PoloDonkey, LLC vs. Tyler N. Quiel, et al

Tentative Ruling: Diana Sandoval v. Robert Seidler, et al. Case Number 24CV04379 Case Type Civil Law & Motion Hearing Date / Time Wed, 05/13/2026 - 10:00 Nature of Proceedings Motion of Defendants Robert Seidler and PoloDonkey, LLC to Stay Proceedings in Case after Jury Trial in Related Case No. 24CV05259 Tentative Ruling For Plaintiff Diana Sandoval, trustee of the Sandoval Quiel Revocable Living Trust: Stephen M. Sanders, Jeff G. Coyner, Sanders Coyner Cade PC For Defendants PoloDonkey, LLC and Robert Seidler: Todd A. Amspoker, Jeff F. Tchakarov, Price Postel & Parma LLP RULING For all reasons discussed herein, the hearing on this matter is continued until June 24, 2026, at 10 a.m., to be heard concurrently with the hearing on the motion to stay enforcement of the judgment in Case No. 24CV05259.

Background/Analysis This action commenced on August 5, 2024, by the filing of the original petition and complaint by plaintiff Diana Sandoval, trustee of the Sandoval Quiel Revocable Living Trust (Sandoval) against defendants County of Santa Barbara Department of Planning and Development (CSBDPD) for: (1) Writ of Administrative Mandamus, (2) Nuisance, and (3) Negligence. In the original complaint, PoloDonkey was identified as the real party in interest.

On February 6, 2025, Sandoval filed her operative second amended petition for writ of mandate and complaint for damages (SAC), asserting causes of action for: (1) Writ of Administrative Mandamus, (2) Writ of Mandate, (3) Violation of California Coastal Act, (4) Nuisance, (5) Negligence, (6) Inverse Condemnation, (7) Fraud/Deceit, (8) Negligent Misrepresentation, (9) Waste & Trespass, (10) Ejectment, (11) Quiet Title on Easement & Action for Possession Based on Unlawful Use, and (12) Declaratory Relief, against defendants CSBDPD, County of Santa Barbara Board of Building Appeals (collectively the "County Defendants"), California Coastal Commission (the "Coastal Commission"), PoloDonkey, and Robert Seidler (Seidler). Following the sustaining of demurrers, without leave to amend, Sandoval's complaint was dismissed as to the County Defendants and the Coastal Commission.

As alleged in the SAC: Sandoval is the owner of real property located at 3196 Serena Avene, Carpinteria (the Serena Property). (SAC, P. 1.) PoloDonkey owns real property located at 3215 Foothill Road, in Carpinteria, California (the Foothill Property). (SAC, P. 5.) Seidler is the principal, beneficiary, and interested owner of PoloDonkey. (SAC, P. 6.)

On or before October 30, 2006, PoloDonkey's predecessor in interest, through its manager and principal Michael Rothbard (Rothbard), confirmed in writing that they would abandon one existing residential driveway and the use therefore of the Serena Property easement, road access, and previous bridge. (SAC, P. 34 & Exh. 12.) Rothbard expressly stated to the County that they would create two new driveways, one for residential access and one for commercial equestrian facility use, both of which driveways were located with access onto Foothill Road. (Ibid.) Rothbard, and PoloDonkey's predecessor company, maintained this abandonment of the Serena Property easement and did not use the tertiary road and previous bridge associated with the easement until Rothbard sold the Foothill Property to PoloDonkey. (SAC, P. 35.)

PoloDonkey, through Seidler, purchased the Foothill Property on July 31, 2014, and thereafter used it unlawfully, without permitted use or entitlement thereto, or right of legal access to the Serena Property. (SAC, P. 36.) In 2016, Siedler misrepresented and submitted on behalf of PoloDonkey an application stating, "Access will continue to be provided off of Foothill Road" without reference to or disclosure of PoloDonkey's and Siedler's unlawful use of the expressly abandoned bridge and the Serena Property easement. (SAC, P. 37.) On June 30, 2025, Seidler and PoloDonkey answered the SAC admitting some allegations and denying others.

