UNDER SEAL VS. UNDER SEAL

REQUESTS FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF ALAMEDA 25CV109652: UNDER SEAL VS. UNDER SEAL 06/03/2026 Hearing on Motion for Leave to Intervene filed by Southern California District Council of Laborers and The Laborers Training and Retraining Trust of Southern California (Non-Party) CRS# 681986806887 in Department 18

All requests for judicial notice are denied as moot, as the court finds the materials irrelevant to resolution of the motion.

LEGAL STANDARD

A court “shall, upon timely application, permit a nonparty to intervene in the action or proceeding” if the “person seeking intervention claims an interest relating to the property or transaction that is the subject of the action and that person is so situated that the disposition of the action may impair or impede that person’s ability to protect that interest, unless that person’s interest is adequately represented by one or more of the existing parties.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 387, subd. (d)(1)(B).)

A court “may, upon timely application, permit a nonparty to intervene in the action or proceeding if the person has an interest in the matter in litigation, or in the success of either of the parties, or an interest against both.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 387, subd. (d)(2).)

The purpose of intervention is “to obviate delay and multiplicity of actions by creating an opportunity to those directly interested in the subject matter to join in an action already instituted.” (State Water Bd. Cases (2023) 97 Cal.App.5th 1035, 1045.)

DISCUSSION

A “direct and immediate” interest is a threshold requirement for either mandatory or permissive intervention. (See Turrieta v. Lyft, Inc. (2024) 16 Cal.5th 664, 680; Code Civ. Proc., § 387, subd. (d)(1)(B) [mandatory intervention requires “an interest relating to the property or transaction that is the subject of the action”]; S. Coast Air Quality Mgmt. Dist. v. City of Los Angeles (2021) 71 Cal.App.5th 314, 319 [permissive intervention requires “direct and immediate” interest in action].)

Proposed Intervenors claim an interest in (1) defending the applicability of the prevailing wage classifications; (2) defending the scope and integrity of their own collective bargaining agreements from which prevailing wage determinations are derived; and (3) in preserving member job opportunities and apprenticeship programs. Proposed Intervenors explain that pipelayer classifications historically overlap with pipefitter classifications and that contractors may select from those overlapping classifications, absent conflicting obligations in the relevant collective bargaining agreements. Proposed Intervenors contend that Plaintiffs are targeting contractors for employing members and apprentices pursuant to pipelayer prevailing wages rather than pipefitter prevailing wages, and argue that Plaintiffs are attempting to bar pipelayer apprentices from performing certain kinds of work.

These are not direct and immediate interests. Plaintiffs are challenging the accuracy of the

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF ALAMEDA 25CV109652: UNDER SEAL VS. UNDER SEAL 06/03/2026 Hearing on Motion for Leave to Intervene filed by Southern California District Council of Laborers and The Laborers Training and Retraining Trust of Southern California (Non-Party) CRS# 681986806887 in Department 18 invoices and related documents that Defendants submitted to public entities. Proposed Intervenors would not receive payment from those transactions. There is no dispute that DIR uses data from collective bargaining agreements in making prevailing wage determinations, but Plaintiffs are not challenging the determinations, only Defendants’ compliance.

Similarly, Plaintiffs do not challenge the apprenticeship regulations, only Defendants’ compliance. The outcome of this case may affect the employment prospects for Proposed Intervenors’ members, but speculative and indirect harm cannot support intervention, mandatory or permissive. (See Siena Ct. Homeowners Assn. v. Green Valley Corp., 164 Cal.App.4th 1416, 1425 & 1428.)

Intervention is not mandatory for the additional reason that Proposed Intervenor’s interest in upholding Defendants’ hiring decisions is adequately represented by Defendants. (See, e.g., S. Coast Air Quality, supra, 71 Cal.App.5th at p. 321 [trial court has no “mandatory obligation to open the gate to every potentially affected interest that might mobilize itself to appear”].)

Similarly, permissive intervention is not appropriate because Defendants are well-positioned to defend their hiring and apprenticeship choices on the projects at issue and Proposed Intervenor’s submissions would likely be cumulative. (S. Coast Air Quality, supra, 71 Cal.App.5th at pp. 320–21 [Union seeking to intervene was “not the only one seeking to maintain operations—and thus jobs”].) Even if Proposed Intervenors had a direct interest, denying permissive intervention is proper when, as here, seating at the table is already “crowded.” (Id., p. 319.)

Proposed Intervenors, moreover, cannot satisfy the third and final requirement for permissive intervention, that it “will not enlarge the issues in the litigation.” (See Siena Ct. Homeowners, supra, 64 Cal.App.4th at p. 1429.) The briefing on this motion confirms the existence of a longstanding dispute between competing unions, the contours of which need not be explored to resolve the False Claims Act causes of action presented. The court is not persuaded that intervention is likely to obviate delay or a multiplicity of lawsuits.

ORDER

The motion for intervention is DENIED. CONTESTING THE TENTATIVE RULING: If the parties do not contest, the tentative ruling will be adopted. Any party wishing to contest must notify the court by email at Dept18@alameda.courts.ca.gov and notify all opposing counsel or unrepresented parties by 12:00 pm on the day of the hearing.