Paradigm Sports Management, LLC vs. Simpson

For these reasons, the motion is DENIED without prejudice.

Plaintiffs to give notice. 6 Paradigm Petitioners Paradigm Sports Management, LLC, and Paradigm MMA Sports Manageme Management, LLC (collectively, the “Petitioners” or “Paradigm”) move to nt, LLC vs. compel Respondents Timothy Simpson, Daniel Maudsley, and Chosen Advisory Simpson Group, LLC, (collectively, “Respondents”) to resume ongoing arbitration proceedings and to stay this action pending outcome of the parties’ arbitration. For the following reasons, the petition is DENIED.

Standard on Motions to Compel Arbitration

The right to arbitration depends upon contract; a petition to compel arbitration is simply a suit in equity seeking specific performance of that contract. (Little v. Pullman (2013) 219 Cal.App.4th 558, 565.) The petitioner bears the burden of proving the existence of a valid arbitration agreement by the preponderance of the evidence, and a party opposing the petition bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence any fact necessary to its defense. (Ibid.) In these summary proceedings, the trial court sits as a trier of fact, weighing all the affidavits, declarations, and other documentary evidence, as well as oral testimony received at the court’s discretion, to reach a final determination. (Ibid.)

Employees’ Statutory Right to Withdraw from Arbitration

Code of Civil Procedure section 1281.98(a)(1) provides:

In an employment or consumer arbitration that requires, either expressly or through application of state or federal law or the rules of the arbitration provider, that the drafting party pay certain fees and costs during the pendency of an arbitration proceeding, if the fees or costs required to continue the arbitration proceeding are not paid within 30 days after the due date, the drafting party is in material breach of the arbitration agreement, is in default of the arbitration, and waives its right to compel the employee or consumer to proceed with that arbitration as a result of the material breach.

(Code Civ. Proc., § 1281.98(a)(1).)

Subdivision (b) continues: “If the drafting party materially breaches the arbitration agreement and is in default under subdivision (a), the employee or consumer may unilaterally elect to . . . [¶] [w]ithdraw the claim from arbitration and proceed in a court of appropriate jurisdiction.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 1281.98(b)(1).) In the alternative, the employee or consumer may elect to continue with the arbitration proceeding, petition the court for an order

compelling the drafting party to pay all arbitration fees it is obligated to pay, or pay the drafting party’s fees and proceed with the

arbitration proceeding. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 1281.98(b)(2)-(4).)

If the employee or consumer elects to withdraw from the arbitration and proceed in court, “[t]he employee or consumer may bring a motion, or a separate action, to recover all attorney's fees and all costs associated with the abandoned arbitration proceeding. The recovery of arbitration fees, interest, and related attorney's fees shall be without regard to any findings on the merits in the underlying action or arbitration.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 1281.98(c)(1).)

The court may, however, consider whether nonpayment was inadvertent. (Hohenshelt v. Superior Court (2025) 18 Cal.5th 310, 332.) The court noted that section 1281.98 was enacted to address “willful nonpayment of fees by a defendant [that] stymies the ability of employees and consumers to have their claims resolved in arbitration pursuant to a predispute arbitration.” (See id. at p. 337.)

In Hohenshelt v. Superior Court, the court had stayed the trial court proceedings and ordered the employee to arbitrate his claims for retaliation, failure to prevent harassment, and various Labor Code claims. (Hohenshelt v. Superior Court (2025) 18 Cal.5th 310, 324.) The arbitration proceeded for approximately one year, when the arbitrator issued two invoices for the defendant employer to pay. (Ibid.) The defendant employer did not pay those invoices within 30 days. (Ibid.) Following that failure to make payment, the arbitrator sent a letter to both parties providing notice the arbitrator had not yet received payment and that pursuant to the arbitration service’s fee and cancellation policy, a failure to pay within 28 days could subject the hearing to cancelation. (Id. at p. 324.)

The plaintiff employee filed a motion in the superior court to lift the stay, representing that he elected to withdraw his claims from arbitration and proceed in court, pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure 1281.98. (See id. at pp. 324-325.) Shortly thereafter, the employer paid the arbitration fees and sent an email objecting to the plaintiff employee’s withdrawal from arbitration. (Id. at p. 325.) The trial court denied the plaintiff’s motion to lift stay, ruling the arbitrator had seemingly set a new due date following the employer’s initial failure to make payment. (See id.)

The California Supreme Court concluded “that section 1281.98, properly construed, is not preempted by the FAA” and explicitly “reject[ed] the rigid construction” that “impose[d] an inflexible and sometimes harsh rule resulting in loss of arbitral rights . . . and instead conclude[d] that the statute does not abrogate the longstanding principle, established by statute and common law, that one party’s nonperformance of an obligation automatically extinguishes the other

party’s contractual duties only when nonperformance is willful, grossly negligent, or fraudulent.” (Id. at p. 322.)

Application

Here, it is undisputed that a valid arbitration agreement exists that covers the parties’ underlying claims, that the parties previously participated in contractual arbitration administered by JAMS, and that Respondents withdrew the claim from arbitration pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 1281.98(b).

