CIEMA SALEM VS. SONY INTERACTIVE ENTERTAINMENT, LLC, ET AL

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2:00 PM LINE: 4 25-CIV-03573 CIEMA SALEM VS. SONY INTERACTIVE ENTERTAINMENT, LLC, ET AL

CIEMA SALEM GEVIK YENOKI SONY INTERACTIVE ENTERTAINMENT, LLC ERIN MARIE CONNELL

DEFENDANT SONY INTERACTIVE ENTERTAINMENT, LLC’S DEMURRER TO PLAINITFF CIEMA SALEM'S FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT

TENTATIVE RULING:

For the reasons stated below, Defendants Sony Interactive Entertainment, LLC (“SIE”), Sony Interactive Entertainment Payroll Services, Inc., and Anthony Justman’s demurrer to the fourth, fifth, seventh, and tenth causes of action in Plaintiff Ciema Salem’s First Amended Complaint (“FAC”), filed October 23, 2025, is OVERRULED.

BACKGROUND

This is an employment action involving Plaintiff, a 60-year-old woman of Middle Eastern descent whom Defendants hired in or around October 2016 as Senior Corporate Counsel. Plaintiff alleges she was repeatedly denied promotions in favor of younger male colleagues, subjected to demeaning comments about her gender, race, and national origin, and told she should be quieter like a “traditional Japanese wife” to advance her career. Plaintiff further alleges that, after she and her family suffered serious medical issues, Defendants failed to accommodate her scheduling needs and ultimately terminated her while she was on protected medical leave, on or around October 27, 2023.

Defendants’ demurrer to the initial complaint was sustained with leave to amend at the hearing held on October 9, 2025.

Plaintiff’s FAC alleges the same eleven causes of action: (1) discrimination in violation of FEHA; (2) hostile work environment harassment in violation of FEHA; (3) retaliation in violation of FEHA; (4) failure to provide reasonable accommodation in violation of FEHA; (5) failure to engage in the interactive process in violation of FEHA; (6) failure to prevent discrimination, harassment, or retaliation in violation of FEHA; (7) negligent hiring, supervision, and retention; (8) wrongful termination in violation of public policy; (9) whistleblower retaliation under Labor Code section 1102.5; (10) intentional infliction of emotional distress; and (11) leave retaliation under CFRA.

Defendants again demur to the fourth, fifth, seventh, and tenth causes of action for failure to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 430.10, subdivision (e). Defendants also contend the seventh cause of action is barred by the workers’ compensation exclusivity doctrine. Defendants further request fees and costs.

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Plaintiff opposes, contending that the FAC adequately states each challenged cause of action and that Defendants’ request for costs should be disregarded. The Court agrees.

MEET AND CONFER

A party filing a demurrer “shall meet and confer in person or by telephone with the party who filed the pleading that is subject to demurrer for the purpose of determining whether an agreement can be reached that would resolve the objections to be raised in the demurrer.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.41, subd. (a).)

The Court finds that the parties met and conferred as required by Code of Civil Procedure section 430.41 but were unable to reach a resolution. (Declaration of Nicholas Horton, ¶ 2.)

LEGAL STANDARD

A demurrer for sufficiency tests whether the complaint states a cause of action. (Hahn v. Mirda (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 740, 747.) A demurrer tests the pleading alone, not the evidence or other extrinsic matters. Therefore, it lies only where the defect appears on the face of the pleading or from matters that may be judicially noticed. (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 430.10, subd. (e), 430.30, 430.70.)

When considering a demurrer, courts give the complaint a reasonable interpretation, reading it as a whole and its parts in context, in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. The complaint is liberally construed with a view to substantial justice between the parties. (Villafana v. County of San Diego (2020) 57 Cal.App.5th 1012, 1016- 1017.)

The general rule is that a plaintiff need only allege ultimate facts, not evidentiary facts. (Doe v. City of Los Angeles (2007) 42 Cal.4th 531, 550.) In reviewing a complaint on demurrer, the trial court has an independent duty to determine whether the complaint alleges facts sufficient to state a cause of action under any legal theory. (Das v. Bank of America, N.A. (2010) 186 Cal.App.4th 727, 734.)

