Paul Harper, et al. v. Alvin Taylor, et al.

1 The Court refers to the individual parties by their first names due to their shared surnames; no disrespect is intended.

The parties’ Agreement required Plaintiffs to vacate the subject property by a certain date and leaving the property in a specified condition, and Defendants were required to make certain settlement payments to them. (Harper Dec., Ex. C, ¶ 1.)

At issue here was Defendants’ deduction of $9,044.15, from the final $15,000 settlement payment. (Hamon Decl., Ex. B [itemized deductions].)

The Agreement allowed for deductions from the final payment as follows:

The remaining balance of $15,000 of the settlement shall be paid on or before November 30, 2025, less any documented labor or service (meaning receipts or bids) for debris removal or other reasonable actions necessary to achieve the "broom clean" condition of the residence. It is further understood that "broom clean" means that all personal property and debris must be removed from the residence aforementioned, but that Plaintiffs are not required to perform any repairs, painting or the like and no amounts shall be deducted from the settlement for any lack of repairs, painting, or the like. Each party agrees to indemnity, defend and hold harmless the other for any and all damages caused by their actions performing the various acts contemplated herein. (Harper Decl., Ex. C, ¶ 1 [emphasis added].)

Plaintiffs contend that Defendants’ deductions from the final payment were improper and did not fall within the allowed deductions detailed in the Agreement. The Court agrees.

Defendants’ first deduction was for “Yard cleanup and debris removal (multiple nails/screws from shed removal causing property damage): $1,249.00 Receipt attached: Trujillo Land Clearing invoice dated 10/30/2025.”

Plaintiffs contend they removed all of their personal property and debris when they vacated the property on October 27, 2025. (Harper Decl., Ex. D [photographs of condition of property on move-out walkthrough.]) Alvin declares that “[a]fter Plaintiffs removed the contents and structures of the two sheds, nails, screws, trash, and debris remained in the shed-removal and yard areas. We incurred a $1,249.00 charge from Trujillo Land Clearing for removal of trash, debris, nails, and cleanup.” (A. Taylor Decl., ¶ 30.) However, the photographs submitted by Plaintiffs from the October 27, 2025, walk-through show a clean site, and Defendants have no photographs of any debris that was allegedly left behind.

Defendants contend that the debris, nails and screws left in the yard after shed removal caused documented harm, namely, punctured tires. However, the receipts submitted from the tire company are dated April 30, 2026, six months after Plaintiffs moved out. (A. Taylor Decl., Ex. M.) Defendants also admittedly began their own renovations and construction at the property on October 27, 2025, and declared that substantial renovations were done on the property prior to it being listed for rent on Zillow in December 2025. (A. Taylor Decl., ¶¶ 38, 39.) A punctured tire in April 2026 does not show that the punctures were caused by or related to Plaintiffs.

Plaintiffs had the right to clean or remove any debris or correct any condition identified in the walk-through until October 31, 2025. (Harper Decl., Ex. C, ¶ 1.) Defendants’ counsel emailed Plaintiffs’ counsel on October 28, 2025, identifying issues Defendants contended were outstanding. The email mentions some items left in the driveway, which were cleaning products that were left out to be picked up for donation, and which were picked up the next day by a local organization. No other remaining debris was identified.2 (S. Taylor Decl. Ex. F; Harper Decl., ¶ 25; Ex. E.) Additionally, if debris was identified as remaining, Plaintiffs should have been given the opportunity under the Agreement to remove it themselves until October 31, and the Trujillo debris pick-up occurred on October 30.

The Court finds that Plaintiffs’ evidence shows that they left the site broom clean as required, and Defendants have failed to show that the Trujillo debris pick-up expense was a result of debris left by Plaintiffs. That deduction therefore was not authorized under the Agreement.

The Court further finds that the deductions for improvements for repairs, replacements and the like were improper. Defendants contend they fall within the broader indemnity clause, but the Agreement specified that deductions were only for “documented labor or service (meaning receipts or bids) for debris removal or other reasonable actions necessary to achieve the ‘broom clean’ condition of the residence,” and that deductions for repairs were specifically not allowed. The following were improperly withheld from the final payment under the Agreement: the replacement garage door opener, replacement mailbox lock/openers, replacement gate openers, replacement door locks, replacement stove and dishwasher repair/replacement.

