JOHN MMB DOE, AN INDIVIDUAL vs MOORPARK UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT, A CALIFORNIA LOCAL PUBLIC ENTITY, et al.

2025CUPP054442: JOHN MMB DOE, AN INDIVIDUAL vs MOORPARK UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT, A CALIFORNIA LOCAL PUBLIC ENTITY, et al. 05/28/2026 in Department 42 Demurrer and Motion to Strike FAC by Moorpark Unified

Motions: Defendant MUSD’s Demurrer to First Amended Complaint Defendant MUSD’s Motion to Strike First Amended Complaint Tentative Ruling: The Court OVERRULES the Demurrer to each cause of action on the grounds asserted. The Court GRANTS the Motion to Strike without leave to amend. The Court previously sustained Defendant Macias’ demurrer and erroneously ordered that an amended complaint should be filed by June 29. There is nothing to amend based on Defendant Macias’ demurrer or in response to the present demurrer and motion to strike.

As a result, the Court vacates its prior order only to the extent that it authorized the filing of an amended complaint. Answers to the First Amended Complaint should be filed and served no later than June 15, 2026. Background: Plaintiff alleges that he was sexually harassed, assaulted, and abused by teacher’s aide Defendant Gladys Macias in 2007 and 2008 while a student at Moorpark High School, resulting in the birth of their child in November 2008. The First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) was filed on March 24, 2026 with the following causes of action (1) Negligence; (2) Negligent Supervision; (3) Negligent Hiring and/or Retention; (4) Negligent Failure to Warn Train or Educate; (5) Sexual Assault; (6) Sexual Battery; (7) IIED; (8) Gender Violence (Civil Code § 52.4); and (9) Sexual Abuse and Harassment in the Educational Environment (Education Code § 220).

Demurrer: Defendant again challenges the First, Second, and Fourth causes of action and argues that Plaintiff failed to cite code sections providing statutory liability against the District under negligence per se theories. Defendant argues the Third cause of action is uncertain and not permitted to be asserted directly against public entities as a matter of law because there is no statutory basis pled. Defendant maintains that the Seventh cause of action fails because the District cannot be sued for intentional torts, and the District’s conduct does not rise to the level of outrageous conduct that it intended to cause Plaintiff severe emotional distress.

The Ninth cause of action is devoid of factual allegations that the District was on notice. Motion to Strike: Defendant argues that the request for attorney fees should be stricken as lacking any statutory basis. Discussion: A. Demurrer- Legal Standard Grounds for demurrer must appear on the face of the pleading or from judicially noticeable matters. (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.30, subd. (a); Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318.) The sole issue on demurrer is whether the facts pleaded, if true, state a valid cause of action – i.e., if

2025CUPP054442: JOHN MMB DOE, AN INDIVIDUAL vs MOORPARK UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT, A CALIFORNIA LOCAL PUBLIC ENTITY, et al.

the complaint pleads facts that would entitle the plaintiff to relief. (LiMandri v. Judkins (1997) 52 Cal.App.4th 326, 339.) “[W]e give the complaint a reasonable interpretation, reading it as a whole and its parts in their context.” (Zelig v. County of Los Angeles (2002) 27 Cal.4th 1112, 1126.) “The rules of pleading [generally] require only general allegations of ultimate fact. [Citations.] The plaintiff need not plead evidentiary facts supporting the allegation of ultimate fact. [Citation.] A pleading is adequate so long as it apprises the defendant of the factual basis for the plaintiff’s claim.” (McKell v.

Washington Mutual, Inc. (2006) 142 Cal.App.4th 1457, 1469-1470.) B. Demurrer – Application Vicarious liability against the District may be based on the actions of its employees in the scope and course of their duties pursuant to Government Code § 815.2. The new allegations in the FAC related to the negligence of MUSD employees are as follows: • Plaintiff was “under the care, control and supervision of MUSD. As a result thereof, and at all times material hereto, Plaintiff was under MUSD and MHS’ supervisory personnel’s care, control, and supervision.” (¶19) • “MUSD hired MACIAS to work at MHS and/or failed at all facets of their obligation, including in the hiring, retention, training and supervision of MACIAS as outlined herein.