Related Case: On December 18, 2024, Sandoval filed a notice of related case regarding Case No. 24CV04379, PoloDonkey v. Quiel, et al. In that matter: On September 23, 2024, plaintiff PoloDonkey, LLC, (PoloDonkey) filed a verified complaint against defendants Tyler N. Quiel (Quiel) and Diana Sandoval (Sandoval) (collectively, "Defendants"), alleging six causes of action: (1) interference with easement; (2) private nuisance; (3) quiet title; (4) declaratory relief; (5) temporary restraining order and preliminary and permanent injunctions; and (6) quiet title to prescriptive easement.

As alleged in the complaint: PoloDonkey owns real property located at 3215 Foothill Road/3200 Serena Avenue, in Carpinteria, California. (Compl., P. 8.) Defendants are the owners of property located at 3196 Serena Avenue, in Carpinteria, California. (Compl., P. 9.) The PoloDonkey Property is benefitted by an express easement located on a portion of the Serena Property. (Compl., P.P. 11-13.) Contrary to the express language of the easement, Defendants have maintained a fence on and across the easement, blocking PoloDonkey's access and denying PoloDonkey a safe and unobstructed easement area. (Compl., P.P. 15-16.) On November 26, 2024, Defendants filed a verified answer to the complaint, responding to its allegations and asserting forty-three affirmative defenses.

The matter was tried simultaneously before a jury and the court on January 5, 6, 8, 9, 12, 13, 15, 16, 20, 22, and 23, 2026. Following the presentation of each side's respective cases, judgment was entered in favor of PoloDonkey. On February 9, 2026, the court issued its final statement of decision, and on March 17, 2026, the court signed the judgment.

The judgment requires defendants to do, or abstain from doing, several things, including: (1) refraining from interfering with PoloDonkey's valid easement, including by maintaining or installing immobile fencing on the easement area or by preventing PoloDonkey free access through a swinging gate, (2) maintaining and keeping the easement area free of any obstructions that could unreasonably interfere with PoloDonkey's use and enjoyment of the easement for its purpose and scope as set forth in the Official Records of Santa Barbara County, (3) sign and deliver to PoloDonkey, within 10 calendar days after formal written request by PoloDonkey, the Owner/Applicant Consent Form referenced in the Letter re: Determination of Application Incompleteness, dated May 9, 2025, and sent by the Santa Barbara County Planning and Development Department to Ms.

Eva Turenchalk, and any other documents required by the County, in order to allow the County to proceed with review and processing of Plaintiff's currently pending Coastal Development Permit application submitted on April 10, 2025, (4) remove the black locked mailbox, which defendants installed at the intersection of the easement roadway and Serena Avenue and return and reinstall PoloDonkey's old mailbox to its previous location, and to refrain at any time in the future from removing or otherwise tampering with PoloDonkey's mailbox, (5) remove the bamboo fence from PoloDonkey's easement and refrain from installing any immobile fencing or other unreasonable obstructions on the easement area at any time in the future, and (6) PoloDonkey has the right to maintain and preserve the existing access bridge within its full structural footprint.

It was also ordered that PoloDonkey is entitled to recover its costs pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 1033, et seq.

On February 10, 2026, defendants filed a notice of appeal of the judgment. Quiel and Sandoval moved to stay enforcement of the judgment during pendency of appeal. On May 6, 2026, the motion for stay was continued until June 24, 2026, in order to see what the Court of Appeals decides. In the present case, on March 6, 2026, PoloDonkey and Seidler filed their motion to stay proceedings, in this case, following the jury trial in Case No. 24CV05259. Quiel and Sandoval oppose the motion to stay proceedings.

This matter does involve some overlapping issues that may be affected by the appeal in the related case, such as whether PoloDonkey abandoned its easement. As such, the court will continue the hearing on the present motion to June 24, 2026, to be heard with the motion to stay enforcement of the judgment in Case No. 24CV05259.