Petitioners argue they are entitled to compel arbitration because their failure to pay invoice fees should be excused under Hohenshelt. Specifically, Petitioners submit evidence they did not receive actual notice of the outstanding invoice until after the deadline to pay the invoice had passed. (See Lust Decl. ¶ 11, Ex. G.)

Respondents submit evidence showing that Paradigm had actual notice of the outstanding fees as early as 09/26/2025 (see Smith Decl. ¶¶ 5, 7, Exs. E-G) and no later than 10/09/2025 (see Smith Decl. ¶¶ 9-10, Exs. I-K). Each notice went to multiple attorneys at Paradigm’s counsel. Furthermore, the 10/09/2025 correspondence from JAMS shows, which Paradigm concedes to have received (see Lust Decl., Ex. G): (1) includes a standalone invoice; (2) states all “Payment is due upon receipt”; and (3) includes an admonishment that “California Code of Civil Procedure sections 1281.97-1281.99 may apply to the payment of fees for this arbitration.” (See Smith Decl., Ex. K.)

Petitioners chose not to file a reply and, thus, concede they received actual notice of the outstanding fees with sufficient time to pay the invoices. (See, e.g., DuPont Merck Pharmaceutical Co. v. Superior Court (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 562, 566 [“By failing to argue the contrary, plaintiffs concede this issue”]; Westside Center Associates v. Safeway Stores 23, Inc. (1996) 42 Cal.App.4th 507, 529 [“failure to address the threshold question ... effectively concedes that issue and renders its remaining arguments moot”; Glendale Redevelopment Agency v. Parks (1993) 18 Cal.App.4th 1409, 1424 [issue is impliedly conceded by failing to address it].)

For this reason, the court will DENY Petitioners’ petition to compel arbitration.

Respondents to give notice. 7 Huang vs. Plaintiff Jackson Huang moves an award of attorney’s fees and costs against Defendant BMW of BMW of North America, LLC. For the following reasons, the motion is GRANTED IN A North REDUCED AMOUNT. America, LLC Defendant is ORDERED to pay Plaintiff $64,000 in attorney’s fees and $1,785.37 in costs.

Civil Code section 1794, subdivision (a) states: “Any buyer of consumer goods who is damaged by a failure to comply with any obligation under this chapter or under an implied 24

or express warranty or service contract may bring an action for the recovery of damages and other legal and equitable relief.” And subdivision (d) section 1794 provides: “If the buyer prevails in an action under this section, the buyer shall be allowed by the court to recover as part of the judgment a sum equal to the aggregate amount of costs and expenses, including attorney’s fees based on actual time expended, determined by the court to have been reasonably incurred by the buyer in connection with the commencement and prosecution of such action.”

Prevailing Party

On or about February 12, 2026, Plaintiff accepted Defendant’s Section 998 settlement offer of $35,000. (Hashemi Dec., Ex. F.) Judgment was entered on March 9, 2026, pursuant to which Defendant shall pay Plaintiff $35,000 in full satisfaction for all of Plaintiff’s claims regarding the vehicle at issue. (ROA 118.) Pursuant to the Judgment, Plaintiff is the prevailing party and is entitled to “reasonable costs, expenses, expert costs and attorney’s fees based on actual time expended pursuant to Civil Code section 1794(d), determined by the court to have been reasonably incurred by Plaintiff in connection with the commencement and prosecution of this action.” (ROA 118, ¶ 4.)

Thus, there is no dispute Plaintiff is the prevailing party and he is entitled to recover reasonable attorney’s fees and costs. (Id.)

Lodestar Calculation

Civil Code section 1794, subdivision (d) requires the attorney fees to be based on “actual time expended” and to have been “reasonably incurred.” In Robertson v. Fleetwood Travel Trailers of California, Inc. (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 785, 818–819, 820, the court concluded, “the statutory language of section 1794, subdivision (d), is reasonably compatible with a lodestar adjustment method of calculating attorney fees” because “the lodestar adjustment method is based on actual, reasonable attorney time expended as the objective starting point of the analysis [citation], it is compatible with this statutory provision.”

The court reasoned that the lodestar method is applicable to calculating attorney fees under section 1794, subdivision (d) because “the lodestar adjustment method is the prevailing rule for calculation of statutory attorney fees unless the statute expressly indicates a contrary intent, and no such contrary intent is apparent.” (Id. at 821; Doppes v. Bentley Motors, Inc. (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 967, 997.)

The lodestar adjustment method requires the trial court first to determine a lodestar figure based on actual time spent and reasonable hourly compensation for each attorney. (Robertson, 144 Cal.App.4th at 819, citing Serrano v. Priest (1977) 20 Cal.3d 25, 48–49.) For Song–Beverly Consumer Warranty Act claims, “[a] prevailing buyer has the burden of ‘showing that the fees incurred were “allowable,” were “reasonably necessary to the conduct of the litigation,” and were “reasonable in amount.’” (Nightingale v. Hyundai Motor America (1994) 31 Cal.App.4th 99, 104; Doppes, 174 Cal.App.4th at 998.)

The court then has the discretion to increase or decrease the lodestar figure by applying a positive or negative multiplier based on a variety of factors that the court did not consider when determining the lodestar figure, such as the novelty and difficulty of the issues presented, the extent to which the nature of the litigation precluded other employment by the attorneys, and the contingent nature of the fee award. (See Northwest Energetic Servs., 25