RIVERA vs SACRAMENTO UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT, A PUBLIC ENTITY, et al.

24CV016415: RIVERA vs SACRAMENTO UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT, A PUBLIC ENTITY, et al. 09/08/2026 Hearing on Motion to Compel Further Discovery Responses for Production, Set One in Department 16C

Tentative Ruling

NOTICE: Consistent with Local Rule 1.06(B), any party requesting oral argument on any matter on this calendar must comply with the following procedure: To request limited oral argument, on any matter on this calendar, you must call the Department 16C Oral Argument Request Line at (916) 874-1475 by 4:00 p.m. the Court day before the hearing and advise opposing counsel. At the time of requesting oral argument, the requesting party shall leave a voice mail message: a) identifying themselves as the party requesting oral argument; b) indicating the specific matter/motion for which they are requesting oral argument; and c) confirming that it has notified the opposing party of its intention to appear and that opposing party may appear via Zoom using the Zoom link and Meeting ID indicated below.

If no request for oral argument is made, the tentative ruling becomes the final order of the Court. Unless ordered to appear in person by the Court, parties may appear remotely either telephonically or by video conference via the Zoom video/audio conference platform with notice to the Court and all other parties in accordance with Code of Civil Procedure §367.75. Although remote participation is not required, the Court will presume all parties are appearing remotely for non-evidentiary civil hearings.

The Department 16C Zoom Link is https://saccourt-ca-gov.zoomgov.com/j/16030877014 and the Zoom Meeting ID is 160 3087 7014. To appear on Zoom telephonically, call (833) 568-8864 and enter the Zoom Meeting ID referenced above. NO COURTCALL APPEARANCES WILL BE ACCEPTED. Parties requesting services of a court reporter will need to arrange for private court reporter services at their own expense, pursuant to Government code §68086 and California Rules of Court, Rule 2.956. Requirements for requesting a court reporter are listed on the Court Reporter Services webpage available on the Sacramento Superior Court website at https://saccourt.ca.gov/general-information/court-reporter-services-transcripts.

Parties may contact Court- Approved Official Reporters Pro Tempore by utilizing the list of Court Approved Official Reporters Pro Tempore available at https://saccourt.ca.gov/home/showpublisheddocument/227/639084034465370000. A Stipulation and Appointment of Official Reporter Pro Tempore (CV/E-206) is required to be signed by each party, the private court reporter, and the Judge prior to the hearing, if not using a reporter from the Court’s Approved Official Reporter Pro Tempore list. Once the form is signed it must be filed with the clerk.

If a litigant has been granted a fee waiver and requests a court reporter, the party must submit a Request for Court Reporter by a Party with a Fee Waiver (CV/E-211) and it must be filed with the clerk at least 10 days prior to the hearing or at the time the proceeding is scheduled if less than 10 days away. Once approved, the clerk will forward the form to the Court Reporter’s Office and an official reporter will be provided.

24CV016415: RIVERA vs SACRAMENTO UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT, A PUBLIC ENTITY, et al. 09/08/2026 Hearing on Motion to Compel Further Discovery Responses for Production, Set One in Department 16C

*** EFFECTIVE APRIL 13, 2026, THIS DEPARTMENT HAS MOVED TO THE TANI G. CANTIL- SAKAUYE COURTHOUSE LOCATED AT 500 G STREET IN SACRAMENTO, CA 95814. ALL HEARINGS NOTICED FOR DEPARTMENT 54 WILL BE HEARD IN DEPARTMENT 16C OF THE NEW COURTHOUSE. ***

The Amended Notice of Hearing states the incorrect address for the hearing on this motion. Department 54 has moved to Department 16C at the Tani G. Cantil-Sakauye Courthouse at 500 G Street, Sacramento, CA 95814. Moving counsel shall notify opposing counsel immediately.

Tentative Ruling:

Plaintiff Mary Rivera’s (“Plaintiff”) motion to compel Defendant Sacramento City Unified School District (“the District”) to serve further responses to Plaintiff’s Request for Production of Documents, Set One is ruled upon as follows.

