Pena vs. American Honda Motor Co., Inc.

Plaintiff SHALL file and serve a status report no later than 10 court days before the hearing.

Plaintiffs to give notice.

9 Pena vs. American Motion for Attorneys’ Fees Honda Motor Co., Inc. The court GRANTS in part Plaintiff CASPAR A. PENA’s motion for attorney’s fees.

As a preliminary matter, there is no dispute that the motion is timely brought or that Plaintiff is entitled to fees. The parties dispute the amount of fees sought. Plaintiff seeks fees in the total amount of $29,748.75. Defendant opposes the motion, requesting the court exercise its discretion to disallow fees altogether or alternatively, to greatly reduce counsel’s requested attorney’s fees to “at most” $4,165.00.

“In evaluating whether the attorney fee request is reasonable, the trial court should consider ‘“ whether the case was overstaffed, how much time the attorneys spent on particular claims, and whether the hours were reasonably expended.’” (Morris v. Hyundai Motor America (2019) 41 Cal.App.5th 24, 38.) “‘Reasonable compensation does not include compensation for ‘“padding” in the form of inefficient or duplicative efforts....’ [Citations.] “A reduced award might be fully justified by a general observation that an attorney overlitigated a case or submitted a padded bill or that the opposing party has stated valid objections.”’” (Ibid.)

“[V]erified time statements of the attorneys, as officers of the court, are entitled to credence in the absence of a clear indication the records are erroneous.” (Horsford v. Board of Trustees of California State University (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 359, 396.)

In support of the hourly rates claimed by each attorney who worked on this matter, Plaintiff’s counsel includes what seems to be a running tally of cases up to and including June 2026, where Plaintiff’s counsel received

favorable attorney’s fees and rates. (See, Exhs. 1-39.) The billing records pertaining to this case however were not addressed until Exh. 42 (258 pages into Plaintiff’s provided evidence).

Plaintiff requests rates varying by attorney experience (12 different attorneys in total) and billing year. Based on the evidence presented, the attorneys who performed the majority of the work on this case were:

1. E. Schmitt, associate, 13.9 hrs. billed at $475/hr. for 27.36% (Mtn, p. 9:28; Jacobson Decl., ¶¶ 56- 57); 2. D. Gopstein, associate, 9.7 hrs billed at $395/hr. and $452/hr., for 19.09% (Mtn., p. 10:2; Jacobson Decl., ¶¶ 60-61); 3. S. Hovahnnisyan, associate, 5.2 hrs. billed at $395/hr. for 10.24% (Mtn., p. 10:7; Jacobson Decl., ¶¶ 68-69); and 4. D. Mahnke, partner, 4 hrs. billed at $350/hr. and $400/hr., for 7.87% (Mtn., p. 9:25; Jacobson Decl., ¶¶ 48-49).

Combined, these four attorneys accounted for 64.56% of the work performed in this case. Based upon the foregoing and based upon the court’s previous experiences with Lemon Law actions in Orange County, the court finds a blended hourly rate of $450/hour to be reasonable for the attorneys who billed in this matter.

Plaintiff’s counsel’s invoices further show that five other timekeepers below billed a combined total of 6 hours on this case at a rate of $175/hr. (See, Exh. 42.) However, the moving papers fail to offer any evidence as to the education, years of experience or even what classification of legal professional the billers are, e.g. law clerk, paralegal, legal secretary. The descriptions provided (primarily regarding filing and serving documents) suggest non-attorney work. The court strikes these amounts (6 hours @ $175/hour = $1,050.00).

Next, review of the billing entries submitted by Plaintiff, the billing for the most part appears reasonable, even accounting for “templated” documents. For instance,

Plaintiff billed 0.20 hr. for Motions in Limine Nos. 1-20, 0.1 hrs. to review Defendant’s Motions in Limine Nos. 1-14, and 1.7 hours total for the opposition to compel arbitration.

However, the court strikes the 1.50 hrs. billed by Mr. Altman on 4/30/25 on Ex. 42, page 12. As noted by Defendant, Mr. Altman billed at $950/hr. There are no other billing entries from Mr. Altman and the “Case Update” is not tied to any task.

The court further reduces the fees associated with preparing this instant motion to 2 hours.

Thus, the court strikes 4.7 hours of attorney time and $1,050.00 (for 5 timekeepers at $175/hour for 6 hours), making the total attorney hours recoverable to be 36.10 hours (44.80-10.7 hours).

Based upon the rate of $450/hour and the 40.10 recoverable hours, the attorney rates total $18,045.