Because a demurrer admits the truth of all material factual allegations in the complaint, a plaintiff’s ability to prove those allegations does not concern the reviewing court. Plaintiffs need only plead facts showing that they may be entitled to some relief. (Fisher v. San Pedro Peninsula Hospital (1989) 214 Cal.App.3d 590, 604, superseded by statute on other grounds.) When a plaintiff has stated a cause of action under any possible legal theory, it is error to sustain a demurrer. (Bush v. California Conservation Corps (1982) 136 Cal.App.3d 194, 200.)

ANALYSIS

Defendants contend that the central allegation underlying Plaintiff’s claims is that Defendants terminated Plaintiff for taking protected medical leave. Defendants argue Plaintiff alleges, without factual support, that she was mistreated or terminated for any conceivable protected characteristic that applies to her as a woman older than 40 and of Middle Eastern descent. Defendants further contend Plaintiff’s termination had nothing to do with any protected characteristic, that she was never mistreated based on a protected characteristic, and that her role was eliminated because Defendants had a critical business need for a cybersecurity lawyer but were financially unable to add that position without eliminating another.

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At the demurrer stage, however, the Court does not weigh competing factual explanations or determine whether Plaintiff will ultimately be able to prove her allegations. The Court considers whether the FAC alleges facts sufficient to state the challenged causes of action.

Fourth Cause of Action — Failure to Provide Reasonable Accommodation

“The elements of a reasonable accommodation cause of action are (1) the employee suffered a disability, (2) the employee could perform the essential functions of the job with reasonable accommodation, and (3) the employer failed to reasonably accommodate the employee’s disability.” (Nealy v. City of Santa Monica (2015) 234 Cal.App.4th 359, 373; see also Allos v. Poway Unified School Dist. (2025) 112 Cal.App.5th 822, 838.) “A claim for associational disability discrimination may lie where the plaintiff was subjected to an adverse employment action because of his or her association with a disabled person.” (Allos, supra, 112 Cal.App.5th at p. 839.)

The Court finds that the FAC sufficiently alleges a basis for disability-related accommodation in paragraphs 13.f, 13.g, 13.j, 13.k, and 14. Plaintiff alleges that when she told Justman she needed time to attend to her father’s ongoing COVID-related issues and her husband’s cancer treatment, he told her she should apply for a different position because he had interviewed a younger candidate with a technical background who would be a better fit for Plaintiff’s position. In other words, Plaintiff alleges that, when she requested accommodations, she was told she should leave her position and seek a different job. (FAC, ¶ 14.g.)

Contrary to Defendants’ position, the fact that Plaintiff may have been granted medical leave upon request does not necessarily resolve whether Defendants failed to provide other reasonable accommodations requested by Plaintiff. Defendants’ arguments regarding the reasons for Plaintiff’s rating, the adequacy of any accommodations provided, and the business reasons for Plaintiff’s termination raise factual issues that cannot be resolved on demurrer.

Accordingly, the demurrer to the fourth cause of action is OVERRULED.

Fifth Cause of Action — Failure to Engage in the Interactive Process

“To prevail on a claim under section 12940, subdivision (n) for failure to engage in the interactive process, an employee must identify a reasonable accommodation that would have been available at the time the interactive process should have occurred.” (Scotch v. Art Institute of California (2009) 173 Cal.App.4th 986, 1018.) However, the employee is not “expected to identify and request all possible accommodations” because the employee does not have information concerning all possible alternatives the employer would consider. (Ibid.)

The Court finds that FAC paragraphs 13.f, 13.k, 14.a-d, and 14.f-h allege sufficient facts to support this cause of action at the pleading stage. Plaintiff alleges that she sought additional accommodations in light of her and her family’s medical needs, but Defendants did not meaningfully engage with her regarding those accommodations before informing her of her termination.

Although Defendants argue Plaintiff’s requests for medical leave to care for her family members were granted, that contention does not conclusively establish that Defendants satisfied their separate obligation to engage in a good-faith interactive process concerning other reasonable accommodations. At this stage, the FAC adequately alleges that Plaintiff requested accommodation, that additional reasonable accommodation may

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have been available, and that Defendants failed to engage in a legally sufficient interactive process before terminating her employment.

Accordingly, the demurrer to the fifth cause of action is OVERRULED.

Seventh Cause of Action — Negligent Hiring, Supervision, and Retention

“California case law recognizes the theory that an employer can be liable to a third person for negligently hiring, supervising, or retaining an unfit employee. [Citation.] Liability is based upon the facts that the employer knew or should have known that hiring the employee created a particular risk or hazard and that particular harm materializes.” (McKenna v. Beesley (2021) 67 Cal.App.5th 552, 566.) “To establish negligent supervision, a plaintiff must show that a person in a supervisorial position over the actor had prior knowledge of the actor’s propensity to do the bad act.” (Z.V. v. County of Riverside (2015) 238 Cal.App.4th 889, 902.)

