exhibit to the Smith Amended Appendix, why each of exhibits is confidential under Penal Code sections 832.5, 832.7, and 832.8, or Evidence Code sections 1043, 1044, and 1045.

To the extent the Regents contends that some portion of each exhibits contains or reflects information that is confidential under those statutes, the Smith Motion to Seal also fails to present any information or evidence showing where any such purportedly confidential information appears in each exhibit. By failing to present any information, evidence, or reasoned argument showing why each specific exhibit or portions of any exhibit are confidential pursuant to Penal Code section 832.7, the Regents has effectively shifted its burden to the court, which requires the court to review over 1,000 pages of material to determine which, if any, exhibit attached to the Smith Amended Appendix is, as attorney Orozco contends, a law enforcement personnel record and why; and to determine which, if any, exhibit contains information from workplace or internal affairs investigations and why.

For these and all further reasons discussed above, the Regents has wholly failed to meet its burden to show why each of the 23 exhibits attached to the Smith Amended Appendix is confidential pursuant to Penal Code sections 832.5, 832.7, and 832.8, or Evidence Code sections 1043, 1044, and 1045. (Providian, supra, 96 Cal.App.4th at p. 301 [noting that, as to the issue presented in that case, "it was defendants' burden to prove the existence of trade secrets [citations], and to overcome the presumption in favor of public access."].)

The failure by the Regents to meet its burden justifies a denial of the Smith Motion to Seal for all reasons

discussed above. Notwithstanding the Regents' failure to present any information or evidence, on a point-by-point basis, explaining why each exhibit is confidential, contains confidential information, or is required to be kept confidential pursuant to the statutory provisions cited in attorney Orozco's declaration and above, the court has conducted its own review of the exhibits attached to the Smith Amended Appendix. For all reasons discussed herein, the court will grant the Smith Motion to Seal as to exhibits 3 and 17 through 21, only, and will otherwise deny that motion.

Considering the nature of the confidentiality protection claimed by the Regents as to exhibits 1 through 23 of the Smith Amended Appendix which remain lodged conditionally under seal, the court's "discussion of those documents must be circumspect." (Providian, supra, 96 Cal.App.4th at p. 303.) (a) Exhibits 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, and 22 Relevant here based on the sole ground stated in the Regents' memorandum and attorney Orozco's declaration, "[i]n 1978, the California Legislature codified the privileges and procedures surrounding what had come to be known as ' Pitchess motions' ... through the enactment of Penal Code sections 832.7 and 832.8 and Evidence Code sections 1043 through 1045." (City of Santa Cruz v.

Municipal Court (1989) 49 Cal.3d 74, 81 & fns. 3, 4.) "Those sections create a statutory scheme making [certain law enforcement personnel] records confidential and subject to discovery only through the procedure set out in the Evidence Code." (Riverside County Sheriff's Dept. v. Stiglitz (2014) 60 Cal.4th 624, 630.) Penal Code section 832.7, which "creates a general privilege and then carves out a limited exception" (City of Hemet v. Superior Court (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 1411, 1427 (City of Hemet)), provides that "the personnel records of peace officers and custodial officers and records maintained by a state or local agency pursuant to [Penal Code] [s]ection 832.5, or information obtained from these records, are confidential and shall not be disclosed in any criminal or civil proceeding except by discovery pursuant to Sections 1043 and 1046 of the Evidence Code[]" (Pen.

Code, Sec. 832.7, subd. (a)). The public redacted version of the Smith Amended Appendix describes exhibits 11 through 16 and 22 as: (exhibit 11) "Pertinent Pages from the Certified Copy of the Transcript of the Deposition of Plaintiff, Taken on March 20, 2025"; (exhibit 12) "Pertinent Pages from the Certified Copy of the Transcript of the Deposition of David Millard, Taken on June 19, 2024"; (exhibit 13) "Pertinent Pages of Plaintiff's Responses to Defendant's Special Interrogatories, Set One, Served on October 4, 2021"; (exhibit 14) "Plaintiff's Supplemental Responses to Defendant's Special Interrogatories, Set One, Served on December 10, 2025"; (exhibit 15) "Plaintiff's Responses to Defendant's Requests for Production, Set One, Served on October 4, 2021"; (exhibit 16) "Plaintiff's Supplemental Responses to Defendant's Requests for Production, Set One, Served on December 10, 2025; and (exhibit 22) "Defendant's Responses to Plaintiff's Requests for Production, Set One, Served on October 1, 2021". (Orozco Dec., exhibit 2 at p. 5.) "[P]eace officer personnel records include only the types of information enumerated in [Penal Code] section 832.8." (Commission on Peace Officer Standards & Training v.

Superior Court (2007) 42 Cal.4th 278, 293; see also Pasadena Police Officers Assn. v. Superior Court (2015) 240 Cal.App.4th 268, 292 (Pasadena).) Penal Code section 832.8 states: "'Personnel records' means any file maintained under that individual's name by his or her employing agency and containing records relating to any of the following: "(1) Personal data, including marital status, family members, educational and employment history, home addresses, or similar information. "(2) Medical history. "(3) Election of employee benefits. "(4) Employee advancement, appraisal, or discipline. "(5) Complaints, or investigations of complaints, concerning an event or transaction in which he or she participated, or which he or she perceived, and pertaining to the manner in which he or she performed his or her duties. "(6) Any other information the disclosure of which would constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy." (Pen.

Code, Sec. 832.8, subd. (a)(1)-(6).) The court's review of exhibits 11 through 16 and 22 shows, without dispute by the Regents, that those exhibits

consist of excerpts from the transcripts of the depositions of Smith and Millard, and the discovery responses of Smith and the Regents, each of which appear to have been generated during this litigation. Considering that exhibits 11 through 16 and 22, on their face, consist of discovery materials generated during this litigation, and as the Smith Motion to Seal presents no information, evidence, or argument showing why those materials contain the type of information described in Penal Code section 832.8, the Smith Motion to Seal, and the court's review, does not show that exhibits 11 through 16 and 22 are personnel records or confidential pursuant to Penal Code section 832.7.

Pursuant to California Rules of Court, rules 2.550 and 2.551, a "record" includes "all or a portion of any document, paper, exhibit, transcript, or other thing filed or lodged with the court, by electronic means or otherwise." (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 2.550(b)(1).) The Smith Motion to Seal also does not present any information specifically identifying where any purportedly confidential information of the type described in Penal Code section 832.8, subdivision (a), appears in exhibits 11 through 16 or 22, or explain why that information is required to be kept confidential.

