ARNOLDO TORRES vs GENERAL MOTORS, LLC

Defendant shall give notice.

2025CUBC036937: ARNOLDO TORRES vs GENERAL MOTORS, LLC

I. Undisputed Material Facts

A. Defendant’s Undisputed Material Facts (“UMF”)

UMF 1-8 are undisputed and established for purposes of this motion.

B. Plaintiff’s Additional Material Facts (“AMF”)

AMF 1-12 are undisputed and established for purposes of this motion.

II. Relevant Background

This action arises out of the purchase of an alleged defective used 2020 Chevrolet Corvette on April 8, 2024. The vehicle was purchased from Connell Chevrolet in Costa Mesa, California, and had 8,834 miles on it at the time of purchase. Plaintiff alleges that with the purchase, he received written and other express and implied warranties that the vehicle would be free from defects in material and workmanship; that the vehicle would be fit for ordinary purposes for which it was intended; that the vehicle could confirm to the promises and affirmations of fact made; that Defendant would perform any repairs, alignments, adjustments, and/or replacements of any parts necessary to ensure that the vehicle was free from any defect in material workmanship; that Defendant would maintain the utility of the vehicle for three years or 36,000 miles; and would conform the vehicle to the applicable express warranties. (Complaint, ¶¶ 13, 16.)

Subsequent to purchase, the vehicle has suffered from various problems, including engine noises during acceleration on two occasions; a “check engine” light illuminating on two occasions; and a loosening of weather stripping on the roof of the driver’s side on two occasions. The vehicle was presented for repairs at Paradise Chevrolet and Connell Chevrolet, both authorized repair facilities, on May 8, 2024, September 4, 2024, September 30, 2024, October 23, 2024, and November 12, 2024. On these occasions, the vehicle had fewer than 15,000 miles on it. Plaintiff was without the vehicle for a total of 16 days during the repair attempts. (Complaint, ¶ 19.) Defendant has been unable to make the vehicle conform to the applicable warranties, through no fault of Plaintiff’s. (Complaint, ¶¶ 20-23.)

Plaintiff filed a verified Complaint on January 6, 2025, alleging violations of California Business & Professions Code § 17200 and the federal Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2301.

The instant motion was filed on January 29, 2026. Plaintiff’s opposition was filed on April 27, 2026. Plaintiff filed an amended opposition on May 1, 2026. Defendant’s reply memorandum was filed on May 6, 2026. Trial is set for September 28, 2026.

III.Legal Standard: Summary Judgment

The purpose of summary judgment is to enable courts to determine whether trial is actually necessary by cutting through the parties’ pleadings. (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25

2025CUBC036937: ARNOLDO TORRES vs GENERAL MOTORS, LLC

Cal.4th 826, 843.) Strict compliance with Code of Civil Procedure section 437c safeguards the constitutional right to jury trial. (Bahl v. Bank of America (2001) 89 Cal.App.4th 389, 395.) A defendant moving for summary judgment bears the initial burden to show that one or more elements of a cause of action cannot be established or that a complete defense exists. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (p)(2); Dollinger DeAnza Associates v. Chicago Title Ins. Co. (2011) 199 Cal.App.4th 1132, 1144.) The defendant need not produce affirmative evidence negating an element but may point to the absence of evidence supporting the plaintiff’s case. (Padilla v.

Rodas (2008) 160 Cal.App.4th 742, 752.) If the defendant meets this burden, it shifts to the plaintiff to set forth specific admissible facts showing a triable issue of material fact. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (p)(2); LaChapelle v. Toyota Motor Credit Corp. (2002) 102 Cal.App.4th 977, 981.) A party’s admission that a material fact is undisputed is conclusive for purposes of the motion. (City of San Diego v. DeLeeuw (1993) 12 Cal.App.4th 10, 14; Myers v. Trendwest Resorts, Inc. (2009) 178 Cal.App.4th 735, 747.)