The Court’s review of FAC paragraphs 67 through 79 demonstrates that this cause of action survives demurrer. The FAC now specifically identifies both Curtis and Justman and alleges that Defendants knew or should have known of the risk of the alleged misconduct but failed to take appropriate corrective action. Paragraph 68 alleges sufficient ultimate facts to support the negligent hiring, supervision, and retention claim at the pleading stage.

Defendants also contend this claim is barred by workers’ compensation exclusivity. On the present pleading record, however, the Court cannot conclude as a matter of law that the claim is barred. Plaintiff’s allegations are intertwined with alleged discrimination, harassment, retaliation, and other conduct that may fall outside the normal risks of the employment relationship. Whether the claim is ultimately barred, in whole or in part, is better resolved on a more developed record.

Accordingly, the demurrer to the seventh cause of action is OVERRULED.

Tenth Cause of Action — Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress

To prevail on an intentional infliction of emotional distress claim, a plaintiff must allege facts showing: (1) outrageous conduct by the defendant; (2) an intent to cause, or reckless disregard of the probability of causing, emotional distress; (3) severe emotional distress; and (4) causation. (Huntingdon Life Sciences, Inc. v. Stop Huntingdon Animal Cruelty USA, Inc. (2005) 129 Cal.App.4th 1228, 1259.) Outrageous conduct is conduct so extreme that it exceeds all bounds usually tolerated in a civilized community. (Hughes v. Pair (2009) 46 Cal.4th 1035, 1050-1051.) The conduct must be beyond all possible bounds of decency and regarded as atrocious and utterly intolerable in a civilized community. (Cochran v. Cochran (1998) 65 Cal.App.4th 488, 496.) Whether conduct is outrageous is usually a question of fact. (Smith v. BP Lubricants USA Inc. (2021) 64 Cal.App.5th 138, 148.)

Here, Plaintiff alleges that Curtis and Justman made demeaning comments tied to Plaintiff’s gender, race, and national origin, including comments that she should be quiet like a traditional Japanese wife. (FAC, ¶ 89.) Plaintiff also alleges that Justman told third-party performance consultant Simon that there was “cultural opposition” to Plaintiff’s promotion and that Plaintiff needed to be quieter and more indirect. (FAC, ¶ 13.e.)

At the pleading stage, these allegations are sufficient to place Defendants on notice of the conduct underlying the IIED claim. Whether the alleged conduct was sufficiently extreme and outrageous, whether Defendants

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acted with the requisite intent or reckless disregard, and whether Plaintiff suffered severe emotional distress are factual issues not properly resolved on demurrer.

Accordingly, the demurrer to the tenth cause of action is OVERRULED.

CONCLUSION

Defendants’ demurrer to the fourth, fifth, seventh, and tenth causes of action in Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint is OVERRULED.

Defendants shall file their answer to the FAC within 14 days after entry of this Court’s order.

If the tentative ruling is uncontested, it shall become the order of the Court. Thereafter, counsel for the prevailing party shall prepare a written order consistent with this ruling for the Court’s signature, pursuant to California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312, and provide notice of the ruling to all appearing parties as required by law. The Court further directs the parties’ attention to revised Local Rule 3.403(b)(iv) (eff. Jan. 1, 2024) regarding the form of proposed orders.

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2:00 PM LINE: 5 25-CIV-03573 CIEMA SALEM VS. SONY INTERACTIVE ENTERTAINMENT, LLC, ET AL

CIEMA SALEM GEVIK YENOKI SONY INTERACTIVE ENTERTAINMENT, LLC ERIN MARIE CONNELL

DEFENDANT SONY INTERACTIVE ENTERTAINMENT, LLC ‘S MOTION FOR PROTECTIVE ORDER

TENTATIVE RULING:

Defendants Sony Interactive Entertainment, LLC’s, Sony Interactive Entertainment Payroll Services, Inc.’s, and Anthony Justman’s Motion for Protective Order is CONTINUED to August 20, 2026, 2:00 p.m. in Department 2 of the Superior Court of the State of California, County of San Mateo, located at Courtroom K, 1050 Mission Road, South San Francisco, California.

If the tentative ruling is uncontested, it shall become the order of the Court.