John Sedgh, M.D. et al. v. Fenton Law Group, LLP, et al.

(Santa Monica Courthouse: Dept. P) September 10, 2026 DEPARTMENT P LAW AND MOTION RULINGS

Ruling John Sedgh, M.D. et al. v. Fenton Law Group, LLP, et al., Case No. 23STCV00274 Defendants' Motion for Attorneys' Fees Hearing Date: September 10, 2026 Background Plaintiffs John Sedgh, M.D., and Millennium Multispecialty Medical Group, Inc., sue defendants Fenton Law Group and attorneys Sedley, H. and B. Fenton, Jurkowitz, Kirkpatrick, and Lee for legal malpractice and breach of contract.

Defendants represented plaintiffs in a lawsuit against Disability Determination Service Division of the California Department of Social Services ("DDSD") for breach of implied contract. In that case, Plaintiff Sedgh alleged DDSD improperly terminated him from its panel of consultative examiners, from which he generated significant business income.

On January 5, 2025, Plaintiffs filed their complaint against Defendants. On March 24, 2024, Defendants answered and filed their cross-complaint for breach of contract and common counts for attorneys' fees owed. On October 3, 2024, Defendants filed the Motion for Summary Judgment. The Court heard the Motion for Summary Judgment on June 25, 2025, and took the matter under submission. On June 27, 2025, the Court granted Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment.

On September 8, 2025, Plaintiffs appealed the Court's ruling on the Motion for Summary Judgment. On January 13, 2026, Plaintiffs filed a motion to stay pending appeal. On May 1, 2026, they withdrew the motion. On February 25, 2026, Defendants filed this Motion for Attorneys' Fees. On July 20, 2026, Plaintiffs filed opposition.

Arguments Defendants argue that they are entitled to recover reasonable attorneys' fees under the client engagement agreement as the prevailing party on the motion for summary judgment. (Motion for Attorneys' Fees, p. 3.) Defendants argue that though this was an action for legal malpractice and breach of contract, the work was so intertwined as to be impracticable to separate the time into compensable and non-compensable time. (Id. at p. 4.) Defendants argue that they are the prevailing party as a matter of law and request $177,690.00 in attorneys' fees. (Id. at pp. 5-6.) Defendants argue that their requested hours and rates were reasonable in light of the complexity of this case. (Id. at pp. 8-10.)

In opposition, Plaintiffs argue that the fee motion is premature because the cross-complaint concerns the same contract. (Opposition, p. 6.) Plaintiffs argue that the Court cannot determine who the prevailing party on a contract is where substantial claims on the contract remain because it is not yet clear which party recovered greater relief. (Id. at p. 7.) Plaintiffs argue that piecemeal awards before full resolution of the dispute are disfavored and asks that this motion be continued until after trial on the cross-complaint in May 2027. (Id. at p. 9.) Next, Plaintiffs argue that the fee clause is narrow and that Defendants have not properly apportioned their fees. (Id. at p. 10.) Finally, on the merits, Plaintiffs argue that the amount requested is overbroad and unsupported by Defendants' evidence. (Id. at p. 14.)

Governing Law- Motion for Attorneys' Fees In an action to enforce a contract that authorizes attorneys' fees and costs to either party, the prevailing party is entitled to reasonable attorney fees and costs. Code Civ. Proc. Sec.1717(a). The prevailing party on a contract is the party who received greater relief in the action on the contract. Where there are multiple defendants and defendants prevail, the plaintiff's claims against each defendant must be considered separately in determining who is the prevailing party or if there are multiple prevailing parties. (Burkhalter Kessler Clement & George, LLP v. Hamilton, (2018) 19 Cal.App.5th 38, 45-46.)

A motion for attorneys' fees must be filed before the time to file an appeal elapses. The Court has wide discretion in determining what constitutes reasonable attorneys' fees based on its own expertise. (Hjelm v. Prometheus Real Estate Group, Inc., (2016) 3 Cal. App. 5th 1155, 1177.) The California Supreme Court has determined the lodestar method is the proper mechanism to calculate attorneys' fees under Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16(c). (Ketchum v. Moses, 24 Cal.4th 1122, 1136.) To calculate a lodestar amount, the court must determine the reasonableness of the hourly rates sought.

The "reasonable hourly rate" applicable under the lodestar method is the rate "prevailing in the community for similar work." (PLCM Group v. Drexler (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1084, 1095.) "The trial court makes its determination after consideration of a number of factors, including the nature of the litigation, its difficulty, the amount involved, the skill required in its handling, the skill employed, the attention given, the success or failure, and other circumstances in the case." (Id. at 1096.)

