Motion for leave to file First Amended Complaint
question, the exam was terminated and the offer of employment was withdrawn. (Ibid.)
There are no similar allegations in the TAC. Plaintiff argues Tribal First controlled which medical providers she could see, decided whether to accept or deny her claim and requests for medical treatment, received and memorialized her work restrictions, communicated them to Graton, and maintained detailed knowledge of her disability and medical condition throughout her employment. None of these activities support finding it was Tribal First, on Graton’s behalf, who terminated Plaintiff, failed to reasonably accommodate her disability, failed to engage in the interactive process, or who retaliated against her by terminating her employment for requesting an accommodation.
It appears Plaintiff’s complaint against Tribal Health is that its decisions impacted her ability to recover from her injury: “These decisions were inextricably intertwined with Ms. Gelsinger's rate of recovery, her ability to achieve maximal medical improvement, her level of permanent impairment, and ultimately her ability to return to work.” (Oppo., 3:7-9.)
No case is cited that administering healthcare equates to acting as an agent of an employer for the purpose of employer related decisions in terminating an employee or in the failure to provide a reasonable accommodation or engage in the interactive process. Nor is there any case cited establishing that transmitting medical information to an employer makes the one transmitting that information liable for any decision an employer makes based upon that information.
Plaintiff also argues that Tribal First dismisses the “collusion allegations.” However, there is no basis for liability for collusion of a violation of FEHA if there is no employment practice taken on behalf of Graton by Tribal First. While there might be some other theory under which Tribal First may be liable, the FEHA does not apply.
3. Conclusion and Order
Plaintiff has been given a chance to amend her complaint to state a valid cause of action against Tribal First for violation of the FEHA. Her TAC continues to fail in this regard. Nor has she shown any possibility that she could amend her complaint to state a valid cause of action against Tribal First for violation of the FEHA.
Accordingly, the demurrer is SUSTAINED without leave to amend. Tribal First’s counsel is directed to submit a written order to the court consistent with this ruling and in compliance with Cal. Rules of Court, Rule 3.1312
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5. 25CV03106, Gentry v. Scarritt
Plaintiff Cindy Gentry (“Plaintiff”) moves for leave to file a First Amended Complaint adding a fifth cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress and additional factual allegations concerning Defendant’s threats, intimidation, and acts of violence toward Plaintiff that came to light during Plaintiff’s deposition.
“The court may, in furtherance of justice, and on any terms as may be proper, allow a party to amend any pleading.” (CCP § 473(a)(1).) Judicial policy dictates the court’s discretion be applied liberally to allow amendments. (Nestle v. Santa Monica (1972) 6 Cal. 3d 920, 939.) It is only when there is prejudice to the other side that cannot be alleviated by imposing conditions on the moving party that leave should not be allowed. (Hirsa v. Sup.Ct. (Vickers) (1981) 118 Cal. App. 3d 486, 490.) Arguments regarding the validity of the proposed amended complaint, such as that a cause of action is barred by the statute of limitations, are not considered on a motion for leave. (See Kittredge Sports Co. v. Sup.Ct. (Marker, U.S.A.) (1989) 213 Cal. App. 3d 1045, 1048.)
In opposition, Defendant Curt Scarritt (“Defendant”) argues allowing Plaintiff to amend now leaves Defendant with insufficient time to conduct discovery on the issues raised in the new 10 cause of action. However, trial is not until August and Defendant was aware of Plaintiff’s intention to add a cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress back in February. None of Defendant’s reasons for denying the motion cannot be alleviated through other means beyond denying the motion.
The motion is GRANTED. Plaintiff is directed to file and serve the First Amended Complaint within 10 days of this order. Plaintiff’s counsel is directed to submit a written order to the court consistent with this ruling and in compliance with Cal. Rules of Court, Rule 3.1312.
6. SCV-272535, Banuelos v. American Honda Motor Co., Inc
Plaintiff Luis Banuelos (“Plaintiff”) moves for an award of attorney fees, costs, and expenses pursuant to Civil Code section 1794(d) of the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act. Plaintiff seeks $21,312.50 in attorney fees plus a multiplier of 1.5 in the amount of $10,656.25, for a total fee award of $31,968.75. Plaintiff also requests reimbursement for costs and expenses in the amount of $6,255.49. The motion is GRANTED, with the modification that this court will grant a modifier of 1.1, for a total attorney fee award of $23,443.75.
1. Litigation and Settlement
Plaintiff filed this action on January 31, 2023, against Defendant American Honda Motor Co., Inc. (“Defendant”) alleging the violation of the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act based upon Plaintiff’s purchase of a 2021 Honda Passport for $21,850.39. On August 21, 2025, the parties settled the matter with Defendant agreeing to pay Plaintiff $58,536.00. (Kirnos decl., ¶14.) As part of the settlement agreement Defendant agreed to pay reasonable attorney fees to be determined by the parties or this motion. (Kirnos decl., Exhibit C., ¶2.) For the purposes of the attorney fee motion, the parties agreed Plaintiff is the prevailing party. (Ibid.)
2. Attorney Fees - Civil Code section 1794(d)
“If the buyer prevails in an action under this section, the buyer shall be allowed by the court to recover as part of the judgment a sum equal to the aggregate amount of costs and expenses, including attorney's fees based on actual time expended, determined by the court to have been reasonably incurred by the buyer in connection with the commencement and prosecution of such action.” (Civ. Code, § 1794(d).) A court exercises its discretion to determine the amount of attorney fees reasonably incurred. (Serrano v. Priest (1977) 20 Cal.3d 25, 50.)
Plaintiff’s counsel utilized nine attorneys and one paralegal on this case. (Kirnos decl., Exhibit A.) The attorneys billed hourly rates from $375 to $575. (Ibid.) The paralegal was billed at $145 per hour. (Ibid.) Plaintiff’s counsel explains that the use of multiple attorneys in lemon law cases is beneficial as each attorney specializes in certain stages of litigation. Each attorney’s experience in particular niches relating to the Song-Beverly Act allows attorneys to spend less time on each case. The invoices provided support this explanation. The time spent on each task is within reason and the tasks performed appear reasonably necessary to the litigation. In addition, Plaintiff’s counsel did not bill for some meetings between counsel and/or staff.
3. Fee Enhancement
A fee enhancement or multiplier is applicable to an attorney fee award under Civil Code section 1794(d). (Robertson v. Fleetwood Travel Trailers of California, Inc. (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 785, 819-821.) A touchstone or lodestar figure based on a careful compilation of the actual time spent and reasonable hourly compensation for each attorney may then be augmented or diminished by taking various relevant factors into account, including (1) the novelty and difficulty 11