Delma Jefferson vs. Samuel Gene Dana

34-2021-00311004-CU-PA-GDS: Delma Jefferson vs. Samuel Gene Dana 01/31/2025 Hearing on Motion to Strike in Department 36

Tentative Ruling

The following is the Court’s tentative ruling on Defendants Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc.’s; Toyota Motor North America, Inc.’s; and Toyota Motor Engineering & Manufacturing North America, Inc.’s (collectively “Toyota”) unopposed motion to strike the claim for punitive damages in Plaintiff Delma Jrmar Jefferson’s Second Amended Complaint (“SAC”). This is a personal injury action arising from a car accident that occurred on September 27, 2020. The SAC asserts causes of action against Toyota based on alleged manufacturing and design defects in the seatbelt system installed in the vehicle. (SAC, pp. 9:20-10-14.)

Specifically, Plaintiff alleges the seatbelt system failed to lock and to restrain Plaintiff at the time of the collision, increasing the severity of the injuries sustained. (SAC, p. 7:10-21.) Plaintiff alleges Toyota has general knowledge of seatbelt system defects and a pattern of delaying corrective action. (SAC, pp. 34:14 - 35:3.) Plaintiff alleges Toyota’s actions display a reckless indifference to consumer safety and an intent to prioritize profits over safety. (SAC, p. 34:16-24.) Toyota moves to strike the eighth cause of action for punitive damages and the claim for punitive damages in the prayer for relief.[1] Plaintiff did not file an opposition.[2] A court tests the adequacy of a claim for punitive damages by way of a motion to strike. (Grieves v.

Superior Court (1984) 157 Cal.App.3d 159, 164.) Under Code of Civil Procedure section 435, a defendant, within the time to respond to a complaint, may file a motion to strike the whole or any part of the pleading. (Code Civ. Proc., § 435, subd. (b)(1).) Under section 436, the court may “[s]trike out any irrelevant, false, or improper matter inserted in any pleading” as well as “all or part of any pleading not drawn or filed in conformity with the laws of this state.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 436, subds. (a) and (b).) “When nondeliberate injury is charged, allegations that the defendant's conduct was wrongful, willful, wanton, reckless or unlawful do not support a claim for exemplary damages; such allegations do not charge malice.” (G.D.

Searle & Co. v. Superior Court (1975) 49 Cal.App.3d 22, 29.) To support a claim for exemplary damages arising from a nondeliberate injury, Plaintiff must allege a reckless or conscious disregard for the safety of others. (Id., ¶ 32.) Further, conclusory allegations are insufficient. (Smith v. Superior Court (1992) 10 Cal.App.4th

34-2021-00311004-CU-PA-GDS: Delma Jefferson vs. Samuel Gene Dana 01/31/2025 Hearing on Motion to Strike in Department 36

1033.) The complaint must include factual assertions supporting the conclusions that a defendant acted with oppression, fraud or malice. (Id. at p. 1042.) The claims against Toyota are based on defects in the seatbelt system. The SAC does not allege that Toyota intentionally designed or manufactured a defective seatbelt system, or that Toyota otherwise deliberately caused the injury. As this case involves a nondeliberate injury, conclusory allegations that Toyota acted willfully or maliciously are insufficient to support a claim for punitive damages.

In support of the claim for punitive damages, the SAC alleges Toyota had “knowledge of seatbelt system defects, revealed in Recall 22TH01, combined with their failure to implement adequate corrective actions, reflects a patter of reckless indifference to consumer safety.” (SAC, p. 34:16-19.) However, there are no allegations indicating Recall 22TH01 was applicable to the subject vehicle or that Toyota had knowledge of the specific types of defect in the seatbelt systems of vehicles similar to the subject vehicle.