Background

This action involves allegations of childhood sexual assault. Plaintiff alleges that in 2010, she volunteered as a student aide in an afterschool program jointly run by the District and Defendant City of Sacramento (“the City”). The program was known as the START program and was located at Mark Twain Elementary School (“Mark Twain”). Plaintiff alleges that one of the program’s leaders, Joshua Rolando Vasquez, groomed her over a period of time before sexually assaulting her inside of a classroom at Mark Twain.

Plaintiff alleges that Vasquez sexually assaulted several other minors in the START program, and in 2016 he was convicted of childhood sexual assault. Plaintiff’s complaint includes three causes of action: (1) negligence; (2) negligent hiring, retention, and supervision; and (3) negligence per se. Plaintiff alleges that the District knew or should have known about Vasquez’s behavior and failed to adequately supervise him during his interactions with minors in the START program.

On August 25, 2025, this Court heard Plaintiff’s first motion to compel further responses to Set One and granted it in part. The Court ruled that litigation documents from four prior Vasquezrelated lawsuits against the District are relevant to show institutional notice, hiring practices, supervision, and reporting protocols.

With regards to the requests at issue (RFP Nos. 34 and 37 through 54), the Court ordered the District to produce publicly filed documents and to serve further responses identifying, in a privilege log, documents withheld.

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

24CV016415: RIVERA vs SACRAMENTO UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT, A PUBLIC ENTITY, et al. 09/08/2026 Hearing on Motion to Compel Further Discovery Responses for Production, Set One in Department 16C

Plaintiff brings this second motion to compel further responses to RFP Nos. 34 and 37 through 54

Legal Standard

A party may move to compel further responses to requests for production of documents on the grounds that a statement of compliance is incomplete, a representation of inability to comply is inadequate, incomplete, or evasive, or that an objection is without merit or too general. (Code Civ. Proc. § 2031.310(a).) The moving party must “set forth specific facts showing good cause justifying the discovery sought by the demand.” (Code Civ. Proc. § 2031.310(b)(1).) Where there is no issue of privilege of attorney work product, good cause may be shown “simply by a fact-specific showing of relevance.” (Glenfed Dev.

Corp. v. Superior Court (1997) 53 Cal.App.4th 1113, 1117.) Where an objection asserts a privilege or the constitutional right of privacy, the analysis is governed by the substantive law of that objection rather than the ordinary relevance standard (Williams v. Superior Court, (2017) 3 Cal.5th 531, 552-558.)

Waived Objections

Plaintiff raises a threshold issue as to whether the Court’s August 25, 2025 order barred the District from asserting objections made in its discovery responses. Plaintiff argues that because the District’s opposition to Plaintiff’s first motions to compel further responses did not address its “equally available,” attorney-client privilege, work product, FERPA, and Education Code objections, the District abandoned those objections. Plaintiff relies on the following language in the minute order:

“ Plaintiff’s motion is GRANTED as to these requests, with the following limitation. The District is ordered to provide further responses that identify documents or categories of documents that are being withheld on the basis of third-party privacy. This obviously does not apply to publicly filed documents, which should be produced. Nor would it seem to apply to deposition transcripts, discovery responses, or most documents produced in discovery other than medical records and other documents related to the plaintiffs’ emotional damages, at least in support of a blanket refusal to disclose ”

(Minute Order (Aug. 25, 2025); emphasis added.) Plaintiff contends that this language limited the District’s ability to assert any objections other than those based on third-party privacy.

The District asserts that the third-party limitation was illustrative, and the Court did not adopt the limitations Plaintiff advances. In support of this contention, the District relies on the August 25, 2025 hearing transcript, during which it requested clarification of the disputed order. The transcript states, in relevant part:

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

24CV016415: RIVERA vs SACRAMENTO UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT, A PUBLIC ENTITY, et al. 09/08/2026 Hearing on Motion to Compel Further Discovery Responses for Production, Set One in Department 16C

MR. CARTER NOTT “ so reading [the tentative ruling], I understand this to mean that other than publicly filed documents, anything--any document the school district is withholding on the basis of third-party privacy or some other type of privilege, it’s to provide a privilege log; create a privilege log, and provide it to plaintiff?