Tentative Ruling: Erin O'Brien v. Santa Barbara Cottage Hospital, et al. Tentative Ruling: Erin O'Brien v. Santa Barbara Cottage Hospital, et al. Case Number 24CV03660 Case Type Civil Law & Motion Hearing Date / Time Wed, 06/03/2026 - 10:00 Nature of Proceedings Plaintiff's Motion for Preliminary Approval of Class Action and PAGA Settlement Tentative Ruling For Plaintiff Erin O'Brien: Marcus J. Bradley, Kiley L. Grombacher, Bradley Grombacher LLP For Defendants Santa Barbara Cottage Hospital, Santa Ynez Valley Cottage Hospital, and Goleta Valley Cottage Hospital: Daniel J. McQueen, Brett D. Young, Arentfox Schiff LLP RULING For the reasons stated herein, the motion of plaintiff for preliminary approval of class action and PAGA settlement is granted. The court has reviewed the proposed order submitted with the motion and intends on signing the same.

The relevant terms include: Preliminary approval of the settlement set forth in the Class Action and PAGA Settlement Agreement is granted; The proposed settlement class is conditionally certified; Plaintiff Erin O'Brien is provisionally appointed as the representative of the settlement class; Bradley Grombacher LLP is provisionally appointed as class counsel; Distribution of the proposed notice of class action settlement to the settlement class is approved; ILYM Group, Inc. is provisionally appointed as the third-party settlement administrator; A hearing on Final Approval of Settlement is set for December 4, 2026, at 10:00 a.m. in Department 3. All documents related to the final approval, fees, costs, and enhancement award, shall be filed no later than 16 court days prior to the final approval hearing date.

Background

The first amended complaint (FAC) filed in this action by plaintiff Erin O'Brien, individually and on behalf of other individuals similarly situated, against defendants Santa Barbara Cottage Hospital, Santa Ynez Valley Cottage Hospital, and Goleta Valley Cottage Hospital, alleges that from approximately February 2018, through the present, she was employed as a Clinical Nurse II by defendants, as an hourly, non-exempt employee in Santa Barbara, California. From February 2018, through December 2019, plaintiff worked as a full-time Clinical Nurse II. From January 2020, through December 2022, plaintiff worked as a full-time Clinical Resource Nurse. From January 2023, through the present, plaintiff worked as a part-time Clinical Resource Nurse.

Plaintiff alleges that Defendants failed to pay plaintiff overtime wages, minimum and overtime wages, to provide or pay for missed meal and rest periods, to provide complete and accurate wage statements reflecting the total number of hours worked by plaintiff, to keep complete and accurate payroll records, and to reimburse plaintiff for necessary business related expenses. On October 25, 2024, defendants answered the FAC with a general denial and 24 affirmative defenses.

Offense." (Motion, exhibit 2.) That document shows that, at the time of the traffic stop on December 7, 2023, Rachel Leeanne Walsh was a passenger in Hernandez's vehicle; that Walsh had an outstanding misdemeanor warrant due to drug related charges; that deputies arrested Walsh; and that during the search of Hernandez's vehicle, deputies located money in a backpack in the backseat. (Id. at p. 2, ll. 8-22.) The document also shows that a search of Hernandez's residence yielded monies located inside a black sock and in clear bags; that Hernandez reported that the drugs located in the vehicle belonged to Walsh; and that a search of Hernandez's cell phone yielded text messages depicting drug sales which Hernandez claimed were sent to and received by Walsh. (Id. at p. 2, l. 23 - p. 3, l. 8.)

Under Health and Safety Code section 11488, "[r]eceipts for property seized pursuant to [that] section shall be delivered to any person out of whose possession such property was seized, in accordance with Section 1412 of the Penal Code. In the event property seized was not seized out of anyone's possession, receipt for the property shall be delivered to the individual in possession of the premises at which the property was seized." (Health & Saf. Code, Sec. 11488, subd. (b).) The People must "make service of process regarding [the] petition upon every individual designated in a receipt issued for the property seized." (Health & Saf. Code, Sec. 11488.4, subd. (c).) The Court infers from the available evidence and information described above that a receipt for the Property was delivered to Hernandez.

On January 9, 2025, the People filed a proof of service of the petition, stating that the petition was mailed to Hernandez at the following address: 1502 San Pascual Street, Apartment B. (Jan. 9, 2025, Proof of Service, P.P. 4-5.) The motion also asserts that Hernandez agreed to forfeit all cash seized. Even if the Court were to assume without deciding that service of the petition on Hernandez was proper or that Hernandez waived any notice required by the Health and Safety Code (and absent appropriate citations to the record, the Court presently makes no findings as to those issues), it is unclear to the Court whether Walsh was designated in any receipt for the Property.

