MARTIN MILLER M.D. VS. JULIE NAESTED

September 10, 2025 Law and Motion Calendar Judge Nicole S. Healy Department 28 ________________________________________________________________________

02:00 PM LINE 7 23-CIV-05760 MARTIN MILLER M.D. VS. JULIE NAESTED

MARTIN MILLER M.D. CURTIS V RODRIGUEZ JULIE NAESTED JESSICA A. DAYTON

Defense Motion for Summary Judgment and Alternative Motion for Summary Adjudication

TENTATIVE RULING:

Defendant Julie Naested’s Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED.

Defendant’s request for judicial notice is GRANTED.

Defendant’s objections to plaintiff Martin Miller’s declaration are moot in light of this court’s ruling.

A.

Background

Plaintiff Miller and defendant Naested met in summer 2018 and began dating soon after. (UMF 1.) The parties became engaged on June 7, 2020. (UMF 2.) The parties went through several break-ups during the course of their relationship. (UMF 3.) Naested is a public-school teacher. (UMF 4.) Miller is a physician. (UMF 6.) He was the higher earner throughout the entire relationship. (UMF 7.) The parties never married. (UMF 8).

After the parties’ relationship ended, Naested pursued and received a Domestic Violence Restraining Order, protecting her from Miller. (UMF 9.) She obtained a restraining order after a hearing on January 15, 2025, which expires on January 14, 2028. (UMF 10.) Miller has violated the Order on two occasions by sending Naested emails in June 2025. (UMF 10.) Naested’s restraining order is based on Miller physically and sexually assaulting her throughout the relationship and his ongoing surveillance and stalking of her after the relationship ended. (UMF 11.)

Naested also obtained a criminal protective from Colorado in August 2020 due to Miller’s charges based on Colorado Criminal Code §§18-6.5-103(3)(c) – Third Degree Assault; 18-3- 204(1)(a) – Crimes against at-risk persons – classifications; 18-8-103 – Resisting arrest; and 18- 9-111(1)(a) – Harassment – Kiana Arellano’s Law. (UMF 12.) Naested’s cross-complaint against Miller relies on the same facts as the Domestic Violence Restraining Order. (UMF 13.)

Prior to the parties’ engagement, Miller claims he made numerous purchases, including: (1) paying for a deluxe private bathroom remodel at his home costing over $140,000; (2) spending over $250,000 on travel, hotels and meals for the parties; (3) purchasing a custom Alfa Romeo sports car for $95,000; and (4) buying multiple pieces of high-quality jewelry exceeding $75,000 in value, including a $38,500 engagement ring. (UMF 14.) Miller also purchased a

September 10, 2025 Law and Motion Calendar Judge Nicole S. Healy Department 28 ________________________________________________________________________ washing machine and dishwasher for Naested. (UMF 15.) Miller asserts he made all purchases based on Naested’s promises to marry him. (UMF 16.)

Naested never demanded or requested that Miller build a bathroom in his home to her specifications. (UMF 17.) Naested never lived in the home where the bathroom remodel took place and only occasionally stayed over. (UMF 18.) Miller has continuously owned the property where the bathroom was remodeled at 3350 Alpine Road, Portola Valley, CA 94028 since at least 2018. (UMF 19.) Miller has had other guests stay at his home and utilize the remodeled bathroom. (UMF 20.).

Miller often bought Naested gifts throughout the relationship. (UMF 21.) Miller never told Naested that she should expect to reimburse him for any meals he treated her to. (UMF 22.) In fact, Naested has also treated Miller to dinners and bought him gifts throughout their relationship. (UMF 23.) Miller never expressed that he paid for meals contingent on the romance growing and continuing. (UMF 24.)

Miller did not ever discuss with Naested that she would be responsible for paying him back for travel expenses after the June 2020 proposal. (UMF 25.) Miller believed that travel was intended to “enhance [the parties’] romantic relationship.” (UMF 26.) Naested rejected travel with Miller repeatedly during and after the relationship. (UMF 27.) Naested emailed him that she “clearly stated repeatedly that [she] would not travel with him.” (UMF 28.) In response, Miller told Naested “You will be dining with me.