Re Multiplier

Plaintiff requests a 1.25 multiplier. As explained by the court in Robertson v. Fleetwood Travel Trailers of California, Inc. (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 785, a lodestar figure may be “augmented or diminished by taking various relevant factors into account, including (1) the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved and the skill displayed in presenting them; (2) the extent to which the nature of the litigation precluded other employment by the attorneys; and (3) the contingent nature of the fee award, based on the uncertainty of prevailing on the merits and of establishing eligibility for the award.” (Id. at 819.) “‘The purpose of such adjustment is to fix a fee at the fair market value for the particular action.

In effect, the court determines, retrospectively, whether the litigation involved a contingent risk or required extraordinary legal skill justifying augmentation of the unadorned lodestar in order to approximate the fair market rate for such services.’” (Ibid.)

Applying a multiplier is discretionary. (Mikhaeilpoor v. BMW of North America, LLC (2020) 48 Cal.App.5th 240, 248.) “Of course, the trial court is not required to include a fee enhancement to the basic lodestar figure for contingent risk, exceptional skill, or other factors, although it retains discretion to do so in the appropriate case; moreover, the party seeking a fee enhancement bears the burden of proof.” (Ketchum v. Moses (2001) 24 Cal.4th 1122, 1138.) “In each case, the trial court should consider whether, and to what extent, the attorney and client have been able to mitigate the risk of nonpayment, e.g., because the client has agreed to pay some portion of the lodestar amount regardless of outcome. It should also consider the degree to which the relevant market compensates for contingency risk, extraordinary skill, or other factors under Serrano III.” (Ibid.)

“[A] trial court should award a multiplier for exceptional representation only when the quality of representation far exceeds the quality of representation that would have been provided by an attorney of comparable skill and experience billing at the hourly rate used in the lodestar calculation.” (Ketchum, 24 Cal.4th at 1139.)

Additionally, while the case was handled on a contingent fee basis, the one-sided mandatory statutory fee award reduced the risk otherwise inherent in a contingent fee case. (See Weeks v. Baker & McKenzie (1998) 63 Cal.App.4th 1128, 1174-1175 [discussing FEHA fees award].)

The court DENIES Plaintiff’s request for a multiplier, as the case did not involve any novel or difficult legal or factual issues. This was a simple lemon law action, which did not require any complex litigation.

In sum, Plaintiff is awarded a total attorneys fee award of $18,045.00.

Plaintiff to give notice.

10 Yang vs. General Motion for Attorney’s Fees, Costs, and Expenses Motors LLC The court GRANTS in part Plaintiff Ki YANG’s motion for attorney fees and costs.

The parties settled this Song-Beverly case before trial with Defendant agreeing to pay reasonable attorney fees, costs and expenses to Plaintiff as the prevailing party. As such, there is no dispute among the parties as to Plaintiff’s right to recover her attorney fees, costs, and expenses.

The Song-Beverly Act provides for attorney fees, costs, and expenses to the prevailing party in a lemon law case. (Civ. Code § 1794(d).) “Determining a reasonable attorney fee award in Song-Beverly Act cases ‘“ordinarily begins with the ‘lodestar,’ [which is] the number of hours reasonably expended multiplied by the reasonable hourly rate.” ’ [Citation.]” (Tidrick v. FCA US LLC (2025) 112 Cal.App.5th 1147, 1157-1158.) “The Song-Beverly Act’s attorney fee provision ‘“requires the trial court to make an initial determination of the actual time expended; and then to ascertain whether under all the circumstances of the case the amount of actual time expended, and the monetary charge being made for the time expended are reasonable.”’ [Citation.]” (Id. at 1158.)

“The reasonable hourly rate is that prevailing in the community for similar work.” (PLCM Group, Inc. v. Drexler (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1084, 1095; see also Chacon v. Litke (2010) 181 Cal.App.4th 1234, 1260 [“reasonable market value” of counsel’s services is measure of reasonable hourly rate].) The relevant “community” is generally based on where the services were rendered, i.e., where the court is located. (Nichols v. City of Taft (2007) 155 Cal.App.4th 1233, 1242-1243.) “Accordingly, the reasonable hourly rate in this case is that charged by consumer attorneys practicing in the local legal community in Orange County.” (Tidrick, 112 Cal.App.5th at 1157.)

The court may rely on personal knowledge and familiarity with the legal market in setting a reasonable hourly rate. (Heritage Pac. Fin., LLC v. Monroy (2013) 215 Cal.App.4th 972, 1009; 569 E. County Boulevard LLC v. Backcountry Against the Dump, Inc. (2016) 6 Cal.App.5th 426, 437.) The

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