Wesselman – Trust

Superior Court of the State of California County of Orange TENTATIVE RULINGS FOR DEPARTMENT CM08 Temporary Judge Catherine Evans

Date: 06/10/2026 Court Room Rules and Notices

# Case Name Tentative 1 Simpson – Probate; 30-2025-01512125

2 Katz - Probate Motion for Summary Judgment

3 Wesselman – Trust; Motion for Reconsideration

Respondent Paul Wesselman’s Motion for Reconsideration (ROA 190) is DENIED.

Respondent Paul Wessleman (Paul) moves for reconsideration of the court’s March 18, 2026 minute order (ROA 183) granting in part and denied in part Paul’s Motion to Compel the Frost Law Firm to Release Settlement Funds (Motion to Release Funds [ROA 129]).

Paul’s motion is made pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure Section 1008(a), which reads in pertinent parts:

(a) When an application for an order has been made to a judge, or to a court, and refused in whole or in part, or granted, or granted conditionally, or on terms, any party affected by the order may, within 10 days after service upon the party of written notice of entry of the order and based upon new or different facts, circumstances, or law, make application to the same judge or court that made the order, to reconsider the matter and modify, amend, or revoke the prior order. The party making the application shall state by affidavit what application was made before, when and to what judge, what order or decisions were made, and what new or different facts, circumstances, or law are claimed to be shown.

...

(e) This section specifies the court’s jurisdiction with regard to applications for reconsideration of its orders and renewals

of previous motions, and applies to all applications to reconsider any order of a judge or court, or for the renewal of a previous motion, whether the order deciding the previous matter or motion is interim or final. No application to reconsider any order or for the renewal of a previous motion may be considered by any judge or court unless made according to this section.

(Emphasis added.)

The requirement of “new or different facts, circumstances or law” is jurisdictional. (Gilberd v. AC Transit (1995) 32 Cal.App.4th 1494, 1500 [“a court acts in excess of jurisdiction when it grants a motion to reconsider that is not based upon ‘new or different facts, circumstances, or law’”].) Further, a party seeking reconsideration pursuant to Section 1008 must explain why the allegedly new or different facts, circumstances or law were not previously presented. (Evan Zohar Construction & Remodeling, Inc. v. Bellaire Townhouses, LLC (2015) 61 Cal.4th 830, 833; Baldwin v. Home Savings of America (1997) 59 Cal.App.4th 1192, 1200.)

Paul argues the new facts and circumstances supporting reconsideration are: (1) the $16,000 in the trust account at the time he filed the Motion to Release has been depleted and there are no additional trust funds to finance his defense of this action; (2) the litigation is ongoing so Paul will have to expend his own funds; and (3) the beneficiaries’ rights are adequately protected because Paul is a fiduciary.

These facts and circumstances are neither new nor different. As an initial matter, Paul—as trustee—is and was subject to fiduciary obligations as a matter of law. Regarding the amount of trust funds and the monetary demands of the ongoing litigation, the Motion to Release Funds argued: “The Citibank Trust Account has approximately $16,000. [Citation.] If the settlement funds from the Frost Law Firm are not deposited into the Trust Account, Paul will have to use his own money to defend against the petition and to pay for the Trust’s administration.” (Motion Release Funds at 9:22-24.) Because Paul does not offer any new facts or circumstances, the motion may not be considered under section 1008.

Even if the facts and circumstances underlying the motion for reconsideration were new, they would not support Paul’s request for different ruling on the Motion to Release Funds. Paul argues the court’s order denying him authorization to use the recently released funds for his defense exceeded the

scope of the motion and was, therefore, “ultra petita” or “in excess of the petition.”

