Huang vs. BMW of North America, LLC

or express warranty or service contract may bring an action for the recovery of damages and other legal and equitable relief.” And subdivision (d) section 1794 provides: “If the buyer prevails in an action under this section, the buyer shall be allowed by the court to recover as part of the judgment a sum equal to the aggregate amount of costs and expenses, including attorney’s fees based on actual time expended, determined by the court to have been reasonably incurred by the buyer in connection with the commencement and prosecution of such action.”

Prevailing Party

On or about February 12, 2026, Plaintiff accepted Defendant’s Section 998 settlement offer of $35,000. (Hashemi Dec., Ex. F.) Judgment was entered on March 9, 2026, pursuant to which Defendant shall pay Plaintiff $35,000 in full satisfaction for all of Plaintiff’s claims regarding the vehicle at issue. (ROA 118.) Pursuant to the Judgment, Plaintiff is the prevailing party and is entitled to “reasonable costs, expenses, expert costs and attorney’s fees based on actual time expended pursuant to Civil Code section 1794(d), determined by the court to have been reasonably incurred by Plaintiff in connection with the commencement and prosecution of this action.” (ROA 118, ¶ 4.)

Thus, there is no dispute Plaintiff is the prevailing party and he is entitled to recover reasonable attorney’s fees and costs. (Id.)

Lodestar Calculation

Civil Code section 1794, subdivision (d) requires the attorney fees to be based on “actual time expended” and to have been “reasonably incurred.” In Robertson v. Fleetwood Travel Trailers of California, Inc. (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 785, 818–819, 820, the court concluded, “the statutory language of section 1794, subdivision (d), is reasonably compatible with a lodestar adjustment method of calculating attorney fees” because “the lodestar adjustment method is based on actual, reasonable attorney time expended as the objective starting point of the analysis [citation], it is compatible with this statutory provision.”

The court reasoned that the lodestar method is applicable to calculating attorney fees under section 1794, subdivision (d) because “the lodestar adjustment method is the prevailing rule for calculation of statutory attorney fees unless the statute expressly indicates a contrary intent, and no such contrary intent is apparent.” (Id. at 821; Doppes v. Bentley Motors, Inc. (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 967, 997.)

The lodestar adjustment method requires the trial court first to determine a lodestar figure based on actual time spent and reasonable hourly compensation for each attorney. (Robertson, 144 Cal.App.4th at 819, citing Serrano v. Priest (1977) 20 Cal.3d 25, 48–49.) For Song–Beverly Consumer Warranty Act claims, “[a] prevailing buyer has the burden of ‘showing that the fees incurred were “allowable,” were “reasonably necessary to the conduct of the litigation,” and were “reasonable in amount.’” (Nightingale v. Hyundai Motor America (1994) 31 Cal.App.4th 99, 104; Doppes, 174 Cal.App.4th at 998.)

The court then has the discretion to increase or decrease the lodestar figure by applying a positive or negative multiplier based on a variety of factors that the court did not consider when determining the lodestar figure, such as the novelty and difficulty of the issues presented, the extent to which the nature of the litigation precluded other employment by the attorneys, and the contingent nature of the fee award. (See Northwest Energetic Servs., 25

LLC v. California Franchise Tax Bd. (2008) 159 Cal.App.4th 841, 879-82; Graciano v. Robinson Ford Sales, Inc. (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 140, 154.) The court is not required to impose a multiplier; the decision is discretionary. (Galbiso v. Orosi Pub. Util. Dist. (2008) 167 Cal.App.4th 1063, 1089; Nichols v. City of Taft (2007) 155 Cal.App.4th 1233, 1241.)

Hourly Rates

The reasonable market value of the attorney’s services is the measure of a reasonable hourly rate. (PLCM Group, Inc. v. Drexler (2000) 22 Cal. 4th 1084, 1094.) This standard applies regardless of whether the attorneys claiming fees charge nothing for their services, charge at below-market or discounted rates, represented the client on a straight contingent fee basis, or are in house counsel. (Id.) To determine that reasonable market value, the court must determine whether the requested rates are within the range of reasonable rates charged by and judicially awarded to comparable attorneys for comparable work. (Children’s Hospital & Medical Center v. Bonta (2002) 97 Cal. App. 4th 740, 783.)

Factors that may be considered in determining whether counsel’s rates are reasonable include: level of skill necessary, time limitations, the amount to be obtained in the litigation, the attorney’s reputation, and the undesirability of the case. (Ketchum v. Moses (2001) 24 Cal.4th 1122, 1139.)

