Dealers Association v. SHMA

adequate showing has yet been made. Plaintiff's principal argument is that it needs the PMK deposition. Plaintiff states that it served a notice for a PMK deposition on July 31, 2026 (along with a request for documents) with the deposition to be held on August 16, 2026--two months and a half months before the trial. Plaintiff stated in the notice that if the date was not good for the defense, the defense should suggest alternative dates. On August 10, 2026, defendants objected on the ground that the date was unilaterally chosen, apparently without committing to another date. Plaintiff states that there is not enough time to get this discovery done, and it claims that the discovery is necessary.

The court's problem is this: the court has no showing of diligence. The court does not know why it is that plaintiff waited until July 31, 2026, to serve the PMK notice and seek documents from the defense. That was about 5 months before trial and 4 months before the FSC and about two and a half years after the complaint was filed. The court does not know what efforts plaintiff had made prior to serving the PMK notice to obtain a mutually agreeable date. For example, plaintiff might have been trying to get a date from the defendant for half a year without any success before serving the deposition notice. That would be a point in plaintiff's favor. Or plaintiff might have not tried at all, which makes it appear that plaintiff simply sat on its hands. Without that kind of information, there is no showing of diligence, and therefore no cause for a continuance.

As to the death of the former counsel, that was at the end of May. The original stipulation was not made for over three months. That, too, is a lack of diligence. Had the request been made in June, the court might have felt differently. The court recognizes that the parties have stipulated to this. The court is not trying to be difficult, but the court simply cannot accommodate this. The trial date was set on February 4, 2025--a year and a half ago. At that time, the court verbally warned the parties that there would be no continuances absent truly unforeseen and unforeseeable circumstances, and the need to complete discovery would not be sufficient. This warning is reflected in the minute order of that date, stating that no continuances would be granted "absent extraordinary good cause."

The reason for this is that the court has over 1300 cases on the docket. Because this is an I/C court, the court needs about 3 weeks to try a case on average. If one does the math, and accounting for days on which the court is dark, that means it will take 100 years to try the current case load. Of course, we all know that most cases resolve without a trial or continuance. But even assuming that 95% of cases so resolve, it will take the court 5 years to try the current docket. As the court warned the parties back at the CMC, the court simply has nowhere to put this case.

Accordingly, the application is DENIED. The court will inquire as to how the mediation (ordered at the CMC with the parties' agreement) went.

Case Number: 25SMCV04336 Hearing Date: September 10, 2026 Dept: I This is a motion to dismiss the action by defendants. The case arises from defendants' earlier plan to make and sell certain electric vehicles under the name Afeela. The vehicles would be sold directly to the public and not through Honda's franchisees. Plaintiff is an association of dealers that includes Honda's franchisees, and plaintiff asserts that this program violates California law.

However, a funny thing happened on the way to the forum. Defendants have apparently abandoned the Afeela program. They state that they no longer have any plans to manufacture or sell the vehicle and that the vast bulk of people associated with the project have been let go, with the rest to follow shortly. Accordingly, defendants contend that the original complaint is now moot, and that the request for prospective relief is not ripe. Plaintiff states that defendants will not commit that the abandonment of the Afeela program is permanent, and therefore they state that they still need at least prospective relief, and accordingly they oppose the motion.

The court agrees with the defense, and the motion is GRANTED. The case will be dismissed, obviously not on the merits. Preliminarily, the court DENIES defendant SHMA's request for judicial notice of the press articles. They are offered not for proof that they exist, but for proof of the truth of the statements therein. That is not proper. Plaintiff's request for judicial notice of various government websites and legislative history is GRANTED. The court has DISREGARDED the new evidence in reply, as it was not necessary to the resolution of this motion.

As to extrinsic evidence, the court disagrees with plaintiff. It is true that an MJOP (which is how this is framed) is a pleading motion and the court cannot go outside of the complaint except as to matters subject to judicial notice. But this is an odd sort of motion. The claim is mootness/ripeness. It is not a merits motion in the way most MJOP motions are. The court believes that it has inherent authority to go outside the four corners of the complaint to make that determination. Indeed, in a sense the matter is jurisdictional. The court has no jurisdiction to make decisions absent a live controversy. In a jurisdictional motion, the court can take evidence going to the jurisdictional question. That is essentially the situation here.

The court also notes that plaintiff does not dispute any of the claims made in the moving papers other than the assertion of permanence or lack thereof. The court believes that the Johnson Declaration is sufficient to establish that defendants have abandoned the Afeela project. All existing reservation agreements have been cancelled and money refunded. There is no production or marketing of the vehicle and there are no retail locations. As to SHMA, which is the entity that was going forward with the Afeela project, the declaration establishes that it is getting rid of all of its assets and has laid off the majority of its workforce. 61% were laid off as of June 11, 2026, with an additional 28% being laid off as of August 1, 2026. At this time, Afeela has only a handful of employees--less than a dozen--and they are closing out the business.

In light of the above, the case as originally brought is MOOT. But plaintiff, while acknowledging that the Afeela program has been mothballed at least, claims it is concerned that the program will come back and therefore wants a declaration for going forward. That strikes the court as an advisory opinion, and the court does not give those. There is no reason to believe that there are any current plans to bring the Afeela program back, or that if there are any plans, that it has been decided that the vehicle will not be sold using traditional means. At present, there is no actual controversy. (Communities for a Better Environment v. State Entergy Resources Conservation & Development Commission (2017) 19 Cal.App.5th 725.)

Nor is the question whether SHMA is an "affiliate" live. SHMA is going out of business. It does not matter whether it was an affiliate of anything or not. Nor does the public interest exception apply. That exception allows a court to rule on an otherwise moot or unripe question if the issue is likely to recur and if the issue needs to be resolved. (Robinson v. U-Haul Co. (2016) 4 Cal.App.5th 304.) But the court has no reason to believe that the situation will recur.

Accordingly, the motion is GRANTED WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND. Defendant to prepare an order of dismissal. As stated above, the order should make it clear that the dismissal is not on the merits.

Case Number: 26SMCV01748 Hearing Date: September 10, 2026 Dept: I This is an application to shorten time in a motion to allow limited discovery to respond to a Special Motion to Strike. The underlying case is one in which plaintiff sues former counsel for wrongly asserting that plaintiff owes them money even though plaintiff had allegedly paid defendants in full, and for wrongfully putting a lien on the recovery of the judgment in the underlying case. Defendant relies on a declaration that plaintiff filed in the underlying case in which plaintiff allegedly acknowledged that he owed defendant money in the context of a fee motion brought in that case. Plaintiff here seeks the accounting records upon which defendants rely in ascertaining that money is in fact owed.

The real issue the court has is this. Assuming that the motion meets the first prong of the SMS analysis (and the discovery does not go to that, really), why is this necessary? In other words, the gist of plaintiff's case is that plaintiff and defendants entered into an oral agreement that plaintiff would pay defendants no more than $25,000 to defend an appeal plus 30% of the amount of any judgment recovered through collection efforts. Prior to that, the court infers from the complaint that plaintiff had retained defendant on some kind of hourly basis through trial and had paid all of the bills in full.

Plaintiff says that defendant acknowledged as much, and with regard to the fee motion in the trial court, said that plaintiff would not be charged for it and even that plaintiff would benefit from it because plaintiff had already paid defendant in full. That was (according to plaintiff) an oral agreement. Plaintiff says he paid the