Motion to Compel Production In Response to Request for Production (Set One); Responses to Form Interrogatories (Set One) or Deemed Admission of Requests for Admission (Set One), and for Sanctions
appeal was never agreed upon in Court on March 6, 2026, pursuant to Sec. 664.6 (in fact, the exact opposite is true of the agreement).
7. The above examples clearly meet the standard for sanctions under Taeb and Levy, supra in that Defendants have taken positions that are "wholly incredible," are in total disregard of the "patent obligations of the contract," and are without "honest belief in the propriety or reasonableness" of the settlement. This was not a bona-fide dispute as to the essential core terms of the settlement, as Defendants' counsel's opposition brief has suggested. This was an obvious attempt to hold settlement monies hostage while trying to salvage a positive result for his client after a decisive jury loss. Put simply, Defendants' draft settlement agreement attempted to change the material terms of the on-the-record settlement and doing so was the height of bad-faith.
8. This Court was dismayed with what happened but was not unprepared. This Court concluded March 6, 2026 Sec. 664.6 hearing by stating the following: THE COURT: Thank you. The settlement is approved pursuant to 664.6. And as I've indicated, I think on the record, should there be any failure in any documentation that the lawyers are contemplating, the Court, when that happens and it rarely happens, but it has, I just get a copy of the settlement that you put on the record from Tara, cut and paste it and put it in a judgment form. That is how it ends up. Now everybody understands that. [Emphasis this Courts]; Reporters Transcript of Hearing dated March 6, 2026 at 24:12-20, attached to Curtis Decl. as Exh. A.]
9. Instead of continuing to deal with Mr. Becker's bad faith redlined settlement agreements with vague and confusing waiver provisions and argumentative recitals, Plaintiffs simply asked the Court to do what it said it was going to do. Plaintiffs were not required to assume the risk of Mr. Becker's "gotcha" settlement agreement, given the simple terms of the on-the-record settlement, namely, "a payment of $1,600,000 within 30 days, and that will be a complete resolution of the case with no appeal." (Reporters Transcript of Hearing dated March 6, 2026 at 10:23-26, attached to Curtis Decl. as Exh. A.)
10. And when the Court sent around a proposed Judgment laying out the simple terms of the settlement, what ensued were several emails from Mr. Becker to this Court accusing Mr. Curtis of "breaching the duty of good faith and fair dealing." (See Email from Mr. Becker dated April 2, 2026, attached to Curtis Decl. as Exh. G.)
11. Because of the repeated bad-faith positions taken by Defendants' counsel set forth above, and as detailed further in the Declaration of Robert A. Curtis, Plaintiffs were forced to pay Plaintiffs' counsel $8,125 in attorney fees between March 7, 2026, and the filing of the opening brief. [Plaintiffs are waiving the additional 1.8 hours it took reviewing the Opposition and preparing the Reply and the anticipated 1 hour attending the hearing on May 13, 2026. Plaintiffs only seek the same amount of fees as set forth in their initial filing.]
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In Summary This case is guided by the more stringent rules requiring subjective bad faith applicable to section 128.5. A reasonable attorney knowing all the facts and the applicable law would conclude, as this Court did, that the sanctions set are justified because Defendants' and their Lawyer's conduct was intended to cause unnecessary delay and/or was undertaken for an improper motive. The Defense Attorney, and the Defendants, have, with rhythmic regularity, taken a position (1) that is "wholly incredible" and (2) in total disregard of the "patent obligations of the contract" and (3) without "honest belief in the propriety or reasonableness" of the settlement.
Tentative Ruling: Matter of The Henry and Venice Dettamanti Family Trust Tentative Ruling: Matter of The Henry and Venice Dettamanti Family Trust Case Number
Case Type Trust Hearing Date / Time Wed, 04/22/2026 - 09:30 Nature of Proceedings
Motion to Compel Production In Response to Request for Production (Set One); Responses to Form Interrogatories (Set One) or Deemed Admission of Requests for Admission (Set One), and for Sanctions Tentative Ruling For Petitioner and Trustee Elizabeth A. Watkins: Aaron R. Feldman, Feldman Law Group For Objector and Petitioner Mario Dettamanti: Jacqueline Misho, Misho Law Group For Additional Parties: See List RULING For the reasons stated herein, the motion of Petitioner Mario Dettamanti to compel production in response to request for production (set one), responses to form interrogatories (set one) or deemed admission of requests for admission (set one), and for sanctions, is denied.
Background
These proceedings were commenced by the filing of a petition for instructions by successor trustee Elizabeth Watkins on May 30, 2023. Among others, Petitioner and beneficiary Mario Dettamanti (M Dettamanti), has filed objections and a verified petition for the removal of trustee Watkins. On March 24, 2026, M Dettamanti filed a motion for an order: (1) compelling successor trustee Watkins to produce all responsive documents to a set one request for production (the RFP) by April 29, 2026; (2) compelling Watkins to respond to a set one form interrogatories (the FI), without objection, by April 29, 2026; (3) deeming all matters in a set one requests for admission (the RFA) admitted; and (4) imposing a monetary sanction of $5,000. (Notice at pp. 1-2.) No opposition to the motion has been filed with the Court.
Analysis
For all reasons discussed herein, the motion is procedurally deficient, moot, and will be denied on those grounds. In support of the motion, M Dettamanti submits a declaration of their counsel, Jacqueline Misho (attorney Misho), who states that on February 17, 2026, Watkins served responses to the RFP and RFA, and that Watkins has failed to serve any responses to the FI. (Misho Dec., P.P. 6-7 & exhibits C-D.) Therefore, the order requested in the motion relates to the RFP, the FI, and the RFA served by M Dettamanti on Watkins, and the responses of Watkins, or a failure by Watkins to respond, to those requests.
