Mosqueda vs. Ford Motor Company

Attorney’s Fees and Penalties

Plaintiff does not oppose striking Prayer No. 5 for wages, civil penalties, and statutory penalties. Plaintiff also does not oppose striking Prayer No. 3 for attorney’s fees as presently pleaded, but requests leave to amend to allege a statutory basis for fees. Plaintiff does not identify any applicable statute or explain how amendment would cure the defect. Accordingly, the motion to strike Prayer Nos. 3 and 5 is GRANTED without leave to amend.

Defendant shall file and serve its answer to the remaining causes of action within 30 days of this ruling.

Defendant to give notice.

2 Herrera vs. OFF CALENDAR Bodda-Herrera 3 Mosqueda vs. TENTATIVE RULING: Ford Motor Company For the reasons set forth below, Defendants Ford Motor Company and Joe Macpherson Ford dba AutoNation Ford Tustin’s demurrer to Plaintiffs Giselle Mosqueda and Martha Andrade Lugardo’s Complaint is OVERRULED.

Statement of Law

A demurrer only tests the sufficiency of the pleadings. (See Satyadi v. West Contra Costa Healthcare District (2014) 232 Cal.App.4th 1022, 1028 [in analyzing a demurrer, the court looks only to the face of the pleadings and to matters judicially noticeable and not to the evidence or other extrinsic matters]).

In reviewing the propriety of the sustaining of a demurrer, the “court gives the complaint a reasonable interpretation, and treats the demurrer as admitting all material facts properly pleaded. [Citations.] The court does not, however, assume the truth of contentions, deductions or conclusions of law. [Citation.] The judgment must be affirmed ‘if any one of the several grounds of demurrer is well taken. [Citations.]’ [Citation.] However, it is error for a trial court to sustain a demurrer when the plaintiff has stated a cause of action under any possible legal theory. [Citation.]

And it is an abuse of discretion to sustain a demurrer without leave to amend if the plaintiff shows there is a reasonable possibility any defect identified by the defendant can be cured by amendment.” (Hale v. Sharp Healthcare (2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 1373, 1379 [citing Aubry v. Tri–City Hospital Dist. (1992) 2 Cal.4th 962, 967].). A court will not consider facts that have not been alleged in the complaint unless they may be reasonably

inferred from the matters alleged or are proper subjects of judicial notice. (Hall v. Great W. Bank (1991) 231 Cal.App.3d 713, 718 fn.7.)

Fraudulent Concealment

Defendant Ford demurrers to the second cause of action for fraudulent concealment.

The elements of a cause of action for fraud based on concealment are: “(1) the defendant must have concealed or suppressed a material fact, (2) the defendant must have been under a duty to disclose the fact to the plaintiff, (3) the defendant must have intentionally concealed or suppressed the fact with the intent to defraud the plaintiff, (4) the plaintiff must have been unaware of the fact and would not have acted as he did if he had known of the concealed or suppressed fact, and (5) as a result of the concealment or suppression of the fact, the plaintiff must have sustained damage.” (Jones v. ConocoPhillips Co. (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 1187, 1198).

With regards to fraudulent concealment, a complaint need not specify information that is uniquely within defendants’ knowledge. (Tenet Healthsystem Desert, Inc. v. Blue Cross of Calif. (2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 821, 840).

Plaintiffs plead the following in their complaint:

FORD’s authorized dealerships are its agents for the purposes of the sale of FORD vehicles to its customers. (Compl., ¶ 112). FORD and its agents intentionally concealed and failed to disclose material facts relating to the defective 10R80 transmission. (Compl., ¶ 113). FORD has never disclosed the 10R80 Transmission Defect to consumers. Instead, from 2017 to the present, FORD has attempted to squelch public recognition of the defect by propagating the falsehood that the harsh and bumpy shifting in 10R80 equipped vehicles was “normal,” through statements made to consumers and the general public by FORD employees, authorized dealers, agents, sales representatives and/or repair technicians, and through TSBs which sought to normalize the poor performance and safety issues, as described herein. (Compl., ¶ 114).

