Peter M. Sailors, Damian Sailors and Tim Hurst vs. Sarah Waters and Diane Waters

Defendant cites to case authority such as Heather Farms Homeowners Assn. v. Robinson in support of her proposition. However, in Heather Farms, as well as the cases referenced therein, dealt with unique factual scenarios distinguishable under the facts in this action (Heather Farms Homeowners Assn. v. Robinson, (1994) 21 Cal. App. 4th 1568, 1574 [e.g. defendant “prevailed” where defendant obtained a dismissal with prejudice where plaintiff failed to timely serve the complaint; neither party “prevailed” where defendant restaurant went out of business and closed; plaintiff “prevailed” where a settlement achieved exactly what plaintiff sought in the action; neither party “prevailed” where plaintiff dismissed action against defendant as part of a global settlement.]) Here, the jury found that Defendant Waters owed each Plaintiff wages under the terms of their employment and awarded each Plaintiff a distinct amount. (Judgment on Special Verdict, November 14, 2025 at pp1-2.)

Labor Code section 218.5, requires the court to award reasonable attorney’s fees to the prevailing party in any action brought for the nonpayment of wages. As the jury awarded Plaintiffs $4,879.98 for unpaid wages, regardless of whether Plaintiffs succeeded on the other causes of action, Plaintiffs are the prevailing party at least as to this issue. b. Is Plaintiff Entitled to Recover Reasonable Attorney’s Fees? Plaintiffs argue that they are entitled to reasonable attorney’s fees for the entire case because they do not have recover on all causes of action to be the prevailing parties.

Plaintiffs assert that they reasonably spent 269.2 attorney hours and 164 legal assistant or paralegal hours litigating this case. In opposition, Defendant Waters argues that a fee award would be patently unreasonable in a case where Plaintiffs were awarded less than the statutory minimum of an unlimited case. Defendant argues that the Court should exercise its discretion under CCP §1033(a) and deny costs where the judgment is $25,000 or less and thus could have been rendered in a limited civil case. (CCP §1033(a).)

In their reply brief, Plaintiffs argue that Gramajo v. Joe’s Pizza on Sunset, Inc. supports their claim that they should be awarded the entirety of requested attorney’s fee because Labor Code section 218.5 controls.[1] The Gramajo Court reviewed the seeming inconsistency between Labor Code section 1194 subdivision (a), which allows a plaintiff receiving less than the legal minimum

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wage to recover reasonable attorney’s fees and Code of Civil Procedure section 1033, which grants the trial court discretion in granting costs in an action where the prevailing party recovers a judgment that could have been rendered in a limited civil case. The Gramajo court finds that there is an irreconcilable conflict between the two statues, such that concurrent operation is not possible. Where two statutes conflict, a more specific statute will take precedence over a general one, and a more recently enacted statute will take precedence over an earlier one.

The Gramajo court ultimately found that the Labor Code section 1194 subdivision (a) controls on the question of whether a prevailing party would be entitled to reasonable attorney’s fees. (Gramajo v. Joe’s Pizza on Sunset, Inc., 100 Cal. App. 5th 1094, 1103.; see also Nishiki v. Danko Meredith, P.C. (2018) 25 Cal.App.5th 883,896 [trial court did not abuse its discretion in awarding attorney fees where an employee/plaintiff had limited success because it was a “oneway” attorney fees provision meant to ensure even employees who achieved minimal success are still entitled to an award of fees].)

Although Plaintiffs are proceeding under Labor Code section 218.5 for nonpayment of wages, this Court finds that the analysis would be the same for Labor Code section 218.5, as Labor Code section 1194 subdivision a. As such, the Court does not have discretion to summarily reject Plaintiffs’ request for attorney’s fees, as Defendant has argued. However, the Gramajo court still limited attorney’s fees to what is reasonable, cautioning: our holding should not be read as a license for attorneys litigating minimum and overtime wage cases to over-file their cases or request unreasonable and excessive cost awards free of consequence.

