VILLASPORT LLC VS. META PLATFORMS, INC.

May 20, 2026, Law and Motion Calendar Judge Nicole S. Healy Department 28 ________________________________________________________________________

Meta also attached certain exhibits to the Declaration of Michael Duffey, which is filed in support of the demurrer, but cites these exhibits in the MPA in support of the anti-SLAPP motion. Defendant is reminded that as a general rule, courts do not consider documents outside the complaint in reviewing a demurrer, but do in reviewing an anti-SLAPP motion. However, because plaintiff’s declaration in opposition to the anti-SLAPP motion refers to the exhibits to the Duffey Declaration, the court has considered them in connection with this motion.

A.

Background

Plaintiff VillaSport LLC operates twelve health and fitness clubs across five states. (FAC, ¶ 6.) Plaintiff claims to be a victim of “[a]ttack[s]” from a “[d]isgruntled [e]mployee” named Anthony Tyler Servello in the form of “salacious” accusations about plaintiff and its employees made on Facebook and Instagram. (Id., ¶¶ 32, 38.) Plaintiff alleges that there was an incident at its Katy, Texas, location in March 2024 in which one of plaintiff’s employees made a complaint to their supervisor that another employee had “engaged in misconduct while in the presence of a toddler.” (Id., ¶ 36.)

Plaintiff’s Katy facility maintains a separate “Kids Club” area where its employees take care of children. (Id., ¶ 30.) Servello, then an employee, was allegedly interviewed by plaintiff as part of its investigation into the reported incident. (Id. ¶¶ 35, 37.) Plaintiff alleges that Servello then posted “videos, photographs, and text posts” on Facebook and Instagram about the purported incident. (Id. ¶ 38.) VillaSport contends that those posts included allegations that a “child was molested” at plaintiff’s daycare by a “staff member.” (Id. ¶ 39.)

Plaintiff alleges that word of this purported incident “spread” and was “amplified . . . beyond Facebook and Instagram” such that the staff member in question was arrested. (Id., ¶¶ 42-43.)

According to plaintiff, the events alleged in the FAC have been the subject of at least two other legal actions, including a Texas grand jury investigation which which resulted in a “no bill” as to the arrested employee, as well as a lawsuit in Texas that has resulted in a temporary injunction against Servello. (Id., ¶¶ 42, 46.) That injunction is attached as Exhibit E to the Declaration of Jason Snyder in opposition to Meta’s motion. It provides generally that Servello “shall not, directly or indirectly, communicate any untrue facts” including regarding the alleged incident, the employee who was accused of misconduct, or VillaSport’s response to the allegations.

Servello was ordered to “immediately remove and/or redact and/or edit any and statements on any website, blog posting, and/or social media platform created by [Servello] and/or owned or controlled by [Servello], . . . including TikTok, Instagram, and Facebook” regarding VillaSport. (Ibid.) VillaSport claims that, despite the injunction, Servello has continued to raise accusations that someone in plaintiff’s employ “touch[ed] a child.” (Id., ¶ 47.)

On April 9, 2025, VillaSport sent a letter to Meta identifying specific posts by Servello allegedly containing false accusations against plaintiff and its employees, demanding that Meta remove those posts. (Snyder Decl., ¶¶ 15-16, exh. D.) Plaintiff included with its letter a copy of the Texas TRO, along with copies of previous letters sent to Meta by plaintiff regarding Servello’s posts. (Ibid.) Meta did not remove the posts.

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Thereafter, VillaSport filed this lawsuit asserting causes of action for breach of contract and of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing; negligence; negligent product design and strict product liability for design defect; and seeking declaratory relief.

B.

