VELASQUEZ VS MONTENEGRO

Moving party to provide notice pursuant to CCP 1019.5. Matter is deemed closed.

2. CASE # CASE NAME HEARING NAME VELASQUEZ VS CVPS2204512 HEARING ON MOTION TO TAX COSTS MONTENEGRO Tentative Ruling: Granted in part.

Plaintiff granted total fees and costs in amount of $81,642.33 and prejudgment interest in the amount of $161,340.48.

This matter was initially heard on March 24, 2026. At the prior hearing, the Court held that the Plaintiff’s December 6, 2023 § 998 settlement offer was valid and ordered further briefing on the recoverable costs.

The Court granted the motion, in part, and continued the hearing, and stated that (1) court and counsel to discuss expert costs; (2) interest from December may be discussed; (3) supplemental memorandum of costs or brief to be prepared, served and submitted by Vadim Fish 10 days prior

to hearing; and (4) supplemental brief only as to supplemental costs to be prepared, served and submitted by Tiffany Spencer 9 days prior to hearing.

Plaintiff’s supplemental brief (filed on April 3, 2026)

Expert Costs

Here, Plaintiff contends that the record establishes that all expert costs sought were incurred after the December 6, 2023 §998 offer and were reasonably necessary for trial. Plaintiff obtained a judgment substantially exceeding her offer and is therefore entitled to recover both expert fees and prejudgment interest. Plaintiff therefore requests that Court to award (1) expert witness fees in the amount of $130,630.33 and (2) prejudgment interest in the amount of $249,671.23.

Plaintiff contends that all expert costs were incurred after the December 6, 2023 § 998 offer.

As to expert costs filed after the December 6, 2023 § 998 Offer, Plaintiff provides a table “confirming” that all expert-related costs sought were incurred after that date. The cost memo and attached invoices are attached as Ex. 2 to the supplemental briefing. The entries are from February 4, 2023 through November 10, 2025 and total $130,630.33, which is consistent with the cost memo. There are no expert costs incurred prior to December 6, 2023 included in Plaintiff’s request.

Plaintiff contends that expert costs are recoverable under CCP § 998

Under CCP § 998, where a plaintiff makes a valid offer that is not accepted and thereafter obtains a more favorable judgment, the Court may award the plaintiff as reasonable sum for post-offer expert witness costs.

Plaintiff notes that here, Plaintiff served a $1,000,000 offer on December 6, 2023 and obtained a $1,300,000 judgment. During the March 24, 2026 Motion to Tax hearing, the Court held that the December 6, 2023 §998 offer was valid. Because Plaintiff achieved a result exceeding her offer by $300,000, she is entitled to recover her post-offer expert costs.

Plaintiff goes on to contend that the expert fees incurred were reasonably necessary for trial preparation and presentation, especially in light of the defense admitting liability on the eve of trial but denying the nature and extent of the Plaintiffs injuries. The expert expenses included: (1) Medical experts to establish causation and future care; (2) Biomechanical and injury analysis; (3) Accident reconstruction; (4) Scientific and technical testimony; and (5) Depositions of defense experts.

These costs are recoverable under CCP § 998 and Plaintiff contends that they were essential to Plaintiff’s ability to present her case at trial.

Prejudgment Interest from December 6, 2023

Under CCP § 998, a plaintiff who obtains a more favorable judgment is entitled to prejudgment interest at 10% per annum from the date of the offer. Plaintiff claims that these fees are mandatory once the statutory requirements set in, unlike expert fees. Per Plaintiff’s calculation, judgment at $1,300,000, with an interest rate of 10% per year, for a period of 701 days from December 6, 2023 (the §998 offer date) results in prejudgment interest of $249,671.23.

Defendant’s Supplemental Brief (filed on May 12, 2026)

According to Defendant, at the March 24, 2026 hearing, Plaintiff’s arguments underscored two dispositive points: (1) Plaintiff’s December 6, 2023 998 Offer was invalid because Defendants lacked sufficient, timely, disclosed information to intelligently evaluate a seven-figure demand at the time of the offer; and (2) even if any 998 Offer were deemed valid, extraordinary expert costs and any prejudgment interest must be limited to items incurred only after Defendants actually knew or reasonably should have known the information necessary to evaluate Plaintiff’s claims, and Plaintiff still has not carried her burden to segregate and substantiate those items as further discussed below. Defendant contends that this Court ordered supplemental briefing on the latter point.

