AYALA VS CITY OF COACHELLA

Summary judgment is granted when a moving party establishes the right to entry of judgment as a matter of law. (CCP § 437c(c).) The moving party bears the initial burden of production to make a prima facie showing that there are no triable issues of material fact. (CCP § 437c(p)(2); Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 850.) Defendant, as the moving party, has the burden to show either that one or more elements of the cause of action cannot be established or that there is a complete defense to that cause of action. (CCP §437c(p)(2).) Defendant can meet their burden by showing either: (1) affirmative evidence that shows an element of the claim cannot be established; or (2) showing an absence of evidence on a critical element of Plaintiff’s claim.

Once the moving party has made such a showing, the burden shifts to the responding party to show that a triable issue of one or more material facts exists as to that cause of action or as to a defense to the cause of action. (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 849.) If the responding party does not make such a showing, summary judgment in favor of the moving party is appropriate.

“The purpose of the summary judgment procedure is not to try the issues but merely to discover ... whether the parties possess evidence which demands the analysis of trial.” (Colvin v. City of Gardena (1992) 11 Cal.App.4th 1270, 1275 (italics added).) Summary judgment can be granted only where the essential facts are either conceded or beyond dispute. If there is one, single material fact in dispute, the motion must be denied.

The court also has the power to summarily adjudicate that one or more causes of action have no merit, that there is no merit to one or more affirmative defenses, or that a defendant owed or did not owe a duty to plaintiff. A motion for summary adjudication shall only be granted if it completely disposes of a cause of action, an affirmative defense, a claim for damages, or an issue of duty. (CCP §437c(f)(1).)

Evidentiary Objection(s)

In ruling on a motion for summary judgment/adjudication, the court need only rule on those evidentiary objections that it deems material to disposition of the motion. (CCP § 437c(q).)

Plaintiff objects to four paragraphs in Andrew Simmons Declaration. Simmons is the Director of Public Works/City Engineer for City of Coachella. Plaintiff objects to paragraphs 9, 10, 11, and 14. SUSTAINED as to paragraphs 9, 10, 11, and 14 (Lack of foundation and improper legal conclusion.)

3rd Cause of Action - Dangerous Condition of Public Property

The prima facie elements of a dangerous condition claim are: (1) the public property was in a dangerous condition at the time of the injury; (2) the injury was proximately caused by the dangerous condition; (3) the kind of injury that occurred was reasonably foreseeable as a consequence of the dangerous condition; and (4) either (a) the dangerous condition was created by a public employee’s negligent or wrongful act within the scope of his or her employment, or (b) the entity had actual or constructive notice of the condition a sufficient time before the injury occurred to have taken reasonable measures to protect against the injury. (Gov. Code § 835; Hacala v. Bird Rides, Inc. (2023) 90 Cal.App.5th 292, 307.)

For purposes of section 835, property of a public entity means real or personal property “owned or controlled by the public entity.” (Gov. Code, § 830, subd. (c).) “A public entity may not be held liable under section 835 for a dangerous condition of property that it does not own or control.” (Goddard v. Dept. of Fish & Wildlife (2015) 243 Cal.App.4th 350, 359, citing Aaitui v. Grande Properties (1994) 29 Cal.App.4th 1369, 1373–1377 and Chatman v. Alameda County Flood Control etc. Dist. (1986) 183 Cal.App.3d 424, 430–431.) “[C]ontrol exists if the public entity has the ‘power to prevent, remedy or guard against the dangerous condition.’” (Huffman v. City of Poway (2000) 84 Cal.App.4th 975, 990.)

Defendant City argues this claim fails because the Coachella Valley Soccer League and not the City was the party in control of the property. City asserts it relinquished all rights for management and control of the land and its land use activities to Coachella Valley Soccer League through a sub-lease agreement.

The City of Coachella is a lessee under a Master Lease dated October 8, 2008, between Armtec Defense Products Co. (lessor) and the City (lessee) for the soccer fields located at Avenue 53. (Plaintiff’s SUMF No. 11; Plaintiff’s Exhibit 1.) The most recent amendment to the Master Lease was executed on June 23, 2021. (Defendant’s SUMF No. 6.) The City entered into a sub-lease agreement with Coachella Valley Soccer League and Coachella Youth Sports Association on February 23, 2022. (DSUMF No. 7.) City contends, through this agreement, it “relinquished all management and control over the property.” (DSUMF No. 7.)

In support of that statement, City references the sublease itself (Exhibit H) and Andrew Simmons’ Declaration (paragraph 11). The sublease does not contain such language. Simmons, as the City’s Director of Public Works and Civil Engineer, states he know from “personal knowledge” that the City entered into this sublease and “relinquished all management and control over the property.” (Simmons Decl. ¶11.) Problematically, Simmons has not established a foundation for how he has this knowledge. Simmons establishes he has access to “official records” showing property owners in the City, he oversees the maintenance of City-owned properties, and he has oversight of contracts related to maintenance of City parks and facilities. (Simmons Decl. ¶¶3-5.)