Those exhibits also do not show, on their face, that they contain law enforcement personnel files as attorney Orozco asserts. To the extent the Regents contend that the entirety of each of those exhibits is confidential because some limited portion reflects information appearing in a personnel record, it would appear that the Smith Motion to Seal seeks to "extend the statute beyond its limited purpose." (Pasadena, supra, 240 Cal.App.4th at p. 293.) Also relevant here, Penal Code section 832.5 provides: "Each department or agency in this state that employs peace officers shall establish a procedure to investigate complaints by members of the public against the personnel of these departments or agencies, and shall make a written description of the procedure available to the public." (Pen.

Code, Sec. 832.5, subd. (a).) "All complaints retained pursuant to [subdivision (b)] may be maintained either in the peace or custodial officer's general personnel file or in a separate file designated by the department or agency as provided by department or agency policy, in accordance with all applicable requirements of law." (Pen. Code, Sec. 832.5, subd. (b).) The Smith Motion to Seal also fails to show, for the same or similar reasons discussed above, why the discovery materials contained in exhibits 11 through 16 and 22 are records maintained by the Regents or UCSB-PD pursuant to the provisions of Penal Code section 832.5.

Those exhibits also do not show, on their face, that they are records maintained pursuant to that statute. For these and the reasons further discussed above, the court questions the credibility of the statements contained in attorney Orozco's declaration. The confidentiality protections provided under Penal Code section 832.7 also apply to "information obtained from" the "personnel records of peace officers and custodial officers and records maintained by a state or local agency pursuant to Section 832.5...." (Pen.

Code, Sec. 832.7, subd. (a).) The Smith Motion to Seal also presents no evidence, information, or reasoned argument showing why any information contained in exhibit 11 was obtained by Smith from a personnel record or record maintained pursuant to Penal Code section 832.5. For example, the court's review of that exhibit shows that it reflects Smith's own observations and complaints regarding the matters at issue in the Smith Action. (See, e.g., Lodged Smith Amended Appendix, exhibit 11 at pp. 36-40, 49-57, 68-73, 76-79, 81-84, 86-88.)

Further, exhibit 11 does not show, on its face, what, if any, information was obtained by Smith from the personnel records of a peace officer or any record maintained by the Regents or UCSB-PD pursuant to Penal Code section 832.5. Even if the Regents could provide evidence or information showing that any specific information contained in exhibit 11 was obtained by Smith from a peace officer's personnel record or a record maintained by the Regents or the UCSB-PD pursuant to Penal Code section 832.5, the Smith Motion to Seal fails, for all reasons discussed above, to present that evidence, or to show where that information appears in that exhibit.

The same reasoning and analysis apply to exhibits 12 through 16 and 22, which also consist of discovery materials ostensibly generated during this litigation, and which do not show, on their face, that any information contained those materials was obtained from a personnel record or records maintained pursuant to Penal Code section 832.5. (See, e.g., Lodged Smith Amended Appendix, exhibit 12 at pp. 17, 58; exhibit 13 at pp. 15-31; exhibit 14 at pp. 2-3; exhibit 15 at pp. 2-4; exhibit 16 at p. 2; exhibit 22 at p. 5.)

The Smith Motion to Seal also fails to present any evidence or information showing why a discovery response in which the responding party agrees to produce documents, or states that no responsive documents exist, reflects information obtained from

the types of records described in Penal Code section 832.7. (See, e.g., exhibit 22 at pp. 4, 7.) In addition, the Regents does not appear to dispute that the personnel records of peace officers, records maintained by the Regents or UCSB-PD pursuant to Penal Code section 832.5, or information obtained from those records, may not be disclosed "except by discovery pursuant to Sections 1043 and 1046 of the Evidence Code." (Pen. Code, Sec. 832.7, subd. (a).) Though exhibits 11 through 16 and 22 consist of discovery materials generated during this litigation, the Smith Motion to Seal does not address whether any written motion was required to be filed, or was filed, by the party seeking the discovery reflected in those exhibits. (See Evid.

Code, Sec. 1043, subd. (a).) Court records also do not show that any written motion pursuant to Evidence Code section 1043 was filed with the court. For these additional reasons, the court views the Regent's and its counsel's representations "with considerable skepticism ... ." (Providian, supra, 96 Cal.App.4th at p. 309.) For all reasons discussed above, the Smith Motion to Seal fails to show why exhibits 11 through 16 and 22 are confidential, or required to be kept confidential, pursuant to Penal Code section 832.7. (Cal.

Rules of Court, rule 2.550(a)(2).) The Smith Motion to Seal also asserts that the confidentiality of peace officer records under Penal Code section 832.7 gives rise to an overriding interest in protecting exhibits 11 through 16 and 22 from disclosure, which will be prejudiced if those records are not sealed because this case is likely to be subject to public scrutiny; it is not uncommon for officers to receive harsh public criticism; the exhibits would be disclosed without going through the process set forth in the " Pitchess statutes"; and any public disclosure of those exhibits could jeopardize a fair and unbiased analysis of the evidence and the security of all individuals involved. (Motion at pp. 6-7.)

The Regents also asserts that the proposed sealing of exhibits 11 through 16 and 22 is narrowly tailored, and that no less restrictive means exists. In support of that assertion, attorney Orozco states that "[r]edaction alone will not achieve the confidentiality of personnel records of peace officers because unredacted information and statements is sufficient to infer the identity of officers involved." (Orozco Dec., P. 7.) "Unless confidentiality is required by law, court records are presumed to be open." (Cal.

Rules of Court, rule 2.550(c).) "The court may order that a record be filed under seal only if it expressly finds facts that establish: "(1) There exists an overriding interest that overcomes the right of public access to the record; "(2) The overriding interest supports sealing the record; "(3) A substantial probability exists that the overriding interest will be prejudiced if the record is not sealed; "(4) The proposed sealing is narrowly tailored; and "(5) No less restrictive means exist to achieve the overriding interest." (Cal.

Rules of Court, rule 2.550(d)(1)-(5); see also Sander v. State Bar of California (2013) 58 Cal.4th 300, 319, fn. 7.) Further, "[a]n order sealing the record must: "(A) Specifically state the facts that support the findings; and "(B) Direct the sealing of only those documents and pages, or, if reasonably practicable, portions of those documents and pages, that contain the material that needs to be placed under seal. All other portions of each document or page must be included in the public file." (Cal.

