JACOB PULLIDO, AN INDIVIDUAL vs COUNTY OF VENTURA, A PUBLIC ENTITY, et al.

Motion: Defendant County of Ventura’s Motion for Summary Judgment

Tentative Ruling: Defendant County of Ventura’s Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED.

2025CUPP037998: JACOB PULLIDO, AN INDIVIDUAL vs COUNTY OF VENTURA, A PUBLIC ENTITY;, et al.

The County’s evidence (jail incident reports and deputy declarations) establishes that staff responded, a nurse was called, medication was given, and Plaintiff was eventually hospitalized. The evidence also demonstrated that Plaintiff was exhibiting pain and difficulty walking at the first evaluation yet was only cleared to return to his housing rather than sent to a hospital.

Plaintiff argues that the County did not establish that the first response was adequate under the statute. However, the County PMK deposition testimony, cited by Plaintiff, shows that there was no failure to take reasonable action to summon immediate medical care. The evidence establishes that the County has met its initial burden. Plaintiff has not submitted any evidence to demonstrate that there is a triable issue of fact as to an alleged failure to properly summon immediate care.

The motion is granted. Moving party is ordered to prepare and circulate a proposed order and judgment for the Court’s signature.

Moving party is ordered to serve notice of the Court’s ruling.

Discussion:

I. Legal Standard"" Summary judgment is proper “if all the papers submitted show that there is no triable issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (c).) Where a defendant seeks summary judgment or adjudication, he must show that either “one or more elements of the cause of action, even if not separately pleaded, cannot be established, or that there is a complete defense to that cause of action.” (Code Civ.

Proc., § 437c, subd. (o)(2).)"""" "" The summary judgment standard is as follows: first, the party moving for summary judgment always bears the burden of’persuasion’that there is no triable issue of material fact and that he is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.""Thus, in defendant’s motion for summary judgment, he bears the burden of persuading the court that one or more elements of plaintiff’s cause of action’cannot be’established’or that there is a complete defense thereto. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (p).)"""" "" Second, the party moving for summary judgment bears an initial burden of’production’to make a prima facie showing of the nonexistence of any triable issue of material fact; if he carries his burden of production, the burden shifts to the opposing party to make a prima facie showing of the existence of a triable issue of material fact.

Thus,"in order to’shift the burden of production to the plaintiff, defendant’is required to’produce evidence showing the nonexistence of some element of the claim. Until the moving defendant has discharged its burden of proof, the opposing plaintiff has no burden to come forward with any evidence. Once the moving defendant has discharged its burden as to a particular cause of action, however, the plaintiff may defeat the motion by producing evidence showing that a triable issue of one or more material facts exists as to that cause of action. (Code Civ.

Proc., § 437c, subd. (p)(2).)"" "" Third, how the parties moving for, and opposing, summary judgment may each carry their burden of persuasion and/or production depends on which would bear what burden of proof at

2025CUPP037998: JACOB PULLIDO, AN INDIVIDUAL vs COUNTY OF VENTURA, A PUBLIC ENTITY;, et al.

trial.""Thus, where defendant moves for summary judgment against a party who bears the burden of proof at trial, he must present’evidence’that would require a reasonable trier of fact’not’to find any underlying material fact more likely than not. (Aguilar v Atlantic Richfield Co."(2001) 25 Cal.4th 826.)"" "" As to any alternative request for summary adjudication of issues, such alternative relief must be clearly’set forth in’the Notice of Motion and the general burden shifting rules apply but the issues upon which summary adjudication may be’sought’are limited by statute. “A motion for summary adjudication shall be granted only if it completely disposes of a cause of action, an affirmative defense, a claim for damages, or an issue of duty.” (Code Civ.

Proc., § 437c, subd. (f)(1).)"""" "" Whether a triable issue of fact exists is’determined’by the supporting papers, not the pleadings. (Martins v. Winder"(1961) 191 Ca.2d 143.) Such supporting papers must be evidentiary, and not ultimate facts or conclusions of law, and must be based upon the’affined’s’personal knowledge.""(Estate of Nelson"(1964) 227 Ca.2d 42.)""" "" As a general rule, in reviewing the evidence presented on summary judgment, the moving party’s evidence is strictly’construed’and the opposing party’s evidence is liberally construed. (See e.g.,"Brantley v."Pisaro"(1996) 42 Cal.App.4th 1591, and’Binder v.

