Truong vs. MKT, Inc.

Contrary to moving parties’ contentions, the SAC sufficiently alleges agency and/or ratification, either of which is sufficient to support joint liability by these moving parties. (SAC, ¶¶ 3, 5 [agency], 6, 11 [ratification]; Skopp v. Weaver (1976) 16 Cal.3d 432, 437 [“numerous cases have held a pleading of agency an averment of ultimate fact”]; Spahn v. Guild Industries Corp. (1979) 94 Cal.App.3d 143, 156 [“an agent's liability for

compensatory and punitive damages may be imputed to even an innocent principal,” and may be imputed where “the principal subsequently ratified the agent's actions”]; see also Quelimane Co., Inc. v. Stewart Title Guar. Co. (1998) 19 Cal.4th 26, 38-39 [a complaint is good against a general demurrer so long as it states a valid cause of action under any theory]; PH II, Inc. v. Superior Court (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 1680, 1682 [“demurrer does not lie to a portion of a cause of action”].)

The authorities cited by moving parties regarding agency were not pleading cases, and did not hold that a plaintiff must allege facts demonstrating a principal’s right to control the agent at the pleading stage, in order to overcome a demurrer. (See Blickman Turkus, LP v. MF Downtown Sunnyvale, LLC (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 858, 886 [in “determining the sufficiency of a pleading ... the existence of an agency relationship is the ‘essential fact,’ and where alleged must be accepted as true”].) Further, ratification is sufficiently alleged (SAC, ¶¶ 6, 11); whether moving parties in reality ratified conduct by other defendants is a question of fact for the trier of fact. (C.R. v.

Tenet Healthcare Corp. (2009) 169 Cal.App.4th 1094, 1110 [whether ratification occurred “is generally a factual question”]; see also Rakestraw v. Rodrigues (1972) 8 Cal.3d 67, 73 [“A purported agent's act may be adopted expressly or it may be adopted by implication based on conduct of the purported principal from which an intention to consent to or adopt the act may be fairly inferred”].)

3 rd cause of action: false light invasion of privacy.

This cause of action sufficiently alleges a false publication, i.e. the videos allegedly falsely implying plaintiff’s affiliation with and/or approval of defendants’ restaurants. (SAC, ¶¶ 3, 6-8; see also Balla v. Hall (2021) 59 Cal.App.5th 652, 688-690 [false implication of endorsement can give rise to false light claim].) Defendants’ alleged agency and/or ratification is also sufficiently alleged as discussed above.

However, unlike the first two causes of action for misappropriation, which only require defendants’ alleged misuse of plaintiff’s name/likeness, this cause of action also requires that the publication be defamatory. (Jackson v. Mayweather (2017) 10 Cal.App.5th 1240, 1264 [false light elements, including allegations that subject publication “exposes a person to hatred, contempt, ridicule, or obloquy and assumes the audience will recognize it as such”].) This is not sufficiently alleged.

“Where the words or other matters which are the subject of a defamation action are of ambiguous meaning, or innocent on their face and defamatory only in the light of extrinsic circumstances, the plaintiff must plead and prove that as used, the words had a particular meaning, or ‘innuendo,’ which makes them defamatory ... [w]here the language at issue is ambiguous, the plaintiff must also allege the extrinsic circumstances which show the third person reasonably understood it in its derogatory sense (the ‘inducement’).” (Smith v.

Maldonado (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 637, 645–646; internal citations omitted.) Here, there are no facts alleged to show how listeners would understate the allegedly false publications to be “derogatory” (Smith v. Maldonado, supra at 646), or expose plaintiff to “hatred, contempt, ridicule, or obloquy” (Jackson v. Mayweather, supra at 1264). “[A] harmful meaning must still be clear to constitute defamation per se.” (Balla v. Hall, supra at 690.)

4 th cause of action: unfair business practices.

This cause of action states sufficient facts based on false misappropriation of plaintiff’s name/likeness. (SAC, ¶¶ 3-12, 14, 18; Bus. & Prof. Code, §§ 17200, 17203 [unfair business practices based on, inter alia, unlawful business acts or practices, or unfair, deceptive, untrue or misleading advertising, as well as plaintiff’s entitlement to restitution and/or injunctive relief]; see also Civ. Code, § 3344, subd. (a)(2) [authorizing injunctive relief for misappropriation]; Schnall v. Hertz Corp. (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 1144, 1153 [“By proscribing 'any unlawful' business practice, section 17200 ‘borrows’ violations of other laws and treats them as unlawful practices that the unfair competition law makes independently actionable”]; Ingels v. Westwood One Broadcasting (2005) 129 Cal.App.4 th 1050, 1060 [UCL claim requires allegations of valid underlying predicate].)

5 th cause of action: intentional and/or negligent infliction of emotional distress.

This cause of action fails to state sufficient facts to show why posting allegedly false endorsement videos is “so extreme as to exceed all bounds of that usually tolerated in a civilized community,” as required for intentional infliction of emotional distress. (Christensen v. Superior Court (1991) 54 Cal.3d 868, 903 [elements]; Fowler v. Varian Associates, Inc. (1987) 196 Cal.App.3d 34, 44 [“it is for the court to determine, in the first instance, whether the defendant’s conduct may reasonably be regarded as so extreme and outrageous as to permit recovery”].)

As to negligent infliction of emotional distress, the SAC fails to allege any facts showing any duty to plaintiff on defendants’ part. (Burgess v. Superior Court (1992) 2 Cal.4

th 1064, 1072 [negligent causing of emotional distress is not an independent tort, but is instead the tort of negligence]; Marlene F. v. Affiliated Psychiatric Medical Clinic, Inc. (1989) 48 Cal.3d 583, 588 [“[t]he traditional elements of duty, breach of duty, causation, and damages apply”]; Wooden v. Raveling (1998) 61 Cal.App.4

th 1035, 1038 [the duty must be one “assumed by the defendant or imposed on the defendant as a matter of law, or that arises out of a relationship between the two”].)

Case Management Conference continued to November 13, 2026 at 8:30 a.m. in Department C44.

Clerk to give notice.

10 Wang vs. Liu

2023-01321234 Motion for Terminating Sanctions

Continued to CM02. See minute order dated 5/27/26.

11 Yang vs. TBG Construction & Flooring Company, Inc.

2024-01385711 Motion to Set Aside/Vacate Judgment:

No tentative. 12 Yu vs. JJC & CO. LLC

2026-01547713 Motion to Compel Arbitration

Defendants JJC & CO. LLC, Jifeng Nan and Zhuofan Duan’s Motion to Compel Arbitration is GRANTED.

“[W]hen a petition to compel arbitration is filed and accompanied by prima facie evidence of a written agreement to arbitrate the controversy, the court itself must determine whether the agreement exists and, if any defense to its enforcement is raised, whether it is enforceable.” (Mitri v. Arnel Management Co. (2007) 157 Cal.App.4th 1164, 1169; (Code Civ. Proc, § 1281.2.) “California contract law applies to determine whether the parties formed a valid agreement to arbitrate.” (Id. at 1170.)

“In determining the existence of an agreement to arbitrate, the trial court must employ a three-step burden shifting process. The party seeking to compel arbitration bears an initial burden to show