SV VALENCIA EUROPEAN INC. VS BMW OF NORTH AMERICA, LLC

4. CASE # CASE NAME HEARING NAME SV VALENCIA EUROPEAN MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE CVPS2505175 INC. VS BMW OF NORTH PLEADINGS ON COMPLAINT OF SV AMERICA, LLC VALENCIA EUROPEAN INC. Tentative Ruling: Granted.

Plaintiff granted leave to file 1st Amended Complaint within 20 days of this order becoming final.

Moving party to provide notice pursuant to CCP 1019.5.

On July 8, 2025, Plaintiff SV Valencia European, Inc. (“Plaintiff’) filed a Complaint against Defendant BMW of North America, LLC (“Defendant”), alleging causes of action for: (1) Breach of Express Warranty Under the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act; (2) Breach of Implied Warranty Under the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act; (3) Violation of the Song-Beverly Act Section 1793.2(b).

In the Complaint, Plaintiff alleges it acquired a new 2022 Rolls Royce Ghost (“Vehicle”), which was delivered with, and later developed, serious defects and nonconformities including, but not limited to, defects relating to the Electrical and the Restraints and Safety systems.

Defendant now moves for judgment on the pleadings as to each cause of action for failure to state sufficient facts to constitute a cause of action, arguing that Plaintiff fails to allege that it leased or purchased the Vehicle in the State of California, as required to obtain standing to assert Song- Beverly claims. Defendant further contends Plaintiff fails to allege that Defendant is the manufacturer or distributor of the Vehicle to provide a basis for liability.

In opposition, Plaintiff argues that it alleged sufficient facts.

Requests for Judicial Notice (RJN)

Defendant seeks judicial notice of the Vehicle’s “Maintenance and Warranty Agreement” (Request for Judicial Notice [“RJN”], Exh. 1) DENIED (Court may not consider extrinsic evidence in ruling on a demurrer. (Southern Pacific Land Co. v. Westlake Farms, Inc. (1987) 188 Cal.App.3d 807, 817 [“ ‘Because the demurrer tests the pleading alone, and not the evidence or other extrinsic matters, it lies only where the defects appear on the face of the pleading.’ [Citation.]”].)

Defendant’s Statement of Information, filed with the California Secretary of State (RJN, Exh. 2). DENIED (Defendant offers to show that it is only in the business of import/wholesale, and is not a manufacturer or retail seller under the Song-Beverly Act. (See Tenet Healthsystem Desert, Inc. v. Blue Cross of California (2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 821, 836 [although the records of a government body may be judicially noticeable, the truth of statements contained in the record and their proper interpretation may not subject to judicial notice].)

Judgment on the Pleadings

C.C.P. § 439 requires a meet and confer in person, by telephone, or by videoconference at least five days before filing a motion for judgment on the pleadings.

Here, the Court continued the hearing because the parties did not initially comply with the meet and confer requirements. On May 18, 2026, defense counsel submitted a supplemental

declaration indicating that the parties met and conferred telephonically, but were unable to come to a resolution. Thus, the parties have complied with the meet and confer requirements.

A defendant’s motion for judgment on the pleadings may be made on the grounds that the court lacks jurisdiction, or that the complaint does not state facts sufficient. (C.C.P. § 438(c)(1)(B).) A motion for judgment on the pleadings involves the same type of procedures that apply to a general demurrer. (Richardson-Tunnell v. School Ins. Program for Employees (2007) 157 Cal.App.4th 1056, 1061.) The grounds for a motion for judgment on the pleadings must appear on the face of the complaint or from a matter of which the court may take judicial notice. (Ibid.)

A general demurrer lies where the pleading does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. (C.C.P. § 430.10(e).) In evaluating a demurrer, the court gives the pleading a reasonable interpretation by reading it as a whole and all of its parts in their context. (Moore v. Regents of University of California (1990) 51 Cal.3d 120, 125.) The court assumes the truth of all material facts which have been properly pleaded, of facts which may be inferred from those expressly pleaded, and of any material facts of which judicial notice has been requested and may be taken. (Crowley v. Katleman (1994) 8 Cal.4th 666, 672.)

If the complaint fails to state a cause of action, the court must grant the plaintiff leave to amend if there is a reasonable possibility that the defect can be cured by amendment. (Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318.) A complaint, with certain exceptions, need only contain a “statement of the facts constituting the cause of action, in ordinary and concise language” (C.C.P. § 425.10(a)(1)) and will be upheld “so long as the pleading gives notice of the issues sufficient to enable preparation of a defense.” (Okun v. Superior Court (1981) 29 Cal.3d 442, 458.)

Song-Beverly Act

California’s Song-Beverly Act (“Act”) provides remedies for California consumers and sets forth certain duties upon “[e]very manufacturer of consumer goods sold in this state and for which the manufacturer has made an express warranty.” (Civ. Code § 1793.2(a) [emphasis added].) The Act mandates that “[e]very sale of consumer goods that are sold at retail in this state” is accompanied by an implied warranty of merchantability. (Id. at § 1792 [emphasis added].) Thus, to bring a cause of action under the Act, the subject vehicle must have been purchased by the plaintiff in California. (Cummins, Inc. v. Super. Ct. (2005) 36 Cal.4th 478, 483, 491–93 [holding that “the Act does not apply unless the vehicle was purchased in California.”].)

The Act only applies to “new motor vehicles,” which it defines as “a new motor vehicle that is bought or used primarily for personal, family, or household purposes” or “primarily for business purposes by a person, including a partnership, limited liability company, corporation, association, or any other legal entity, to which not more than five motor vehicles are registered in this state.” (Civ. Code § 1793.22(e)(2).) Thus, to obtain standing to sue under the Act, a plaintiff must have leased or purchased a new motor vehicle in the State of California, and the vehicle must be bought or used primarily for personal, family, or household purposes.

Here, the Complaint merely alleges that “[o]n April 24, 2022, Plaintiff “acquired a new 2022 Rolls Royce Ghost.” (Complaint, ¶ 6.) Plaintiff, which is a California corporation, fails to allege the method by which it “acquired” the Vehicle, the location of the Vehicle’s acquisition, and whether the Vehicle’s primary purpose qualifies it as a “new motor vehicle” under the Act. Accordingly, Plaintiff fails to allege sufficient facts to establish that it has standing to assert its three causes of action for Song-Beverly violations. GRANTED