You will be traveling with me.” (UMF 29.) Miller expressed Naested’s unwillingness to travel with him were simply part of “fits of hysteria.” (UMF 30.) Miller benefitted from the travel, hotels, and meals that he paid for on behalf of both parties. (UMF 31.) Travel also served the dual purpose of Miller’s professional development when the couple planned travel around Miller’s work conference or event. (UMF 32.)

Miller bought gifts intended for Naested on his own volition, such as flowers and certain pieces of jewelry. (UMF 33.) Miller asked Naested to wear jewelry he purchased for her on at least one occasion. (UMF 34.)

Naested did not retain most pieces of jewelry that Miller purchased for her during the relationship. Naested returned the engagement ring referenced in Miller’s complaint to Miller. (UMF 35.) Miller purchased Naested an emerald pendant and studs. (UMF 36.) These items were retained at Miller’s home and are still in his possession. (UMF 37.) Miller also purchased sapphire earrings and a necklace for Naested for Christmas in 2018. (UMF 38.) Miller wrote to Naested she could keep these items and did not request any sort of reimbursement nor express expectation of payment for the items. (UMF 39.)

Miller purchased a diamond tennis bracelet for Naested. (UMF 40.) He did not ask her to return this item, nor did he express expectation of payment for the item. (UMF 41.) Naested told Miller, in writing, that she has not requested jewelry from him and she did not want anything material from him. (UMF 42.) Naested has, on at least one occasion, offered to return the bracelet, and two other items of jewelry. (UMF 43.)

September 10, 2025 Law and Motion Calendar Judge Nicole S. Healy Department 28 ________________________________________________________________________ A friend of the couple, Mr. Nauenberg said Naested tried to return the tennis bracelet to Miller. (Dayton Decl., ¶ 10, Ex. H, ¶ 12.)

Miller’s behaviors of sending Naested flowers, complimenting her, and buying her gifts and travel were to show affection toward Naested. (UMF 44.) Miller provided these many types of luxuries to Naested to “treat her like a princess.” (UMF 45.)

Miller purchased a car for Naested as “[his] idea, as an engagement gift.” (UMF 46.) Naested did not demand or request that Miller purchase the custom Alfa Romeo sports car for her. (UMF 47.) Naested explicitly told Miller not to give her a car. (UMF 48.) Miller never expected Naested to be financially responsible for any part of the vehicle. (UMF 49.) Naested never had and does not have possession of the Alfa Romeo. (UMF 50.) Miller is the only registered owner of the vehicle and it remains in his possession. (UMF 51.)

Naested never asked Miller to purchase the dishwasher and washing machine for her. (UMF 52.) Miller purchased at least one of the items and sent these items to Naested while the Colorado criminal protective order was in effect. (UMF 53.) Miller considered these to be gifts for Naested. (UMF 54.)

B. Legal Standard

“A party may move for summary judgment in an action or proceeding if it is contended that the action has no merit or that there is no defense to the action or proceeding.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (a)(1).) Summary judgment will only be granted “if all the papers submitted show that there is no triable issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” (Id., subd. (c).)

“A party may move for summary adjudication as to one or more causes of action within an action ... if the party contends that the cause of action has no merit ... .” (Code of Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (f)(1).) A cause of action has no merit if one or more of its elements cannot be separately established or an affirmative defense can be established. (Id., at subd. (o).)

A defendant moving for summary judgment or summary adjudication has an initial burden of showing either that one or more elements of a cause of action cannot be established or that there is a complete defense to the cause of action. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (p)(2).) Once the initial burden has been carried, the burden shifts to the opposing party to show that a triable issue of material fact exists as either to the cause of action or a defense thereto, as applicable. (Ibid.)