THE COURT: That is correct.”

(Decl. of Carter J. Nott ISO Opposition ¶ 7; Ex. F, Hearing Tr. 4:13–25.)

In reviewing the August 25, 2025 order, the court notes there is no finding or determination that the District waived or abandoned its objections to RFPD Nos. 34 and 37 through 54, or that those objections were overruled. (See Minute Order (Aug. 25, 2025).) Rather, the Court’s concern was that the District had not provided a privilege log to assess the privilege claims. The Court stated that “the District’s response does not identify any documents at all as required, and the burden is on the District to establish the privacy interest involved.” (Ibid.) The Court directed the District to identify withheld documents and prepare a privilege log, with a later hearing, if necessary, to determine which documents were protected and on what grounds. (Ibid.)

A timely objection based on privilege preserves that privilege, even if the initial objection or privilege log lacks sufficient factual detail. (People ex rel. Lockyer v. Superior Court (2004) 122 Cal.App.4th 1060, 1074–1075; Catalina Island Yacht Club v. Superior Court (2015) 242 Cal.App.4th 1116, 1128–1129.) The purpose of a privilege log is merely to provide sufficient factual detail regarding withheld documents to enable the court and the opposing party to evaluate the merits of the asserted privilege, and the proper remedy for an insufficient log is an order compelling a further, compliant response. (Best Products, Inc. v. Superior Court (2004) 119 Cal.App.4th 1181, 1188–1189; Code Civ. Proc., § 2031.240(c)(1).)

Here, the District timely objected in its initial responses, and the court contemplated that the privilege log would contain third-party privacy or some other type of privilege. The Court therefore does not find that the District’s objections were procedurally waived or abandoned or overruled by the August 25 order. The District did not abandon its privilege claims by emphasizing some objections over others in a brief, because a privilege is generally waived only by statutory methods, and litigation emphasis is not one of them. (See Catalina Island Yacht Club, supra, 242 Cal. App. 4th at pp. 1126–1127). Preserving an objection, however, is not the same as establishing its validity. The District bears the burden of establishing the factual predicate for each claim of privilege. (Catalina Island Yacht Club, supra, 242 Cal. App. 4th at pp. 1126–1127.)

Accordingly, the Court does not find that all the District’s objections were deemed to be

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

24CV016415: RIVERA vs SACRAMENTO UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT, A PUBLIC ENTITY, et al. 09/08/2026 Hearing on Motion to Compel Further Discovery Responses for Production, Set One in Department 16C

procedurally waived, abandoned, or overruled by the August 25, 2025 order.

Prior Litigation Documents (RFPD Nos. 34 and 37-54.)

The Court addresses Plaintiff’s requests for prior litigation documents and Plaintiff’s contention that the District improperly asserted blanket objections to withhold broad categories of documents falling outside the scope of any recognized privilege or protection. Plaintiff further contends that the descriptions in the District privilege log are too generic to permit Plaintiff to evaluate the validity of the District’s privilege claims. (Mov. MPA, pp. 9:24–10:12.)

As the Court previously determined, prior litigation files concerning Vasquez’s misconduct are relevant to Plaintiff’s claims for negligent hiring, supervision, and institutional notice. (Minute Order (Aug. 25, 2025).) The Court also previously determined that plaintiffs’ recounting of the abuse they suffered is not necessarily protected from disclosure, particularly where there is no showing that protective orders were entered in the prior cases. (Ibid.)

Attorney-client privilege and work product

Notwithstanding her abandonment claim, Plaintiff reiterates her assertion that she is not seeking documents protected by the attorney-client privilege or work product doctrine. (Mov. MPA, p. 13:9-11; Gorelik Dec., ¶ 10, Ex. 9, at p. 10.) Plaintiff’s principal argument appears to be that the privilege log’s descriptions are too generic and insufficient. The proper remedy for an insufficient log is an order compelling a further, compliant response. (Best Products, Inc., supra, 119 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1188–1189; Code Civ. Proc., § 2031.240 (c)(1).)