“In motions for summary judgment or adjudication, all material facts must be set forth in the separate statement. This is the Golden Rule of Summary Adjudication: if it is not set forth in the separate statement, it does not exist. [Citation.] Thus, when the fact is not mentioned in the separate statement, it is irrelevant that such fact might be buried in the mound of paperwork filed with the court, because the statutory purposes are not furthered by unhighlighted facts.” (Los Angeles Unified School Dist. v. Torres Construction Corp. (2020) 57 Cal.App.5th 480, 492 [internal quotation marks omitted; italics in original].)

Summary judgment is a drastic remedy, strictly construed against the moving party, while the opposition is liberally construed. (Murillo v. Rite Stuff Foods, Inc. (1998) 65 Cal.App.4th 833, 840.) Courts may not weigh evidence but must view it in the light most favorable to the opposing party and draw all reasonable inferences in that party’s favor. (Weiss v. People ex rel. Dept. of Transportation (2020) 9 Cal.5th 840, 864.) The motion may not be granted if any triable issue of material fact exists, and any doubts must be resolved in favor of the opposing party. (Robinson v. City and County of San Francisco (1974) 41 Cal.App.3d 334, 337; See’s Candy Shops, Inc. v. Superior Court (2012) 210 Cal.App.4th 889, 900.) Summary judgment law “turns on issue finding rather than issue determination.” (Diep v. California Fair Plan Assn. (1993) 15 Cal.App.4th 1205, 1207.)

“The procedure for resolving a summary judgment motion presupposes that the pleadings are adequate to put in issue a cause of action or defense thereto.” (FPI Development, Inc. v. Nakashima (1991) 231 Cal.App.3d 367, 382 [italics in original].) “However a pleading may be defective in failing to allege an element of a cause of action or in failing to intelligibly identify a defense thereto. In such a case, the moving party need not address a missing element nor, obviously, respond to assertions which are unintelligible or make out no recognizable legal claim.

The summary judgment proceeding is thereby necessarily transmuted into a test of the pleadings and the summary judgment motion into a motion for judgment on the pleadings. In these circumstances it has been said that a defendant’s ‘motion for summary judgment necessarily includes a test of the sufficiency of the complaint and as such is in legal effect a motion for judgment on the pleadings.’” (Ibid. [quoting Barnett v. Delta Lines, Inc. (1982) 137 Cal.App.3d 674, 682]; see also Stolz v. Wong Communications Limited Partnership (1994) 25 Cal.App.4th 1811, 1817 [“A summary judgment motion necessarily includes a test of the

2025CUBC036937: ARNOLDO TORRES vs GENERAL MOTORS, LLC

pleadings and can become a motion for judgment on the pleadings. (citing Barnett and FPI Development)] and Taylor v. California State Auto. Assn. Inter-Ins. Bureau (1987) 194 Cal.App.3d 1214, 1223 [“A motion by a defendant for summary judgment necessarily includes a test of the sufficiency of the pleadings. Where a pure issue of law is raised, in legal effect, the motion is one for judgment on the pleadings.”].)

“Where a motion for summary judgment is in effect a motion for judgment on the pleadings, the court may grant a plaintiff leave to amend the complaint.” (Stolz, supra, 25 Cal.App.4th at p. 1817.)

IV.

Discussion

The complaint asserts only two causes of action: UCL and Magnuson-Moss. It does not separately plead a cause of action for violation of Song-Beverly, breach of express warranty under the Commercial Code, breach of implied warranty under the Commercial Code, or breach of contract. The material facts offered by both parties are undisputed and established for purposes of this motion. A. First Cause of Action: UCL The UCL prohibits unlawful, unfair, or fraudulent business acts or practices. (Bus. & Prof.