Legal Standard

Litigation of an anti-SLAPP motion under Section 425.16 involves a two-step process. (Bonni v. St. Joseph Health System (2021) 11 Cal.5th 995, 1009 (Bonni).) In the first step, the moving defendant has the burden of establishing that the challenged claims arise from protected activity engaged in by the defendant. (Ibid., citing Park v. Board of Trustees of California State University (2017) 2 Cal.5th 1057, 1061 (Park).) It is the defendant’s burden to identify what acts each challenged claim rests on and to show how those acts are protected under a statutorily defined category of protected activity. (Ibid.) Once the defendant meets this burden, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to show that the claim has at least minimal merit. (Ibid.)

To satisfy the “arising from” requirement of Section 425.16, a defendant must demonstrate that the protected activity comes within one of the four categories set forth in Section 425.16, subdivision (e). (Park, supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 1063.) Acts in furtherance of a defendant’s right of free speech in connection with a public issue under Section 425.16 include: . . . “(3) any written or oral statement or writing made in a place open to the public or a public forum in connection with an issue of public interest, or (4) any other conduct in furtherance of the exercise of the constitutional right of petition or the constitutional right of free speech in connection with a public issue or an issue of public interest.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 425.16, subd. (e).)

C.

Analysis

Meta seeks to strike each cause of action in the FAC under Section 425.16, subdivision (e)(4). (See MPA., at p. 4.) Meta argues that the claims arise from protected activity; that the FAC does not state a cause of action; and that Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act (47 U.S.C. § 230) bars the FAC. (See MPA, at pp. 1-2.)

Plaintiff contends that this case is not an attack on protected speech. Rather, plaintiff argues that this lawsuit targets Meta’s post-notice refusal to honor explicit contractual promises and Meta’s active algorithmic amplification and curation of defamatory content, all of which falls outside the anti-SLAPP statute’s protective scope. This argument was rejected in Cross v. Facebook, Inc. (2017) 14 Cal.App.5th 190 (Cross). “Where an “action directly targets the way a content provider chooses to deliver, present, or publish news content on matters of public interest, that action is based on conduct in furtherance of free speech rights and must withstand scrutiny under California’s anti-SLAPP statute.” (Id., at p. 202, quoting Greater Los Angeles Age. on Deafness v.

Cable News (9th Cir. 2014) 742 F.3d 414, 424-425.) Although pled as breach of contract and other causes of action, VillaSport challenges Meta’s failure to remove posts on Facebook and Instagram and Meta’s alleged amplification of the offending posts through its recommendation algorithms.

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1. Plaintiff’s Claims Arise from Protected Activity

a. The Challenged Speech Implicates an Issue of Public Interest

In enacting Section 425.16, the Legislature stated that it “finds and declares that it is in the public interest to encourage continued participation in matters of public significance, and that this participation should not be chilled through abuse of the judicial process. To this end, this section shall be construed broadly.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 425.16, subd. (a).) The court therefore must determine whether Meta has established that VillaSport’s claims arise from protected activity. As an initial matter, protected speech includes speech that is posted on a social media platform by a third party. (See Moody v. NetChoice, LLC (2024) 603 U.S. 707.)

Meta has moved under Section 425.16, subdivision (e)(4), which is broader in scope than the other subdivisions and less firmly anchored to any particular context. (FilmOn.com Inc. v. DoubleVerify Inc. (2019) 7 Cal.5th 133, 144-145 (FilmOn).) The California Supreme Court has directed that courts “should engage in a relatively careful analysis of whether a particular statement falls within the ambit of ‘other conduct’ encompassed by subdivision (e)(4).” (Id., at p. 145.) In doing so, the Supreme Court applied a two-part analysis rooted in Section 425.16’s purpose and internal logic. (Id., at p. 149.)

First, the court must ask what the public issue or public interest the speech in question implicates, which is answered by looking to the content of the speech. (Ibid.) “FilmOn’s first step is satisfied so long as the challenged speech or conduct, considered in light of its context, may reasonably be understood to implicate a public issue, even if it also implicates a private dispute.” (Geiser v. Kuhns (2022) 13 Cal.5th 1238, 1253 [protest outside home of mortgage holder’s officer regarding eviction of long-term tenants constituted speech on a public issue].)