The party requesting fees has the initial burden of producing evidence sufficient to support the reasonableness of the billing rates requested. (See Davis v. City of San Diego (2003) 106 Cal.App.4th 893, 903.) If the moving party meets its burden, the burden shifts to the opposing party to produce admissible evidence sufficient to show that the rates requested are not reasonable. (See Graciano v. Robinson Ford Sales, Inc. (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 140, 155 [finding court erred in reducing rates where evidence of reasonableness of rate requested was undisputed]; Davis v. City of San Diego, 106 Cal.App.4th at 904.)

Plaintiff’s counsel requests an hourly rate of $600 for Babak Hashemi (partner) and $600 for Benjamin Martin (associate). Plaintiff’s counsel declares:

30. In 2009, I founded the Law Offices of Babak Hashemi which is currently established as The Hashemi Law Firm, APC. My firm’s regular hourly rate is $600-$650/hour. My hourly rate for most contingency matters is $600/hour. Other attorney times at my firm has been billed at $600-$650 for Benjamin Martin and $450 for affiliate/associate counsel. I am informed that these rates are reasonable considering each attorney’s respective education, experience, and geographical practice area.

(Hashemi Dec., ¶ 30.)

$600 per hour is high for the entirety of billing on this particular case. Plaintiff is requesting an hourly rate of $600 for 131.2 hours spent on this matter.

Plaintiff filed this matter on May 10, 2024. (ROA 2.) The parties engaged in written discovery, and Plaintiff filed two motions to compel on March 3, 2025. (ROAs 42, 43.) Those motions were granted in part and denied in part. Plaintiff’s deposition was taken and Plaintiff exchanged written discovery responses. (Hashemi Dec., ¶ 16.) Plaintiff then began 26

preparing for trial, but the case was settled shortly before trial was scheduled to begin. (Hashemi Dec., ¶¶ 17-18.) The parties then settled on or about February 6, 2026. (Id. at ¶ 19.)

In opposing this motion, Defendant urges the Court to reduce Plaintiff’s counsel Babak Hashemi’s hourly rate from $600 to $395 and Benjamin Martin’s associate hourly rate from $600 to $295. Defendant contends the rates are excessive and not consistent with prevailing community rates in sources such as the Real Rate Report. For 2023, the median rate for Consumer Goods cases was $395 per hour for partners and $295 per hour for associates. (See Hom Decl., ¶ Ex. A.)

The Court finds that an hourly rate of $500 for both Babak Hashemi and Benjamin Martin is reasonable, based on the Court’s understanding of the range of reasonable rates charged by and judicially awarded to comparable attorneys for comparable work.

Hours Reasonably Expended

In challenges to the reasonableness of the number of hours billed, “it is the burden of the challenging party to point to the specific items challenged, with a sufficient argument and citations to the evidence.” (Premier Med. Mgmt. Sys., Inc. v. Cal. Ins. Guarantee Ass’n (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 550, 564.) “General arguments that fees claimed are excessive, duplicative, or unrelated do not suffice.” (Id.) Additionally, moving party’s counsel’s verified time records should be “entitled to credence in the absence of a clear indication the records are erroneous.” (Horsford v. Board of Trustees (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 359, 396.) However, the Court “may not rubber stamp a request for attorney fees, but must determine the number of hours reasonably expended.” (Donahue v. Donahue (2010) 182 Cal.App.4th 259, 271.)

Defendant has challenged certain time entries of Plaintiff’s counsel. The Court has analyzed Plaintiff’s billing records and Defendant’s objections thereto.

Defendant contends that Plaintiff has spent an excessive amount of time – 13.2 hours – on the instant fee motion. There is some merit to this objection, and the Court reduces the time awarded by 3.2 hours.

Defendant also objects that Plaintiff requests 2.1 hours for confirming Defendant’s contact information. That May 9, 2024 billing entry at issue states: Update draft. Repurchase Demand to BMW, verify BMW's mailing address on DCA and for certified mail (1.0) confirm based on factual summary and legal basis for Song-Bev. and CLRA (1.0); verify Proper mailing address, fax and email for demands (0.1)- USPS Cert. 7022 2410 0001 8354 1138- Fax. 201-930-8484 and copy to Gabrielle.Dorcean@bmwgroup.com

The Court finds that the reasonable time spent on the tasks specified in this entry is 1 hour, and the Court thus reduces the time awarded by 1.1 hours.

Applying the above hourly rates and eliminating entries for duplicative, excessive and/or unnecessary work, the following hours and rates are reasonable:

Timekeeper Hourly Rate Time Total Granted Babak Hashemi $500 124.8 $62,400 Benjamin Martin $500 3.2 $1,600 Total $64,000

This amount includes the time reasonably spent in preparing the fees motion.