During MACIAS’ employment at MUSD, MACIAS did and would frequently engage male minors in grooming behavior indicative of an intent to commit sexual acts –in the presence of various MUSD administrators, student and students. This behavior by MACIAS included the following: o MACIAS being allowed to be alone with students in violation of MUSD and State policy, without supervision; o MACIAS being allowed to be alone with Plaintiff in a vehicle during and outside of school hours in violation of MUSD and State policy, without supervision; o MACIAS being allowed to touch Plaintiff’s hands and buttocks openly on MHS campus; o MACIAS being allowed to remove students, including Plaintiff, from campus in violation of MUSD and State policy; o Among other conduct that should have raised a red flag. ((¶21) • Despite the exhibition of these behaviors in an open and obvious manner in the presence of MUSD administration, teachers, and other staff, MUSD failed to cease such actions. (¶22) • Upon information and belief, MACIAS maintained contact with minor students, including Plaintiff, through social media platforms.

Upon information and belief, MACIAS posted photographs with minor students, including Plaintiff, and made comments about Plaintiff’s age and physical appearance. These actions were sexual in nature, sexually motivated, harassing, and inappropriate. (¶25) • Upon information and belief, a male MHS school counselor witnessed MACIAS and Plaintiff together outside of MHS campus. (¶26) • Upon information and belief, Plaintiff requested permission from the MHS principal to bring MACIAS as his date to a school dance.

Upon information and belief, this led

2025CUPP054442: JOHN MMB DOE, AN INDIVIDUAL vs MOORPARK UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT, A CALIFORNIA LOCAL PUBLIC ENTITY, et al.

to an investigation by the MHS Administration of MACIAS, which was not pursued until several months later and wherein no mandated report was made. (¶27) • MUSD, MHS and the Administration failed to monitor Macias (¶28.c) • Open grooming behavior that should have placed MUSD on notice included o “Leaving the MHS campus with Plaintiff in her vehicle during lunch periods, in view of staff and administrators;” o Transporting Plaintiff to his home rather than returning him to MHS after leaving school campus for lunch; o Engaging in inappropriate sexual conversations with Plaintiff while alone with him in her vehicle in the MHS parking lot without supervision.” (¶49a-c) • “During Plaintiff’s junior and senior year, in or around 2007 to 2008, MACIAS engaged in sexually abusive and harassing conduct on Plaintiff on MHS grounds.

Throughout Plaintiff’s junior and senior year, the sexual abuse and molestation included the following incidents: o On one occasion, a male school counselor witnessed MACIAS and Plaintiff together off-campus; o On multiple occasions, MACIAS took Plaintiff off-campus without permission after stating she had previously taken other students off-campus for lunch. MACIAS brought Plaintiff to restaurants and to his home, without returning him to MHS; o MACIAS kissing Plaintiff while they were alone and unsupervised in her vehicle in the MHS parking lot, visible to staff and administration; o On another occasion, Plaintiff asked the principal of MHS if MACIAS could be his date to the school dance. (¶146) • “Defendants' conduct toward Plaintiff, as described herein, was outrageous and extreme, and done with intent to cause injury or under the realization that injury would occur.” (¶147) • “Plaintiff is informed and believes that an MHS school counselor had actual knowledge, having observed Plaintiff and MACIAS together.” (¶163) First, Second, Fourth Causes of Action Based upon the new allegations, the FAC now alleges sufficient factual allegations beyond general, boilerplate assertions to support claims of negligence, negligent supervision, and negligent failure to warn.

The FAC properly alleges the District’s failure, through its employees, to comply with the mandatory reporting requirements to report the alleged child abuse caused Plaintiff’s harm. As for notice, the allegations in ¶¶21-22, 25-27 include several allegations of open and obvious behaviors between Macias and students that sufficiently allege that concerns should have been raised, as well as the allegations that a school counselor witnessed MACIAS and Plaintiff together outside of MHS campus and that the school know Plaintiff wanted to bring MACIAS as his date to a school dance.