The first step “calls for an objective inquiry, without deference to the movant’s framing or personal motivations. A court evaluating an anti-SLAPP motion should take the position of a reasonable, objective observer.” (Id., at p. 1254.) “If a reasonable inference can be drawn that the challenged activity implicates a public issue, then the analysis proceeds to FilmOn’s second step.” (Ibid.) To determine if the speech addresses a matter of public interest, the court must examine the context which includes the identity of the speaker, the audience, and the purpose of the speech. (FilmOn, supra, 7 Cal.5th at pp. 142-143, 145; see also Geiser, supra, 13 Cal.5th at p. 1256 [noting that the contextual considerations apply to both the first and second steps in the FilmOn analysis].)

Plaintiff argues that the posts involve a private dispute. (Opp., at pp. 5-6.) Plaintiff explains that after being demoted and suspended, a disgruntled former employee made false accusations that a child was molested by another staff member at one of plaintiff’s facilities (FAC, ¶¶ 32-39); a Texas court found the statements false and enjoined their publication (id., ¶ 46); and the dispute is localized to one business and one former employee. (Opp., at p. 5.)

The allegation of sexual abuse of a minor by an employee of a fitness club that maintains an area where its employees take care of children is a matter of public interest for the purposes of an anti-SLAPP motion. (See Doe v. California Assn. of Directors of Activities (2025) 117 Cal.App.5th 796, 813 [accusations of inappropriate sexual activities between minors and adults involved in youth activities are a matter of public interest]; Terry v. Davis Community Church

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(2005) 131 Cal.App.4th 1534, 1547 [“The issue as to whether or not an adult who interacts with minors in a church youth program has engaged in an inappropriate relationship with any minor is clearly a matter of public interest.”]; Cross v. Cooper (2011) 197 Cal.App.4th 357, 375, as modified on den. of reh’g. Aug. 4, 2011 [“preventing child sexual abuse and protecting children from sexual predators are issues of widespread public interest.”].) The court therefore moves on to the second step in the FilmOn analysis.

b. A Functional Relationship Exists Between the Posts and the Public Interest

At the second step of the FilmOn analysis, the court asks what functional relationship exists between the speech and the public conversation about some matter of public interest. (See FilmOn, supra, 7 Cal.5th at pp. 149-150.) “[I]t is not enough that the statement refer to a subject of widespread public interest; the statement must in some manner itself contribute to the public debate.” (Id., at p. 150.)

At this step of this analysis must include a consideration of the context or specific circumstances in which the statement was made, including the identity of the speaker, the audience and the purpose of the speech. (Murray v. Tran (2020) 55 Cal.App.5th 10, 28 (Murray), citing FilmOn, supra, 7 Cal.5th at pp. 140, 151-152.) In FilmOn, the court found that the defendant issued reports with allegedly false information not to the wider public but privately to a coterie of paying clients who used the information for business purposes alone. (Id., at p. 153.) Because the alleged wrongful statements about matters of public interest never entered the public sphere and the parties never intended it to, the defendant’s reports were too remotely connected to the public conversation about those issues to merit protection under section 425.16, subdivision (e)(4). (Id., at p. 140.)

In Murray, emails containing statements about an issue of public interest (the quality of care at a dental practice) did not further or contribute to a public conversation or discussion where there was no allegation or evidence that any member of the public received it or that the party sending the emails intended for anyone else to read the emails. However, the court also found that alleged statements to the dentist’s current employer furthered the public discourse regarding the quality of dental care. (Murray, supra, 55 Cal.App.5th at p. 31, 35.)

Here, unlike the reports in FilmOn and the emails in Murray, the speech that plaintiff alleges Meta allowed and algorithmically promoted — content about “serious criminal activity” of child molestation at one of plaintiff’s facilities — was posted on Facebook and Instagram, which are public forums for purposes of the anti-SLAPP statute, and led to the arrest of one of plaintiff’s employees. (FAC, ¶ 42.) Accordingly, plaintiff’s FAC attacks Meta’s conduct in furtherance of speech regarding an issue of public interest.