As to the stove, Defendants contend that it was a fixture that was improperly removed by Plaintiffs. However, even if that were an allowable deduction, the parties’ 2021 agreement wherein Defendants purchased the property from Plaintiffs stated that the stove was included in the purchase if the box was checked; the box was not checked. (See Harper Decl., Ex. A, ¶ 8.B.)

Defendants also deducted $546.30 for flooring materials they contend that they had purchased to install in the master bedroom. Plaintiffs contend that they were required to remove all personal property from the site, and that they purchased the materials in 2015. The 2015 receipts show Alvin Taylor’s name, but regardless of who purchased the flooring and any claim arising therefrom, it again was not an allowed deduction from the final payment under the Agreement. (Hamon Decl., Ex. B.)

The charge for bagging food as part of termites services was invoiced on September 12, 2024, over a year before the parties entered into the Agreement and therefore is also an improper deduction. (A. Taylor Decl., ¶ 6; Ex. S; S. Taylor Decl., ¶ 32, Ex. R.) Similarly, the allegedly unpaid utilities were largely before the Agreement were signed and were not a deduction allowed under the Agreement.

2 Plaintiffs also submit the declaration of Cynthia Harrigan, a local realtor and friend of Plaintiffs who conducted the October 27, 2025 walk-through on behalf of Plaintiffs, in support of the condition of the property at the time Plaintiffs had vacated, as well as respondent to any contention that Defendants identified additional cleanup that was required. This declaration will not be considered as it was submitted in the Reply and has been objected to.

Nor was the $4,500 “holdover” deduction proper under the Agreement. The Court has reviewed the facts and declarations and determines that Plaintiffs vacated the property and Defendants regained possession on October 27, 2025. The holdover provisions do not apply and the deduction was improper.

Prejudgment Interest and Attorney Fees

Defendants dispute Plaintiffs’ entitlement to prejudgment interest and attorney fees.

Plaintiffs contend that Defendants failed to timely pay the full final settlement installment, and they are entitled to prejudgment interest on the improperly withheld $9,044.15 from November 30, 2025, the date the final payment was due, or such other date as the Court deems appropriate. contend that Plaintiffs are not entitled to prejudgment interest on the full $9,044.15 unless and until the Court determines that the entire amount was wrongfully withheld. As set forth above, the Court finds that amount was improperly withheld.

The Court finds that Plaintiffs are entitled to prejudgment interest on $9,044.15 from November 30, 2025.

Plaintiffs further contend they are entitled to recover their attorney’s fees and costs pursuant to the Agreement.

The Parties reserve to themselves the right to initiate and to pursue any legal action necessary to enforce the terms of this Mutual Release. In the event of legal action, the prevailing party shall be entitled to recover from the non- prevailing party, their reasonable attorneys' fees and costs actually incurred. The legal action need not result in judgment by a court of law before the provisions of this paragraph shall come into effect. (Harper Decl., Ex. B, ¶ 11.)

Plaintiffs have prevailed on this motion.

Plaintiffs seek $5,724 in fees in connection with the motion. Counsel declares that they made a good faith effort to resolve the dispute without court intervention. Lisa Hamon billed 11.7 hours at $420 per hour, and Michael Haupt billed 1.8 hours at $420 per hour. (Hamon Decl., ¶¶ 8-16.) Counsel further declares that she anticipates billing an additional six hours of time for an additional $2,520 on the reply, preparation for and attendance at the hearing. (Harmon Decl., ¶ 17.)

The Court finds that Plaintiffs are entitled to their fees under Paragraph 11 of the Agreement, and finds the hours and rates billed by counsel to be fair and reasonable for legal work in this community. The Court shall award Plaintiffs’ their fees in the total amount of $8,244.

ORDER (TENTATIVE)

Plaintiffs’ motion is granted. The Court’s September 3, 2025, order is vacated. Plaintiffs shall prepare a proposed judgment.

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