Under Labor Code section 1194, subdivision (a), a prevailing employee is still only entitled to a reasonable fee and cost award. In assessing requests for litigation costs, trial courts must always be guided by what is reasonable and exercise their discretion to strike costs or reduce fees they find unreasonable. On this last point, we find Harrington illustrative. There, an employee filed a class action for unpaid overtime wages. After class certification was denied, the employee's remaining individual claim was for $44.63 in unpaid wages.

The employer ultimately settled the case for $10,500 and agreed that for purposes of attorney fees, the employee would be deemed the prevailing party. The employee then requested more than $46,000 in attorney fees and more than $2,200 in costs. The trial court denied the employee's request, finding it unreasonable and excessive, and that the employee had already been paid a windfall of $10,500 for a $44 overtime claim. After the employee appealed, the Court of Appeal reversed the denial but fixed

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the fee award at $500. Although the Harrington court found the employee was entitled to an award of fees under various provisions of the Labor Code, including Labor Code section 1194, subdivision (a), “there [was] no way on earth this case justified the hours purportedly billed by Harrington's lawyers.” Given the nature of the dispute, the amount of the settlement, and the record on appeal, the court was “satisfied that the trial court could not reasonably award an amount in excess of $500.” Thus, as Harrington demonstrates, there are still sufficient consequences for attorneys who make unreasonable and excessive requests to recover fees and costs even in the face of a mandatory fee statute like Labor Code section 1194, subdivision (a). (Id. at 1107-1108 citing to Harrington v.

Payroll Entertainment Services, Inc, (2008) 160 Cal.App.4th 589) With the guidance from both Gramajo and Harrington in mind, the Court now turns to what amount of attorney’s fees claimed by Plaintiffs is reasonable. c. What is the Reasonable Amount of Attorney’s Fees? Plaintiffs argue that both counsel’s fee of $550 per hour and his legal assistant’s fee of $150 per hour is patently reasonable. Plaintiffs further argue that the case was litigated for over three years and that Plaintiffs are entitled to recover on all claims in their case, because they are inextricably intertwined with the claim on which they prevailed.

Defendant argues that Plaintiffs’ counsel vastly over inflated the amount of time spent on this case and provide duplicative or inaccurate records. Defendant Waters further argues that Plaintiffs are only entitled to a portion of their attorney’s fees because they only prevailed on one cause of action. “It is well established that the determination of what constitutes reasonable attorney fees is committed to the discretion of the trial court.The value of legal services performed in a case is a matter in which the trial court has its own expertise.

The trial court may make its own determination of the value of the services contrary to, or without the necessity for, expert testimony. The trial court makes its determination after consideration of a number of factors, including the nature of the litigation, its difficulty, the amount involved, the skill required in its handling, the skill employed, the attention given, the success or failure, and other circumstances in the case.” (PLCM Group, Inc v. Drexler, (2000) 22 Cal. 4th 1084, citing to Melnyk v.

Robledo, (1976) 64 Cal.App.3d 618, 623-4.) Defendant Waters argues that looking to the time claimed to have been spent, Plaintiffs’ counsel contends that roughly 270 hours of attorney time and 164 hours of paralegal time was spent on this matter. Defendant Waters asserts that trial was at most six days,

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some of them half days, totaling roughly 30 hours. Defendant also asserts that the case consisted of one round of discovery, two motions and roughly four depositions. As such, Defendant argues that it is patently unreasonable to award the entirety of Plaintiffs’ requested attorneys fees. In addition, Defendant Waters points out specific issues with the billing. For instance for each Plaintiff, the billing appears to be identical, just multiplied by three. For example, the first entry is “intake on Sailors v.

Waters” for 2.67 hours. This entry and the amount of time is identical on each of the 3 spreadsheets. Plaintiffs’ counsel is claiming to have spent 8 hours on performing the initial intake. For another entry, Plaintiffs’ counsel claims to have spent seven to eight hours on “case review” in preparation for a conference with the Client, while the conference itself apparently only took 2 hours. Defendant points out more egregious contentions including that Plaintiffs’ counsel declares under oath, that he spent over twelve hours preparing Judicial Council form subpoenas to third parties and spent seven hours over three days in settlement negotiations with Defendants’ counsel.