In opposition, the District’s asserts that its objections on attorney work-product and attorneyclient privilege grounds were asserted “out of an abundance of caution due to Plaintiff’s incredibly overbroad requests.” (Opp., pp. 19: 2-7) The District further asserts that some documents may include attorney-client communications, or that Certain discovery requests and responses and deposition transcripts reveal the District’s lawyers’ impressions of the case, constituting work-product. (Id.at p. 19:8-28.)

The District cites no authority supporting its purported “abundance of caution” exception. Nor does it identify any authority holding that discovery or deposition questions are protected as attorney work product merely because they were asked by the District’s lawyers. (Contra Regents of University of California v. Superior Court (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 672, 679 [voluntary disclosure to a third party generally waives work-product protection, subject to the coercion exception].) The law requires a showing that the material reflects an attorney’s protected impressions, conclusions, opinions, legal research, or theories. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2018.030(a).)

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

24CV016415: RIVERA vs SACRAMENTO UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT, A PUBLIC ENTITY, et al. 09/08/2026 Hearing on Motion to Compel Further Discovery Responses for Production, Set One in Department 16C

The Court agrees that it is unclear what portion of each record is being withheld based on attorney-client privilege or work product protection, as opposed to other privileges. Generally, discovery responses are created for exchange with adverse parties and are neither confidential communications nor counsel’s work product. Because the Court generally may not review the contents of documents claimed to be protected by the attorney-client privilege to determine whether the privilege applies, the District should provide an amended compliant privilege log for any documents it continues to withhold on that basis. (Evid. Code, § 915 (a); Costco Wholesale Corp. v. Superior Court (2009) 47 Cal.4th 725, 736.)

“The precise information required for an adequate privilege log will vary from case to case based on the privileges asserted and the underlying circumstances. In general, however, a privilege log typically should provide the identity and capacity of all individuals who authored, sent, or received each allegedly privileged document, the document’s date, a brief description of the document and its contents or subject matter sufficient to determine whether the privilege applies, and the precise privilege or protection asserted.” (Catalina Island Yacht Club v. Superior Court, supra, 242 Cal.App.4th at p. 1130.) Although this Court may not require such specific facts, the Court does require more than a bare assertion as to such broad categories of documents.

Accordingly, the Court does not sustain the attorney-client and work-product objections on the present privilege log, which supplies insufficient information to evaluate them. The District shall amend its privilege log to the extent it wishes to continue asserting these privileges. The Court notes that withholding documents out of an 'abundance of caution' is not, by itself, a valid basis for withholding. Additionally, absent authority, simply asking questions in discovery will not be sustained as attorney work-product. Should the District fail to comply, the Court may impose sanctions, but not a forced waiver of the privilege. (See Catalina Island Yacht Club, supra, 242 Cal.App.4th 1116.)

Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA) and Education Code §49075 et seq

The District does not cite authority establishing that FERPA or the California Education Code creates an independent discovery privilege. The District’s authorities instead address confidentiality and restrictions on disclosure, rather than a categorical privilege against discovery. These statutory provisions therefore do not create an absolute discovery privilege. (See Evid. Code § 911.)

FERPA conditions the availability of federal funds on limiting unauthorized disclosure of education records, while expressly permitting disclosure pursuant to a judicial order. (Rim of the World Unified School Dist. v. Superior Court (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 1393, 1397–1398; see also Doe v. U.S. Swimming, Inc. (2011) 200 Cal.App.4th 1424, 1438 [“FERPA is not analogous to

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

24CV016415: RIVERA vs SACRAMENTO UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT, A PUBLIC ENTITY, et al. 09/08/2026 Hearing on Motion to Compel Further Discovery Responses for Production, Set One in Department 16C

protective nondisclosure in discovery”]). Likewise, Education Code section 49077 provides that “[i]nformation concerning a pupil shall be furnished in compliance with a court order or a lawfully issued subpoena.” These statutory provisions therefore do not create an absolute discovery privilege.