Conclusory statements that Toyota had generalized knowledge of its seatbelt systems and generally delayed correcting seatbelt defects does not show that Toyota acted with oppression or malice with respect to the particular defects at issue in this case. The allegations in the SAC are insufficient to give Toyota adequate notice of the conduct charged against them that would support an award of exemplary damages. The SAC therefore fails to adequately state a claim for punitive damages. Further, to recover punitive damages against a corporate employer, a plaintiff must allege the conduct supporting a finding of malice was done, authorized, or ratified by the corporation’s officers, directors, or managing agents, or that such officers, directors, or managing agents hired the employee that performed the acts with advance knowledge of the employee’s unfitness. (Civil Code § 3294.)

There are no allegations in the SAC indicating that Toyota’s officers, directors or managing agents knew about seatbelt defects, that they delayed correcting seatbelt defects, or that they authorized or ratified the delays. Thus, even if the SAC had sufficiently alleged oppression, fraud or malice, the SAC fails to allege the corporate defendants are liable for punitive damages based on the actions of their employees. The motion to strike the claim for punitive damages is granted. As there is a reasonable

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

34-2021-00311004-CU-PA-GDS: Delma Jefferson vs. Samuel Gene Dana 01/31/2025 Hearing on Motion to Strike in Department 36

possibility the defects can be cured, the Court will grant leave to amend. Plaintiff may file a third amended complaint no later than February 20, 2025. If Plaintiff does not file a timely third amended complaint, Defendants shall file an answer to the SAC by March 7, 2025. *** This tentative ruling shall become the Court’s final ruling unless a party wishing to be heard so advises the clerk of this department no later than 4:00 p.m. on the court day preceding the hearing, and further advises the clerk that such party has notified the other side of its request for hearing.

The parties may appear remotely through the use of Zoom. The parties may join the Zoom session by audio and/or video through the link/telephone number which can be obtained by contacting the clerk of the court at dept36@saccourt.ca.gov or (916) 874-7661 no later than 4:00 p.m. the day before the scheduled hearing. In the event that a hearing is requested, oral argument shall be limited to no more than 30 minutes per side. Parties requesting services of a court reporter will need to arrange for private court reporter services at their own expense, pursuant to Government Code section 68086 and California Rules of Court, rule 2.956.

Requirements for requesting a court reporter are listed in the Policy for Official Reporter Pro Tempore available on the Sacramento Superior Court website at https://www.saccourt.ca.gov/court-reporters/docs/crtrp-6a.pdf. Parties may contact Court-Approved Official Reporters Pro Tempore by utilizing the list of Court Approved Official Reporters Pro Tempore available at https://www.saccourt.ca.gov/court-reporters/docs/crtrp- 13.pdf. A Stipulation and Appointment of Official Reporter Pro Tempore (CV/E-206) is required to be signed by each party, the private court reporter, and the Judge prior to the hearing, if not using a reporter from the Court’s Approved Official Reporter Pro Tempore list.

Once the form is signed it must be filed with the clerk. If a litigant has been granted a fee waiver and requests a court reporter, the party must submit a Request for Court Reporter by a Party with a Fee Waiver (CV/E-211) and it must be filed with the clerk at least 10 days prior to the hearing or at the time the proceeding is scheduled

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

34-2021-00311004-CU-PA-GDS: Delma Jefferson vs. Samuel Gene Dana 01/31/2025 Hearing on Motion to Strike in Department 36

if less than 10 days away. Once approved, the clerk will be forward the form to the Court Reporter’s Office and an official reporter will be provided. In the event that this tentative ruling becomes the final ruling of the Court, the order will be effective immediately. No formal order or other notice will be required. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1019.5; Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1312.)

[1] Toyota’s motion cites to the prayer for punitive damages “at Paragraph 7 (33: 13-15).” This appears to be an error because the prayer for punitive damages in the SAC, filed on November 12, 2024, is contained in paragraph 6 on page 36, lines 11-15, and the Court construes the motion as pertaining to paragraph 6 in the prayer for relief. [2] Toyota filed a reply to Plaintiff’s opposition. Thus, it appears Plaintiff served, but did not file,

an opposition. The Court has, however, considered the points raised by Plaintiff in opposition that are addressed in Toyota’s reply.