Analysis

Prevailing Party a. The Cross-Complaint

There can only be one prevailing party in an action on a contract. (Code Civ. Sec. 1717; Frog Creek Partners, LLC v. Vance Brown (2012) 206 Cal.App.4th 515, 539.) The prevailing party determination "is to be made only upon final resolution of the contract claims and only by 'a comparison of the extent to which each party ha[s] succeeded and failed to succeed in its contentions.'" (Chia-Lee Hsu v. Maher J. Abbara (1995) 9 Cal.4 th 863, 876.) In Frog Creek Partners, the Court of Appeal reversed a trial court decision to award Frog Creek attorneys' fees for prevailing on a petition to compel arbitration where they lost the contract action overall. (Frog Creek Partners, supra, 206 Cal.App.4th at 546.)

In DisputeSuite.com, LLC v. Scoreinc.com, the California Supreme Court found that a trial court acted within its discretion in determining that the defendant had not prevailed on the contract when it had only prevailed on its motion to move the litigation to Florida. (DisputeSuite.com, LLC v. Scoreinc.com (2017) 2 Cal.5th 968, 974.)

This case is distinct. Unlike Plaintiffs' cited authority, Defendants prevailed on a dispositive motion, a motion for summary judgment, not a procedural motion. The motion to compel arbitration and the transfer motions, above, did not rule on the merits of the case. Additionally, cross-complaints are generally treated as separate actions from the underlying case. (K.R.L. Partnership v. Superior Court (2004) 120 Cal.App.4th 490, 503.) Plaintiffs' complaint and Defendants' cross-complaint are very different: Plaintiffs' complaint for professional negligence and breach of contract arising from professional negligence is fundamentally different from Defendants' cross-complaint, which is an action for fees owed. The complaint and cross-complaint are separate actions, so the Court will consider the merits of Defendants' fee motion.

b. Apportionment and Scope of the Agreement Defendants contend that their two claims, for legal malpractice and breach of contract, are so intertwined that the costs cannot be apportioned. Plaintiffs argue that the costs must be broken out because the scope of the contractual fee agreement is narrow. The fee agreement provides that: If an action or proceeding is commenced to enforce this Agreement or any provision thereof, the prevailing party in such an action or proceeding shall be entitled to recover the reasonable amount of attorneys' fees and costs, in addition to compensatory damages.

This applies whether we choose to have attorneys in our firm represent us or engage outside counsel to represent us. Any such action or proceeding shall be brought in and determined by a court or tribunal in Los Angeles County, and you consent to the jurisdiction of such court or tribunal. For purposes of enforcing this Agreement only, you agree that this Agreement may be disclosed to the court or tribunal. (Everson Decl., P. 3, Exhibit H.)

It is undisputed that the agreement does not apply to legal malpractice actions. Generally, attorneys' fees should be apportioned where there are two distinct claims and fees are only recoverable on one of the claims. (Abdallah v. United Savings Bank (1996) 43 Cal.App.4th 1101, 1111.) However, fees are not necessarily apportioned where the fees are "incurred for representation on an issue common to both a cause of action in which fees are proper and one in which they are not allowed," or where the actions are inextricably intertwined. (Ibid.)

Here, Plaintiffs' claims for legal malpractice and breach of contract are practically identical. Plaintiffs alleged that Defendants committed legal malpractice by failing to file a claim under the Government Tort Claims Act before filing the underlying action against DDSD. (Complaint, P. 29.) Plaintiffs alleged that this same fact constituted breach of the client agreement containing the attorneys' fees provision. (Id. at P. 36.) On Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, the Court found that plaintiffs were not likely to prevail in their underlying action against DDSD, essentially finding that plaintiffs could not prove causation on either their legal malpractice or breach of contract claim. (Minute Order (June 27, 2025.)

The Court's ruling was therefore dispositive on both claims, on the same facts. Plaintiffs' two causes of action were therefore sufficiently intertwined to make apportionment of fees impossible.

Lodestar Analysis The party that seeks payment must "keep records in sufficient detail that a neutral judge can make a fair evaluation of the time expended, the nature and need for the service, and the reasonable fees to be allowed."¿ (Hensley v. Eckerhart (1983) 461 U.S. 424, 441 (conc. opn. of Burger, C.J.).)¿ The evidence should allow the court to consider whether the case was overstaffed, how much time the attorneys spent on particular claims, and whether the hours were reasonably expended. . (ComputerXpress, Inc. v. Jackson ¿(2001) 93 Cal.App.4th 993, 1020.)