Simmons reviewed the Master Lease and later Amendment (¶¶9-10), as well as the sub-lease with the soccer leagues. (¶11.) However, Simmons does not establish any basis for his conclusion that, through the sub-lease, the City “relinquished all management and control over the property.” (¶11.) This is a legal conclusion and one that is unsupported by Simmons’ declaration or the other evidence provided. The City has not provided sufficient evidence to establish it relinquished all control over the property.

Since City has not met its initial burden, the motion must be denied.

However, even if the City had met its initial burden, Plaintiff provides evidence to raise a triable issue of material fact. Plaintiff took Simmons’ deposition. Simmons has worked for the City as the Director of Public Works and City Engineer since 2025. (Plaintiff’s Exhibit 9, p.12:6-11.) Simmons never negotiated lease agreements with regards to City parks. (Plaintiff’s Exhibit 9, p.13:15-19.) Simmons could not state whether the Coachella Valley Soccer League was ever an authorized subtenant to the Master Lease agreement between City and Armtec. (Plaintiff’s Exhibit 9, p.80:10- 81:4.)

Armtec admitted through discovery it never provided written consent under Section 15 of the Master Lease authorizing the City to sublease any portion of the property to Coachella Valley Soccer League. (Plaintiff’s Exhibit 10, Response to RFA No. 26.) The Master Lease notes City as Lessee “agrees to manage and control the operation of the Premises so as to not interfere with conduct of business by” Armtec as Lessor. (Plaintiff’s Exhibit 1, ¶28.) Furthermore, the City and Armtec had a right to enter the soccer fields at reasonable times and on reasonable notice for the purpose of inspection. (PSUMF No. 18.)

Armtec states City was “responsible for supervising the activities conducted on the premises.” (PSUMF No. 26.) This evidence creates a triable issue of material fact as to whether City had control over the property.

For these reasons, the motion must be denied.

4. CASE # CASE NAME HEARING NAME SV VALENCIA EUROPEAN MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE CVPS2505175 INC. VS BMW OF NORTH PLEADINGS ON COMPLAINT OF SV AMERICA, LLC VALENCIA EUROPEAN INC. Tentative Ruling: Granted.

Plaintiff granted leave to file 1st Amended Complaint within 20 days of this order becoming final.

Moving party to provide notice pursuant to CCP 1019.5.

On July 8, 2025, Plaintiff SV Valencia European, Inc. (“Plaintiff’) filed a Complaint against Defendant BMW of North America, LLC (“Defendant”), alleging causes of action for: (1) Breach of Express Warranty Under the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act; (2) Breach of Implied Warranty Under the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act; (3) Violation of the Song-Beverly Act Section 1793.2(b).

In the Complaint, Plaintiff alleges it acquired a new 2022 Rolls Royce Ghost (“Vehicle”), which was delivered with, and later developed, serious defects and nonconformities including, but not limited to, defects relating to the Electrical and the Restraints and Safety systems.

Defendant now moves for judgment on the pleadings as to each cause of action for failure to state sufficient facts to constitute a cause of action, arguing that Plaintiff fails to allege that it leased or purchased the Vehicle in the State of California, as required to obtain standing to assert Song- Beverly claims. Defendant further contends Plaintiff fails to allege that Defendant is the manufacturer or distributor of the Vehicle to provide a basis for liability.

In opposition, Plaintiff argues that it alleged sufficient facts.

Requests for Judicial Notice (RJN)

Defendant seeks judicial notice of the Vehicle’s “Maintenance and Warranty Agreement” (Request for Judicial Notice [“RJN”], Exh. 1) DENIED (Court may not consider extrinsic evidence in ruling on a demurrer. (Southern Pacific Land Co. v. Westlake Farms, Inc. (1987) 188 Cal.App.3d 807, 817 [“ ‘Because the demurrer tests the pleading alone, and not the evidence or other extrinsic matters, it lies only where the defects appear on the face of the pleading.’ [Citation.]”].)

Defendant’s Statement of Information, filed with the California Secretary of State (RJN, Exh. 2). DENIED (Defendant offers to show that it is only in the business of import/wholesale, and is not a manufacturer or retail seller under the Song-Beverly Act. (See Tenet Healthsystem Desert, Inc. v. Blue Cross of California (2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 821, 836 [although the records of a government body may be judicially noticeable, the truth of statements contained in the record and their proper interpretation may not subject to judicial notice].)

Judgment on the Pleadings

C.C.P. § 439 requires a meet and confer in person, by telephone, or by videoconference at least five days before filing a motion for judgment on the pleadings.

Here, the Court continued the hearing because the parties did not initially comply with the meet and confer requirements. On May 18, 2026, defense counsel submitted a supplemental