Garcia-Rodea vs. General Motors LLC

representation cause of action. (Id. at 157). As discussed above, the specificity requirements of pleading “the persons who made the allegedly fraudulent representations, their authority to speak, to whom they spoke, what they said or wrote, and when it was said or written” (Id. at 157) do not apply to concealment causes of action. Defendant also relies on White v. Ultramar, Inc. (1999) 21 Cal.4th 563, 566–567, 573. However, this case discussed the appeal of a judgment following a jury trial, and did not discuss pleading requirements for Civ. Code §3294, subd. (b). At the pleading stage, the complaint may rely on ultimate facts. (Spinks v. Equity Residential Briarwood Apartments (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 1004, 1055.)

Accordingly, the court denies the motion to strike.

Plaintiffs shall give notice of both rulings.

4 Wheelock vs. OFF CALENDAR Anaheim Regional Medical Center 5 Castilla vs. CONTINUED TO 12/16/26 Southland Credit Union 6 Garcia-Rodea TENTATIVE RULING: vs. General Motors LLC For the reasons set forth below, Plaintiff Daniel Garcia-Rodea’s motion for attorney’s fees, is DENIED, without prejudice, and Defendant General Motors, LLC’s motion to tax/strike costs is DENIED.

Plaintiff is awarded $2,110.03 in costs.

Pending Motions

Plaintiff moves for attorneys’ fees, expenses, and costs award of $32,915.03, consisting of $30,805 in fees incurred, $2,110.03 in costs and expenses.

Defendant also moves to tax/strike Plaintiff’s costs/expenses.

The court first addresses Plaintiff’s fee award and then addresses Defendant’s motion to tax/strike costs and Plaintiff’s cost award.

Plaintiff’s Motion for Attorneys’ Fees

A. Standard on Motions for Attorney’s Fees

Plaintiff moves for attorneys’ fees, expenses, and costs award of $32,915.03, consisting of $30,805 in fees incurred and $2,110.03 in costs and expenses.

On a motion for attorney’s fees, the moving party has the burden of: (1) establishing entitlement to an award, and (2) documenting the appropriate hours expended and hourly rates. (ComputerXpress, Inc. v. Jackson (2001) 93 Cal.App.4th 993, 1020.)

The Song-Beverly Act provides for the recovery of attorney’s fees, costs, and expenses. (Civ. Code, § 1794(d).) Courts use the lodestar adjustment method to determine the amount of attorney’s fees to award in Song-Beverly actions. (Reynolds v. Ford Motor Co. (2020) 47 Cal.App.5th 1105, 1112.) “[T]he lodestar is the basic fee for comparable legal services in the community.” (Ketchum v. Moses (2001) 24 Cal.4th 1122, 1132.) It is “based on the ‘careful compilation of the time spent and reasonable hourly compensation of each attorney . . . involved in the presentation of the case.’ [Citation.] [The California Supreme Court] expressly approved the use of prevailing hourly rates as a basis for the lodestar...

In referring to ‘reasonable’ compensation, [the Court] indicated that trial courts must carefully review attorney documentation of hours expended; ‘padding’ in the form of inefficient or duplicative efforts is not subject to compensation. (Id. at 1131- 1132.)

When determining a reasonable attorneys’ fees award using the lodestar method, the court begins by deciding the reasonable hours the prevailing party’s attorney spent on the case and multiplies that number by the reasonable hourly compensation of each attorney. (Doppes v. Bentley Motors, Inc. (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 967, 998; see also Environmental Protection Info. Ctr. v. California Dep’t of Forestry & Fire Protection (2010) 190 Cal.App.4th 217, 248.) “The reasonable hourly rate is that prevailing in the community for similar work.” (PLCM Group v. Drexler (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1084, 1095.) The court may rely on personal knowledge and familiarity with the legal market in setting a reasonable hourly rate. (Heritage Pac. Fin., LLC v. Monroy (2013) 215 Cal.App.4th 972, 1009; 569 E. County Boulevard LLC v. Backcountry Against the Dump, Inc. (2016) 6 Cal. App. 5th 426, 437.)

The court then has the discretion to increase or decrease the lodestar figure by applying a positive or negative multiplier; “such an

adjustment is commonly referred to as a ‘fee enhancement’ or ‘multiplier.’ [Citation.]” (Mikhaeilpoor v. BMW of North America, LLC (2020) 48 Cal.App.5th 240, 247 (“Mikhaeilpoor”).) The lodestar may be adjusted based on factors which include the novelty and difficulty of issues presented, complexity of the case, the attorney’s skills, the results achieved, and the extent to which taking the case on a contingent fee basis has precluded the attorney from taking other feegenerating work. (Ketchum, 24 Cal.4th at 1132-1134; Mikhaeilpoor, 48 Cal.App.5th at 247.) “The purpose of [the] adjustment is to fix a fee at the fair market value for the particular action.