Defendants claim that several attorneys worked on this matter for over 400 hours at rates ranging from $325 to $550 per hour. These rates are appropriate for attorneys in the Los Angeles Area. In their objections, Plaintiffs identify three specific hourly reductions: "(1) reduce the lodestar by $11,290 for the 23.8 hours claimed for Waxler, Everson, and Edelman that are not supported by Exhibit 1 through the filing date; (2) exclude or defer at least $720 for the 1.8 hours expressly devoted to drafting Fenton's still-pending cross-complaint; and (3) decline to award estimated future fee motion time as estimated, while avoiding double counting of the 9.0 estimated hours already encompassed within the $11,290 unsupported-hour reduction." (Supplemental Objection, p. 16.) Following a review of the records submitted, the Court agrees with these reductions.

Additionally, a pro rata fee reduction is warranted because Defendants filed the motion without the necessary supporting documentation, requiring additional briefing and additional Court resources. It is not merely that Fenton filed the motion without full records, it is that the evidence provided on the initial motion was egregiously inadequate--it provided no breakdown of attorneys' time at all, making it impossible for the Court to evaluate the reasonableness of the time Defendants' attorneys spent on this matter. Therefore, the Court reduces Defendants' fees an additional 20%.

Conclusion

Defendants' Motion for Attorneys' Fees is GRANTED. Defendants are awarded $132,544.00 ($177,690 - $12,010 = $165,680 - ($165,680 x.20) = $132,544.00) Case Number: 24SMCV05811 Hearing Date: September 10, 2026 Dept: P Tentative Ruling Sandra K. Neal, et al. v. U.C.L.A. Health Systems, et al., Case No. 24SMCV 05811 Defendant's Motion to Deem RFAs Admitted Hearing Date: September 10, 2026 Background Plaintiff s Sandra K. Neal and Don Ford sue Defendants U.C.L.A. Health System; U.C.L.A. Santa Monica Hospital, Christian Alfar, and the State of California for negligence, medical malpractice, and premises liability.

Plaintiffs allege that Neal was injured when Defendants negligently transported her from the hospital to a car and failed to assist her when she was getting into the car, causing her to fall and break her femur. (Complaint, P. 15.) On November 27, 2024, Plaintiffs filed the complaint. On March 30, 2026, Defendants Christian Alfaro and the Regents of the University of California (for the purposes of this motion, "Defendants") filed this Motion to Deem RFAs Admitted. As of September 7, 2026, the Court has not received opposition.

Motion to Deem Requests for Admission, Set One, Admitted "Any party may obtain discovery . . . by a written request that any other party to the action admit the genuineness of specified documents, or the truth of specified matters of fact, opinion relating to fact, or application of law to fact. A request for admission may relate to a matter that is in controversy between the parties."¿ (Code Civ. Proc., Sec. 2033.010.)¿ "Within 30 days after service of requests for admission, the party to whom the requests are directed shall serve the original of the response to them on the requesting party, and a copy of the response on all other parties who have appeared . . . . "¿ (Code Civ. Proc., Sec. 2033.250(a).)

If a party to whom request for admissions are served fails to provide a timely response, the party to whom the request was directed waives any objections, including based on privilege or the work product doctrine. (Code Civ. Proc., Sec. 2033.280(a).) The requesting party can move for an order that the genuineness of any documents and the truth of any matters specified in the request be deemed admitted, as well as for monetary sanctions. (Code Civ. Proc., Sec. 2033.280(b).) The court shall issue this order unless the party to whom the request was made serves a response in substantial compliance prior to the hearing on the motion. (Code Civ. Proc., Sec. 2033.280(c).)

Here, Defendants served the Requests for Admission, Set One, on Neal on August 21, 2025. (Tomlinson Declaration, P. 3.) On September 22, 2025, Defendants requested full and complete responses without objections by October 7, 2025. (Id. at P. 6.) The parties ultimately extended the response deadline to February 17, 2026. (Id. at P. 12.) As of the filing of this motion, Neal has not responded. (Id. at P. 13.) Neal has not filed an opposition indicating that that he has produced responsive discovery since this motion was filed. The Court GRANTS Defendants ' motion to deem RFAs admitted. Sanctions