FORD actively concealed information from the public, preventing Plaintiff(s) from discovering any of the concealed facts as described in detail above. (Compl., ¶ 115). Plaintiff(s) did not know about the defective 10R80 transmission at the time of sale or lease. (Compl., ¶ 116). FORD intended to deceive Plaintiff(s) by concealing the known issues with the 10R80 transmission in an effort to sell or lease the Subject Vehicle. (Compl., ¶ 118). FORD fraudulently induced Plaintiff(s) to purchase or lease

the Subject Vehicle they would not have entered into but for FORD’s concealment of the defective nature of the 10R80 transmission. (Compl., ¶ 119).

Plaintiff(s) were harmed by purchasing or leasing the Subject Vehicle that Plaintiff(s) would not have purchased or leased had Plaintiff(s) known the true facts about the 10R80 defect. Plaintiff(s) also suffered diminution in the value of Plaintiff(s)’ vehicle, out-of-pocket expenses, damages in the amount of the difference between the value of the vehicle equipped with the defective transmission and the value of the vehicle if it had been equipped as warranted, and reliance damages. Plaintiff(s) also incurred expenses relating to registration, insurance, and maintenance of the Subject Vehicle. (Compl., ¶ 123).

Specificity

First, Defendant contends that Plaintiffs failed to plead their cause of action with the requisite specificality or particularity, citing to Tarmann v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. (1991) 2 Cal.App.4th 153, 157, wherein the court held: “The requirement of specificity in a fraud action against a corporation requires the plaintiff to allege the names of the persons who made the allegedly fraudulent representations, their authority to speak, to whom they spoke, what they said or wrote, and when it was said or written.”

However, Plaintiffs need not plead specific information that should be within defendant’s knowledge. (See West v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. (2013) 214 Cal.App.4th 780, 793). See also Jones v. ConocoPhillips Co. (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 1187, 1199: “As one court has aptly observed, ‘it is harder to apply [the requirement of specificity] to a case of simple nondisclosure. “How does one show ‘how’ and ‘by what mean’ something didn't happen, or ‘when’ it never happened, or ‘where’ it never happened.” ’”.

See also Dhital v. Nissan North America, Inc. (2022) 84 Cal. App. 5th 828, 844: “Nissan also contends plaintiffs did not provide specifics about what Nissan should have disclosed. But plaintiffs alleged the CVT transmissions were defective in that they caused such problems as hesitation, shaking, jerking, and failure to function. The SAC also alleged Nissan was aware of the defects as a result of premarket testing and consumer complaints that were made both to NHTSA and to Nissan and its dealers.

It is not clear what additional information Nissan believes should have been included... We conclude plaintiffs’ fraud claim was adequately pleaded.”

Similar to Dhital, Plaintiffs here have plead the existence of the 10R80 transmission defect, which causes consumers to experience

the following unexpected manifestations of the defect: abrupt harsh shifting, erratic shifting, jerking (commonly known as “juddering” or “shuddering”), lunging while slowing down, hesitation between gears, lack of acceleration, loss of power, stalling, slipping gears, failure to change gears, clunking or banging noises, and other drivability concerns that impede the driver’s safety, each and all of which prevent a 10R80 equipped vehicle from operating as intended by the driver. (Compl., ¶ 14). Plaintiffs allege that their 2020 Ford Mustang was equipped with a 10R80 transmission and that it was defective. (Compl., ¶¶ 55, 59).

Similar to Dhital, Plaintiffs alleged that “FORD was aware that the 10R80 transmission installed in the vehicles was defective and would manifest symptoms as described above when it began receiving consumer complaints from NHSTA and issued Technical Service Bulletins, which are internal memorandums from the manufacturer to its dealerships on how to diagnose and repair recurring problems with a particular line of vehicles.” (Compl. ¶ 17). They allege that “FORD tracks and monitors warranty spending by component part. After failures in pre release testing data, FORD’s knowledge of the defects were enhanced by its regular internal review of warranty spending on repairs for the 10R80 transmission and its component parts that it monitored.” (Compl., ¶ 18).