2. Plaintiff Has Not Established a Probability of Prevailing on the Claims

Once the defendant has established that the challenged claim arises from protected activity, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to demonstrate the merits of the claims by establishing their probability of success. (Baral v. Schnitt (2016) 1 Cal.5th 376, 384-385 (Baral).) The

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California Supreme Court has “described this second step as a ‘summary-judgment-like procedure.’” (Sweetwater Union High School Dist. v. Gilbane Building Co. (2019) 6 Cal.5th 931, 940 (Sweetwater Union).) “As to the second step inquiry, a plaintiff seeking to demonstrate the merit of the claim ‘may not rely solely on its complaint, even if verified; instead, its proof must be made upon competent admissible evidence.’” (Ibid., citation omitted.) “The court does not weigh evidence or resolve conflicting factual claims. Its inquiry is limited to whether the plaintiff has stated a legally sufficient claim and made a prima facie factual showing sufficient to sustain a favorable judgment. It accepts the plaintiff’s evidence as true, and evaluates the defendant’s showing only to determine if it defeats the plaintiff’s claim as a matter of law.” (Baral, supra, 1 Cal.5th at pp. 384-385.)

VillaSport contends that its claims are meritorious. Meta argues that each cause of action lacks minimal merit and that overarchingly, Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act requires dismissal.

3. Plaintiff’s Claims Are Barred by Section 230 Immunity

Under Section 230, subdivision (c)(1) of the Communications Decency Act, “no provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any information provided by another information content provider.” (47 U.S.C., § 230, subd. (c)(1).) An “interactive computer service” is “any information service, system, or access software provider that provides or enables computer access by multiple users to a computer server.” (Id., subd. (f)(2).) An “information content provider” is “any person or entity that is responsible, in whole or in part, for the creation or development of information provided through the Internet or any other interactive computer service.” (Id., subd. (f)(3).) Further, “[n]o cause of action may be brought and no liability may be imposed under any State or local law that is inconsistent with this section.” (Id., subd. (e)(3).)

“Section 230 immunizes from liability ‘(1) a provider or user of an interactive computer service (2) whom a plaintiff seeks to treat, under a state law cause of action, as a publisher or speaker (3) of information provided by another information content provider.’” (Doe 1 v. Meta Platforms, Inc. (9th Cir., April 28, 2026) -- F.4th --, 2026 WL 114707, at p. *5 (Doe 1), quoting Barnes v. Yahoo!, Inc. (9th Cir. 2009) 570 F.3d 1096, 1100–1101 (Barnes).)

As noted above, plaintiff has asserted causes of action for breach of contract and of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, negligence, and products liability, and seeks declaratory relief. VillaSport argues that these claims do not target Meta’s editorial discretion but rather are based on Meta’s failure to remove content that violates its Community Guidelines and on the design of its algorithm, which purportedly amplifies defamatory content. Meta contends that its terms of service permit but do not require it to remove offending conduct. As the Ninth Circuit has stated, however, “[w]e have been wary of the ‘artful skirting’ of Section 230 immunity [citation], and “creative attempt[s] to plead around’ it. [citation].” (Doe 1, supra, 2026 WL 114707, at p. *5, citations omitted.)

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VillaSport’s arguments that Meta is contractually obligated to remove offending content, and that Meta amplified the offending content through its algorithmic product design do not take this case out of Section 230 immunity. As in Doe 1, the “alleged defects relate to Facebook’s core design as a publishing platform, particularly how Facebook promoted or downplayed thirdparty posts using algorithms. Under our case law, matching users with content is publishing conduct, even when the user has not requested the content.” (Doe 1, supra, 2026 WL 114707, at p. *6.)

Likewise, this case “is about the content of third-party posts.” (Id., at p. *7.) “It thus necessarily relies on information provided by third parties. [citations] Calling Facebook a ‘product’ rather than a publication platform only obscures the point that Meta ‘published usergenerated speech that was harmful’ to Plaintiffs.” (Ibid., citations omitted.)