In effect, the court determines, retrospectively, whether the litigation involved a contingent risk or required extraordinary legal skill justifying augmentation of the unadorned lodestar in order to approximate the fair market rate for such services.” (Ketchum, 24 Cal.4th at 1132.)

The court is not required to impose a multiplier; the decision is discretionary. (Mikhaeilpoor, 48 Cal.App.5th at 247; Galbiso, 167 Cal.App.4th at 1089; Nichols v. City of Taft (2007) 155 Cal.App.4th 1233, 1241.)

“‘[T]he lodestar method vests the trial court with the discretion to decide which of the hours expended by the attorneys were “reasonably spent” on the litigation’ [Citation] and to determine the hourly rates that should be used in the lodestar calculus. [Citation.]” (Mikhaeilpoor, 48 Cal.App.5th at 246-247.) “The experienced trial judge is the best judge of the value of professional services rendered in his court . . . . [Citation.]” (Ketchum, 24 Cal.4th at 1132.)

Here, it is undisputed Plaintiff is the prevailing party over Defendant GM and that Plaintiff is entitled to recover attorney’s fees pursuant to the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act.

Plaintiff submits time records detailing the work performed, amount of time billed, date, and timekeeper. The records show 78 hours of work by non-attorneys, paralegals, and attorneys totaling $30,805 in attorney’s fees. (Ex. A.) The court notes, however, that the exhibits filed with the court do not actually contain a declaration authenticating any of these records. (See ROA #253). The court finds that the moving papers do not contain admissible evidence establishing Plaintiff’s reasonable rates or reasonable hours expended.

Authentication of a writing is required before it may be admitted in evidence. (People v. Goldsmith (2014) 59 Cal.4th 258, 266). Authentication requires a person with personal knowledge to lay sufficient foundation “for a trier of fact to find that the writing is what it purports to be, i.e., that it is genuine for the purpose offered.” (Id. at 267). Plaintiff’s moving papers fail to meet this standard.

Plaintiff attempts to cure this defect by providing a declaration in Plaintiff’s reply papers for the first time. The general rule of motion practice, which applies here, is that new evidence is not permitted with reply papers. (Jay v. Mahaffey (2013) 218 Cal.App.4th 1522, 1537). While the court has discretion to consider new evidence on reply, the inclusion “of additional evidentiary matter with the reply should only be allowed in the exceptional case ...’’ (Id.)

Here, the court does not find that exceptional circumstances exist to consider Plaintiff’s new evidence on reply. A notice of settlement was filed on August 7, 2025—over one year ago. The actual settlement was accepted on July 24, 2025. (Opp. Bowton Decl., ¶ 9). Plaintiff has had ample time to prepare and file a motion for attorneys’ fees, but did not do so for nearly a year. Further, Plaintiff filed its motion on May 18, 2026. Plaintiff had ample time before the September 9, 2026, hearing on the motion to file a notice of errata and/or correct any defects in the moving papers with sufficient time to give Defendant the requisite 16 court day notice and before Defendant filed an opposition. Plaintiff, however, did not do so.

Waiting until the eleventh hour to correct and offer admissible evidence to support its motion does not constitute an exceptional circumstance. Because Plaintiff bore the burden, as the moving party, of establishing its fees, but failed to authenticate the time records or offer admissible evidence of the reasonable hourly rates or reasonable hours expended, the motion is DENIED, without prejudice.

Defendant’s Motion to Tax Costs

On May 18, 2026, Plaintiff filed a memorandum of costs, seeking costs totaling $2,110.03. Defendant GM seeks to tax/strike costs in its entirety and/or, in the alternative, $973.85 in costs.

In general, the prevailing party is entitled as a matter of right to recover costs for suit in any action or proceeding. Cal. Civ. Proc. Code §1032(b); Santisas v. Goodin (1998) 17 Cal.4th 599, 606; Scott Co. Of Calif. v. Blount, Inc. (1999) 20 Cal.4th 1103, 1108. The term prevailing party is defined by statute to include: The party with a net monetary recovery; a defendant who is dismissed from the action; a defendant where neither plaintiff nor defendant recovers anything; and a defendant as against those plaintiffs who do not recover any relief against that defendant. Cal. Civ. Prov. Code § 1032(a)(4).