Code, § 17200.) “The purpose of the UCL is to protect both consumers and competitors by promoting fair competition in commercial markets for goods and services.” (Gutierrez v. Carmax Auto Superstores California (2018) 19 Cal.App.5th 1234, 1265.) “The UCL’s definition of unfair competition uses the terms ‘unlawful, unfair or fraudulent’ in the disjunctive.” (Id.) “Consequently, the definition establishes three varieties of unfair competition.” (Ibid. [citing Cel-Tech Communications, Inc. v. Los Angeles Cellular Telephone Co. (1999) 20 Cal.4th 163, 180].)

Plaintiff’s UCL claim is based on allegations that GM placed a defective vehicle into the stream of commerce, failed to warn or remedy the defect, and failed to diagnose or repair the vehicle adequately. The complaint alleges that GM’s alleged Song-Beverly violations and related warranty conduct constitute deceptive and fraudulent business practices.

Plaintiff’s UCL theory fails under each prong.

First, Plaintiff has not shown a triable issue under the unlawful prong. By prescribing ‘any unlawful’ business practice, the UCL borrows violations of other laws and treats them as unlawful practices that the UCL makes independently actionable. (Gutierrez, supra, 19 Cal.App.5th at p. 1265.) “Virtually any statute or regulation (federal or state) can serve as a predicate for a UCL unlawful practice cause of action.” (Ibid.) A UCL claim may borrow violations of other laws and treat them as independently actionable unfair competition.

But the UCL borrows violations; it does not create them. Plaintiff’s theory depends on GM allegedly violating Song-Beverly by failing to repair or repurchase a used vehicle. That theory is barred by Rodriguez v. FCA US, LLC (2024) 17 Cal.5th 189. In Rodriguez, the California Supreme Court held that the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act does not apply to the sale of a used vehicle when the manufacturer does not provide a new warranty at the time of that sale. The plaintiff in Rodriguez had purchased a used Dodge truck with an unexpired portion of the

2025CUBC036937: ARNOLDO TORRES vs GENERAL MOTORS, LLC

original manufacturer’s warranty and later sued the manufacturer for breach of express warranty under Song-Beverly. The Court concluded that the phrase “other motor vehicle sold with a manufacturer’s new car warranty” does not include vehicles sold used with a balance of the original warranty. Rather, the statute refers to situations where the manufacturer issues a new warranty in connection with a resale. The Supreme Court in Rodriguez affirmed summary judgment for the manufacturer, finding the Act inapplicable where no new warranty was issued, and the manufacturer played no role in resale. Rodriguez applies retroactively. (See Vazquez v Jan-Pro Franchising International, Inc. (2021) 10 Cal.5th 944, 951.)

In light of Rodriguez, Plaintiff’s vehicle is not a “new motor vehicle” for Song-Beverly purposes merely because some portion of the original warranty remained when Plaintiff bought the vehicle used. Plaintiff has presented no evidence that a new vehicle warranty was issued in connection with Plaintiff’s used-vehicle purchase. Plaintiff therefore cannot use the UCL to impose Song-Beverly duties that do not apply to this transaction. Because Plaintiff has not shown an underlying Song-Beverly violation, there is no Song-Beverly predicate for the UCL’s unlawful prong.

Second, Plaintiff has not shown a triable issue under the unfair prong. “California courts have applied a variety of tests to determine whether a business practice is unfair under the UCL.” (Naranjo v. Doctors Medical Center of Modesto, Inc. (2025) 111 Cal.App.5th 408, 437.) For example, the Fifth Appellate District summarized the various tests as follows: “Under the UCL's unfairness prong, courts consider either: (1) whether the challenged conduct is ‘tethered to any underlying constitutional, statutory or regulatory provision, or that it threatens an incipient violation of an antitrust law, or violates the policy or spirit of an antitrust law,’ (Durell[, supra,] 183 Cal.App.4th [at p.] 1366, 108 Cal.Rptr.3d 682); (2) whether the practice is ‘immoral, unethical, oppressive, unscrupulous or substantially injurious to consumers,’ (Morgan v.