To the extent Walsh was designated in or delivered a copy of any such receipt, there is no information or evidence showing that Wash was served with process regarding the petition, or any notices required by Health and Safety Code section 11488.4. The petition and motion also present no information or evidence showing that any notices required by Health and Safety Code section 11488.4 were given, or were published once a week for three successive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation in the county where the seizure was made or the Property is located.

For these reasons, the petition and motion are not procedurally appropriate, fail to show whether the time period set forth in subdivision (a) of Health and Safety Code section 11488.5 has ended, and do not allow the Court to make the declaration or order described in subdivision (b) of section 11488.5. The examples provided herein are intended to be illustrative but not exhaustive, and, absent appropriate citations to the record, the Court declines to issue an advisory opinion as to whether the petition or motion are appropriate or statutorily compliant in all other respects. For all reasons further discussed above, the Court will continue the hearing on the motion to permit the People an opportunity to submit supplemental briefing which corrects or explains the deficiencies described herein, and any other deficiencies, if appropriate.

Tentative Ruling: PoloDonkey, LLC vs. Tyler N. Quiel, et al Tentative Ruling: PoloDonkey, LLC vs. Tyler N. Quiel, et al Case Number 24CV05259 Case Type Civil Law & Motion Hearing Date / Time Wed, 05/06/2026 - 10:00 Nature of Proceedings 1. Motion of Defendants Tyler N. Quiel and Diana Sandoval to Tax Costs 2. Motion of Defendants Tyler N. Quiel and Diana Sandoval for Stay of Enforcement of Judgment During Pendency of Appeal Tentative Ruling For Plaintiff PoloDonkey, LLC: Todd A. Amspoker, Jeff F.

Tchakarov, Price Postel & Parma LLP For Defendants Tyler N. Quiel and Diana Sandoval: John Forest Hilbert, Joseph A. LeVota, Hilbert & Satterly LLP RULING For all reasons discussed herein: Defendants' motion to tax costs is granted in part and denied in part as follows: PoloDonkey's recovery of Court reporter fees will be reduced to $7,870.00. $1,596.48 for costs incurred from Nationwide Legal for secure document download of 3rd party subpoenas will be allowed and will not be taxed. $1,427.90 listed under "deposition fees," for service of deposition subpoenas will be allowed and will not be taxed.

All costs not challenged by Defendants will be allowed. Defendants' motion for stay of enforcement of judgment during pendency of appeal is granted. Enforcement of the judgment, filed March 17, 2026, is temporarily stayed until such time as all rights to an appeal by Defendants are exhausted and a final, post-appeal judgment has been entered.

Background

On September 23, 2024, Plaintiff PoloDonkey, LLC, (PoloDonkey) filed a verified complaint against Defendants Tyler N. Quiel (Quiel) and Diana Sandoval (Sandoval) (collectively, "Defendants"), alleging six causes of action: (1) interference with easement; (2) private nuisance; (3) quiet title; (4) declaratory relief; (5) temporary restraining order and preliminary and permanent injunctions; and (6) quiet title to prescriptive easement.

As alleged in the complaint: PoloDonkey owns real property located at 3215 Foothill Road/3200 Serena Avenue, in Carpinteria, California (the PoloDonkey Property). (Compl., P. 8.) Defendants are the owners of property located at 3196 Serena Avenue, in Carpinteria, California (the Serena Property). (Compl., P. 9.) The PoloDonkey Property is benefitted by an express easement located on a portion of the Serena Property. (Compl., P.P. 11-13.) Contrary to the express language of the easement, Defendants have maintained a fence on and across the easement, blocking PoloDonkey's access and denying PoloDonkey a safe and unobstructed easement area. (Compl., P.P. 15-16.) On November 26, 2024, Defendants filed a verified answer to the complaint, responding to its allegations and asserting forty-three affirmative defenses.