Therefore, these provisions, standing alone, do not justify withholding responsive documents. The underlying records nonetheless remain subject to the third-party constitutional privacy interests, addressed below. (See BRV, Inc. v. Superior Court (2006) 143 Cal.App.4th 742, 756– 757.) Furthermore, while FERPA and the Education Code do not independently preclude discovery, they remain illustrative of the types of sensitive pupil information that warrant protective nondisclosure or targeted redaction. Their applicability does not, however, eliminate the furnishing party’s obligations under applicable law concerning the disclosure, use, and further dissemination of pupil-record information.

The objection is OVERRULED as an independent basis for withholding documents.

Law Enforcement Investigative Privilege

The District asserts the conditional official-information privilege under Evidence Code section 1040 to withhold law-enforcement investigative materials, including police reports, interview logs, and recorded interviews. However, plaintiff objects to the privilege because Plaintiff asserts the privilege was never asserted. (See, generally, Gorelik Dec., ¶¶ 3-4, Exs. 2-3.)

Under the Discovery Act, a responding party must state the specific ground for an objection to an inspection demand in its written response, and if the objection is based on privilege, the particular privilege invoked must be stated. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2031.240(b).) California courts have recognized that a party waives an objection based on privilege when the party fails to timely assert the privilege in response to a discovery demand. (See Scottsdale Insurance Co. v. Superior Court (1997) 59 Cal.App.4th 263, 274; McKesson HBOC, Inc. v. Superior Court (2004) 115 Cal.App.4th 1229, 1239.)

Here, the District did not assert Evidence Code section 1040 privilege in either its initial December 2024 responses or its March 2025 amended responses. Instead, the District first identified section 1040 as a basis for withholding the materials in its October 24, 2025 privilege log. Accordingly, the District did not timely preserve section 1040 as an objection to these inspection demands, and it has not provided authority establishing why the objection should nevertheless be deemed preserved.

Although the sharing of information among governmental entities does not necessarily destroy an otherwise applicable governmental privilege (see Michael P. v. Superior Court (2001) 92

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

24CV016415: RIVERA vs SACRAMENTO UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT, A PUBLIC ENTITY, et al. 09/08/2026 Hearing on Motion to Compel Further Discovery Responses for Production, Set One in Department 16C

Cal.App.4th 1036, 1048), the materials withheld appear to have been previously produced in discovery to adverse parties in prior civil litigation. The District has not shown that its prior production to an adverse party was subject to a protective order, confidentiality agreement, or other restriction preserving the asserted privilege. To the extent the district voluntarily produced the materials without such a restriction, that prior disclosure further undermines its present attempt to invoke section 1040. (Evid. Code § 1040(b)(2).)

Notwithstanding the District’s waiver of Evidence Code section 1040, that waiver does not eliminate the independent constitutional privacy rights of third parties, including minor victims and witnesses. (Cal. Const., art. I, § 1; Boler v. Superior Court (1987) 201 Cal.App.3d 467, 472; Valley Bank of Nevada v. Superior Court (1975) 15 Cal.3d 652, 657–658.) Those interests must be considered separately under the framework articulated in Hill v. National Collegiate Athletic Assn. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 1 and Williams, supra, 3 Cal.5th 531.

Police video and audio recordings depicting minor victims implicate particularly sensitive interests in personal privacy and control over intimate information. Disclosure of the original audiovisual recordings also creates a substantial risk of identifying nonparty minors and exposing them to unnecessary and potentially irreparable privacy harm. Plaintiff does not appear to request and has not demonstrated a need for the original audio or visual recordings that cannot reasonably be satisfied through less intrusive means.

The Motion to Compel is therefore GRANTED IN PART as to written incident reports, officer narratives, investigative correspondence, and other written materials generated during the criminal investigation, to the extent those materials were previously disclosed in the prior civil proceedings, subject to redactions and the existing stipulated Protective Order.

The Motion to Compel is therefore DENIED as to the original audio and video recordings of minor-victim interviews and forensic examinations, without prejudice. Any further documents withheld by the District under a third-party right claim must be accompanied by a sufficient privilege log.

Right to Privacy

The District contends that the majority, or vast majority, of the requested materials implicate the constitutional privacy rights of non-party plaintiffs and District employees, including the identities of the former plaintiffs and their family members, student records and other identifiable pupil information, oral, written, and recorded accounts of the sexual abuse, medical records and treatment information, District employees’ employment histories and personnel files, and lawenforcement investigation materials.