Rules of Court, rule 2.550(e)(1)(A), (B).) The same or similar reasoning and analysis apply. Apart from the contentions further discussed above, the Smith Motion to Seal fails to present any information, evidence, or reasoned argument showing the existence of any overriding interest that overcomes the right of public access to exhibits 11 through 16 and 22, or any information contained in those exhibits. Because that motion fails to identify any specific information contained in exhibits 11 through 16 and 22 that is confidential, or where that information appears, the Regents has also failed to meet its burden to show why the proposed sealing of the entirety of those exhibits is narrowly tailored.

Furthermore, the general assertion that this case may be subject to public scrutiny or public criticism, without more, "calls for speculation." (In re Willon (1996) 47 Cal.App.4th 1080, 1100.) For example, the Smith Motion to Seal presents no information, evidence, or reasoned argument showing "(1) the nature and extent of the publicity, (2) the amount of information already in the public domain, (3) the existence of prejudicial information not yet released to the public, (4) the size of the county from which prospective jurors will be drawn, and (5) whether potential voir dire or other measures could eliminate any prejudice caused by the publicity." (People v.

Jackson (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 1009, 1025.) That motion also fails to show, with appropriate citations to the record, why any exhibit contains information that is "highly prejudicial." (Ibid.) For these reasons, the Smith Motion to Seal fails to show "[a] substantial probability exists that the overriding interest will be prejudiced if the record is not sealed[.]" (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 2.550(d)(3).) "[T]he public has an interest, in all civil cases, in observing and assessing the performance of its public judicial system, and that interest strongly supports a general right of access in ordinary civil cases." (NBC Subsidiary (KNBC-TV), Inc. v.

Superior Court (1999) 20 Cal.4th 1178, 1210, original italics.) For all reasons discussed above, the general and conclusory points and arguments advanced in the Smith Motion to Seal, which lack credibility and the specificity required under court rules, fail to show the existence of an overriding interest that overcomes the right of public access to exhibits 11 through 16 and 22, or why the proposed sealing of those exhibits in their entirety is narrowly tailored. For these same reasons, that motion also fails to show any prejudice to an overriding interest, or why there exists no less restrictive means to achieve any purported overriding interest in those exhibits.

For these and all further reasons discussed above, and as the Smith Motion to Seal does not present any information or evidence that would support the express findings required under California Rules of Court, rule 2.550 to seal all or any part of exhibits 11 through 16 and 22, the court will deny the Smith Motion to Seal as to those exhibits. (b) Exhibit 2 The Smith Amended Appendix describes exhibit 2 as "Plaintiff Ryan Smith's Complaint, Filed on March 27, 2019". (Orozco Dec., exhibit 2 at p. 4.)

The same reasoning and analysis apply. For all reasons discussed above, the Smith Motion to Seal fails to show why exhibit 2 is a personnel record or a record maintained by the Regents or UCSB-PD pursuant to Penal Code section 832.5, or why that exhibit, or any information contained in that exhibit, is confidential, or required to be kept confidential, pursuant to Penal Code section 832.7. The undisputed available information and evidence also shows that Smith filed their complaint in the public record of the Smith Action.

The public version of that complaint does not include any redactions. In addition, though Smith is named as "John Doe" in their complaint, the Regents do not appear to dispute that Smith's name was publicly disclosed after the filing of that pleading, including by the Regents and Smith in this proceeding. Smith contends in their opposition that the Regents has failed to meet its burden to show why any exhibit, or information contained in an exhibit, is confidential pursuant to Penal Code section 832.7, and that the Regents' reliance on that statute is misplaced. (See Opp. at pp. 5-6.)

Notwithstanding whether the opposition of Smith was filed timely, the court construes that opposition as an express waiver of the confidentiality protections provided under Penal Code section 832.7 as to any information regarding Smith that is contained in exhibit 2. (Pasadena, supra, 240 Cal.App.4th at pp. 274, 293-294 [discussing waiver as to personnel information appearing in a report concerning an officer-involved shooting].) As further discussed above, though Smith cannot waive any confidentiality protections as to any peace officer other than Smith (Pasadena, supra, 240 Cal.App.4th at pp. 293-294), the Smith Motion to Seal fails, for the same reasons discussed above, to identify any specific information contained in exhibit 2 that is confidential or required to be kept confidential pursuant to Penal Code section 832.7, or where that information appears in that exhibit.

There also exists some question as to whether the Regents, by its conduct, has waived any confidentiality protection as to exhibit 2. "Waiver refers to the act, or the consequences of the act, of one side. Waiver is the intentional relinquishment of a known right after full knowledge of the facts and depends upon the intention of one party only. Waiver does not require any act or conduct by the other party." (DRG/Beverly Hills, Ltd. v. Chopstix Dim Sum Cafe & Takeout III, Ltd. (1994) 30 Cal.App.4th 54, 59.)

Relevant here, "[f]iling a document makes it a part of the permanent court file, whereas lodging a document makes it only temporarily a court record." (Mao's Kitchen, Inc. v. Mundy (2012) 209 Cal.App.4th 132, 150 (Mao's Kitchen); see also Overstock, supra, 231 Cal.App.4th at p. 487, fn. 8.) Because exhibit 2 was filed and not lodged with the court, the information contained in that document has been made available to any member of the public who consults the court's file since 2019. (See Mao's Kitchen, supra, 209 Cal.App.4th at p. 150 [general discussion].)

The Smith Motion to Seal presents no information or evidence to indicate or suggest that Smith inadvertently or mistakenly filed their complaint in the public record instead of lodging that pleading confidentially under seal. Instead, the present record shows or suggests that Smith intended to publicly disclose any confidential information contained in exhibit 2. Even if the public filing of the complaint in the Smith Action is not, in itself, sufficient to show an express waiver of any statutory confidentiality protections, Smith's conduct in this proceeding as further described above, suggests that Smith has chosen to waive those protections as to that record. (Berkeley Police Assn. v.

City of Berkeley (2008) 167 Cal.App.4th 385, 406, fn. 22.) Furthermore, though "the confidentiality privilege is possessed both by the agency and the subject officer[]" (City of Hemet, supra, 37 Cal.App.4th at p. 1430, original italics), the Smith Motion to Seal presents no evidence or information showing that the Regents did not know that exhibit 2 was filed by Smith in the public record without redaction. The Smith Motion to Seal also does not explain why the Regents was prevented from filing a motion for an order placing exhibit 2 under seal pursuant to the provisions of Penal Code section 832.7.