The crux of plaintiff’s claims – that Meta failed to remove allegedly defamatory posts — falls squarely under section 230’s immunity. Where an intermediary “goes no further than the mere act of publication — including a refusal to depublish upon demand, after a subsequent finding that the published content is libelous — section 230 prohibits this kind of directive.” (Hassell v. Bird (2018) 5 Cal.5th 522, 541.) Accordingly, VillaSport’s claims are barred by Section 230.

4. VillaSpport Further Has Not Shown that it Would Prevail on the Causes of Action Alleged in the FAC

Not only does Section 230 immunity bar plaintiff’s claims, VillaSport has not shown that it would prevail on each of the causes of action.

Plaintiff has not identified any contractual term that it claims Meta has breached. (See FAC, ¶¶ 60-61, 65, 68-69, 71 [generally referring to Meta’s TOS and Community Standards].)

Under Meta’s terms of service, it has discretion to determine whether to remove any particular content from its services’ websites. (MPA, at p. 7; citing Duffey Decl., exh. B, §§ 1.5, 3.2; and exh. D, § 6.) Courts have found that the company’s user agreements do not place it under any obligation to remove requested content. (See, e.g., Cross, supra, 14 Cal.App.5th at p. 201 [“while Facebook’s Terms of Service ‘place restrictions on users’ behavior,’ they ‘do not create affirmative obligations’ on Facebook.”], quoting Caraccioli v.

Facebook, Inc. (N.D.Cal. 2016) 167 F.Supp.3d 1056, 1064, quoting Young v. Facebook, Inc. (N.D.Cal. Oct. 25, 2010, No. 5:10-cv-03579-JF/PVT) 2010 WL 4269304 at p. *3; Klayman v. Zuckerberg (D.C. Cir. 2014) 753 F.3d 1354, 1359; see also King v. Facebook, Inc. (N.D. Cal., Dec. 3, 2019) 2019 WL 6493968, at p. *2; Lloyd v. Facebook, Inc. (N.D. Cal., Dec. 16, 2024) 2024 WL 5121035, at p. *5.)

Indeed, Meta’s Terms of Service state “[t]hese Terms govern your use of Facebook, Messenger, and the other products, features, apps, services, technologies, and software we offer. . .” (Duffey Decl., exh. A, introduction.) If Meta “detect[s] potential misuse of our Products, harmful conduct towards others, and situations where we may be able to help support or protect our community, including to respond to user reports of potentially violating content” . . . we may take appropriate action based on our assessment . . .” (Id., § 1, 5th bullet point, emphasis added;

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see also Duffey Decl., exh. B, § 1.5.) The TOS require users to agree not to engage in certain harmful or violative activity (id., § 3.2), and Meta “can remove or restrict access to content that is in violation of these provisions” or “suspend or disable your account for conduct that violates these provisions . . .” (Duffey Decl., exh. A, § 3.2; id., exh. B, § 3.2.) Further, “[i]f we determine, in our discretion, that you have clearly, seriously or repeatedly breached our Terms or Policies, including in particular the Community Standards, we may suspend or permanently disable your access to Meta Company Products, and we may permanently disable or delete your account.” (Duffey Decl., exh.

A, § 4.2; id., exh. B, § 4.2; see also id., exh. C & D, § 6.) Each of Meta’s representations regarding its authority over user-generated content is discretionary; nothing in the TOS requires Meta to take any particular action regarding offending content.

That a Texas court found that Servello’s statements were false and enjoined him from publishing them and that Meta was provided with notice of that injunction (see Opp. at p. 3), does not make Meta’s refusal to remove the content a breach of a contractual agreement with VillaSport. In Barnes, the plaintiff alleged that a Yahoo! employee had made an express promise to the plaintiff that she would remove the offensive content. (Barnes, supra, 570 F.3d at p. 1099 [employee stated that “she would personally walk the statements over to the division responsible for stopping unauthorized profiles and they would take care of it.”]; see also id. at pp. 1107- 1109.) No such direct promise is alleged here. Rather, without specifying which terms were allegedly violated, plaintiff contends that Facebook and Instagram’s terms of service (TOS) and terms of use (TOU) supply the contractual agreements.