AT&T Wireless Servs., Inc. [(2009)] 177 Cal.App.4th 1235, 1254, 99 Cal.Rptr.3d 768); or (3) whether the practice's impact on the victim outweighs ‘the reasons, justifications and motives of the alleged wrongdoer.’ [Ibid.]” (Doe v. CVS Pharmacy, Inc. (9th Cir. 2020) 982 F.3d 1204, 1214–1215.) (Naranjo, supra, at p. 437.)

The Second Appellate District, on the other hand, described the standard as follows: With regard to the unfair prong of the UCL, a business practice is unfair if (1) the consumer injury is substantial; (2) the injury is not outweighed by any countervailing benefits to consumers or competition; and (3) the injury could not reasonably have been avoided by consumers themselves. (Sepanossian v. National Ready Mixed Concrete Co. (2023) 97 Cal.App.5th 192, 201.)

Regardless of the standard used, Plaintiff has not created a triable issue as to the unfairness prong. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, Plaintiff’s theory is, at best, that Defendant failed to honor or perform warranty obligations after the used-vehicle purchase. But an alleged warranty-performance dispute does not become an unfair business practice merely

2025CUBC036937: ARNOLDO TORRES vs GENERAL MOTORS, LLC

because repairs were unsuccessful or the vehicle allegedly remained defective. Plaintiff identifies no evidence of a separate unfair practice, such as a systematic refusal to honor transferable warranties, a deceptive repair policy, or conduct beyond the alleged failure to repair Plaintiff’s vehicle.

Third, Plaintiff has not shown a triable issue under the fraudulent prong. “[T]o state a claim under either the UCL or the false advertising law, based on false advertising or promotional practices, it is necessary only to show that members of the public are likely to be deceived.” (In re Tobacco II Cases (2009) 46 Cal.4th 298, 312 [internal quotation marks omitted]; Bardin v. DaimlerChrysler Corp. (2006) 136 Cal.App.4th 1255, 1274.) “The fraudulent business practice prong of the UCL has been understood to be distinct from common law fraud.

A [common law] fraudulent deception must be actually false, known to be false by the perpetrator and reasonably relied upon by a victim who incurs damages. None of these elements are required to state a claim for injunctive relief under the UCL.” (In re Tobacco II, supra, at p. 312 [internal quotation marks omitted].) “This distinction reflects the UCL’s focus on the defendant’s conduct, rather than the plaintiff's damages, in service of the statute's larger purpose of protecting the general public against unscrupulous business practices.” (Ibid.)

Here, Plaintiff has not presented evidence of conduct on the part of Defendant that is likely to deceive, whether such conduct be a specific misrepresentation, an omission, or other conduct. Plaintiff relies primarily on the existence of the remaining warranty and Defendant’s alleged failure to repair. But a promise to repair under a warranty, followed by allegedly unsuccessful repairs, supports a warranty theory, not necessarily a deceptive-business-practice theory. (Daugherty v. American Honda Motor Co. (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 824, 838 [failure to disclose a defect when not under a duty to disclose is not likely to deceive within the meaning of the UCL]; see also Bardin, supra, 136 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1274-1275 [affirming trial court’s sustaining of demurrer on fraud prong where complaint alleged that manufacturer had concealed material facts about exhaust manifolds but failed to allege facts supporting the allegation that the public was likely to be deceived].)

Finally, the UCL claim also fails for the separate reason that Plaintiff has not shown a recoverable UCL remedy. “While the scope of conduct covered by the UCL is broad, its remedies are limited.” (Korea Supply Co. v. Lockheed Martin Corp. (2003) 29 Cal.4th 1134, 1144.) “A UCL action is equitable in nature; damages cannot be recovered.” (Ibid.; see also Gutierrez, supra, 19 Cal.App.5th at p. 1265 [“[T]he remedies available in a UCL action generally are limited to injunctive relief and restitution.”].)