Aetna Life Insurance Company"(1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 832.) The court is to consider all evidence’submitted’by the parties, direct and circumstantial, except that to which a proper objection has been sustained. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (c).)"""""" "" Summary adjudication is granted where a moving party’establishes’a right to adjudication of an issue in its favor as a matter of law. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (c).) The purpose of a motion for summary judgment/adjudication is to penetrate evasive language and adept pleading to’ascertain’the existence or absence of triable issues of material fact. (Chern v.

Bank of America"(1976) 15 Cal.3d 866, 873.) The material issues on the motion are framed by the pleadings, and the motion can neither be granted nor denied on a ground not properly raised’therein. (Tsemetzin’v. Coast Fed. Sav. & Loan’Ass’n"(1997) 57 Cal.App.4th 1334, 1343;"FPI Development, Inc. v. Nakashima"(1991) 231 Cal.App.3d 367, 381-382.)"""" "" In ruling on a motion for summary judgment/adjudication, the trial court must consider not only the evidence’submitted’but the reasonable inferences deducible from such evidence. (Binder v.

Aetna Life Ins. Co., supra, 75 Cal.App.4th at p. 840.) Conflicting reasonable inferences must be resolved in favor of the party opposing the motion. (Boicourt v. Amex Assurance Co."(2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 1390, 1397, fn.4.)"" "" I. Application"" A. Material Facts 1. Undisputed Material Facts The County’s undisputed material facts 1, 2, 3, 6, 7 are undisputed and established.

UMF 4 and 5 are disputed but established.

2025CUPP037998: JACOB PULLIDO, AN INDIVIDUAL vs COUNTY OF VENTURA, A PUBLIC ENTITY;, et al.

B. Merits Government Code section 845.6 provides:

Neither a public entity nor a public employee is liable for injury proximately caused by the failure of the employee to furnish or obtain medical care for a prisoner in his custody; but, except as otherwise provided by Sections 855.8 and 856, a public employee, and the public entity where the employee is acting within the scope of his employment, is liable if the employee knows or has reason to know that the prisoner is in need of immediate medical care and he fails to take reasonable action to summon such medical care. Nothing in this section exonerates a public employee who is lawfully engaged in the practice of one of the healing arts under any law of this state from liability for injury proximately caused by malpractice or exonerates the public entity from its obligation to pay any judgment, compromise, or settlement that it is required to pay under subdivision (d) of Section 844.6.

“Liability under section 845.6 is limited to serious and obvious medical conditions requiring immediate care.” (Watson v. State of California (1993) 21 Cal. App. 4th 836, 841.) Liability under section 845.6 is limited to “when: (1) the public employee knows or has reason to know [of the] need, (2) of immediate medical care, and (3) fails to take reasonable action to summon such medical care.” (Castaneda v. Dep't of Corr. & Rehab. (2013) 212 Cal. App. 4th 1051.) Section 845.6 is “very narrowly written to authorize a cause of action against a public entity for its employees’ failure to summon immediate medical care only, not for certain employee’s malpractice in providing that care.” (Ibid.)

The evidence proffered by the County by way of jail incident reports and deputy declarations establishes that staff responded, a nurse was called, medication was given, and Plaintiff was hospitalized. The evidence also demonstrates that Plaintiff was exhibiting pain and difficulty walking at the first evaluation and was cleared to return to his housing rather than being sent to a hospital. The hospitalization decision came more than two hours later, after a call from Plaintiff’s mother prompted another check.

Plaintiff argues that the County has not established that the first response was adequate under the statute. However, the County PMK deposition testimony, cited by Plaintiff, shows that there was no delay in summoning care which meets the standard for immediate care. Plaintiff argues that the hospitalization decision should have been made at the initial evaluation. However, this is a standard of care argument that the nurse did not make the proper initial evaluation, and liability does not attach to the County for the nurse’s failure to meet the treatment standard of care. (Castaneda v.

Dep’t of Corr. & Rehab., supra, 212 Cal. App. 4th at p. 1070.) The evidence establishes that the County has met its initial burden. Plaintiff has not submitted any evidence to demonstrate that there is a triable issue of fact regarding a failure to summon immediate care. The evidence submitted by Plaintiff, the PMK deposition testimony, supports the County’s position.

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