Defendant Ford contends that these allegations do not establish “nonpublic superior knowledge” because “the Complaint does not plead the contents or results of any particular test, dataset, report, or internal analysis.” (Reply, 5:18-19). This level of information is not required at the pleading stage, particularly where such test results would be within the knowledge of Defendants. As the court held in Dhital, supra, allegations that the manufacturer was “aware of the defects as a result of premarket testing and consumer complaints that were made both to the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration and to Nissan and its dealers” were sufficient. (Dhital, supra, 84 Cal.App.5th at 844). As the court went on to state: “It is not clear what additional information Nissan believes should have been included.” (Id.).

Defendant also contends that Plaintiffs failed to plead intent or reliance. The court finds that Plaintiffs have plead these elements. (See Compl., ¶¶ 113, 118, 123; see also Mirkin v. Wasserman (1993) 5 Cal.4th 1082, 1093 [“[o]ne need only prove that, had the omitted information been disclosed one would have been aware of it and behaved differently.”]).

Duty to Disclose/Fiduciary Duty

Next, Defendant Ford contends that Plaintiffs fail to plead a direct transactional relationship with Ford to trigger a duty to disclose. In Bigler-Engler, Inc. v. Breg, Inc. (2017) 7 Cal.App.5th 276, the court held that: “A duty to disclose facts arises only when the parties are in a relationship that gives rise to the duty, such as ‘seller and buyer, employer and prospective employee, doctor and patient, or parties entering into any kind of contractual arrangement.’” (Id. at 311). “[The California] Supreme Court has described the necessary relationship giving rise to a duty to disclose as a ‘transaction’ between the plaintiff and defendant: ‘In transactions which do not involve fiduciary or confidential relations, a cause of action for nondisclosure of material facts may arise in at least three instances: (1) the defendant makes representations but does not disclose facts which materially qualify the facts disclosed, or which render his disclosure likely to mislead; (2) the facts are known or accessible only to defendant, and defendant knows they are not known to or reasonably discoverable by the plaintiff; (3) the defendant actively conceals discovery from the plaintiff.’” (Id. [italics in original]). “Such a transaction must necessarily arise from direct dealings between the plaintiff and the defendant; it cannot arise between the defendant and the public at large.” (Id. at 312).

However, in Bigler-Engler, no seller and buyer or contractual relationship existed between the plaintiff and manufacturing defendant. (Bigler-Engler, 7 Cal.App.5th at 314).

In Dhital, supra, the court found that a car buyer need not allege a contract with the manufacturer in order to allege a duty to disclose:

“Nissan argues plaintiffs did not adequately plead the existence of a buyer-seller relationship between the parties, because plaintiffs bought the car from a Nissan dealership (not from Nissan itself). At the pleading stage (and in the absence of a more developed argument by Nissan on this point), we conclude plaintiffs’ allegations are sufficient. Plaintiff alleges that they bought the car from a Nissan dealership, that Nissan backed the car with an express warranty, and that Nissan’s authorized dealerships are its agents for purposes of the sale of Nissan vehicles to consumers. In light of these allegations, we decline to hold plaintiffs’ claim is barred on the ground there was no relationship requiring Nissan to disclose known defects.” (Id. at 844).

Similarly, here, Plaintiffs allege that they entered into a warranty agreement with Ford, and that Ford’s authorized dealerships are its

agents for the purposes of the sale of Ford vehicles to its customers. (Compl., ¶¶ 6, 112).

The court finds Plaintiffs’ allegations to be sufficient.

Finally, it is unclear whether Defendant Ford is also demurring on the basis that the second cause of action is barred by the statute of limitations.

In Defendant’s demurrer, Defendant Ford sets forth that the “Second Cause of Action for Fraudulent Inducement... fails to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action against Ford pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 430.10(e) because Plaintiffs failed to plead fraudulent concealment with sufficient particularity, and because Plaintiffs’ conclusory allegations of delayed discovery and class-action tolling do not suffice to salvage an otherwise defective fraud claim.” (See Demurrer, 2:6-11 [emphasis added]).

However, there is no reference to the applicable statute of limitations for this claim, or any discussion as to when the statute commenced or would have run.

Nevertheless, to the extent Defendants demurrer on this basis, the court finds that Plaintiffs’ tolling allegations are sufficient. (See Compl., ¶ 70).

Accordingly, the demurrer is overruled as to this cause of action.

