Bryan Cave Leighton Paisner LLP vs. Napster Corporation

impact Plaintiff’s statutory right to recover prevailing party costs under Code of Civil Procedure sections 1032 and 1033.5, and a memorandum of costs. This ruling is limited to this motion and the request to recover attorney fees and expenses pursuant to the partition statutes. Plaintiff’s counsel is ordered to give notice of this ruling.

10. Bryan Cave Leighton Paisner LLP vs. Napster Corporation 2026-01548951 OFF CALENDAR based on notice of withdrawal filed on May 21, 2026.

11. Domaoal vs. Caring Moments, Inc. 2019-01104318 Before the court is the motion of judgment creditor Alicia Domaoal (Domaoal) to amend the judgment to add Joan Christine Sangrones Botin A/K/A Joan Christine Botin (Botin) and Immanuel Care Home LLC (Immanuel). As more fully set forth below, the motion is DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.

Judgment was entered in this action in October 2019 on the request of the California Labor Commissioner following administrative proceedings before the Labor Commissioner regarding the failure to pay wages. The Labor Commissioner awarded Domaoal $73,631.26 in unpaid wages, damages, interest, penalties, and costs as against Caring Moments, Inc, a suspended California corporation.

By this motion, Domaoal seeks to amend that judgment to add Botin and Immanuel as judgment debtors pursuant to Labor Code sections 200.3, subdivision (a), 238, subdivision (e), and 558.1, subdivision (a). Botin and Immanuel are not parties to the judgment.

Domaoal, however, has only served this motion on Botin and Immanuel by mail, and has failed to show merely mailing copies of this motion to Botin and Immanuel at multiple unexplained addresses is sufficient to provide a basis for the court to exercise personal jurisdiction over these nonparties.

When a party seeks to amend a judgment to at a nonparty as an alter ego of a judgment debtor, the court must have jurisdiction over the judgment debtor’s alter ego in order to enter a valid judgment against the alter ego, and that is normally accomplished by service of process. (See Milrot v. Stamper Med. Corp. (1996) 44 Cal.App.4th 182, 186.)