The court notes that no published California case refers to either “ultra petita” or “in excess of the petition.” Indeed, in the entire body of state and federal case law, the court has only been able to identify six cases that refer to the doctrine of refer to “ultra petita”—an 1817 case from the Supreme Court of Louisiana, and unreported 2022 case from the United States District Court, District of Maryland, a unreported 2015 case from the United States District Court, Northern District of Alabama, an unreported 1942 case from El Tribunal Supremo De Puerto Rico, and unreported 2025 case issued by Tribunal de Apelaciones, and an unreported 2026 case issued by Tribunal de Apelaciones.

Similarly, in the entire body of state and federal case law, this court can only find eight cases referring to “in excess of the petition.” Seven of those cases address judgments not orders. The eighth addresses a zoning variance.

To the extent, Paul is making a due process argument, the court is entitled to consider the grounds stated in the notice of motion and grounds included in the supporting papers. (Luxury Asset Lending, LLC v. Philadelphia Television Network, Inc. (2020) 56 Cal.App.5th 894, 909 [“‘As a general rule, the trial court may consider only the grounds stated in the notice of motion. [Citations.] An omission in the notice may be overlooked if the supporting papers make clear the grounds for the relief sought’”].)

The second paragraph of the memorandum of Points and Authorities in support of the Motion to Release Funds reads, in full: “In an abundance of caution, the Frost Law Firm took the position that the settlement funds can be transferred only with the agreement of all five beneficiaries or a court order. Petitioner Amy Helleson did not agree because Paul would use the settlement funds to pay attorney fees to defend the petition and to pay a different law firm that is handling the administration of the Wesselman Trust.

The Wesselman Trust has only $16,000 remaining. So, Amy is foreseen Paul to use his own money to defend the petition and pay different law firm to handle the administration of the Wesselman Trust.” (Motion to Release Funds at 4:11-17.)

The third paragraph of the memorandum of Points and Authorities in support of the Motion to Release Funds argues that the court should order the settlement funds released because the trust “expressly states Paul can [use] trust funds to pay attorney fees to defend the petition” and “both the Probate Code and case law support that Paul can use trust funds to pay for attorney fees to defend the petition.” (Motion to Release Funds at 4:21-23.) Pages 8 and 9 of the memorandum are dedicated to the argument that the funds

should be released so that Paul can use them to pay for his defense of this action. (Motion to Release Funds at 8:3- 9:27.)

Paul argued the funds should be released so that he could use them to pay for his defense. He raised the issue. The opposition responded to this argument and requested that the settlement proceeds either be distributed to the beneficiaries or placed into a blocked account. (ROA 176 at 5:15-9:13.) Paul’s reply dedicates more than two of its seven total pages to the issue of Paul’s use of the funds for his defense. (ROA 178 at 4:16-6:27.) The issue of Paul’s ability to utilize the funds for his defense was raised by the motion and was, therefore, before the court.

Further, even if the issue had not been raised by Paul, “the probate court has the ‘inherent power to decide all incidental issues necessary to carry out its express powers to supervise the administration of the trust.’ [Citation.] This inherent equitable power of the probate court has long been recognized to encompass the authority to take remedial action. ‘Under California trust law, a court can intervene to prevent or rectify abuses of a trustee's powers. [Citations.]’ [Citation.] And, where a probate court has the express authority to remove a trustee sua sponte, it necessarily has the inherent equitable power to employ the less extreme remedy of suspending most of the trustee's powers and appointing an interim trustee pending a hearing. [Citation.] (Schwartz v. Labow (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 417, 427-428.)

The motion is DENIED.

Petitioner is directed to give notice.

4 Anderson/Callahan – Trust; 30-2024-01389721 5 Bent – Trust; Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings 30-2024-01418521 Petitioner Bernadette Bell’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings as to Respondent James Charles Bent’s Opposition to Petitioner Bernadette Bell’s Petition to Confirm Beneficiary Status and for Distribution Pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 438 (ROA 129) is DENIED.

This proceeding was initiated on August 13, 2024, when Charles Lamar Bent filed a petition (ROA 2) seeking removal of James Charles Bent (James) and James T. Sullivan as trustees of The Bent Trust (Trust). The initiating petition is