Allowable costs under section 1033.5 must be reasonably necessary to the conduct of the litigation, rather than merely convenient or

beneficial to its preparation, and must be reasonable in amount. Cal. Civ. Proc. Code §1033.5. An item not specifically allowable under § 1033.5(a) nor prohibited under subdivision (b) may nevertheless be recoverable in the discretion of the court if they meet the above requirements (i.e., reasonably necessary and reasonable in amount). Ladas v. California State Automotive Assoc. (1993) 19 Cal.App.4th 761, 773-774.

If the items appearing in a cost bill appear to be proper charges, the burden is on the party seeking to tax costs to show that they were not reasonable or necessary. Id. at 773-774. On the other hand, if the items are properly objected to, they are put in issue and the burden of proof is on the party claiming them as costs. Id.

Separate and apart from section 1033.5, Civil Code section 1794, subdivision (d), provides: “If the buyer prevails in an action under this section, the buyer shall be allowed by the court to recover as part of the judgment a sum equal to the aggregate amount of costs and expenses, including attorney's fees based on actual time expended, determined by the court to have been reasonably incurred by the buyer in connection with the commencement and prosecution of such action.” (Cal. Civ. Code 1794(d); see also Nightingale v. Hyundai Motor America (1994) 31 Cal.App.4th 99, 103–104.)

“Section 1794, subdivision (d), permits the prevailing buyer to recover both ‘costs’ and “expenses.” (Jensen v. BMW of North America, Inc. (1995) 35 Cal.App.4th 112, 137.) “Examining the language of the statute... (the Legislature intended the word ‘expenses’ to cover items not included in the detailed statutory definition of ‘costs...’ under Code of Civil Procedure section 1033.5. (Id.)

Specifically, the Legislature added the “costs and expenses” language to section 1794 in 1978. (Id. at 138.) An analysis by the Assembly Committee on Labor, Employment, and Consumer Affairs states: “Indigent consumers are often discouraged from seeking legal redress due to court costs. The addition of awards of 'costs and expenses' by the court to the consumer to cover such out-of-pocket expenses as filing fees, expert witness fees, marshall's fees, etc., should open the litigation process to everyone.” (Id., citing Assem.

Com. on Labor, Employment & Consumer Affairs, Analysis of Assem. Bill No. 3374 (May 24, 1978) p. 2.; see also Warren v. Kia Motors America, Inc. (2018) 30 Cal.App.5th 24, 42-43 (in enacting provision of the Song- Beverly Consumer Warranty Act governing award of costs, legislature intended the phrase costs and expenses to cover items not included in the detailed statutory definition of “costs.”)

Here, Defendant argues that the court should essentially strike all costs or, alternatively, $973.85 in costs. According to Defendant, Plaintiffs’ costs are without merit, are unreasonable, unsupported, and/or unnecessary. Specifically, Defendant objects to costs related to electronic fees, service of process fees, filing fees and jury fees.

Defendant in its moving papers, however, completely ignores that Plaintiff has a broader and more expansive avenue of recovering costs than section 1033.5. Defendant’s arguments are based on the standard set forth in section 1033.5 and not section 1794. Specifically, Defendant argues that costs are not recoverable because the costs are not reasonably necessary for the conduct of litigation. The correct standard here is civil code 1794, which contemplates a broader recovery for costs and expenses for consumers than those statutorily allowed.

The court has reviewed Plaintiffs’ cost items and finds that Plaintiffs’ requests for costs related to electronic fees, service of process fees, filing fees and jury fees, to which Defendant objects, are reasonable and awardable under section 1794 and/or 1033.5.

As such, Defendant’s motion is DENIED. Plaintiff is awarded $2,110.03 in costs.

Plaintiff to give notice.

7 Josh Zwagil as TENTATIVE RULING: trustee for the JZ Marketing For the reasons set forth below, Defendant Tracy Grove’s motion to Holdings dismiss, with prejudice, Plaintiffs’ First Amended Complaint as to Irrevocable Trust Dated her is GRANTED. The dismissal without prejudice entered on May 29, 2018 August 26, 2026, is VACATED. vs. Capstone Financial Defendant’s request for judicial notice of Exhibits 1 through 4 is Partners, LLC GRANTED. (Evid. Code, § 452, subd. (d).)

Defendant moves for an order dismissing, with prejudice, the First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) as to her pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 581, subdivision (f).

Under Code of Civil Procedure section 581, subdivision (f)(2), the Court may dismiss an action as to a defendant after a demurrer is sustained with leave to amend and the plaintiff fails to amend within the time allowed.