The moving party’s ultimate burden of persuasion that there are no issues of triable fact, however, never shifts to the opposing party. (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 850.) This burden is unaffected by the strength or weakness of the showing in opposition to the motion (Scalf v. D.B. Log Homes, Inc. (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 1510, 1519), and summary judgment must be denied — despite deficiencies in the opposition — if the burden has not been carried (Kojababian v. Genuine Home Loans, Inc. (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 408, 416).

September 10, 2025 Law and Motion Calendar Judge Nicole S. Healy Department 28 ________________________________________________________________________ Because summary judgment deprives an adverse party of the right to a trial, any doubts are resolved in favor of the party opposing the motion. (Huynh v. Ingersoll-Rand (1993) 16 Cal.App.4th 825, 830; See’s Candy Shops, Inc. v. Superior Court (2012) 210 Cal.App.4th 889, 900.) Thus, “[t]he moving party’s affidavits are to be strictly construed, and ... all conflicts in the affidavits are to be resolved in favor of the opposing party and all reasonable inferences are to be drawn in favor of that party as well.” (Hufft v. Horowitz (1992) 4 Cal.App.4th 8, 20.)

C. ANALYSIS

1. Threshold Issue: Quantum Meruit vs. Conditional Gifts

“Quantum meruit refers to the well-established principle that ‘the law implies a promise to pay for services performed under circumstances disclosing that they were not gratuitously rendered.’” (Huskinson & Brown v. Wolf (2004) 32 Cal.4th 453, 458 (Huskinson) [emphasis added].)

Plaintiff’s opposition states, for the first time in this action, that his claims are cognizable under Civil Code, section 1590. Accordingly, plaintiff seeks to recover not for the value of services rendered, but rather for the value of conditional gifts allegedly made with the assumption that a contemplated marriage would take place — e.g., jewelry, an expensive sports car, a remodeled bathroom, appliances, travel, meals, and flowers. Plaintiff further alleges that he performed $2,000 worth of Botox services on defendant and he made still-outstanding loans to defendant in the amounts of $5,000 and $3,000.

To the extent that plaintiff alleges these items constituted conditional gifts, Section 1590 allows for the recovery of such gifts – not quantum meruit:

Where either party to a contemplated marriage in this State makes a gift of money or property to the other on the basis or assumption that the marriage will take place, in the event that the donee refuses to enter into the marriage as contemplated or that it is given up by mutual consent, the donor may recover such gift or such part of its value as may, under all of the circumstances of the case, be found by a court or jury to be just.

(Civ. Code, § 1590.)

The parties have not previously litigated the issue of conditional gifts versus services rendered.

2. Plaintiff Fails to Show Triable Issues of Fact for His Quantum Meruit Claim

The elements in a quantum meruit action are: (1) plaintiff acted pursuant to an explicit or implicit request for services by the defendant; and (2) the services conferred a benefit on the defendant. (Day v. Alta Bates Medical Center (2002) 98 Cal.App.4th 243, 248 (Day).) Additionally, the plaintiff must show that the services were rendered under some understanding

September 10, 2025 Law and Motion Calendar Judge Nicole S. Healy Department 28 ________________________________________________________________________ or expectation of both parties that compensation would be made. (Huskinson, supra, 32 Cal.4th at p. 458.)

Here, plaintiff seeks compensation for botox treatments he allegedly performed for defendant, purportedly worth $2,000. (Miller Decl., ¶ 10.) Defendant argues that the Botox service is a factual theory outside of the pleading and therefore outside of the scope of this summary judgment motion. However, in addition to specifically identifying big ticket expenses such as jewelry, a bathroom remodel, an expensive car, and travel expenses, plaintiff’s complaint alleges: “Plaintiff incurred numerous and extensive additional expenditures.” (Compl., ¶ 10.)

The general allegation of additional expenses is sufficient to put defendant on fair notice of the nature of the claims and that additional expenses or services existed beyond those identified in the complaint. (See White v. Smule, Inc. (2022) 75 Cal.app.5th 346, 354 [acknowledging pleadings are construed broadly and with reasonable precision to acquaint a defendant with the nature of the claim].)