Negligent Repair

Next, Defendant Joe Macpherson Ford contends that the cause of action for negligent repair fails to state a cause of action. (See Burgess v. Superior Court (1992) 2 Cal.4th 1064, 1072 [elements of negligence]).

Defendant contends that Plaintiffs cannot state a cause of action for fraud pursuant to the economic loss rule. The economic loss rule “precludes recovery for purely economic loss due to disappointed expectations, unless the plaintiff can demonstrate harm above and beyond a broken contractual promise. Conduct amounting to a breach of contract becomes tortious only when it also violates a duty independent of the contract arising from principles of tort law.” (Robinson Helicopter Co. v. Dana Corp. (2004) 34 Cal.4th 979, 988- 989).

However, “California decisional law has long recognized that the economic loss rule does not necessarily bar recovery in tort for damage that a defective product (e.g., a window) causes to other portions of a larger product (e.g., a house) into which the former has been incorporated.” (Jimenez v. Superior Court (2002) 29 Cal.4th 473, 483.) Furthermore, a negligent failure to perform services competently may constitute both a breach of contract and a tort. (North American Chemical Co. v. Superior Court (1997) 59 Cal.App.4th 764, 774).

Plaintiffs cite to numerous federal district courts that have incorporated this analysis (See, for example, Sabicer v. Ford Motor Company (C.D. Cal. 2019) 362 F.Supp.3d 837, 840-842 [finding that economic loss rule would not bar recovery in tort for damage that subcomponents of an engine cause to the engine as a whole or for damage that the engine caused to the vehicle in which it has been incorporated and that Defendants failed to show the economic loss rule entirely precludes Plaintiffs’ negligent repair claim];see also Viveros v. Ford Motor Company (S. D. Cal. 2021) 2021 WL 5989365 at *8 [“[T]his Court is persuaded by the ‘growing body of case law recognizing that local dealerships can be liable to plaintiffs who assert negligent repair claims.’”]).

Defendants contend that these cases have no application here because they are decisions discussing federal remand. However, the court in Sabicer cited to Jimenez, supra, when finding that “[t]he economic loss rule would not bar recovery in tort for damage that these subcomponents cause to the engine as a whole or for damage that the engine caused to the Vehicle in which it has been incorporated.” (Sabicer, supra, 362 F.Supp.3d at 841). The court finds this to be persuasive.

Plaintiffs allege the following in their Complaint:

On or around September 6, 2024, Plaintiff(s) delivered the Subject Vehicle to AutoNation Ford Tustin, an authorized Ford repair facility, for repair. Plaintiff(s) complained that the Subject Vehicle has a hard shift primarily in gears 1-3 during normal acceleration, and especially in sport mode. The repair facility technicians road tested the Subject Vehicle. After 6 days at the repair facility, the Subject Vehicle was returned to Plaintiff(s). The service technician represented to Plaintiff(s) that the Subject Vehicle had been repaired and was safe to drive. Plaintiff(s) reasonably relied on this representation by the service technician at the authorized Ford repair facility.

(Compl., ¶ 60).

On or around October 4, 2025, Plaintiff(s) delivered the Subject Vehicle to Villa Ford of Orange, an authorized Ford repair facility, for repair. Plaintiff(s) complained that the Subject Vehicle’s transmission exhibited hard engagement, delayed shifting characterized by an inability to select the correct gear, followed by harsh gear engagement, and associated abnormal noises. The repair facility technicians road tested the vehicle and verified the concern, they then inspected the Subject Vehicle, revealing a burnt transmission fluid odor. After performing TSB-guided procedures and additional pinpoint testing, the concern persisted. The transmission was removed and disassembled, revealing significant internal damage, including burnt clutch materials, metal debris contamination, damaged cylinder support splines, scoring on internal components, and sticking valves within the valve body.

(Compl., ¶ 61).

The court finds these allegations sufficient at the pleading stage.

Accordingly, the demurrer is OVERRULED.

Motion To Strike

For the reasons set forth below, Defendant Ford Motor Company’s motion to strike is DENIED.

A court may strike out any irrelevant, false, or improper matter inserted in any pleading or strike out all or any part of any pleading not drawn or filed in conformity with the laws of this state, a court rule, or an order of the court. (Code Civ. Proc., § 436.)