The matter was tried simultaneously before a jury and the Court on January 5, 6, 8, 9, 12, 13, 15, 16, 20, 22, and 23, 2026. Following the presentation of each side's respective cases, judgment was entered in favor of PoloDonkey. On February 9, 2026, the Court issued its final statement of decision, and on March 17, 2026, the Court signed the judgment.

The judgment requires Defendants to do, or abstain from doing, several things, including: (1) refraining from interfering with PoloDonkey's valid easement, including by maintaining or installing immobile fencing on the easement area or by preventing PoloDonkey free access through a swinging gate, (2) maintaining and keeping the easement area free of any obstructions that could unreasonably interfere with PoloDonkey's use and enjoyment of the easement for its purpose and scope as set forth in the Official Records of Santa Barbara County, (3) sign and deliver to PoloDonkey, within 10 calendar days after formal written request by PoloDonkey, the Owner/Applicant Consent Form referenced in the Letter re: Determination of Application Incompleteness, dated May 9, 2025, and sent by the Santa Barbara County Planning and Development Department to Ms.

Eva Turenchalk, and any other documents required by the County, in order to allow the County to proceed with review and processing of Plaintiff's currently pending Coastal Development Permit application submitted on April 10, 2025, (4) remove the black locked mailbox, which Defendants installed at the intersection of the easement roadway and Serena Avenue and return and reinstall PoloDonkey's old mailbox to its previous location, and to refrain at any time in the future from removing or otherwise tampering with PoloDonkey's mailbox, (5) remove the bamboo fence from PoloDonkey's easement and refrain from installing any immobile fencing or other unreasonable obstructions on the easement area at any time in the future, and (6) PoloDonkey has the right to maintain and preserve the existing access bridge within its full structural footprint.

It was also ordered that PoloDonkey is entitled to recover its costs pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 1033, et seq.

On February 10, 2026, Defendants filed a notice of appeal of the judgment. On March 18, 2026, PoloDonkey filed and served its memorandum of costs. Defendants now move to tax certain claimed costs. PoloDonkey opposes the motion. Defendants also move to stay enforcement of the judgment during pendency of appeal. PoloDonkey has not filed opposition or any other response to the motion to stay enforcement.

Analysis

Motion to Tax Costs "Except as otherwise expressly provided by statute, a prevailing party is entitled as a matter of right to recover costs in any action or proceeding." (Code Civ. Proc., Sec. 1032, subd. (b).) Code of Civil Procedure section 1032, subdivision (a)(4), provides, in relevant part, "'[p]revailing party' includes the party with a net monetary recovery, a Defendant in whose favor a dismissal is entered, a Defendant where neither Plaintiff nor Defendant obtains any relief, and a Defendant as against those Plaintiffs who do not recover any relief against that Defendant.

If any party recovers other than monetary relief and in situations other than as specified, the " 'prevailing party' " shall be as determined by the Court, and under those circumstances, the Court, in its discretion, may allow costs or not and, if allowed, may apportion costs between the parties on the same or adverse sides pursuant to rules adopted under Section 1034."

Defendants do not dispute that PoloDonkey is the prevailing party. CCP Sec. 1033.5(a) identifies cost items that are allowable under section 1032; CCP Sec. 1033.5(b) identifies items that are not allowable; and CCP Sec. 1033.5(c)(4) provides that "[i]tems not mentioned in this section ... may be allowed or denied in the Court's discretion." "Allowable costs shall be reasonably necessary to the conduct of the litigation rather than merely convenient or beneficial to its preparation" and "shall be reasonable in amount." CCP Sec. 1033.5(c)(2) & (3).

"If the items appearing in a cost bill appear to be proper charges, the burden is on the party seeking to tax costs to show that they were not reasonable or necessary. On the other hand, if the items are properly objected to, they are put in issue and the burden of proof is on the party claiming them as costs. [Citation] Whether a cost item was reasonably necessary to the litigation presents a question of fact for the trial Court...." Ladas v. California State Auto. Assn. (1993) 19 Cal.App.4th 761, 774 (" Ladas "). "[T]he verified memorandum of costs is prima facie evidence of their propriety, and the burden is on the party seeking to tax costs to show they were not reasonable or necessary." (612 South, LLC v.

