Motion in Limine; Special Motion to Strike (Anti-SLAPP)
Case No.: PCU329769 Date: June 2, 2026 Time: 8:30 A.M. Dept. 19-The Honorable Russell P. Burke Motions: Motion in Limine; Special Motion to Strike (Anti-SLAPP) Tentative Rulings: The motion in limine is denied without prejudice. The anti-SLAPP motion is denied. Dillon Schuler filed a motion in limine and an anti-SLAPP motion.
Motion in Limine By way of the first motion, Dillon seeks "an order excluding any testimony, evidence, or reference to ...: Any expunged, dismissed, or sealed cases involving [Dillon]"; "Any past criminal history, allegations of criminal conduct, or 'prior bad acts' not directly relevant to this wrongful termination suit"; and "Any personal information, social media activity, or financial records irrelevant to work performance or employment claims."
Dillon asserts "[t]his is a wrongful termination case" and that the categories of evidence identified in his motion should be excluded because they are "irrelevant" to such a case, and "prejudicial" in the context of the issues therein raised. It is somewhat clear, as Dillon indicates, that a termination event is one thing at issue in his suit, but the scope of the complaint, generally, is uncertain. The allegations are difficult to follow; it is not easy to conclude Dillon's suit is just "a wrongful termination case."
There is, in any event, more at issue in this case than what is pled just in Dillon's complaint (whatever its scope might be). Though not mentioned by Dillon, defendant Terry Schuler has filed a cross-complaint, and, in it, he alleges Dillon "physically attacked" him "[i]n 2025," and, based on that allegation, he asserts an assault and battery claim (and he also asserts other, different claims).
Given the issues raised by the cross-complaint, the court is disinclined to determine, at this stage, that the categories of evidence presented in Diller's motion would necessarily be "irrelevant" to the issues ultimately to be determined at trial, or that all such categories of evidence are unduly "prejudicial." As a general practice, this court typically addresses in limine motions closer to trial when the parties are further along in trial preparation efforts. (See TCSC Local Rule 608, 611; see also Amtower v. Photon Dynamics, Inc. (2008) 158 Cal.App.4th 1582, 1593 [71 Cal.Rptr.3d 361] ["In limine motions are designed to facilitate the management of a case, generally by deciding difficult evidentiary issues in advance of trial."].)
Accordingly, the court denies the motion without prejudice to Dillon re-raising these or other objections, closer to trial, in a subsequent motion to exclude specific evidence that Terry intends to, or that Dillon believes Terry intends to, have admitted at trial. Also, this motion is denied without prejudice to any objection Dillon might raise to evidence Terry seeks to admit during trial.
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Anti-SLAPP Motion Dillon also filed an anti-SLAPP motion. Dillon's motion states that he moves to strike Terry Schuler's entire cross-complaint. On review of the whole of the motion, however, it's clear Dillon only expressly targets Terry's assault and battery claim.
Dillon maintains the cross-complaint "is a retalitory [sic] SLAPP suit." By this, Dillon means that Terry sued him for assault and battery in retaliation for his having sued Terry. Whether Terry sued Dillon for assault and battery in retaliation for his suit, however, is irrelevant. (City of Cotati v. Cashman (2002) 29 Cal.4th 69, 74 [124 Cal.Rptr.2d 519, 52 P.3d 695]; id., p. 77.)
Dillon is required, instead, to make a threshold showing that the challenged cause of action--in this case, the assault and battery claim--"is one 'arising from' protected activity." (Id., at p. 76, citing Code Civ. Proc., Sec. 425.16, subd. (b)(1).) Where, as here, Dillon asserts a lawsuit as the subject protected petitioning activity, he must specifically show that that petitioning activity "supplies one or more elements" of Terry's assault and battery claim. (Wilson v. Cable News Network, Inc. (2019) 7 Cal.5th 871, 887 [249 Cal.Rptr.3d 569, 444 P.3d 706].)
Dillon fails to make such showing, and it is obvious why he cannot. Terry's assault and battery claim is not based on Dillon's suit, but on allegations that Dillon "physically attacked" him. Accordingly, the anti-SLAPP motion is denied.
If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order.
Court reporters are usually not available for law and motion matters in the civil division. The parties and counsel must provide their own reporter if they want a transcript of the proceedings.
Visalia-County Civic Center Honorable Nathan D. Ide Presiding - Department 9 Examiner notes for probate matters calendared Tuesday, June 2, 2026, that allow for posting: Status: Recommended for Approval (RFA), Appearance Required or Recommended, Approval Conditional Upon, etc. Case Number | Case Name | Type