For these reasons, the motion is authorized under subdivisions (a) of Code of Civil Procedure sections 2030.300, 2031.310, 2031.320, and 2033.290. The order requested in the motion is keyed to the responses of Watkins to the FI and RFA, and the production of documents by Watkins in response to the RFP, each of which constitute separate and particular sets of discovery. (Code Civ. Proc., Sec. 2030.210, subds. (a) & (b) [responses to interrogatories]; Sec. 2031.280 [production of documents in response to a demand]; Sec. 2033.210, subds. (a) & (b) [responses to admission requests].)
Code of Civil Procedure section 2016.010 et seq. (the Civil Discovery Act) separately authorizes motions to compel further responses to specific sets of discovery. For these and all further reasons discussed above, the present motion effectively combines three motions made under the Civil Discovery Act with respect to three separate and particular sets of discovery directed to Watkins. (See Code Civ. Proc., Sec. 1003 ["[e]very direction of a Court or judge, made or entered in writing, and not included in a judgment, is denominated an order.
An application for an order is a motion"].) The fee to file a motion applies to "[d]iscovery motions under Title 4 (commencing with Section 2016.010) of Part 4 of the Code of Civil Procedure." (Gov. Code, Sec. 70617, subd. (a)(4).) "Regardless of whether each motion or matter is heard at a single hearing or at separate hearings, the filing fees required by subdivisions (a), (c), (d), and (e) apply separately to each motion or other paper filed." (Gov. Code, Sec. 70617, subd. (f).) Because each request for an order compelling a party to provide further responses, or produce documents in response, to a specific set of discovery is a separately authorized motion, a separate filing fee is required for each motion whether or not they are presented in a single notice with combined supporting papers or presented with separate notices and supporting papers.
Though a party is, generally, not prohibited from combining papers supporting some types of motions, such as M Dettamanti has done here, there exists a procedural problem regarding the payment of filing fees for that motion.
The Court's records reflect that M Dettamanti paid one filing fee for the three separately authorized motions presented by M Dettamanti as one motion. "Officers of the state, or of a county or judicial district, shall not perform any official services unless upon the payment of the fees prescribed by law for the performance of the services, except as provided in this chapter." (Gov. Code, Sec. 6100.) "An unbroken line of decisions by our Supreme Court holds that it is mandatory for Court clerks to demand and receive the fee required by statute before documents or pleadings are filed." (Duran v.
St. Luke's Hospital (2003) 114 Cal.App.4th 457, 459.) Though M Dettamanti must pay additional filing fees if they want the Court to adjudicate the motion as to the RFA, the FI, and the production of documents in response to the RFP, the motion is procedurally deficient for the additional reasons discussed below. Subject to exception, "any motion involving the content of a discovery request or the responses to such a request must be accompanied by a separate statement." (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1345(a).) "A separate statement is a separate document filed and served with the discovery motion that provides all the information necessary to understand each discovery request and all the responses to it that are at issue.
The separate statement must be full and complete so that no person is required to review any other document in order to determine the full request and the full response. Material must not be incorporated into the separate statement by reference." (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1345(c).) "The separate statement must include--for each discovery request (e.g., each interrogatory, request for admission, deposition question, or inspection demand) to which a further response, answer, or production is requested--the following: "(1) The text of the request, interrogatory, question, or inspection demand; "(2) The text of each response, answer, or objection, and any further responses or answers; "(3) A statement of the factual and legal reasons for compelling further responses, answers, or production as to each matter in dispute; "(4) If necessary, the text of all definitions, instructions, and other matters required to understand each discovery request and the responses to it; "(5) If the response to a particular discovery request is dependent on the response given to another discovery request, or if the reasons a further response to a particular discovery request is deemed necessary are based on the response to some other discovery request, the other request and the response to it must be set forth; and "(6) If the pleadings, other documents in the file, or other items of discovery are relevant to the motion, the party relying on them must summarize each relevant document." (Cal.
Rules of Court, rule 3.1345(c)(1)-(6).) As the motion shows that Watkins served responses to the RFP and the RFA on February 17, 2026, the motion must be accompanied by a separate statement as to those discovery requests. (See Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1345(a); cf. 3.1345(b) [when separate statement is not required].) As the motion is not accompanied by a separate statement, the motion fails to comply with the requirements of California Rules of Court, rule 3.1345(a). The Court has discretion to deny the motion on that basis. (Mills v.
U.S. Bank (2008) 166 Cal.App.4th 871, 893.) In addition, though Watkins has not filed an opposition with the Court, M Dettamanti filed a reply in support of the motion on April 16, 2026. In support of that reply, attorney Misho states: "on March 25, 2026, well after the February 17, 2026, stipulated deadline, and only after this Motion was filed, [Watkins] served Amended and Supplemental Responses to [the RFA] and a belated Response to [the FI]." (Reply Misho Dec., P. 3, 7 & exhibits B-C; see also Reply at p. 1, ll. 22-25.)
Where a responding party provides discovery requested in a motion to compel and the moving party proceeds with the motion, the Court has substantial discretion to determine how to rule on the motion based on the circumstances of the case. (Sinaiko Healthcare Consulting, Inc. v. Pacific Healthcare Consultants (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 390, 408-409.) The Court may take the motion off-calendar, deny the motion as moot or unnecessary, or narrow its scope to the issue of sanctions. (Id. at p. 409.) Under the circumstances present here, and considering the deficiencies in the motion discussed above including the failure by M Dettamanti to include a rule compliant separate statement with the motion, the Court will deny the motion, without prejudice to any appropriate motion to compel that may be filed by M Dettamanti in the future to the extent they determine that the amended or supplemental responses of Watkins remain deficient.
The