Laconic Limited Partnership (2010) 184 Cal.App.4th 1270, 1285.) "[W]hen [costs] are properly challenged the burden of proof shifts to the party claiming them as costs." (Hadley v. Krepel (1985) 167 Cal.App.3d 677, 682.) "[T]rial Courts have a duty to determine whether a cost is reasonable in need and amount." (Thon v. Thompson (1994) 29 Cal.App.4th 1546, 1548.)

PoloDonkey's memorandum of costs totals $46,218.06. Of that amount, Defendants seek to tax the following: $12,905.00 for Court reporter fees that include amounts for transcripts that were not ordered by the Court (the "transcripts"). Defendants argue that this amount should be reduced to $7,663.00; $1,596.48 for costs incurred from Nationwide Legal for secure document download 3rd party subpoenas (the "document download"). Defendants argue that these costs are disallowed as investigation expenses in preparation for trial; and $1,427.90 listed under "deposition fees."

Defendants argue that the costs were for service of deposition subpoenas and do not fit within the categories for deposition fees and are, instead, investigation expenses (the "service of subpoenas"). Defendants further argues that the costs are associated with subpoenas on parties who did not appear at trial, did not produce any documents used as evidence at trial, and did not otherwise contribute to the resolution of the matter. Defendants do not challenge any of the other claimed costs.

By way of opposition, PoloDonkey states that the Court reporter overcharged by $1,149.00, and therefore the total amount in Court reporter fees is $11,756.00, rather than the $12,905.00 appearing in the memorandum of costs. PoloDonkey states that, of that amount, $3,886.00 is for fees paid to the Court reporter for rough draft and certified trial proceeding transcripts. The claim is evidenced by invoices attached to the declaration of PoloDonkey's counsel. This, as acknowledged in Defendants' reply brief, results in Defendants seeking to limit the Court reporter fees to $7,870.00.

Code of Civil Procedure section 1033.5, subdivision (b)(5) specifically disallows costs for: "Transcripts of Court proceedings not ordered by the Court." Defendants request that they should be allowed to recover the costs for the transcripts pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 1033.5, subdivision (c)(2)-(4). Those sections provide: "(c) An award of costs shall be subject to the following: . . . "(2) Allowable costs shall be reasonably necessary to the conduct of the litigation rather than merely convenient or beneficial to its preparation. "(3) Allowable costs shall be reasonable in amount. "(4) Items not mentioned in this section and items assessed upon application may be allowed or denied in the Court's discretion."

By making this argument, Defendants ignore the above language that states: "Items not mentioned in this section . . .." Transcripts are mentioned in the section and are specifically disallowed. Defendants' reliance on Glass v. Gulf Oil Corp. (1970) 12 Cal.App.3d 417, is also unhelpful for Defendants. In that case, "although the transcript was not ordered by the Court, the parties agreed that it should be prepared to relieve counsel of the necessity for taking depositions, and that the cost would be shared. (Id. at p. 439.)

The transcripts, which were mutually agreed upon, were "in lieu of further deposing those who testified at the earlier hearing . . .." (Id. at p. 440.) Here, the transcripts were not ordered by the Court and there was no agreement between the parties for preparation of the transcripts. They are specifically disallowed and will be taxed. PoloDonkey's recovery of Court reporter fees will be reduced to $7,870.00.

Defendants argue that the document download is disallowed as investigation expenses pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 1033.5, subdivision (b)(2). In opposition, PoloDonkey argues that the document download should be considered a deposition cost because it was the result of obtaining business records through a deposition subpoena. PoloDonkey requests that the Court use its discretion and allow the costs pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 1033.5, subdivision (c)(2)-(4) or, alternatively, to consider the document download deposition costs.

After reviewing and considering the arguments for and against recovery of these costs, the Court does not believe that the document download is either an investigation cost or a deposition cost. Rather, the cost falls under Code of Civil Procedure section 1033.5. subdivision (c)(4) and are discretionary. The Court finds that the costs were reasonably necessary for the conduct of the litigation and were not merely convenient or beneficial to its preparation. The $1,596.48 in costs for the document download will be allowed.

