But even if the Court were to reconsider its prior ruling, the evidence provided does not warrant reversal. The passport entries do not show Willet was out of the country on the day the proof of service shows he was personally served. (ROA 26; Suppl. Willet Decl., Ex. A.) And the credit card transactions are not proof of physical presence, as they do not show who made the purchases or that the card was physically in Willet’s possession. (Id., Ex. B.) Moreover, the Court also denied the motion based on untimeliness, and the new evidence does not overcome this finding. (ROA 126.)
The motion is therefore DENIED.
Counsel for Plaintiff shall give notice of this ruling.
9. Gibson Holdings, LLC v. Pure Rapscallion, Inc 24-1382993 Plaintiff Gibson Holdings, LLC’s (“Plaintiff”) unopposed Motion for Issue Sanctions (“Motion”) is DENIED.
Plaintiff requests issue sanctions against pro per defendant Daniel Adam Hewko aka Adam Hewko (“Adam”). Adam was previously represented by counsel, but that counsel substituted out. The pleadings Plaintiff served on Adam following Adam’s former counsel stopping representation have all been e-served on Adam at adam@bottlecoatings.com and/or adam@glugwater.com. To electronically serve a pro per party, the pro per party must file consent to receive electronic service. (CA Rules of Court Rule 2.251.) There is nothing in the court’s records which indicates Adam filed such consent. Adam’s former counsel noted Adam’s email address was adam@dynamicbrandsllc.com, which is neither of the two email addresses above. (ROA 184.) It is unclear where Plaintiff obtained the above addresses where electronic service has been sent.
In addition to electronically serving Adam the present Motion, Plaintiff electronically served Adam the underlying court order which is the basis of this Motion. (ROA 270.) As that service was improper, Adam has not technically received notice of the court’s order and therefore cannot have violated it.
For the above reasons the Motion is DENIED. Plaintiff will need to properly serve the underlying order and then, if Adam does not comply, Plaintiff will need to file a new motion for sanctions should it so choose.
The court also notes corporate defendant Pure Rapscallion, Inc. (“PRI”) has been unrepresented since 10/02/25. (ROA 268.) The court hereby sets an OSC Re: Why Unrepresented Corporation Pure Rapscallion, Inc.’s Answer Should Not Be Struck for July 9, 2026, at 1:30 p.m. in Dept. C-20.
Plaintiff to give notice to all parties, including Pure Rapscallion, Inc.
10. Farkas v. Smith 23-1324888 (Off calendar) 11. Millen v. General Motors LLV (Continued)
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26-1554736 12. Mito’s Holdings, Inc. v. Deniz Restaurants, LLC 25-1534622 Before the Court are three demurrers filed by defendants Deniz Restaurants, LLC (Deniz), Berkay Altintas (Berkay) and Nalan Altin tas (Nalan)(collectively, Defendants) to the complaint of plaintiff M ito’s Holdings, Inc. (Plaintiff). For the reasons set forth below, the demurrers by Deniz, Berkay and Nalan are SUSTAINED with 20 days’ leave to amend on the 8th cause of action and OVERRULED on the 9th, 10th and 12th causes of action. In addition, the demurrers by Berkay an d Nalan are SUSTAINED with 20 days’ leave to amend on the 6th cause of action.
A general demurrer lies where the pleading does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. (Code of Civ. Proc. § 430.10, subd. (e).)
Demurrer by Deniz
8th cause of action (indemnification): Civil Code section 2772 provides:
“Indemnity is a contract by which one engages to save another from a legal consequence of the conduct of one of the parties, or of some other person.” Because an indemnity agreement is basically a contract, it is subject to all the requirements applicable to contracts in general. (Branson v. Sun Diamond Growers (1994) 24 Cal.App.4th 327, 347; see also San Mateo Union High School Dist. v. County of San Mateo (2013) 213 Cal.App.4th 418, 439 [elements of breach of contract].) Here, Plaintiff fails to adequately allege damages, i.e., that a third party h as filed a claim against Plaintiff arising out of Defendants’ alleged wrongful conduct. Plaintiff simply alleges exposure to “potential claims, demands and liability,” that has not materialized. (Compl. ¶ 164.) As such, the demurrer is SUSTAINED as to this cause of action with 20 days’ leave to amend.
9th and 10th cause of action (fraud claims): Defendant does not argue insufficiency of pleading allegations – only that these claims are duplicative of the breach of contract claim. Redundancy of a cause of action is not a ground on which a demurrer may be sustained. (Blickman Turkus, LP v. MF Downtown Sunnyvale, LLC (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 858, 889-890.) Moreover, the Court finds the fraud claims are not duplicative of the breach of contract claim because they arise ou t of independent tortious conduct, not breach of contractual terms. (Compl. ¶¶ 173-180, 185-191.) As such, the demurrer is OVERRULED as to these causes of action.
12th cause of action (intentional interference with prospective economic advantage): The Court finds Plaintiff adequately pleads the elements of this cause of action, including actual disruption that has caused damage to Plaintiff’s reputation and goodwill. (Korea Supply Co. v. Lockheed Martin Corp. (2003) 29 Cal.4th 1134, 1153 [elements]; see also Compl. ¶¶ 209-216.) As such, the demurrer is OVERRULED as to this cause of action.