There is also no information or evidence to suggest that the Regents, acting through its counsel, did not know that exhibit 2 would become part of the court's permanent file or would be accessible to the public once that pleading was filed, including in regard to any purportedly confidential information contained in that record. A waiver may arise from "an act which, according to its natural import, is so inconsistent with an intent to enforce the right as to induce a reasonable belief that such right has been relinquished." (Rheem Mfg.

Co. v. U. S. (1962) 57 Cal.2d 621, 626.) To the extent it can be implied from the Regent's conduct in this litigation further described above, that the Regents waived the confidentiality protection provided under Penal Code section 832.7 concerning any information contained in exhibit 2, there also exists some question as to whether that waiver extends to other exhibits to the extent they contain that same information. Even if the Regents could provide evidence or information that identifies any specific information contained in exhibit 2 which the Regents contend is subject to the statutory confidentiality protections discussed above, and that the Regents has not waived those protections by its conduct in this litigation, the Smith Motion to Seal does not present any such evidence or information as further discussed above.

That motion also fails to specifically identify where any such information appears in exhibit 2, or why that specific information cannot be redacted for the reasons asserted by attorney Orozco and described above. Apart from the contentions described above, the Smith Motion to Seal also fails, for the same reasons discussed herein, to identify the existence of an overriding interest in exhibit 2 that overcomes the right of public access to that document. Considering that exhibit 2 has been accessible to the public since 2019, the Smith Motion to Seal also fails to show why there exists any substantial probability of prejudice if that record is not sealed. (Cal.

Rules of Court, rule 2.550(d)(3).) The court also notes that exhibit 2 contains general allegations regarding the status of the Regents and UCSB-PD; the relationship between those parties; whether venue and jurisdiction is proper or appropriate; the exhaustion of administrative remedies; the dates of plaintiff's employment; and the damages sought by plaintiff. (Lodged Smith Amended Appendix, exhibit 2, P.P. 2-3, 9-14, 15, & pp. 35-36.) Wholly absent from the Smith Motion to Seal is any information, evidence, or argument showing why those matters are or are confidential or required to be kept confidential pursuant to Penal Code section 832.7.

For these reasons, the Smith Motion to Seal fails to show that there exist no less restrictive means to achieve any overriding interest in that exhibit. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule, 2.550(d)(5).) "[T]he trial courts can, and should, view overly inclusive sealing efforts with a jaundiced eye, and impose sanctions as appropriate." (Overstock, supra, 231 Cal.App.4th at p. 500.) For all reasons discussed above, and as the court does not credit the representation that exhibit 2 is a personnel record or record maintained pursuant to Penal Code 832.5 that is confidential or required to be kept confidential under Penal Code section 832.7, the Regents has failed to meet its burden to show why exhibit 2, or any portion of that document, is confidential.

Therefore, the court will deny the Smith Motion to Seal as to that exhibit. (c) Exhibits 1, 4, and 23 The Smith Amended Appendix describes exhibit 1 as the "Federated University Police Officers Association Agreement dated July 1, 2017 to December 31, 2020" (the FUPOA Agreement). (Orozco Dec., exhibit 2 at p. 4.) It is the court's understanding, based on its review of the FUPOA Agreement, that exhibit 1 concerns

employment relations. (Lodged Smith Amended Appendix, exhibit 1 at pdf pp. 10-12.) The same or similar reasoning and analysis apply. For the same reasons discussed above, the Smith Motion to Seal fails to present any information, evidence, or argument showing why exhibit 1 is a personnel record that contains the type of information set forth in Penal Code section 832.8, or why that document is maintained by the Regents pursuant to Penal Code section 832.5. The court's own review shows that exhibit 1, on its face, is not a personnel record or record maintained pursuant to Penal Code section 832.5.

Furthermore, the Smith Motion to Seal fails to present any information or evidence showing why exhibit 1 contains any information obtained from the types of records described in Penal Code section 832.7. In addition, and for the same reasons described above, the Regents has failed to meet its burden to show the existence of an overriding interest in exhibit 1 that overcomes the right to public access and supports sealing that record. As the Smith Motion to Seal seeks to place the entire document contained in exhibit 1 under seal, that motion also fails to show, for the same reasons discussed above, why the proposed sealing of that entire exhibit is narrowly tailored, or why no less restrictive means exist.

The same reasoning and analysis apply to the Regents' "WPP" and the "UCSB-PD Policy Manual" attached to the lodged Smith Amended Appendix as exhibits 4 and 23. For all further reasons discussed above, the court will deny the Smith Motion to Seal as to exhibits 1, 4, and 23. (d) Exhibits 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, and 10 The Smith Amended Appendix describes exhibits 5 through 10 as (exhibit 5) "Mr. Horton's Correspondence, Dated October 26, 2018; (exhibit 6) "Correspondence to Smith and Mr. Horton, Dated July 17, 2019"; (exhibit 7) "Unsigned Whistleblower Retaliation Complaint Form Submitted by Mr.

Horton on July 19, 2019"; (exhibit 8) "Correspondence to Smith and Mr. Horton, Dated August 1, 2019"; (exhibit 9) "Email Correspondence to Mr. Horton, Dated August 1, 2019"; and (exhibit 10) "Smith's Signed Whistleblower Retaliation Complaint Form, Dated July 19, 2019". (Orozco Dec., exhibit 2 at pdf pp. 4-5.) Public records filed in the Smith Action reflect, without dispute, that as of December 2017, Smith was no longer employed with the UCSB-PD. (See Smith Complaint, P.P. 15 & 20.) Though the personnel records of a peace officer "do not cease being such after the officer's retirement", the Smith Motion to Seal presents no information or evidence showing why exhibits 5 through 10 were "generated while the officer [was] employed by" the Regents or UCSB-PD. (Davis v.

City of Sacramento (1994) 24 Cal.App.4th 393, 400.) In addition, the dates of exhibits 5 through 10 show or suggest that those documents were generated after Smith was no longer employed with the UCSB-PD. The Smith Motion to Seal presents no information or evidence showing why exhibits 5 through 10, or any part of those exhibits, were generated while Smith was employed by the Regents or UCSB-PD, notwithstanding the dates of those documents. For these additional reasons, the Smith Motion to Seal fails to show why exhibits 5 through 10 are personnel records pursuant to Penal Code section 832.8.

Exhibits 5 through 10 also do not show, on their face, that those documents were maintained by either the Regents or the UCSB-PD pursuant to Penal Code section 832.5. For these and all further reasons discussed above, the Regents has failed to meet its burden to show that exhibits 5 through 10 are confidential or required to be kept confidential pursuant to Penal Code section 832.7. For the same or similar reasons discussed above, the Smith Motion to Seal also fails to identify any overriding interest that overcomes the right of public access to exhibits 5 through 10.