Here, Plaintiff identifies alleged loss of vehicle value, travel expenses incurred in driving to and from repair visits, and the purchase of a replacement vehicle. Those alleged losses are consequential damages. They are not money or property that Defendant obtained from Plaintiff and that can restore through UCL restitution. Nor has Plaintiff identified an ongoing practice that could support meaningful injunctive relief.

In sum, Defendant is entitled to summary adjudication of the First Cause of Action.

2025CUBC036937: ARNOLDO TORRES vs GENERAL MOTORS, LLC

B. Second Cause of Action: Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act

“The Magnuson–Moss Warranty—Federal Trade Commission Improvement Act (Magnuson– Moss), 15 U.S.C. sections 2301 et seq., authorizes a civil suit by a consumer to enforce the terms of an implied or express warranty. Magnuson–Moss calls for the application of state written and implied warranty law, not the creation of additional federal law, except in specific instances in which it expressly prescribes a regulating rule.” (Daugherty v. American Honda Motor Co., Inc. (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 824, 832-833 [internal quotation marks omitted]; Orichian v. BMW of North America, LLC (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 1322, 1330 [citing Daugherty].) Thus, a plaintiff asserting a Magnuson-Moss claim must identify a viable state-law warranty obligation that was breached.

Plaintiff argues that the Magnuson-Moss claim survives because the vehicle was covered by the remaining balance of GM’s transferable powertrain warranty and because repeated repair efforts allegedly failed. There is some authority that a used-vehicle purchaser may, in an appropriate case, pursue Magnuson-Moss relief as the assignee or beneficiary of a transferable express warranty. In Dagher v. Ford Motor Co. (2015) 238 Cal.App.4th 905, for example, the Court of Appeal held that the plaintiff should have been granted leave to amend to assert a Magnuson-Moss claim based on an unexpired transferable express warranty, even though his Song-Beverly claim failed.

In that case, the plaintiff had purchased a used 2006 model year vehicle from a private in 2009. He sued the vehicle’s manufacturer alleging violations of Song-Beverly after various unsuccessful attempts to repair an alleged engine issue. (Id. at p. 910.) The manufacturer moved for summary judgment on grounds that the vehicle was used. Plaintiff opposed the motion and concurrently filed a motion for leave to amend the complaint to assert a new cause of action for breach of express warrant under Magnuson-Moss.

The trial court granted summary judgment and denied the motion to amend. (Id. at p. 911.) The Court of Appeal reversed the denial of leave to amend because there was no dispute some “some express warranty claims are viable in this action, whether under the Commercial Code or Magnuson-Moss.” (Id. at p. 928.)

Here, Plaintiff did not plead a separate state-law cause of action for breach of express warranty, breach of implied warranty, breach of contract, Commercial Code warranty relief, or Song-Beverly relief. Plaintiff pleaded only UCL and Magnuson-Moss claims. “[C]laims under Magnuson-Moss ‘stand or fall’ with express and implied warranty claims under state law.” (West v. Rheem Manufacturing Company (C.D. Cal. 2025) 765 F.Supp.3d 976, 990.) The UCL claim fails for the reasons stated above. Further, since the decision in Rodriguez, Plaintiff cannot use Song-Beverly as the state-law warranty anchor because he purchased the vehicle used.

Nor can the Magnuson-Moss claim be saved by treating the Complaint as though it separately pleaded a Commercial Code or contract-based express warranty claim. The pleadings frame the issues on summary judgment. Plaintiff’s Complaint does allege, within the Magnuson-Moss count, breaches of express and implied warranties. But it does not specifically plead the state-law claim supplying the substantive warranty obligation. Magnuson-Moss may provide a federal remedy for breach of a qualifying warranty; it does not itself supply the missing state-law warranty theory.