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

24CV016415: RIVERA vs SACRAMENTO UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT, A PUBLIC ENTITY, et al. 09/08/2026 Hearing on Motion to Compel Further Discovery Responses for Production, Set One in Department 16C

The parties agree that the analysis begins with Hill v. National Collegiate Athletic Assn. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 1. Under Hill, a party asserting a right to privacy must establish: “(1) a legally protected privacy interest; (2) a reasonable expectation of privacy in the circumstances; and (3) conduct by the defendant constituting a serious invasion of privacy.” (Id. at pp. 39–40.) If those threshold requirements are satisfied, the Court must balance the privacy interest against the competing interests supporting disclosure. (Id. at pp. 34–35; Williams, supra, 3 Cal.5th at p. 552.)

The District argues that the requested materials satisfy each of the Hill factors. It relies on authorities recognizing privacy interests in information concerning sexual abuse, medical records, personnel files, employment histories, and student records.

The Court agrees that non-party sexual-assault victims have a substantial privacy interest in their medical, mental-health, and other highly sensitive personal information. A sexual-assault victim does not necessarily forfeit that privacy interest merely because she previously asserted a claim arising from the assault. (Susan S. v. Israels (1997) 55 Cal.App.4th 1290, 1295–1299.) The Court therefore is not inclined to order production of non-party victims’ medical records, mental-health records, or other records concerning their emotional damages. Those materials principally concern the later victims’ damages and treatment rather than the District’s alleged pre-abuse notice, and Plaintiff has not demonstrated a sufficient need to overcome the substantial privacy interests implicated by such records. (See County of Los Angeles v. Superior Court (2021) 65 Cal.App.5th 621, 644–648.)

The District also contends that redaction of the victims’ names would not adequately protect their privacy because the remaining information could permit their identities to be reconstructed. It relies on County of Los Angeles, supra, 65 Cal.App.5th at p. 651, for the proposition that anonymization does not necessarily eliminate a privacy intrusion where other information may be used to re-identify an individual. The District argues that the risk is particularly acute here because the prior litigation materials contain information concerning the victims’ parents and relatives, schools, medical treatment, the circumstances of the abuse, and other identifying facts that may be cross-referenced with information already produced in this action.

The Court has considered the District’s reliance on County of Los Angeles and concludes it does not compel categorical withholding here. That case involved a court order requiring production of a massive volume of fully identified and highly sensitive medical and substance-abuse data to a third-party vendor, under a bare direction to “de-identify” that specified no protocol for how de-identification would occur. The re-identification riskarose from the scale of the dataset, its ease of cross-referencing, and the lack of safeguards. (County of Los Angeles, Supra, 65 Cal.App.5th at. pp. 644–648.)

Here, the litigation documents to be produced with the names and direct identifiers of non-party

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

24CV016415: RIVERA vs SACRAMENTO UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT, A PUBLIC ENTITY, et al. 09/08/2026 Hearing on Motion to Compel Further Discovery Responses for Production, Set One in Department 16C

victims and families redacted, under an existing stipulated protective order limiting use and dissemination to this action. The California Supreme Court directs courts to prefer such narrower accommodations over a complete ban on disclosure. (See Williams, supra, 3 Cal.5th at p. 552, 557.) The re-identification risk the District identifies is a reason to define the redaction protocol with care amongst the parties and not a reason to withhold entire categories of relevant litigation materials.

The District further argues that Plaintiff has not demonstrated a compelling need for the prior litigation materials because she has already received thousands of documents. However, the Court previously determined that “the prior lawsuits against the District related to other incidents of childhood sexual abuse by Vasquez are clearly relevant to Plaintiff’s claims, notwithstanding the fact that the abuse occurred after the abuse alleged in this case.” (Minute Order, Aug. 25, 2025.) The Court therefore does not revisit the determination that the prior litigation is relevant to Plaintiff’s notice theory.