Moreover, the Smith Motion to Seal does not present any information identifying what, if any, specific information contained in those exhibits is confidential pursuant to Penal Code section 832.7, where that information appears, or why that information cannot be redacted from those records. For these reasons, the Smith Motion to Seal fails to show that the proposed sealing of exhibits 5 through 10 is narrowly tailored. For all reasons discussed above, the court will deny the Smith Motion to Seal as to exhibits 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, and 10. (e) Exhibits 3, 17, 18, 19, 20, and 21 Though the Regents has, for the reasons discussed above, failed to meet its burden to show, on a point-by-point basis with supporting information, evidence, and argument, why each exhibit to the Smith Amended Appendix is a personnel record or record maintained by the Regents or UCSB-PD pursuant to Penal Code section 832.5, or

confidential or required to be kept confidential under Penal Code section 832.7, it appears to the court, based on its own review, that exhibits 3 and 17 through 21 are or may be personnel records as further discussed below. Though exhibits 3 and 17 through 21 do not show, on their face, that they are records maintained by the Regents or the UCSB-PD pursuant to Penal Code section 832.5, those exhibits appear to be files maintained under the name of an individual employed by the Regents and UCSB-PD, and which contain records relating to the information described in Penal Code section 832.8, subdivision (a). (See Pen.

Code, Sec. 832.8, subd. (a)(4), (5), & (6).) Notwithstanding whether Smith has waived any confidentiality protections provided under Penal Code section 832.7 as to exhibits 3 and 17 through 21, there is no evidence or information to suggest that the Regents has waived those protections as to those specific exhibits. The opposition of Smith also does not present any information, evidence, or argument showing why exhibits 3 and 17 through 21 are subject to the limited exceptions set forth in Penal Code section 832.7. (See Pen.

Code, Sec. 832.7, subds. (a) [describing the "investigations or proceedings" to which that section does not apply] & (b)(1)-(13) [describing categories of records which "shall not be confidential"]; see also Becerra v. Superior Court (2020) 44 Cal.App.5th 897, 915-916 [discussing amendments to section 832.7 providing that "the confidentiality of officer personnel records is subject to a newly added subdivision (b)...."].) For all reasons discussed above, the court's review of exhibits 3 and 17 through 21 to the Smith Amended Appendix indicates or suggests that those documents are personnel records as that term is defined in Penal Code section 832.8, and that those exhibits are required to be kept confidential pursuant to Penal Code section 832.7, subdivision (a).

For these and all further reasons discussed above, the court will grant the Smith Motion to Seal as to exhibits 3 and 17 through 21, only. The court's ruling as to exhibits 3 and 17 through 21 to the Smith Amended Appendix is for the purpose of determining the Smith Motion to Seal, only. The court does not determine, at this stage of the proceedings, whether those exhibits, or any other exhibit that the Regents seeks to place under seal in this proceeding, are confidential for purposes of trial. (f) Procedural Matters The May 8 Order requires that "any motion to seal any material lodged conditionally under seal as a basis for adjudication of the Regents Smith Motion include a notification of whether any lodged record is to be filed unsealed in the event that motion is denied." (See Cal.

Rules of Court, rule 2.551(b)(6).) In its reply to the opposition of Smith, the Regents states: "Should the Court be inclined to deny The Regents' motion to seal, The Regents respectfully request that the Court Order The Regents to publicly file the exhibits in support of [the Regents Smith Motion] that are currently lodged with the Court ...." (Reply at p. 4, ll. 13-17.) For all reasons discussed above and in the May 8 Order, the court will order the Regents to file a public redacted version of the Smith Amended Appendix, that redacts only exhibits 3 and 17 through 21, which are the only exhibits that the court will order to be placed under seal for purposes of adjudicating the Regents Smith Motion, and which does not include any redactions to exhibits 1, 2, 4 through 16, 22, and 23 of the Smith Amended Appendix, or any material contained in those exhibits. (2) Signa Motion to Seal The Signa Motion to Seal seeks an order placing under seal exhibits 1 through 9 submitted by the Regents as a basis for adjudication of the Regents Signa Motion.

In support, attorney Orozco states that on February 2, 2026, the Regents filed an "Amended Appendix of Evidence" (the Signa Amended Appendix) which sought to lodge a copy of the exhibits numbered 1 through 9 under seal. (Orozco Dec., P. 4.) Attached to attorney Orozco's declaration is a copy of the public redacted version of the Signa Amended Appendix filed by the Regents on February 2, 2026, as a basis for adjudication of the Regents Signa Motion. (Orozco Dec., exhibit 2.) Court records reflect that the Regents also filed an appendix of evidence in support of the Regents Signa Motion on January 22, 2026, and did not lodge a complete, unredacted version of that appendix.

As further discussed above, the Regents did not lodge a complete, unredacted version of the Signa Amended Appendix conditionally under seal until February 25, 2026, when the Regents delivered the flash drive described above to the Clerk of the Court. That flash drive also contains the complete, unredacted version of the Signa Amended Appendix. Though the unredacted Signa Amended Appendix lodged with the court on February 25 also does not include a

the court understands to be the M Little Amended Appendix described above, and an amended appendix of evidence in support of the Regents Little Motion as against the T Little Complaint, which court understands to be the T Little Amended Appendix referenced above. The present record also reflects that the Regents did not lodge complete, unredacted versions of the T Little Amended Appendix or the M Little Amended Appendix conditionally under seal until February 25, 2026, in the manner further discussed above.

In addition, and for the same reasons discussed above, the court understands the T Little Amended Appendix to supersede any prior version of that appendix filed by the Regents, and the M Little Amended Appendix to supersede any prior version of that appendix. The Little Motion to Seal, including the notice and the separately filed declaration of attorney Orozco, is identical or nearly identical to the motions further discussed above, and advances the same sole ground for the issuance of an order placing under seal the exhibits submitted by the Regents as a basis for adjudication of the Regents Little Motion.

Therefore, the same reasoning and analysis apply here. For example, though the court's review of the exhibits attached to the lodged T Little Amended Appendix and M Little Amended Appendix shows that those exhibits consist of nearly 2,000 pages of material, wholly absent from the Little Motion to Seal is any information, evidence, or reasoned argument showing, on a point-by-point basis with appropriate citations to the record, why each exhibit or information contained in any exhibit is confidential or required to be kept confidential pursuant to Penal Code section 832.7.