However, regardless of whether the Botox treatment falls within the scope of issues alleged in the Complaint, plaintiff has not shown that a triable issue of fact exists as to whether an expectation existed that compensation would be made for his services. (Huskinson, 32 Cal.4th at p. 458.) Plaintiff has submitted no evidence supporting that he expected compensation for the Botox services.

Plaintiff further alleges that defendant has not paid outstanding loans for $5,000 and $3,000. (Miller Decl., ¶¶ 7-9.) The $3,000 loan is not included in the complaint. The $5,000 load was included in the plaintiff’s second cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress, which was dismissed by this court on June 11, 2025. Regardless of whether these claims are properly before the court, they fail because plaintiff cannot recover an unpaid loan on quantum meruit. Quantum meruit refers to the principle that the law implies a promise to pay for services performed under circumstances disclosing they were not gratuitously rendered. (Huskinson, supra, 32 Cal.4th at p. 458.)

The measure of recovery is the reasonable value of the services rendered. (Maglica v. Maglica (1998) 66 Cal.App.4th 442, 459.) A loan, by contrast, is simply the delivery of a sum of money to another under a contract that the sum be repaid to the lender at a future time. (Rochester Capital Leasing Corp. v. K & L Litho Corp., 13 Cal.App.3d 697, 702.) The appropriate remedy is a breach of contract claim, not quantum meruit.

Plaintiff’s remaining claims for other alleged expenses – jewelry, car, bathroom remodel, appliances, travel, meals, and flowers – are likewise not for services and fail on that reason alone. Separately, they also fail for the same reason as the Botox services: plaintiff has not provided evidence, or even alleged, that there was an expectation that compensation would be made for those expenses. (Huskinson, supra, 32 Cal.4th at p. 458.)

3. Plaintiff’s Conditional Gift Theory Is Not Properly Raised in Opposition to this Motion

California courts have consistently held that the pleadings set the boundaries of the issues to be resolved at summary judgment. (Oakland Raiders v. National Football League, (2005) 131

September 10, 2025 Law and Motion Calendar Judge Nicole S. Healy Department 28 ________________________________________________________________________ Cal.App.4th 621, 648.) A plaintiff cannot bring up new, unpleaded issues in his or her opposing papers. (Ibid.) “To allow a party to expand its pleadings by way of opposition papers creates . . . an unwieldy process.” (Laabs v. City of Victorville (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 1242, 1258.)

The elements of a Section 1590 claim are: (1) a contemplated marriage in California; (2) a gift of money or property made by one party to the other; (3) the gift was made on the basis or assumption that the marriage would take place; and (4) the donee refused to enter into the marriage as contemplated, or the marriage was given up by mutual consent. (Civ. Code, § 1590.)

The elements in a quantum meruit action are: (1) plaintiff acted pursuant to an explicit or implicit request for services by the defendant; and (2) the services conferred a benefit on the defendant. (Day, supra, 98 Cal.App.4th at p. 248.) The plaintiff must show that the services were rendered under some understanding or expectation of both parties that compensation would be made. (Huskinson, supra, 32 Cal.4th at p. 458.)

The two causes of action are legally and factually distinct. Quantum meruit focuses on the value of services rendered, while Civil Code, section 1590 focuses on the recovery of gifts made in contemplation of a marriage that did not occur. Introducing a Section 1590 claim in the opposition paper here would introduce an entirely new cause of action with different elements, facts, and remedies.

Accordingly, defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED as to the sole cause of action for quantum meruit.

If the tentative ruling is uncontested, it shall become the order of the court. Thereafter, defendant’s counsel shall prepare a written order consistent with the court’s ruling for the court’s signature, pursuant to California Rules of Court, Rule 3.1312 and Local Rule 3.403(b)(iv), and provide written notice of the ruling to all parties who have appeared in this action. The order should be e-filed only, do not email or mail a hard copy to the court.