Plaintiff’s cause of action for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing likewise fails because the implied covenant does not imply terms into a contract that otherwise do not exist. “The covenant of good faith and fair dealing, implied by law in every contract, exists merely to prevent one contracting party from unfairly frustrating the other party’s right to receive the benefits of the agreement actually made.” (Guz v. Bechtel Nat., Inc. (2000) 24 Cal.4th 317, 349.) However, “it is well established that ‘an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing cannot contradict the express terms of a contract.’” (Alameda Health Sys. v.

Alameda County Employees’ Retirement Ass’n (2024) 100 Cal.App.5th 1159, 1190-1191, quoting Storek & Storek, Inc. v. Citicorp Real Estate, Inc. (2002) 100 Cal.App.4th 44, 55; see also Carma Developers (Cal.), Inc. v. Marathon Development California, Inc. (1992) 2 Cal.4th 342, 374 [“It is universally recognized [that] the scope of conduct prohibited by the covenant of good faith is circumscribed by the purposes and express terms of the contract.”], citation omitted.)

The negligence and product liability claims fail based on the economic loss doctrine. Plaintiff’s relationship with Meta is based on contract, and the FAC alleges economic and not physical injury. Accordingly, the claims are barred. (Rattagan v. Uber Technologies, Inc. (2022) 17 Cal.5th 1, 27.) Further, Meta has disclaimed any duty to plaintiff in its terms of service. (Duffey Decl., exh. A, § 3; exh. B, § 4.3.)

Moreover, because Facebook and Instagram are services, not products, the product liability claims fail. Plaintiff argues that product liability law applies, contending that this claim “targets Meta’s algorithmic recommendation engine;” that “the product/service distinction under California law turns on the essence of the transaction;” and that “Meta’s own Terms of Service

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and public disclosures refer to its offerings as ‘Meta Company Products.’” (Opp., at p. 8.) In support, plaintiff cites Lemmon v. Snap, Inc. (9th Cir. 2021) 995 F.3d 1085 (Lemmon), which is distinguishable. In Lemmon, the Ninth Circuit found that the “interplay between Snapchat’s reward system and the Speed Filter,” which allegedly enticed young people to drive at over 100 mph stated a product liability claim because the claim did not involve publication but sprung from Snap’s role as a product designer. (Id., at p. 1092-1093; see Doe 1, supra, 2026 WL 114707, at p. *6 [distinguishing Lemmon in which the interaction with the platform’s “speed filter” was not “mediated by third-party content, meaning that the claim stood independently of the content that other users creatrd.”].)

Here, the algorithm allegedly enhanced or magnified the effect of third-party content on the platforms — that is, Meta allegedly employs its algorithms in its role as a publisher. (See FAC, ¶¶ 21-22, 25-26, 41, 44; Doe 1, supra, 2026 WL 114707, at p. *6-*8.)

Finally, Meta is correct that declaratory relief is a remedy and not an independent cause of action, and the “trial court properly sustained the demurrer as to these claims because they were ‘wholly derivative of’ other nonviable causes of action.” (Faunce v. Cate (2013) 222 Cal.App.4th 166, 173.)

D. CONCLUSION

Defendant’s Special Motion to strike pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure, section 425.16, is GRANTED, without leave to amend.

If the tentative ruling is uncontested, it shall become the order of the court. Thereafter, defendant’s counsel shall prepare a written order consistent with the court’s ruling for the court’s signature, pursuant to California Rules of Court, Rule 3.1312 and Local Rule 3.403(b)(iv), and provide written notice of the ruling to all parties who have appeared in this action. The order should be e-filed only, do not email or mail a hard copy to the court.