Instead, and in the same manner discussed above, the Regents has placed the burden on the court to review each page of those materials to determine whether any exhibit, in whole or in part, is confidential or required to be kept confidential under Penal Code section 832.7. Though there exists, for all reasons discussed above, sufficient grounds to deny the Little Motion to Seal based on the failure by the Regents to meet its burden as to any of the exhibits attached to the T Little Amended Appendix or the M Little Amended Appendix, the court has conducted its own review of those exhibits.

Based on the court's review of the exhibits attached to the T Little Amended Appendix, and the allegations of the complaint filed in the public record of the Little Action which indicate that T Little remains employed with the UCSB-PD, it appears that exhibits 4, 6 through 13, 16 through 25, and 30 through 37 to the T Little Amended Appendix are personnel records for purposes of subdivision (a) of Penal Code section 832.8. As Penal Code section 832.7 provides that those personnel records are confidential and shall not be disclosed in this proceeding except by discovery pursuant to sections 1043 and 1046 of the Evidence Code (Pen.

Code, Sec. 832.7, subd. (a)), the court will grant the Little Motion to Seal as to exhibits 4, 6 through 13, 16 through 25, and 30 through 37 to the T Little Amended Appendix, only. For the same reasons discussed above, the court will deny the Little Motion to Seal as to exhibits 1 through 3, 5, 14, 15, 29, and 38 through 47 to the T Little Amended Appendix. As to exhibits 26, 27, and 28, the public redacted version of the T Little Amended Appendix states that those exhibits, which are not included with the lodged unredacted version of that appendix, were "intentionally omitted". (Orozco Dec., exhibit 2 at p. 7.)

Therefore, the Little Motion to Seal is moot as to those exhibits. In addition, and for the same or similar reasons discussed above, the court will grant the Little Motion to Seal as to exhibits 3 through 5, 7, 8, 11 through 16, 18, and 22 through 29 to the M Little Amended Appendix, only. For those same reasons, and as available information and evidence indicates or suggests that documents dated or generated after March 20, 2020, are not files maintained in the name of a peace officer or records maintained pursuant to Penal Code section 832.5, the court will deny the Little Motion to Seal as to exhibits 1, 2, 6, 9, 10, 19, 20, 21, and 30 through 41 to the M Little Amended Appendix.

The public redacted version of that appendix shows that exhibit 17 has been omitted by the Regents. (Orozco Dec., exhibit 3 at p. 7.) In its reply to the opposition of M Little and T Little to the Little Motion to Seal, the Regents states: "Should the Court be inclined to deny [the Little Motion to Seal], The Regents respectfully request that the Court Order The Regents to publicly file the exhibits in support of [the Regents Little Motions] that are currently lodged with the Court...." (Reply at p. 4, ll. 21-25.)

For the same reasons discussed above, the court will order the Regents to file a public redacted version of the lodged T Little Amended Appendix, that includes redactions to exhibits 4, 6 through 13, 16 through 25, and 30 through 37, only. Further, the court will order the Regents to file a public redacted version of the lodged M Little Amended Appendix that redacts exhibits 3 through 5, 7, 8, 11 through 16, 18, and 22 through 29, only. No other

exhibit to the T Little Amended Appendix or the M Little Amended Appendix, or material contained in any exhibit, apart from the exhibits described above, shall be redacted from the public versions of the T Little Amended Appendix or the M Little Amended Appendix. (5) Stern Motion to Seal The Stern Motion to Seal also seeks an order placing under seal all of the exhibits to an amended appendix of evidence (the Stern Amended Appendix) filed by the Regents in support of the Regents Stern Motion. The public redacted version of the Stern Amended Appendix was filed by the Regents on February 4, 2026.

The Regents lodged the complete, unredacted version of the Stern Amended Appendix conditionally under seal on February 25, 2026, in the same manner described above. As to any prior version of the Stern Amended Appendix that was filed by the Regents in support of the Regents Stern Motion, including the appendix filed on January 22, 2026, the same reasoning and analysis apply. The court's review of the lodged Stern Amended Appendix shows that its exhibits are numbered 1 through 16, and consist of over 800 pages of material. (Lodged Stern Amended Appendix at pdf pp. 9-834.)

The Stern Motion to Seal and the separately filed supporting declaration of attorney Orozco, are identical in substance to the motions and declarations further described above, and advance the same sole ground for the issuance of an order placing under seal exhibits 1 through 16 of the Stern Amended Appendix. Therefore, the same reasoning and analysis apply. Though the Stern Motion to Seal fails, for all reasons discussed above, to show why any exhibit, or information appearing in any exhibit, to the Stern Amended Appendix is confidential or required to be kept confidential under Penal Code section 832.7, the court has conducted its own review of those exhibits.

Based on that review, and for the same reasons discussed above, the court will grant the Stern Motion to Seal as to exhibits 3, 4, 7 through 9, and 16 to the Stern Amended Appendix, only, and will otherwise deny that motion as to exhibits 1, 2, 5, 6, and 10 through 15. In its reply to the opposition of Stern, the Regents states: "Should the Court be inclined to deny The Regents' motion to seal, The Regents respectfully request that the Court Order The Regents to publicly file the exhibits in support of [the Regents Stern Motion] that are currently lodged with the Court...." (Reply at p. 4, ll. 13-15.)

For the same reasons discussed above, the court will order the Regents to file a public redacted version of the lodged Stern Amended Appendix that redacts exhibits 3, 4, 7 through 9, and 16, only. No other exhibit to the Stern Amended Appendix, or material contained in any other exhibit, apart from the exhibits described above, shall be redacted from that public version of the Stern Amended Appendix. (6) Regents Smith Motion "A party may move for summary judgment in an action or proceeding if it is contended that the action has no merit or that there is no defense to the action or proceeding." (Code Civ.

Proc., Sec. 437c, subd. (a)(1).) "A party may move for summary adjudication as to one or more causes of action within an action, one or more affirmative defenses, one or more claims for damages, or one or more issues of duty, if the party contends that the cause of action has no merit, that there is no affirmative defense to the cause of action, that there is no merit to an affirmative defense as to any cause of action, that there is no merit to a claim for damages, as specified in Section 3294 of the Civil Code, or that one or more defendants either owed or did not owe a duty to the plaintiff or plaintiffs.

