BARBER v. MAYNARD, et al.

I. LEGAL STANDARDS

LAW AND MOTION TENTATIVE RULINGS DATE: JUNE 10, 2026 TIME: 8:30 A.M.

In general, when the main relief sought does not relate to real property, the superior court in the county where defendants, or some of them, reside is the proper venue. (Code Civ. Proc., § 395, subd. (a)1; California State Parks Found. v. Superior Court (2007) 150 Cal.App.4th 826, 833.) “If the action is for injury to person or personal property or for the death from wrongful act or negligence, the superior court in either the county where the injury occurs or the injury causing death occurs or the county where the defendants, or some of them reside at the commencement of the action, is a proper court for the trial of the action.” (§ 395, subd (a).) On timely motion, the court must order a transfer of an action “when the court designated in the complaint is not the proper court.” (§§ 396b, 397, subd. (a); Rycz v. Superior Court (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 824, 836.)

A trial court may order a change of venue “[w]hen the convenience of witnesses and the ends of justice would be promoted by the change.” (§ 397, subd. (c).) The grant or denial of a motion to transfer venue made pursuant to section 397(c) is discretionary, and a trial court’s decision on such a motion will only be overturned for a clear abuse of discretion. (Union Trust Live Ins. Co. v. Sup. Ct. (1968) 259 Cal.App.2d 23, 28; Wrin v. Ohlandt (1931) 2113 Cal. 158, 159.) The burden of proof is on the party bringing such a motion to show that the proposed transfer will promote both the convenience of witnesses and the ends of justice. (Peiser v.

Mettler (1958) 50 Cal.2d 594, 607.) A motion under section 397(c) requires a factual showing that transfer will promote the “convenience of witnesses and the ends of justice.” (Juneau v. Juneau (1941) 45 Cal.App.2d 14, 16.) Specifically, declarations in support of the motion must show the names of witnesses and the nature of their testimony, so the court may determine the materiality of the evidence or the necessity of testimony from the witnesses. (Ibid.) Such declarations must contain admissible evidence as a change of venue cannot be predicated upon declaration consisting of hearsay and conclusions. (Lieppman v.

Lieber (1986) 180 Cal.App.3d 914, 919).

The general rule directs that venue is proper at a defendant’s residence unless there is a specific venue statute, in which case the general rule is subordinated. (Code Civ. Proc., § 395(a).) A defendant entitled to a change of venue as to one count in a multiple count complaint is entitled to the change as to the entire action. (Jhirmack Enterprises, Inc. v. Superior Court (1979) 96 Cal.App.3d 715, 720.)

“In its discretion, the court may order the payment to the prevailing party of reasonable expenses and attorney's fees incurred in making or resisting the motion to transfer whether or not that party is otherwise entitled to recover his or her costs of action. In determining whether that order for expenses and fees shall be made, the court shall take into consideration (1) whether an

1 All future statutory references are to the Code of Civil Procedure unless otherwise stated.

LAW AND MOTION TENTATIVE RULINGS DATE: JUNE 10, 2026 TIME: 8:30 A.M.

offer to stipulate to change of venue was reasonably made and rejected, and (2) whether the motion or selection of venue was made in good faith given the facts and law the party making the motion or selecting the venue knew or should have known. As between the party and his or her attorney, those expenses and fees shall be the personal liability of the attorney not chargeable to the party. Sanctions shall not be imposed pursuant to this subdivision except on notice contained in a party’s papers, or on the court's own noticed motion, and after opportunity to be heard.” (§ 396, subd. (b).)

II. DISCUSSION

Here, the complaint establishes that Dr. Maynard was at all times a physician practicing in Tuolumne County and he provided prenatal care, ordered imaging, and was responsible for clinical follow-up, counseling and referral in Tuolumne County. (Compl. at ¶¶ 2, 13, 17, 24.) Dr. Maynard confirms this in his declaration. (Maynard Declaration ¶¶ 2-3.) Dr. Kahn’s joinder fails to provide any additional evidence. Plaintiff and his mother both reside in Texas, but will travel to attend proceedings regardless of the county in which the action is tried. Ms. Hamlin also describes that while she received pre-natal care in Sonora, CA, the plaintiff received care after birth in San Francisco, CA (NICU and surgery). (Hamlin Decl. ¶¶ 2-6.)

Plaintiff argues that since one defendant resides in Santa Cruz County (Kahn resides and performs telehealth services from an address in Aptos, CA; see plaintiff’s RJN 1) and the injurycausing conduct occurred here, venue is proper in Santa Cruz County. Plaintiff contends that defendant’s legal theory to transfer venue (“center of gravity”) has not been viable for years and that as long as the case is venued in a county where one defendant resides, venue is proper. (Monogram Co. of California v.

Kingsley (1951) 38 Cal.2d 28, 31-32.) Plaintiff also argues that moving party has failed to fulfill his evidentiary obligations to transfer venue based on convenience pursuant to section 397, subdivision (c) since he has not provided any declaration describing each expected witness, their testimony, whether they have given a statement, why it would be inconvenient for them to appear, and why the ends of justice are promoted by transfer to Tuolumne County.

Dr. Maynard’s reply insists he is entitled to transfer venue based on the Court’s discretion under section 397, subdivision (c). However, Dr. Maynard’s motion and supporting evidence fail to satisfy the requirements of the statute. Further, based on the evidence, it appears that plaintiff and his GAL will be participating from out of state, and that several witnesses related to plaintiff’s care likely reside and/or will testify from other counties besides Santa Cruz and Tuolumne.

LAW AND MOTION TENTATIVE RULINGS DATE: JUNE 10, 2026 TIME: 8:30 A.M.

The Court agrees that plaintiff has brought this action in a county in which at least one of the defendants reside, which means venue is proper in Santa Cruz County. (§ 395, subd. (a).) Further, moving party has failed to meet his burden to establish that venue in Tuolumne County is required for the convenience of witnesses and the ends of justice. (§ 397, subd. (c.).) The Court declines to impose sanctions against moving party or his attorney.

Plaintiff’s request for judicial notice of the medical board license verification record for defendant Kahn is granted. (Evid. Code § 452, subd. (c).)

No. 25CV01147

ANDERSON et al. v. PACIFIC GAS & ELECTRIC

PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR DISMISSAL OF AMENDED CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT FOR INJUNCTIVE RELIEF PURSUANT TO CRC 3.700(a)

PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION TO SEAL EXHIBIT FILED IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR DISMISSAL

The unopposed motions are granted.

I. BACKGROUND AND MOTIONS

On December 25, 2024, there was a gas explosion and fire in Capitola. As a result, this class action case was filed, which asserts a private nuisance and seeks injunctive relief. The class was never certified. Additional related cases were filed by individuals who sustained damage in the accident. The parties participated in a mediation on December 19, 2025, and reached a global settlement. The parties agreed to settle the individual claims for monetary relief and the class action for equitable relief. PG&E agreed to take certain actions and make assurances concerning the remediation work done on the lines.

Pursuant to the global settlement agreement, plaintiffs seek court dismissal of the uncertified class action pursuant to California Rules of Court, rule 3.770. Plaintiffs assert they have met the three requirements provided for in rule 3.770 and have provided the facts on which the party relies for dismissal; a clear statement of whether this is any consideration and a detailed description of this consideration.

Plaintiffs also move to seal Exhibits B and C to the Declaration of William Kershaw, which consists of the unredacted global settlement agreement and the allocation plan, both filed in support of the motion for dismissal. Plaintiffs argue that they, and PG&E, have an overriding