“Irrelevant” matters include: allegations not essential to the claim, allegations neither pertinent to nor supported by an otherwise sufficient claim, or a demand for judgment requesting relief not supported by the allegations of the complaint. (Code Civ. Proc., § 431.10, subd. (b).) A motion to strike also may strike legal conclusions. (Weil & Brown, Cal. Prac. Guide, Civil Proc. Before Trial, ¶ 7:179 (2010).) Conclusory allegations are permitted, however, if they are supported by other factual allegations in the complaint. (Perkins v. Superior Court (1981) 117 Cal.App.3d 1, 6.)

Defendant moves to strike punitive damages from the second cause of action for fraudulent inducement on the basis that this case of action is insufficiently plead, and because Plaintiffs allege no facts showing authorization or ratification by corporate leaders.

Civ. Code § 3294, subd. (b) provides, in part: “With respect to a corporate employer, the advance knowledge and conscious disregard, authorization, ratification or act of oppression, fraud, or malice must be on the part of an officer, director, or managing agent of the corporation.”

According to Civ. Code § 3294 (c)(1), (2) and (3):

(1) “Malice” means conduct which is intended by the defendant to cause injury to the plaintiff or despicable conduct which is carried on by the defendant with a willful and conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others. (2) “Oppression” means despicable conduct that subjects a person to cruel and unjust hardship in conscious disregard of that person's rights. (3) “Fraud” means an intentional misrepresentation, deceit, or concealment of a material fact known to the defendant with the intention on the part of the defendant of thereby depriving a person of property or legal rights or otherwise causing injury.

As explained in the demurrer analysis, Plaintiffs sufficiently plead the second cause of action for fraudulent concealment.

With regards to Defendant’s argument regarding ratification/authorization by corporate leaders, Defendant contends that Plaintiffs’ Complaint alleges no officer, director, or managing agent of Ford who committed the alleged conduct, no facts showing authorization or ratification by Ford’s corporate leadership, and no facts demonstrating advance knowledge or conscious disregard by any Ford managing agent.

Here, Plaintiffs have alleged that “[a]ll acts of corporate employees as alleged were authorized or ratified by an officer, director or managing agent of the corporate employer.” (Compl., ¶ 8). Plaintiffs also alleged Ford’s exclusive knowledge of the defects through premarket testing and consumer complaints, and failure to disclose, as discussed above. (Compl., ¶¶ 16-18).

In support of its contention that this is insufficient, Defendant cites to Tarmann v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. (1991) 2 Cal.App.4th 153. However, this case discussed the dismissal of a fraudulent

representation cause of action. (Id. at 157). As discussed above, the specificity requirements of pleading “the persons who made the allegedly fraudulent representations, their authority to speak, to whom they spoke, what they said or wrote, and when it was said or written” (Id. at 157) do not apply to concealment causes of action. Defendant also relies on White v. Ultramar, Inc. (1999) 21 Cal.4th 563, 566–567, 573. However, this case discussed the appeal of a judgment following a jury trial, and did not discuss pleading requirements for Civ. Code §3294, subd. (b). At the pleading stage, the complaint may rely on ultimate facts. (Spinks v. Equity Residential Briarwood Apartments (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 1004, 1055.)

Accordingly, the court denies the motion to strike.

Plaintiffs shall give notice of both rulings.

4 Wheelock vs. OFF CALENDAR Anaheim Regional Medical Center 5 Castilla vs. CONTINUED TO 12/16/26 Southland Credit Union 6 Garcia-Rodea TENTATIVE RULING: vs. General Motors LLC For the reasons set forth below, Plaintiff Daniel Garcia-Rodea’s motion for attorney’s fees, is DENIED, without prejudice, and Defendant General Motors, LLC’s motion to tax/strike costs is DENIED.

Plaintiff is awarded $2,110.03 in costs.

Pending Motions

Plaintiff moves for attorneys’ fees, expenses, and costs award of $32,915.03, consisting of $30,805 in fees incurred, $2,110.03 in costs and expenses.

Defendant also moves to tax/strike Plaintiff’s costs/expenses.

The court first addresses Plaintiff’s fee award and then addresses Defendant’s motion to tax/strike costs and Plaintiff’s cost award.