Defendant is right that even if a CCP § 998 Offer is valid, the Court still has discretion to deny an award of expert fees. (See Martinez v. Brownco Construction Company, Inc. (2013) 56 Cal.4th 1014. In that case, Plaintiff issued two CCP § 998 offers (one early on, and one immediately prior to trial) and beat both offers to compromise at time of trial. The main question in the case was whether Plaintiff was entitled to expert fees from the date of the first offer forward or the date of the second offer forward. (Id. at 1019.) In addressing concerns raised by Brownco that the timing of Plaintiff’s offers was indicative of gamesmanship, the Supreme Court held that:

Finally, section 998 expressly states an award of expert witness fees is discretionary. Accordingly, if a later offer results in mischief or confusion, or any gamesmanship appears, the court may address such concerns when considering what postoffer expert fees to award. In this regard, we note section 998 allows a court, in its discretion, to award a defendant expert fees incurred both before and after a defense settlement offer where the plaintiff fails to obtain a more favorable judgment or award. We are confident that, as in those situations, the discretion conferred upon trial courts suffices as a meaningful check against mischief and gamesmanship.

(Id. at 1026-2017).

Defendant contends that Plaintiff’s CCP § 998 offer in this case raises concerns of gamesmanship in that she served the offer at a time when she was unable or unwilling to share her largest items of economic damages. That is, at the time of the March 24, 2026 hearing, Plaintiff relied on the characterization that the medical diagnosis should have been apparent to Defendants as plaintiffs’ position was that the information was hiding in plain sight within Plaintiff’s medical records. Defendants, upon reviewing these obscure and minor reference to diagnoses, reiterate their position that Defendants did not have sufficient information, based on what they knew or reasonably should have known, to assess whether the offer was a reasonable one, such that defendant had a fair opportunity to intelligently evaluate the offer at the time of the offer. (In fact, Plaintiffs did not direct the Court to the referenced medical records in their Opposition.

They did not begin fishing for supporting references until after receiving the tentative to GRANT defendants motion to tax or strike. Defendant has a point that this further highlights that the medical diagnosis was not hiding in plain sight and as such, was unknown to Defendants at the time of the § 998 offer.)

The medical records supposedly addressing “adjacent segment disease” are a plan for an entirely different surgery, wherein the doctor noted that adjacent segment disease—along with a host of other conditions—was a risk of that surgery: Risks of surgery include bleeding, infection, wound complications, dural tear, neurovascular damage, pseudoarthrosis, adjacent segment disease, hardware complications, paralysis or weakness, sexual disfunction, fracture, paresthesia, loss of vision, stiffness, bowel/bladder incontinence, persistent pain, heart attack, pneumonia, blood clots, stroke, and death.

Plaintiffs theory is that, based on this sole entry, Defendants should have known—despite Plaintiff not revealing in any other discovery—that one of that smorgasbord of potential risks was, in fact, a certainty. That is simply unreasonable. Plaintiff’s other suggestion, that Defendants should have conducted more discovery, is equally unreasonable. It does seem that Plaintiff played “hide the ball” with her conditions, which invalidated her December 2023 998 Offer.

Given the above, Defendant claims that the court should deny all expert fees in its discretion.

August 2024 998

As noted by Defendant, this offer was served after Plaintiff served her life care plan (which included items for substantial – yet unsubstantiated - future medical care). (See Plaintiff’s Supp. Brief, Ex. 1 at p. 9:14-24.) Defendants did not address that Offer in their Motion to Strike because it was not raised in Plaintiff’s Memorandum of Costs (only the December 2023 Offer was referenced).

The court finds that the 998 dated August 30, 2024 is the valid offer.

Accordingly, the lesser value in the Memorandum of Costs $130,430.33 in expert fees sought pursuant to § 998 should control as the “starting point.” As such, Plaintiff’s request must be taxed by $200.

Since the August 30, 2024 offer is the only valid offer, fees incurred before August 30, 2024 must be taxed. That includes $17,400 (02/04/2024 and 04/24/2024) for Dr. Zaffarkhan and $1,500 (08/01/2024) for Dr. Le, for a total of $18,900. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s request is taxed by $18,900 to remove pre-Offer fees.