2025CUBC036937: ARNOLDO TORRES vs GENERAL MOTORS, LLC

Further, to the extent Plaintiff relies on implied warranties, that theory fails as a matter of law against Defendant. Plaintiff purchased the vehicle from Connell Chevrolet, not Defendant. Defendant was not the seller in Plaintiff’s transaction. Under Nunez v. FCA US LLC (2021) 61 Cal.App.5th 385, Song-Beverly’s implied-warranty provisions for used goods do not impose manufacturer liability where the manufacturer was not the distributor or retail seller of the used goods. (Id. at pp. 398-399.) Additionally, any Commercial Code implied-warranty claim would also face the vertical privity problem identified in cases such as Clemens v. DaimlerChrysler Corp. (9th Cir. 2008) 534 F.3d 1017. (See id. at pp. 1023-1024.)

For these reasons, Defendant is entitled to summary adjudication of the Second Cause of Action.

C. Leave to Amend

Plaintiff requests leave to amend if the Court concludes that the Magnuson-Moss claim requires a separately pleaded state-law warranty claim. (Amended Opp. at 10:1-15.) “[L]eave to amend is liberally granted, even when a summary judgment motion is pending.” (Willemsen v. Mitrosilis (2014) 230 Cal.App.4th 622, 633.) Plaintiff has submitted a declaration with his amended opposition which attaches a copy of the alleged applicable warranty. The duration of the powertrain warranty was five years or 60,000 miles, whichever occurred first. (Torres Decl., ¶ 6, Exh.

B.) The vehicle was a 2020 model year. Defendant asserts in its separate statement, and Plaintiff does not dispute, that the vehicle was delivered to its original owner on August 15, 2020. Nor is it disputed that the warranty issued in connection with the original purchase in 2020. (UMF 5-7.) Plaintiff filed suit on January 6, 2025, within five years of August 15, 2020. Dagher, discussed above, supports Plaintiff’s position. Further, although the statute of limitations is four years for Commercial Code violations (Com.

Code, § 2725(1)), the future performance exception appears to apply to express warranties. (Com. Code, § 2725(2); Krieger v. Nick Alexander Imports, Inc. (1991) 234 Cal.App.3d 205, 217 [“A promise to repair defects that occur during a future period is the very definition of express warranty of future performance[.]” (citing Civ. Code, § 1791.2 and Com. Code, § 2313].) Consequently, Plaintiff may be able to state a state-law claim if he is permitted to amend his Complaint.

On the other hand, this case was filed on January 6, 2025, after Rodriguez was decided. Plaintiff therefore had notice of the used-vehicle Song-Beverly issue when he chose to plead only UCL and Magnuson-Moss causes of action. Defendant moved for summary judgment based on the absence of a viable state-law warranty claim, and trial is set for September 28, 2026. Allowing Plaintiff to add a new state-law warranty theory at this stage would materially alter the case after summary judgment briefing and would likely require additional discovery and motion practice, as well as a trial continuance.

Further, amendment would be futile to the extent Plaintiff seeks to add a Song-Beverly claim against Defendant. Under Rodriguez, the vehicle’s remaining original warranty balance does not make this used vehicle a “new motor vehicle,” and Plaintiff has presented no evidence of the issuance of a new vehicle warranty with Plaintiff’s used-vehicle purchase. A Song-Beverly express-warranty, implied-warranty, repair, replacement, restitution, civil-penalty, or fee-shifting theory against Defendant therefore would not cure the defect.

2025CUBC036937: ARNOLDO TORRES vs GENERAL MOTORS, LLC

Finally, Plaintiff did not immediately file a motion for leave to amend his Complaint once Defendant filed its summary judgment motion and, despite the arguments in the motion, still has not filed one. Instead, Plaintiff waited several months and addressed the issue in his opposition, where he has not presented a proposed amended pleading, has not clearly identified the exact state-law cause of action he would add, and has not shown that the amendment could be made without prejudice at this stage. The Court had to perform independent research to determine whether Plaintiff might be able to save his Magnuson-Moss claim.

For these reasons, the Court DENIES Plaintiff’s request for leave to amend.

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