The District has established a substantial privacy interest in the non-party victims’ medical, mental-health, emotional-damages, and similarly sensitive records. The Court will not order production of those materials. The same conclusion does not necessarily follow for deposition transcripts, discovery responses, and other litigation documents merely because they contain descriptions of the prior abuse. Although those materials may contain highly sensitive information that may be subject to redaction or withholdings, the District has not established that the entirety of those categories is subject to a privacy protection that categorically bars disclosure.

The Court previously observed that the privacy limitation did not appear to apply to deposition transcripts, discovery responses, or most documents produced in discovery, other than medical records and documents related to the plaintiffs’ emotional damages, “at least in support of a blanket refusal to disclose.” (Minute Order, Aug. 25, 2025.)

The Court therefore finds that the privacy interests implicated by deposition transcripts, discovery responses, and other litigation materials can be substantially accommodated through redaction of names and direct identifying information, together with a protective order limiting the use and dissemination of the materials to this litigation. (See Williams, supra, 3 Cal.5th at pp. 556–557.)

Accordingly, the District shall produce responsive deposition transcripts, discovery responses, and other litigation materials concerning the prior incidents, subject to appropriate redactions and the protective order. The District may redact the names of non-party victims and parents and their direct identifying information, as well as medical, mental-health, and emotional-damages information that is not necessary to the understanding or use of the responsive material. The District shall identify those materials in its amended privilege log.

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

24CV016415: RIVERA vs SACRAMENTO UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT, A PUBLIC ENTITY, et al. 09/08/2026 Hearing on Motion to Compel Further Discovery Responses for Production, Set One in Department 16C

The Court likewise does not order blanket production of District employees’ personnel files. Personnel files implicate recognized privacy interests, and the District has identified concerns regarding personal, medical, financial, contact, and employment information contained therein. (BRV, Inc. v. Superior Court (2006) 143 Cal.App.4th 742, 756; Versaci v. Superior Court (2005) 127 Cal.App.4th 805, 818-821.) But neither case means every document in every personnel file is protected from discovery.

The District must clarify the privacy interest as to the particular personnel materials withheld and cannot rely solely on a categorical assertion that all personnelfile materials are private. To the extent responsive personnel records contain information directly relevant to Plaintiff’s claims, the District shall identify the documents withheld and the particular privacy interest asserted so that the Court can determine whether redaction or another narrower limitation is appropriate.

Finally, to the extent the district continues to withhold any responsive document on the basis of privilege or other specific protection, it shall provide an amended privilege log containing sufficient factual information to permit Plaintiff and the Court to evaluate the asserted protection.

Monetary Sanctions

The instant motion presents genuine disputes concerning the scope of third-party privacy interests and the appropriate treatment of materials generated in prior litigation. Moreover, the District was substantially justified in maintaining its privilege objections notwithstanding deficiencies in its privilege log. A timely asserted privilege objection is not waived merely because the responding party later provides an inadequate privilege log. Plaintiff was likewise substantially justified in seeking further production given the relevance of the prior litigation materials to Plaintiff’s notice theory and the District’s failure to establish a categorical basis for withholding the requested materials. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2031.310(h).)

Accordingly, all requests for attorney fees and sanctions are DENIED.

The court reminds the parties that “A meet and confer declaration in support of a motion shall state facts showing a reasonable and good faith attempt, either in person, by telephone, or by videoconference, to informally resolve each issue presented by the motion. (Code Civ. Proc. § 2016.040.) Future failure to comply may lead to sanctions.

Disposition

Plaintiff Mary Rivera’s Motion to Compel Further Responses to RFP Nos. 34 and 37–54 is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART, as set forth above. Both parties’ requests for monetary sanctions are DENIED. The District shall serve verified further responses with redactions where applicable and an amended privilege log by October 8, 2026, or as otherwise

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

24CV016415: RIVERA vs SACRAMENTO UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT, A PUBLIC ENTITY, et al. 09/08/2026 Hearing on Motion to Compel Further Discovery Responses for Production, Set One in Department 16C

agreed in writing. Prior to production, the District shall redact all identifying information and any additional information required to be redacted by law or the protective order.

The minute order is effective immediately. No formal order pursuant to California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312, or further notice is required.