The allegations are adequate to support the claims asserted. The demurrer is overruled as to these claims. Third Cause of Action “[A] public school district may be vicariously liable under section 815.2 for the negligence of administrators or supervisors in hiring, supervising and retaining a school employee who sexually harasses and abuses a student.” (C.A. v. William S. Hart Union High Sch. Dist. (2012) 53 Cal. 4th 861, 879.) “[The] district may be held liable if its supervisory employees were

2025CUPP054442: JOHN MMB DOE, AN INDIVIDUAL vs MOORPARK UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT, A CALIFORNIA LOCAL PUBLIC ENTITY, et al.

negligent in hiring and supervising the abusive teacher and that negligence resulted in the student’s harm.” (A.H. v. Tamalpais Union High Sch. Dist. (2024) 105 Cal. App. 5th 340, 350.) Negligence liability will be imposed upon the employer if it “knew or should have known that hiring the employee created a particular risk or hazard and that particular harm materializes.” (Doe v. Capital Cities (1996) 50 Cal.App.4th 1038, 1054.) While this is a closer call, the Court finds that the allegations outlined above are sufficient to allege liability for retaining Macias after knowledge of her propensities manifested.

It is true that the FAC lacks details about the manner or timing of when Defendants were informed of inappropriate conduct, and there is nothing alleged about how or when they should have known prior to hiring Macias what her propensities were. However, for purposes of pleading the Court finds that what has been pled is adequate to state a claim. The demurrer to this cause of action is overruled. Seventh Cause of Action Given the new allegations at ¶¶146-147, the Court finds that the FAC identifies conduct by an employee in the scope or course of their employment that would support a claim for IIED.

Construed in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, the facts alleged adequately assert extreme conduct in acting with reckless disregard for the probability that Plaintiff would suffer distress. The allegations that a school counselor saw Plaintiff and Macias together outside of school and that Plaintiff asked the principal of MHS if he could take Macias to a school dance suggest that the school should have known there was a potential inappropriate relationship and should have stepped in to protect Plaintiff, who was a minor.

The demurrer is overruled. Ninth Cause of Action As with the other causes of action, the FAC now alleges factual allegations about the District’s actual knowledge of the alleged harassment and does provide some factual allegations showing that a person with authority and actual knowledge failed to adequately respond. The demurrer is overruled. C. Motion to Strike – Legal Standard A motion to strike may be used to strike any “irrelevant, false, or improper matter inserted in any pleading.” (CCP, § 436, subd. (a).) “The grounds for a motion to strike shall appear on the face of the challenged pleading or from any matter of which the court is required to take judicial notice.” (CCP, § 437.)

D. Motion to Strike Application “[T]he private attorney general doctrine ‘rests upon the recognition that privately initiated lawsuits are often essential to the effectuation of the fundamental public policies embodied in constitutional or statutory provisions, and that, without some mechanism authorizing the award of attorney fees, private actions to enforce such important public policies will as a practical matter frequently be infeasible.’ Thus, the fundamental objective of the doctrine is to encourage suits enforcing important public policies by providing substantial attorney fees to successful litigants in such cases.” (Maria P. v.

Riles (1987) 43 Cal.3d 1281, 1289, internal citation omitted.) “[E]ligibility for section 1021.5 attorney fees is established when ‘(1) plaintiffs’ action ‘has resulted in the enforcement of an important right affecting the public interest,’ (2) ‘a significant benefit, whether pecuniary or nonpecuniary has been conferred on the general public or a large

2025CUPP054442: JOHN MMB DOE, AN INDIVIDUAL vs MOORPARK UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT, A CALIFORNIA LOCAL PUBLIC ENTITY, et al.

class of persons’ and (3) ‘the necessity and financial burden of private enforcement are such as to make the award appropriate.’ [Citation].” (Conservatorship of Whitley (2010) 50 Cal.4th 1206, 1214.) Here, Plaintiff is the sole litigant and seeks damages for conduct that occurred almost 20 years ago. Further, Plaintiff does not seek to institute any institutional changes or request damages for anyone other than himself. The Court does not find that Plaintiff has demonstrated that a judgment for Plaintiff would confer a significant benefit to a large class or persons. The motion to strike is granted, without leave to amend.

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