Defendants argue that the deposition fees, for serving the deposition subpoenas, are investigative expenses for preparing the case for trial and are specifically disallowed. They further argue that the costs are associated with subpoenas on parties who did not appear at trial, did not produce and documents used as evidence at trial, and did not otherwise contribute to the resolution of the matter. This being the case, Defendants argue, the costs were not reasonably necessary to the conduct of the litigation. PoloDonkey argues that the service of the deposition subpoenas are costs associated with depositions and are allowable. In the alternative, PoloDonkey argues that the Court should award the costs pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 1033.5, subdivision (c)(2)-(4).

Defendants fail to provide any cogent argument of how the service of deposition subpoenas could constitute investigative expenses in preparing the case for trial. It is standard discovery and even if the obtained documents were not used at trial, counsel for PoloDonkey had a duty to conduct the discovery in order to properly represent PoloDonkey. "Code of Civil Procedure section 1033.5 permits the recovery of costs for the " '[t]aking, video recording, and transcribing necessary depositions' " as well as for " '[s]ervice of process by a public officer, registered process server, or other means.' " [Citation.]" (Garcia v.

Tempur-Pedic North America, LLC (2024) 98 Cal.App.5th 819, 823-824.) "[C]ourts routinely refuse to tax costs on the ground that a deponent did not end up testifying or providing useful testimony at trial. [Citation.]" (Id. at p. 825.) The Court has considered the arguments presented, as well as considered the nature of this case, and finds that the service of subpoenas were reasonably necessary costs. They will be allowed.

Motion for Stay of Enforcement of Judgment Defendants' motion for stay of enforcement of judgment is, as noted above, unopposed. "(a) Except as provided in Sections 917.1 to 917.10, inclusive, and in Section 116.810, the perfecting of an appeal stays proceedings in the trial Court upon the judgment or order appealed from or upon the matters embraced therein or affected thereby, including enforcement of the judgment or order, but the trial Court may proceed upon any other matter embraced in the action and not affected by the judgment or order. "(b) When there is a stay of proceedings other than the enforcement of the judgment, the trial Court shall have jurisdiction of proceedings related to the enforcement of the judgment as well as any other matter embraced in the action and not affected by the judgment or order appealed from." (Code Civ. Proc., Sec. 916.)

"To prevent injuries " 'from the premature enforcement of a determination which may later be found to have been wrong,' " the law has developed a set of rules and procedures for staying enforcement of certain Court orders while they are reviewed on appeal. [Citation.] In California, a long-established set of rules governs stays of injunctive orders -- that is, orders to do something or to refrain from doing something. What rule applies depends on which kind of order it is. An injunction that requires no action and merely preserves the status quo (a so-called prohibitory injunction) ordinarily takes effect immediately, while an injunction requiring the Defendant to take affirmative action (a so-called mandatory injunction) is automatically stayed during the pendency of the appeal." (Daly v. San Bernardino County Bd. of Supervisors (2021) 11 Cal.5th 1030, 1035.)

As noted above, on February 10, 2026, Defendants filed a notice of appeal of the judgment. On February 20, 2026, Defendants filed their notice of designating record on appeal. The mandatory injunctions contained in the judgment are automatically stayed. Those include: (1) removal of the bamboo fence, (2) the mailbox removal and installation, (3) the signing of consent form and other documents required by the County, (4) assumption of maintenance obligations, and (5) relinquishment of certain property rights relating to the existing bridge access.

Defendants further ask this Court to exercise its discretion and stay the remaining provisions of the judgment pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 918. As the motion is unopposed, the Court will order the temporary stay of enforcement of the judgment, until such time as all rights to an appeal by Defendants are exhausted and a final, post-appeal judgment has been entered.

Tentative Ruling: PoloDonkey LLC v. Quiel Tentative Ruling: PoloDonkey LLC v. Quiel Case Number 24CV05259 Case Type Civil Law & Motion Hearing Date / Time Wed, 05/13/2026 - 10:00 Nature of Proceedings 1. Motion to vacate the judgment, vacate or modify the judgment, or for a new trial; 2. Motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict.