A motion for summary adjudication shall be granted only if it completely disposes of a cause of action, an affirmative defense, a claim for damages, or an issue of duty. [P.] A motion for summary adjudication may be made by itself or as an alternative to a motion for summary judgment and shall proceed in all procedural respects as a motion for summary judgment. " (Code Civ. Proc., Sec. 437c, subd. (f)(1)-(2).) "The purpose of the law of summary judgment is to provide courts with a mechanism to cut through the parties' pleadings in order to determine whether, despite their allegations, trial is in fact necessary to resolve their dispute." (Aguilar v.

Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 843 (Aguilar).) The party moving for summary judgment "bears the burden of persuasion that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that he is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." (Id. at p. 845.) Relevant here, a defendant meets that burden by showing "that one or more elements of the cause of action, even if not separately pleaded, cannot be established, or that there is a complete defense to the cause of action." (Code Civ. Proc., Sec. 437c, subd. (p)(2).)

"In reviewing a defense summary judgment, we apply the traditional three-step analysis ..., that is, we (1) identify the pleaded issues, (2) determine if the defense has negated an element of the plaintiff's case or established a complete defense, and if and only if so, (3) determine if the plaintiff has raised a triable issue of fact." (Meddock v. County of Yolo (2013) 220 Cal.App.4th 170, 175, fn. omitted.) The Regents Smith Motion seeks summary adjudication of 25 issues, which are set forth in the notice of that motion. (Notice at pp. 4-8.)

The separate statement filed by the Regents in support of the Regents Smith Moton sets forth 133 material facts that, according to the Regents, relate to "all causes of action" asserted in the complaint filed by Smith and each issue that is the subject of the Regents Smith Motion, "and that could make a difference in the disposition of the motion." (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1350(a)(2); see also Sep. Stmt. at pp. 4-43.) " '[T]he separate statement effectively concedes the materiality of whatever facts are included.

Thus, if a triable issue is raised as to any of the facts in [the Regents'] separate statement, the motion must be denied!' [Citation.]" (Nazir v. United Airlines, Inc. (2009) 178 Cal.App.4th 243, 252 (Nazir), original italics.) The issues which are the subject of the Regents Smith Motion include that Smith "failed to exhaust his administrative remedies by filing a verified complaint with the Department of Fair Employment and Housing ("DFEH") or the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") and obtaining a notice of right to sue." (Notice at p. 6, P. 14; see also P. 15 [punctuation and capitalization unchanged]; Sep.

Stmt. at p. 33, issue "F"; p. 36, issue "O"; p. 37, issues "R" & "S"; see also Memorandum at pp. 21-23 [asserting that that the evidence shows that Smith failed to exhaust administrative remedies].) The material facts that relate to that issue include that Smith "has not produced any evidence that he ever filed a complaint with the Department of Fair Employment and Housing ... or Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ... and received a right to sue letter before filing this action." (Sep. Stmt., Undisputed Material Fact [UMF] no. 103.) "A motion for summary judgment must be supported by evidence, and it is the moving party who bears the initial burden of producing evidence." (Boyle v.

CertainTeed Corp. (2006) 137 Cal.App.4th 645, 655.) "A burden of production entails only the presentation of 'evidence.' [Citation.]" (Aguilar, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 850.) Each of the material facts set forth in the Regents' separate statement that the Regents contends are undisputed "shall be followed by a reference to the supporting evidence." (Code Civ. Proc., Sec. 437c, subd. (b)(1); see also subd. (f)(2) ["[a] motion for summary judgment ... shall proceed in all procedural respects as a motion for summary judgment"].)

The evidence referenced in the separate statement that supports the material fact set forth above includes the responses and supplemental responses of Smith to the Regents' set one special interrogatories and requests for production of documents. (Sep. Stmt., UMF no. 103 & evidence cited therein; Smith Amended Appendix, exhibits 13-16.) "[S]ummary judgment law in California requires the defendant to present evidence, and not simply point out through argument, that the plaintiff does not possess and cannot reasonably obtain the needed evidence." (Lona v.

Citibank, N.A. (2011) 202 Cal.App.4th 89, 110, original italics.) "The defendant may ... present evidence that the plaintiff does not possess, and cannot reasonably obtain, needed evidence--as through admissions by the plaintiff following extensive discovery to the effect that he has discovered nothing." (Aguilar, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 855.) Even if the Regents Smith Motion is sufficient to show that, on the date of the discovery responses on which the Regents rely to support the material fact stated above and set forth in the separate statement, Smith did not possess evidence regarding that material fact, the motion fails to present any information, evidence, or reasoned argument showing why Smith cannot reasonably obtain necessary evidence, any admissions by Smith during discovery, or that Smith has discovered nothing in regard to that material fact.

The Regents Smith Motion also concedes, for all reasons discussed above, that the following material facts relate to the causes of action and issues that are the subject of that motion: Smith "has not ... produced any evidence that any complaints by the individual defendants made against [Smith] 'on or around May or June of 2017' were made under oath or penalty of perjury[]"; Smith "has not established that any complaint of misconduct filed against him was accepted by UCSB-PD and involved a complaint..."; and Smith claims "with no evidence that 'no investigation was ever conducted...." (Sep.

Stmt., UMF nos. 108, 109, 111 & evidence cited therein.) The

same reasoning and analysis applies to those material facts. Because the Regents Smith Motion, for all reasons discussed above, does not show that Smith cannot reasonably obtain needed evidence in regard to the causes of action or issues that are the subject of that motion, the Regents has failed to meet its burden to show, with supporting evidence, that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the Regents is entitled to judgment as a matter of law as to those causes of actions and issues.

The Regents Smith Motion also asserts that the alleged protected disclosures by Smith at issue in the Smith Action involve personnel matters and not protected whistleblowing. (Memorandum at pp. 25-26.) For this reason, the Regents argue, Smith cannot establish a violation of the California Whistleblower Protection Act (the Act). The Act, codified as Government Code section 8547, et seq., "prohibits retaliation against state employees who 'report waste, fraud, abuse of authority, violation of law, or threat to public health' [Citation.]

The Act authorizes 'an action for damages' to redress acts of retaliation. [Citation.]" (Miklosy v. Regents of University of California (2008) 44 Cal.4th 876, 882.) Pursuant to Government Code section 8547.2, a "protected disclosure" is "a good faith communication, including a communication based on, or when carrying out, job duties, that discloses or demonstrates an intention to disclose information that may evidence either of the following circumstances: "(A) An improper governmental activity. "(B) A condition that may significantly threaten the health or safety of employees or the public if the disclosure or intention to disclose was made for the purpose of remedying that condition." (Gov.