Reduction of Fees for Dr. Zaffarkhan

Determining the reasonableness of an expert’s costs is largely within the trial court’s sound discretion. (Balfour, Guthrie & Co. v. Gourmet Farms (1980) 108 Cal.App.3d 181, 191-192.) Here, Defendant seems right that the cost of Dr. Khyber Zaffarkhan are disproportionately high compared to the complexity of this case and the time expended by his fellow experts.

As explained by Defendant, Khyber Zaffarkhan, a life care planner, spent 50 hours on this case. By way of comparison, Dr. Vu Le (an orthopedic surgeon) spent 10.85 hours. Dr. Khyber Zaffarkhan’s fees are excessive given the amount of time expended by other medical experts. Defendant submits that a reduction of 20 hours would be appropriate, as 30 hours is more than an appropriate amount of time for a life care planner to expend on a case. Dr. Khyber Zaffarkhan’s fee schedule (see Plaintiff’s supplemental brief bate stamp 36) provides he charges approximately $800 per hour. Twenty (20) hours multiplied by $800 per hour is $16,000. As such, Dr. Zaffarkhan’s fees are taxed in the amount of $16,000.

As noted by Defendant, in Plaintiff’s Memorandum of Costs, she requested $21,908.24 in fees for Dr. Yates. Now, she requests $35,796.24, based on what appears to be duplicative invoices. Plaintiff cannot recover costs she never initially requested. Accordingly, the difference between those numbers - $13,888 – is taxed and stricken.

Prejudgment Interest Accrual

Judgment was entered on November 26, 2025. There were 453 days between November 26, 2025 and August 30, 2024. The Judgment accrued interest at a per diem rate of $356.16 ($1,300,00 * 0.10 / 365). Thus, prejudgment interest is in the amount of $161,340.48.

3. CASE # CASE NAME HEARING NAME GARCIA VS MARRIOTT'S MOTION TO COMPEL ARBITRATION DESERT SPRINGS BY MARRIOTT'S DESERT SPRINGS CVPS2500693 DEVELOPMENT DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, CORPORATION VERONICA WILCOX Tentative Ruling: Granted.

The instant matter is stayed in its entirety.

Trial Setting Conference of June 8, 2026 is vacated.

A status hearing is set for October 14, 2026 at 8:30 a.m. in Department PS2. All counsel are ordered to file a joint status declaration regarding arbitration 10 days prior to hearing. An Order to Show Cause is also set for the same date/time as to all counsel for failure to file a joint declaration 10 days prior to hearing.

Moving party to provide notice pursuant to CCP 1019.5.

This is an employment case brought by Plaintiff Anthony Garcia against his former employer and supervisor. Plaintiff worked as a housekeeping aide for Defendant Marriott Desert Springs Development Corporation. (Complaint ¶5.) He alleges he was discriminated against based on his Native American heritage. (¶6.)

Defendants bring the instant motion to compel arbitration pursuant to an Arbitration Agreement Plaintiff signed during his onboarding on June 21, 2021.

Defendant argues the Agreement is valid and enforceable. Defendant argues the Agreement covers Plaintiff’s claims in the instant action. Finally, Defendant argues the Agreement is neither procedurally nor substantively unconscionable.

Plaintiff opposes the motion. Plaintiff argues no agreement exists between the parties. Plaintiff notes the agreement is between Plaintiff and “Marriott Resorts Hospitality Corporation” and not Defendant Marriott Desert Springs Development Corporation. Plaintiff argues these are separate and distinct legal entities and since Defendant is not a party to the agreement, it cannot enforce the agreement.

In Reply, Defendant argues the agreement explicitly extends to the Company’s “affiliates, successors, subsidiaries, assigns, [and] parent companies.” Defendant contends Shipp’s declaration establishes that MDSDC is an affiliated of MRHC. Defendant argues the Opposition concedes the Agreement is valid.

Request for Judicial Notice (RJN)

Defendants ask the court to take judicial notice of a federal district court case: McCormack v. Marriott Ownership Resorts, Inc., No. 17-cv-01663-BEN-WVG, 2018 WL 4242098 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 5, 2018). Though this document is a court record subject to judicial notice under Evidence Code §452(d), it is not relevant or necessary to the Court’s analysis. (See Jordache Enterprises, Inc. v. Brobeck, Phleger & Harrison (1998) 18 Cal.4th 739, 748, fn. 6; Appel v. Superior Court (2013) 214 Cal.App.4th 329, 342, fn. 6.)