Doe vs. Brown

Plaintiffs have only established that Defendants had notice. “Actual notice of the action alone, however, is not a substitute for proper service and is not sufficient to confer jurisdiction. ‘[N]o California appellate court has gone so far as to uphold a service of process solely on the ground the defendant received actual notice when there has been a complete failure to comply with the statutory requirements for service.’ [Citation.]” (American Exp. Centurion Bank v. Zara (2011) 199 Cal.App.4th 383, 391- 392.)

In sum, the motion is GRANTED.

Plaintiffs to give notice.

14 Doe vs. Brown Motion to Compel Further Responses (re RFPs)

The court DENIES Plaintiff JANE DOE’s motion to compel further production from Defendant JAMAL BROWN to Plaintiff’s Requests for Production (Set One).

On 8/14/26, the court CONTINUED Plaintiff’s motion to compel production re Nos. 1, 3, 16-20 and granted the parties leave to file further briefing. (See 8/14/26 Minute Order.) The court ordered Plaintiff’s further briefing to be served and filed no later than 8/19/26 and for Defendant’s response no later than 9/4/26. (Id.)

While Plaintiff’s decision to label the brief an “amended” motion is perhaps confusing, given the context of the proceedings and this court’s previous order, the court finds Plaintiff intended to file her further briefing as permitted by this court’s 8/14/26 order.

A motion to compel further responses “shall” set forth “specific facts showing good cause justifying the discovery sought by the demand.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 2031.310(b)(1).) To establish “good cause,” the burden is on the moving party to demonstrate both: (1) relevance to the subject matter (e.g., how the information in the documents would tend to prove or disprove some issue in the case), and (2) specific facts justifying discovery (e.g.,

why such information is necessary for trial preparation or to prevent surprise at trial). (Glenfed Develop. Corp. v. Superior Court (1997) 53 Cal.App.4th 1113, 1117; Weil & Brown, Cal. Practice Guide: Civil Procedure Before Trial (The Rutter Group 2019) ¶ 8:1495.6.) Arguments made in the moving papers or in a separate statement are insufficient to satisfy this requirement; good cause must be shown by way of admissible evidence, such as by declaration. (Calcor Space Facility, Inc. v. Superior Court (1997) 53 Cal.App.4th 216, 224.)

Only if good cause is shown by the moving party does the burden shift to the responding party to justify any objections made to document disclosure. (See Kirkland v. Superior Court (2002) 95 Cal.App.4th 92, 98 [re interrogatories]; see also Weil & Brown, Cal. Prac. Guide: Civ. Proc. Before Trial (The Rutter Group 2023) ¶ 8:1482.)

RFP No. 1

RFP No. 1 requests all documents reflecting or relating to the criminal case arising from the INCIDENT, including but not limited to police reports, arrest records, booking photos, court filings, minute orders, plea agreements, sentencing transcripts, probation reports, and any correspondence with your criminal defense counsel.

Plaintiff argues the criminal case records contain Defendant’s guilty plea and the factual basis for the charges arising from the incident.

While good cause may exist for a subset or portion of the requested documents, Plaintiff does not show good cause for the production of all documents requested by this RFP.

RFP No. 3

RFP No. 3 requests all documents showing any payments made by Geraldine Hardy AKA Geraldine Jones (or anyone acting on her behalf) for your criminal Defense attorney fees in the criminal case arising from the INCIDENT.

Plaintiff argues that whether Hardy paid or arranged payment for Defendant’s criminal defense fees is relevant to issues of agency, control, ratification, and aiding and abetting, and bear directly on issues of personal jurisdiction over Hardy. Plaintiff does not explain how Hardy’s conduct in paying defense fees after the incident establishes any relevant agency, control, ratification, or aiding and abetting of Defendant’s conduct during the alleged incident. Further, even if the court assumed Hardy paid the criminal defense fees, that fact is not material to the analysis of specific jurisdiction over Hardy in this action.

The operative complaint pleads four causes of action based on an alleged incident that took place in September 2022. At best, the requested documents show only that Hardy had contacts with this state after the incident took place, during her son’s criminal proceedings.

RFP Nos. 16-20

RPF Nos. 16-20 requests documents relating Defendant’s financial condition and income for the period from 1/1/22 to present.

Plaintiff argues the requests are relevant to Defendant’s outstanding criminal restitution obligation of $81K stemming from the criminal action and the punitive damages claim pled against Defendant in this action.

Any outstanding criminal restitution obligation is outside the scope of this litigation (see TAC) and, therefore, does not establish good cause for the production of those documents here.

To the extent Plaintiff argues at hearing that the court should permit pretrial discovery pursuant to Civil Code section 3295(c), Plaintiff must file a separate motion for that relief.

Civil Code section 3295 sets forth the procedure for pretrial discovery relating to a defendant’s financial condition. Specifically, subdivision (c) provides:

No pretrial discovery by the plaintiff shall be permitted with respect to the [among other things, the financial

condition of the defendant] unless the court enters an order permitting such discovery pursuant to this subdivision.... Upon motion by the plaintiff supported by appropriate affidavits and after a hearing, if the court deems a hearing to be necessary, the court may at any time enter an order permitting the discovery otherwise prohibited by this subdivision if the court finds, on the basis of the supporting and opposing affidavits presented, that the plaintiff has established that there is a substantial probability that the plaintiff will prevail on the claim pursuant to section 3294. Such order shall not be considered to be a determination on the merits of the claim or any defense thereto and shall not be given in evidence or referred to at the trial.

Here, Plaintiff requests for the first time in her supplemental declaration that the court “set a procedure under Civil Code section 3295(c).” (Doe Supp. Decl. ¶ 14.) This does not provide Defendant with sufficient notice of the requested relief, especially where neither the notice of motion nor the amended notice of motion indicates that Plaintiff intends to seek discovery pursuant to section 3295(c). (See Cal. Rules Ct., rule 3.1110(a) [providing “[a] notice of motion must state in the opening paragraph the nature of the order being sought and the grounds for issuance of the order”].)

For the above reasons, the court DENIES the motion to compel production as to RFP Nos. 1, 3, 16-20.

Sanctions

The court finds the circumstances here make the imposition of sanctions unjust and as such, DENIES Defendant Brown’s request for monetary and other sanctions against Plaintiff Doe. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2031.310(c).)

Defendant to give notice.

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