However, Defendant argues that her counsel did not engage with Plaintiffs’ counsel for seven hours, nor would this amount of time be considered reasonable. Defendants’ counsel contends that his own billing shows that roughly 0.8 hours was billed for those 3 days. The Court agrees with Defendant Waters that these entries appear to be overinflated on what appeared to be a fairly straightforward wage and hour case. Based on what the Court observed during trial, it is hard for the Court to fathom a seven hour settlement conference between the parties.

But even more concerning to the Court are the factual discrepancies and inaccuracies that persist throughout both the billing records, this motion and the costs that Plaintiffs claimed in its Memorandum of Costs, the latter of which this Court addresses in its ruling on Defendant’s Motion to Tax Costs. For instance, as to the Motion for Attorney’s Fees, Plaintiffs’ claim that the jury determined that they were wrongfully terminated. (Reply ISO Mot. for Atty Fees, at p. 2: 4-5.) However the question of wrongful termination was not before the jury.

The court recalls that Plaintiffs’ counsel made similar errors in closing argument to the jury. Looking next at the billing records, on November 11, 2025 and November 13, 2026, Plaintiff has billed twelve hours for reviewing and processing the jury verdict. Leaving aside what part of reviewing and processing the jury verdict would take twelve hours, November 11, 2025 was three days before the jury rendered a verdict in this action on November 14, 2025. Plaintiff also billed 8 hours of trial attendance on November 11, 2025, which is Veterans Day.

Then on November 13, 2025 and November 14, 2025, Plaintiffs’ counsel claimed to have prepared and served a notice of deposition and prepared for a deposition, even though presentation of evidence ended on November 12, 2025. Next, Plaintiffs list two hours of trial attendance for the date of November 1,

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2025, which is a Saturday. Plaintiffs also list approximately 4 hours of trial attendance on November 3, 2025, yet the earliest date that trial could have begun was November 4, 2025. On that date, looking at the Court Minute Order, the parties spent no more than 2.5 hours in assignment and pre-trial conference, yet billed over eight hours. Plaintiffs’ counsel has also listed entries related to depositions that occurred months before the deposition preparation entry. (Hunt Decl. Exhs A-C.) The number of factual inaccuracies is deeply concerning to the Court and calls into question the veracity of the entirety of the billing records.

As such, the Court finds that the billing records lack credibility and the Court cannot rely on them as an accurate depiction for the time spent on this case. The Court also finds that three billings records for the three Plaintiffs were virtually identical, (at times with the wrong name for the wrong Plaintiff billing record), a tactic that was repeated in Plaintiffs’ submission of its Memorandum of Costs. As for the trial itself, the Court also took into consideration that this action appeared to be a fairly straightforward nonpayment of wage case, with only one exhibit admitted by Plaintiff, that arguably supported Defendant Diane Waters nonsuit and not Plaintiffs’ case in chief.

The Court also took into consideration other such issues such as the level of judicial resources expended on essentially drafting both the special verdict form and the jury instructions and disorganized and cursory manner in which counsel questioned witnesses and presented evidence and testimony, as evidenced by the number of questions from the jury on basic issues of Plaintiffs’ employment, the Waters Bail Bond Company and the bail bonds industry. In sum, the Court cannot find that roughly 270 attorney hours or 164 legal assistant/paralegal hours is reasonable.

After reducing the duplicative records between the three Plaintiffs, the numerous errors in attorney’s fees entries, the reasonableness of time spent on certain tasks, and the various other concerns and factors as outlined by the Court above, the Court finds that an award of $21,461.00 (39.02 hours x $550) in attorney’s fees to be reasonable. Similarly, after reducing the duplicative records between the three Plaintiffs, any errors in entries, the reasonableness of time spent on certain tasks, and the various other concerns and factors as outlined by the Court above, the Court finds that an award of $5,752.5 (38.35 hours x $150) in paralegal’s fees to be reasonable.