Multiplier

In Robertson v. Fleetwood Travel Trailers of California, Inc. (2006) 144 Cal. App. 4th 785, 822, the court recognized the propriety of applying a multiplier to an award of fees under Song Beverly. After the Court determines a lodestar figure based on actual time spent and a reasonable hourly compensation for each attorney, the Court may augment or diminish the lodestar figure by taking various relevant factors into account, including (1) the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved and the skill displayed in presenting them; (2) the extent to which the nature of the litigation precluded other employment by the attorneys; and (3) the contingent nature of the fee award, based on the uncertainty of prevailing on the merits and of establishing eligibility for the award.” (Id. at 819; Doppes, 174 Cal.App.4th at 998.)

Under the circumstances, the Court finds that no multiplier is appropriate for this case.

Costs

Prejudgment costs must generally be claimed in accordance with Judicial Council rules. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1034(a).) CRC 3.1700(a)(1) provides, in pertinent part: A prevailing party who claims costs must serve and file a memorandum of costs within 15 days after the date of service of the notice of entry of judgment or dismissal by the clerk under Code of Civil Procedure 664.5 or the date of service of written notice of entry of judgment or dismissal, or within 180 days after entry of judgment, whichever is first. Failure to comply with the time limits constitutes a waiver of a claim of costs. (Hydratec, Inc. v. Sun Valley 260 Orchard & Vineyard Co. (1990) 223 Cal.App.3d 924, 929.)

Here, however, the judgment explicitly states: Following a ruling on a noticed motion which shall be filed with the court on or before 4/10/26, BMW NA shall pay reasonable costs, expenses, expert costs and attorney’s fees based on actual time expended pursuant to Civil Code section 1794(d), determined by the court to have been reasonably incurred by Plaintiff in connection with the commencement and prosecution of this action. (ROA 118, ¶ 4.)

The motion was timely filed on April 8, 2026. Thus, the Court will not deny Plaintiff’s requests for costs based on timeliness.

The memorandum of costs Plaintiff submitted with her motion seeks $855 in filing and motion fees, $150 in jury fees, $74 in service of process costs, $256.37 in electronic filing or service fees, and $450 in consulting expert fees, electronic file maintenance, clerical, printing, and software-service expenses. The Court grants Plaintiff’s request for costs. 28

Plaintiff shall give notice of this ruling. 8 Gu vs. Defendants Dean Azzeh, DDS and Dean Azzeh D.D.S., Inc. dba Family Orthodontics & Family Oral Surgery’s demurer and motion to strike are CONTINUED to December 17, 2026 at Orthodonti 01:30 PM, in this department. cs & Oral Surgery Defendants’ electronic service of the moving papers to Plaintiff, who is in pro per, is defective. Cal. R. Ct., rule 2.251, subd. (c) provides:

(c) Electronic service required by local rule or court order

...

(2) A court may require other persons to serve documents electronically in specified civil actions by local rule, as provided in Code of Civil Procedure section 1010.6 and the rules in this chapter.

(3) Except when personal service is otherwise required by statute or rule, a party or other person that is required to file documents electronically in an action must also serve documents and accept service of documents electronically from all other parties or persons, unless:

(A) The court orders otherwise, or

(B) The action includes parties or persons that are not required to file or serve documents electronically, including self-represented parties or other self-represented persons; those parties or other persons are to be served by non-electronic methods unless they affirmatively consent to electronic service.

Cal. R. Ct., Rule 2.251, subd. (b)(1)(B) also provides: “(1) A party or other person indicates that the party or other person agrees to accept electronic service by:... A party or other person may manifest affirmative consent by serving notice of consent to all parties and other persons and either: (i) Agreeing to the terms of service with an electronic filing service provider, which clearly states that agreement constitutes consent to receive electronic service; or (ii) Filing Consent to Electronic Service and Notice of Electronic Service Address (form EFS-005-CV).” (See also Code Civ. Proc. §1010.6, subd. (c)).

There is no indication that Plaintiff consented to electronic service, and Plaintiff has not filed an Opposition on the merits, thereby waiving this service defect.

Furthermore, the meet and confer declaration fails to comply with Code Civ. Proc. §§ 430.41, subd. (a) and 435.5, subd. (a). Counsel for Defendants declares that he sent Plaintiff a meet and confer correspondence on 3/24/26, and that Plaintiff did not respond. (Decl. of Aloia, ¶ ¶ 4, 5).

However, there is no meet and confer attempt via telephone, videoconference, or in person, as required by Code Civ. Proc. § 430.41(a) and Code Civ. Proc. § 435.5(a).

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