Delena v. A Team Security

argues Lyft fails to address its independent liability under Public Utilities Code Sec.5354. Though this theory of liability was not pled in the operative complaint, the court will address this argument on its merits.

By its terms, section 5354 attributes to a charter-party carrier the acts and omissions of any person providing the authorized service with the carrier's approval or consent. Id.

Plaintiff's reliance on section 5354 is misplaced. Bus. & Prof. Code Sec.7451 states: "[n]otwithstanding any other provision of law . . . an app-based driver is an independent contractor and not an employee or agent." Id. The phrase "notwithstanding any other provision of law" is a well-established phrase in California law expressing the Legislature's intent that "the specific statute control despite the existence of other law which might otherwise govern." Klajic v. Castaic Lake Water Agency (2004) 121 Cal.App.4th 5, 12-13.

Courts interpret ballot initiatives under the rules governing statutory construction. People v. Park (2013) 56 Cal.4th 782, 796. Plaintiff argues Prop. 22 and section 7451 are limited to labor law disputes. This argument is contradicted by the plain language of section 7451, which states section 7451 applies notwithstanding any other provision of law, not merely labor law. Id. Section 7451 states it includes "but [is] not limited to, the Labor Code." Id. Plaintiff's reliance on the Voter Information Guide's Official Title and Summary (Opp. at p. 8) is misplaced; a ballot summary is not legally binding.

Plaintiff argues the 2025 revision of CACI 3704 purports to "actively direct[] courts to apply the common law Borello right-to-control test... to disputed-status vicarious liability questions." Id. CACI instructions are not legally binding authority; there is no legal basis to find Prop. 22 or section 7451 do not apply to automobile tort cases.

Plaintiff argues the control factors of S.G. Borello & Sons, Inc v. Department of Industrial Relations (1989) 48 Cal.3d 341 create triable issues of fact as to whether Lyft directed Sahakyan. The Borello factors are superceded by Prop.

22. See Bus. & Prof. Code Sec.7459(e). Under section 7451, the only test is whether subdivisions (a) through (d) are met. See Bus. & Prof. Code Sec.7451(a)-(d).

It is undisputed that at the time of the 4/10/23 accident, Sahakyan determined his own schedule. SSAMF 6. Lyft did not require Sahakyan to accept the ride request that led to this incident, nor any other ride request. SSAMF 7. Sahakyan was free to drive for Uber, other TNCs, or any other occupation simultaneously. SSAMF 14. The operative 12/12/22 contract between Lyft and Sahakyan classifies the relationship as one of independent contractor status. SSAMF 8. Bus. & Prof. Code Sec.7451(a)-(d) are satisfied.

There is no triable issue of fact as to applicability of Prop. 22 or section 7451. The undisputed facts show Sahakyan was an app-based independent contractor. Plaintiff cannot establish an employee or agent relationship between Sahakyan and Lyft as a matter of law. Summary judgment GRANTED. Case Number: 24VECV04148 Hearing Date: September 9, 2026 Dept: B Tentative Ruling Delena v. A Team Security, Case no.

Hearing date September 9, 2026

Defendant ATS' Motion for Reconsideration Plaintiffs R. and T. Delena sued defendants Deanco Healthcare, LLC dba Mission Community Hospital ("Deanco") and A Team Security, Inc. ("ATS") for negligence, premises liability and loss of consortium. Plaintiffs allege R. Delena was stabbed by an unidentified assailant while attempting to enter the hospital. Defendants each filed motions for summary judgment; Deanco filed a joinder to ATS's motion. Plaintiffs opposed both. The court granted Deanco's MSJ and denied ATS' MSJ. See 7/20/26 Min. Order.

ATS moves for reconsideration. Plaintiff opposes. Per Code Civ. Proc. Sec.1008(a), a party may seek reconsideration of a prior ruling upon new or different facts or law and a showing of reasonable diligence in not producing such evidence earlier. A motion for reconsideration is proper when critical facts or documents emerge after the original motion which materially affects the court's prior ruling. See Gilberd v. AC Transit (1995) 32 Cal.App.4th 1494, 1500.

ATS argues the court's tentative ruling of 7/9/26 granted ATS' MSJ and Deanco's MSJ, finding plaintiffs and expert Marcisz failed to present any evidence of a prior similar violent criminal stabbing such that no triable issue of fact exists as to duty. Decl. O'Meara, para. 2; exh. A. ATS argues the court's subsequent ruling of 7/20/26 denying ATS' MSJ, wherein the court "denied ATS' Motion for Summary Judgment on a single, narrow theory that appeared only when the Court amended its tentative ruling: that a triable issue exists as to whether ATS assumed a duty when one of its guards 'identified Doe as a possible threat, spoke to him and began the task of requiring Doe to leave the premises,' and then allegedly failed 'to ensure Doe actually left the premises and did not return.'" Id. at paras. 11-12, exh. B.

ATS argues the court's change in its tentative ruling constitutes new or different facts for purposes of Code Civ. Proc. Sec.1008(a). This is incorrect. A motion for reconsideration is proper when critical facts or documents emerge which materially affect the court's prior ruling. See Gilberd, supra. The court's own final ruling on a matter cannot, by definition, affect that same ruling.

ATS' argument that "[a]n internal tension exists in the order" is equally unavailing; the court's final ruling on ATS' MSJ turns on the court's interpretation of the issue of duty and the specific triable issue of fact as to whether ATS adopted a duty. Disagreement with the court's interpretation of the law or facts is not a basis for reconsideration. Id.

ATS requests in the alternative that the court invoke its own "inherent authority" to reconsider its ruling. Plaintiffs argue this is counter to law. Plaintiffs are correct; per Le Francois v. Goel (2005) 35 Cal.4th 1094 this request is expressly prohibited. The California Supreme Court noted "[u]nless the requirements of section 437c, subdivision (f)(2), or 1008 are satisfied, any action to reconsider a prior interim order must formally begin with the court on its own motion." Id. at 1108-1109.

ATS cannot bring a motion to compel, or in the alternative request reconsideration, under Le Francois, supra. Any such reconsideration must occur only by the court's own initiative. There is no basis for reconsideration. DENIED. | Home -->)" -->