The total awarded to Plaintiffs for fees is $27,213.50. d. Monetary Sanctions Against Plaintiff and Plaintiff’s Counsel. Defendant Waters moves to sanction Plaintiffs and their counsel for filing a frivolous motion for attorney’s fees. Plaintiffs argue that Defendants’ motion is baseless as Plaintiffs are entitled to reasonable attorney’s fees in wage and hour claims under the Labor Code. As the Plaintiffs did prevail on their wage and hour claim, the Court does not find that Defendant has met her burden of demonstrating that Plaintiff’s motion for

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attorney’s fees was frivolous and that therefore sanctions are warranted.

Defendant’s motion for sanctions is DENIED.

e. Monetary Sanctions Against Plaintiff and Plaintiff’s Counsel. Plaintiffs move to sanction Defendant Waters in their Reply Brief. As best as the Court can ascertain, Plaintiffs move to sanction Defendant on the basis that their motion for sanctions was procedurally defective and failed to meet the “extremely high proof” and “truly egregious behavior” standard. However, Plaintiffs spend little or no time arguing the merits of their own sanctions motion, and fall prey to the very behavior of which they claim against Defendant. Even if Defendants motion was procedurally defective, the Plaintiffs have not argued why this would fall into the ambit of truly egregious behavior. As such, Plaintiffs have not met their burden and sanctions are not warranted.

Plaintiffs’ motion for sanction is DENIED.

III. DISPOSITION Plaintiffs’ Motion for Attorney’s Fees is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. Plaintiffs are awarded the following: an award of $21,461.00 (39.02 hours x $550) in attorney’s fees and an award of $5,752.5 (38.35 hours x $150) in paralegal’s fees.

NOTICE: To request oral argument on this matter, you must call Department 27 at 916-874- 6697 by 4:00 p.m., the court day before this hearing and notification of oral argument must be made to the opposing party/counsel. If no call is made, the tentative ruling becomes the order of the court. (Local Rule 1.06.) Please check your tentative ruling prior to the next Court date at www.saccourt.ca.gov prior to the above referenced hearing date. If oral argument is requested, the parties may and are encouraged to appear by Zoom with the links below: To join by Zoom Link - https://saccourt-ca-gov.zoomgov.com/my/sscdept27 To join by phone dial (833) 568-8864 ID 16120204632 Parties requesting services of a court reporter will need to arrange for private court

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reporter services at their own expense, pursuant to Government code section 68086 and California Rules of Court, Rule 2.956. Requirements for requesting a court reporter are listed in the Policy for Official Reporter Pro Tempore available on the Sacramento Superior Court website at https://www.saccourt.ca.gov/court-reporters/docs/crtrp- 6a.pdf. Parties may contact Court-Approved Official Reporters Pro Tempore by utilizing the list of Court Approved Official Reporters Pro Tempore available at https://www.saccourt.ca.gov/court-reporters/docs/crtrp-13.Pdf A Stipulation and Appointment of Official Reporter Pro Tempore (CV/E-206) is required to be signed by each party, the private court reporter, and the Judge prior to the hearing, if not using a reporter from the Court’s Approved Official Reporter Pro Tempore list.

Once the form is signed it must be filed with the clerk. If a litigant has been granted a fee waiver and requests a court reporter, the party must submit a Request for Court Reporter by a Party with a Fee Waiver (CV/E-211) and it must be filed with the clerk at least 10 days prior to the hearing or at the time the proceeding is scheduled if less than 10 days away. Once approved, the clerk will be forward the form to the Court Reporter’s Office and an official reporter will be provided. Pursuant to California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary.

[1] Plaintiffs do not provide a citation to the case, leaving the Court to have to conduct its own research to determine if

such a case even exists. Frustratingly, this is but one example of the level of care with which this case was conducted.