Code, Sec. 8547.2, subd. (e)(1)(A), (B).) Under Government Code section 8547.2, "'[i]mproper governmental activity' means an activity by a state agency or by an employee that is undertaken in the performance of the employee's duties, undertaken inside a state office, or, if undertaken outside a state office by the employee, directly relates to state government, whether or not that activity is within the scope of their employment, and that meets any of the following criteria: "(A) The activity is in violation of any state or federal law or regulation, including, but not limited to, corruption, malfeasance, bribery, theft of government property, fraudulent claims, fraud, coercion, conversion, malicious prosecution, misuse of government property, misuse of state expenditures, including allocations, loans, or grants, or willful omission to perform duty. "(B) The activity is in violation of an executive order of the Governor, a California Rule of Court, or any policy or procedure mandated by the State Administrative Manual or State Contracting Manual. "(C) The activity is economically wasteful, involves gross misconduct, incompetency, or inefficiency." (Gov.

Code, Sec. 8547.2, subd. (c)(1)(A)-(C).) Relevant here, "any person who intentionally engages in acts of reprisal, retaliation, threats, coercion, or similar acts against a university employee, including an officer or faculty member, or applicant for employment for having made a protected disclosure shall be liable in an action for damages brought against him or her by the injured party." (Gov. Code, Sec. 8547.10, subd. (c).) "Complaints made 'in the context of internal administrative or personnel actions, rather than in the context of legal violations' do not constitute protected whistleblowing. [Citations.] 'To exalt these exclusively internal personnel disclosures with whistleblower status would create all sorts of mischief.

Most damagingly, it would thrust the judiciary into micromanaging employment practices and create a legion of undeserving protected "whistleblowers" arising from the routine workings and communications of the job site.' [Citation.]" (Levi v. Regents of University of California (2017) 15 Cal.App.5th 892, 904.) The Regents do not dispute that the alleged protected disclosures at issue include or concern "how officers were handling sexual assault cases", "one officer's contact with sexual assault victims outside of assigned calls for service[]", "misconduct by officer [Hashimoto] for creating inappropriate cartoon videos of ...

University of California Santa Barbara officials, citizens and victims of crime[]", and "another officer spending too much time at a student housing residence hall." (Sep. Stmt., UMF nos. 34-39 & 43; Memorandum at p. 25.) Apart from generally asserting, in a conclusory manner, that the alleged protected disclosure made by Smith

concern or consist of internal administrative or personnel actions, the Regents Smith Motion fails to explain why the nature or subject of those concerns do not implicate any alleged abuse of authority, violations of law, or any threat to public health. Instead, a reasonable trier of fact could find, based on the material facts and evidence presented here, that the disclosures at issue implicate or concern improper activity for purposes of the Act, and that Smith's communications regarding those concerns were made in good faith.

In addition, Smith presents evidence of reports made by Smith which Smith contends they reasonably believed constitute or concern unlawful or improper activity, including as to the matters described above and in the Regents' separate statement. (See Resp. Sep. Stmt., Additional Material Fact no. 2; Smith Appendix of Evidence, exhibit A at p. 82, 95, 108, 109.) For these and all further reasons discussed above, the evidence and information presented here gives rise to competing inferences as to whether, based on the content or subject of the reports made by Smith, those disclosures are protected pursuant to the Act. "[S]ummary judgment shall not be granted by the court based on inferences reasonably deducible from the evidence if contradicted by other inferences or evidence that raise a triable issue as to any material fact." (Code Civ.

Proc., Sec. 437c, subd. (c).) Furthermore, even if the Regents could meet its initial burden to show that any protected disclosures by Smith were not a contributing factor to any alleged acts of retaliation by the Regents against Smith, the available evidence and information is, for present purposes, sufficient to give rise to an inference of retaliation. "Both direct and circumstantial evidence can be used to show an employer's intent to retaliate. 'Direct evidence of retaliation may consist of remarks made by decisionmakers displaying a retaliatory motive. [Citation.]' [Citation.]

Circumstantial evidence typically relates to such factors as the plaintiff's job performance, the timing of events, and how the plaintiff was treated in comparison to other workers." (Colarossi v. Coty US Inc. (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 1142, 1153.) The parties do not dispute, or reasonably dispute, that Smith was placed on administrative leave on June 15, 2017. (Resp. Sep. Stmt., UMF no. 68 & evidence cited therein [not reasonably disputed on this point].) Considering the dates of the reports made by Smith disclosed by the Regents' supporting separate statement (see, e.g., Sep.

Stmt., UMF nos. 43, 45, 57), and the timing of those reports in relation to the date Smith was placed on administrative leave, among other factors, a reasonable trier of fact could find, based on competing inferences that arise from the evidence and information presented by the parties and notwithstanding whether the Regents can show the existence of a legitimate reason to place Smith on leave or that its actions were justified, that there existed an intent to retaliate. (See Scheer v. Regents of the University of California (2022) 76 Cal.App.5th 904, 917-918 [general discussion].)

In evaluating the evidence presented by the parties on summary judgment, " '[w]e accept as true the facts ... in the evidence of the party opposing summary judgment and the reasonable inferences that can be drawn from them.' [Citation.] And we must 'view the evidence in the light most favorable to plaintiff[] ...' and 'liberally construe plaintiff['s] evidentiary submissions and strictly scrutinize defendant's own evidence, in order to resolve any evidentiary doubts or ambiguities in plaintiff['s] favor.' " (Nazir, supra, 178 Cal.App.4th at p. 254.)

The court may not weigh the evidence to determine whose version is more likely true. (Binder v. Aetna Life Ins. Co. (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 832, 840.) Though the examples provided herein are intended to be illustrative and not exhaustive, for all reasons discussed above, the present record gives rise to conflicting or competing inferences including as to whether the reports made by Smith constitute protected disclosures pursuant to the Act, and whether the Regents intentionally engaged in any acts of retaliation against Smith based on those disclosures, and which raise a triable issue of material fact.

For these reasons, the court will deny the Regents Smith Motion. (Code Civ. Proc., Sec. 437c, subds. (c), (f)(1); Aguilar, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 845; Gov. Code, Sec. 8547.10, subd. (e).) The Regents' request for judicial notice: The court will grant the request of the Regents for judicial notice of the complaint filed by Smith in the Smith Action. (Regents RJN, P. 1; Evid. Code, Sec. 452, subd. (d)(1).) Evidentiary objections: In its reply to the opposition of Smith to the Regents Smith Motion, the Regents submit objections to material contained in Smith's declaration and the declaration of Smith's counsel, Peter Horton, submitted in support of