Tentative Ruling

Timeline of Mid-Trial Fraud on Court On November 24, 2025, County Counsel for Santa Barbara filed a Notice of Related Case to relate the Lead Case and the present action with Diana Sandoval et al. vs. County of Santa Barbara et al., Case Number 25CV06984 ("25CV06984"). On November 26, 2025, Defendants serve and file oppositions to relate the cases. On January 22, 2026, the Court orders the cases related to the Lead Case and the present action Case No 24CV05259.

On January 7, 2026, Diana Sandoval filed a declaration in 25CV06984 alleging Planning and Development Department of acting in bad faith after identifying a change to the permitting address occurring on the first day of trial, January 5, 2026. On January 14, 2026, the permit log for Santa Barbara County shows a call with an interested party for permits 25CDP-00037/25BDP?00544. On January 15, 2026, during trial, Defendant Diana Sandoval testified that she applied for her ADU with 3200 Serena Avenue because that was assigned to our parcel and the County said her ADU was approved as 3200, though she hasn't seen the approval. Asked about 3200 being reassigned to Plaintiff, Diana answers she's "not sure" because "the County finally approved my permits... with 3200," putting that claimed approval at issue.

On January 15, 2026, Brown emails Turenchalk zoning stamped ADU plans, and notes "I just got your voicemail," and will check on building plans. Turnechalk tells Brown to remove the remaining 3200 Serena address references and mark the bamboo fence unpermitted and linked to 25CDH?00031. Brown sends revised plans, saying she removed 3200 and synced zoning/BDP sheets but won't add to be permitted for 25CDH?00031 yet. On January 15, 2026, Brown emailed Quiel stamping the ADU plans as approved. Thereon, Brown emailed Quiel again the revised ADU plans that supersede the prior set and uses the plans with the changed address reference from 3200 Serena to 3196.

On January 16, 2026, during Defendant Diana Sandoval's examination, she is shown Trial Exhibit 377, to which she responds to have never seen it before. Thereon, the Court excluded Trial Exhibit 377 as hearsay and lacking foundation. In addition, questioned if her approved ADU plans had 3200 Serena struck and 3196 added, Diana says she's unaware, has no plans, and notes Plaintiff's counsel has permitting documents she does not.

On January 16, 2026, Brown emailed Turenchalk updated ADU plans to reference a voicemail from Turenchalk and promising to check the building plans. Thereon, Brown emailed Defendant Tyler Quiel apologizing for the wrong 3200 Serena address and sent an alleged final plan showing 3196 on all pages despite that address being disputed. Later that day, on January 16, 2026, Turenchalk again leaves a voicemail to Brown wherein this confirms the existence of another voicemail.

At trial on January 16, 2026, during Defendant Tyler Quiel's testimony, Trial Exhibit 377 is shown, which Defendant states he has never seen before. "No, I've never seen it," and adds he hasn't checked his email and is concerned his permitting is "coming through your counsel" (PPP); the Court strikes the comment and does not admit the exhibit.

On January 16, 2026, during Turenchalk's testimony as a witness at trial, testifies that Brown emailed her Trial Exhibit 377 on January 15, 2026, and said that the plans show several cross’outs changing 3200 Serena to 3196. The Court excludes the exhibit but lets Turenchalk's testimony in, and she does not reveal she directed many of those edits.

On January 20, 2026, Judge Anderle, in the middle of the trial, relates the Case 24CV05259 and 2506984 without addressing the objections filed by Defendants on November 16, 2025. On January 20, 2026, LoMonaco (also a PPP client) says he received Defendants' ADU plans, saw 3200 Serena, crossed out 3200 and wrote 3196 as it was the only address that hasn't been contested. While Ex. 380 is excluded from the record, LoMonaco's verbal testimony reaches the jury and conflicts with Brown's role. Thereon, LoMonaco confirms PPP is fire’district counsel.

With respect to new material evidence, critical and not merely cumulative, and also not previously discoverable with reasonable diligence subject to CCP Sec. 657, which evidence is strong enough to cause a differing result upon retrial, please also consider the following: On February 10, 2026, the County labeled Public Records Request R015134-023026 a full release of all