RODRIGUEZ CHAVERO vs CLARK

25CV140807: RODRIGUEZ CHAVERO vs CLARK 09/08/2026 Hearing on Motion to Dismiss CRS# 183152578195 in Department 518

Tentative Ruling - 09/03/2026 Mark Fickes

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff and Cross-Defendant Jose A. Rodriguez Chavero (“Rodriguez Chavero”) sued Defendant and Cross-Complainant Hector Daniel Clark (“Clark”) for breach of contract on September 5, 2025, seeking to recover storage fees for Clark's 1994 Mazda RX-7. The dispute arises from Clark's delivery of the vehicle in 2011 to an auto body shop then operating as Genesis Auto Body, for paint and body work, toward which Clark paid an $1,800 deposit. The vehicle remained at the shop for approximately fourteen years and was returned to Clark on March 4, 2026.

Clark answered and filed a cross-complaint for breach of contract, fraud, conversion, negligence, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and violations of the Business and Professions Code. Appearing in propria persona, Clark then filed the present Motion to Dismiss. The motion seeks an order dismissing Rodriguez Chavero's complaint in its entirety with prejudice under Business and Professions Code section 7031, a determination that section 7031 bars Rodriguez Chavero from recovering any compensation, and an award of costs. Clark's reply brief additionally requests sanctions under Code of Civil Procedure section 128.7.

The motion contends that Rodriguez Chavero was unlicensed when he accepted the vehicle in 2011. In verified discovery responses, Rodriguez Chavero has admitted that he did not personally hold an Automotive Repair Dealer ("ARD") license before approximately October 2015; ARD license No. 281832 issued to Galaxy Auto Body on October 23, 2015. Rodriguez Chavero responds that he worked as an employee, and was not the owner, of Genesis Auto Body in 2011, and that the arrangement was later reaffirmed. In support of the motion, Clark relies on his own declaration and exhibits, including the ARD license record and Rodriguez Chavero's discovery responses.

Rodriguez Chavero opposed the motion in propria persona on May 7, 2026, and separately filed a response and objections to Clark's declaration. On June 15, 2026, through retained counsel, Rodriguez Chavero filed a supplemental opposition. Rodriguez Chavero has also filed a motion for leave to amend the complaint, which would withdraw the breach-of-contract theory based on the 2011 transaction and substitute a breach claim based on an alleged May 2021 agreement, formed after Rodriguez Chavero became a licensed ARD, together with a cause of action for trespass to land. The motion for leave to amend is set to be heard after the present motion.

LEGAL STANDARD

California civil procedure does not provide a general "motion to dismiss" for failure to state a cause of action. A defendant who contends that a complaint fails to state a cause of action must proceed by demurrer (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.10, subd. (e)) or by motion for judgment on the 25CV140807: RODRIGUEZ CHAVERO vs CLARK 09/08/2026 Hearing on Motion to Dismiss CRS# 183152578195 in Department 518 pleadings (Code Civ. Proc., § 438, subd. (c)(1)(B)(ii)). The term "motion to dismiss" in the Code of Civil Procedure refers principally to dismissal for delay in prosecution. (Code Civ. Proc., § 583.410.) Because Clark's motion attacks the legal sufficiency of the complaint, the Court construes it as a motion for judgment on the pleadings.

A motion for judgment on the pleadings is the functional equivalent of a general demurrer. It "performs the same function as a general demurrer, and hence attacks only defects disclosed on the face of the pleadings or by matters that can be judicially noticed," and "[p]resentation of extrinsic evidence is therefore not proper on a motion for judgment on the pleadings." (Cloud v. Northrop Grumman Corp. (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 995, 999.) The grounds for the motion "shall appear on the face of the challenged pleading or from any matter of which the court is required to take judicial notice." (Code Civ.

Proc., § 438, subd. (d).) A judicially noticed fact or a party's admission may negate an express allegation on such a motion only where "the notice must be of something that cannot reasonably be controverted." (Columbia Casualty Co. v. Northwestern Nat. Ins. Co. (1991) 231 Cal.App.3d 457, 468.) Unlike on a motion for summary judgment, the pleader is on notice only to argue the legal sufficiency of the allegations, not to come forward with evidentiary support for what is pleaded. (Id. at pp. 468-469.)

DISCUSSION

Two questions frame the motion: whether it may be decided on materials outside the pleadings, and whether Business and Professions Code section 7031, the sole ground asserted, reaches an automotive repair dealer. Neither supports dismissal, and the pending motion for leave to amend confirms that dismissal with prejudice is not warranted.

A. The Motion Relies on Matters Outside the Pleadings

Clark's showing rests almost entirely on materials outside the complaint: his own declaration, the ARD license record, and Rodriguez Chavero's verified discovery admissions. On a motion for judgment on the pleadings, those materials generally may not be considered. (Cloud, supra, 67 Cal.App.4th at p. 999.) Rodriguez Chavero's licensure status in 2011 does not appear on the face of the complaint; Clark derives it from Rodriguez Chavero's responses to requests for admission and special interrogatories.

Even a party's admission may negate an allegation on this motion only where it "cannot reasonably be controverted." (Columbia Casualty Co., supra, 231 Cal.App.3d at p. 468.) Rodriguez Chavero's role in 2011 (employee or owner) and the existence and terms of any later agreement remain disputed. The motion therefore cannot be granted as a motion for judgment on the pleadings, and it has not been noticed or supported as a motion for summary judgment under Code of Civil Procedure section 437c.

Rodriguez Chavero also argues that Clark failed to meet and confer before filing. That asserted failure is not a basis for the Court's ruling. A determination that the meet-and-confer process was insufficient "shall not be grounds to grant or deny" a motion for judgment on the pleadings (Code Civ. Proc., § 439, subd. (a)(4)), and the parallel demurrer provision is to the same effect (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.41, subd. (a)(4)). The Court does not rest its decision on any meet-and-

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF ALAMEDA

25CV140807: RODRIGUEZ CHAVERO vs CLARK 09/08/2026 Hearing on Motion to Dismiss CRS# 183152578195 in Department 518 confer deficiency.

B. Business and Professions Code Section 7031 Does Not Apply Here

Clark's motion rests solely on Business and Professions Code section 7031. That section bars a person "engaged in the business or acting in the capacity of a contractor" from maintaining an action to collect compensation for work "where a license is required by this chapter," that is, Chapter 9, the Contractors State License Law. (Bus. & Prof. Code, §§ 7031, subd. (a), 7000.) "Contractor" is a defined term, keyed to construction: one who undertakes to "construct, alter, repair, add to, subtract from, improve, move, wreck or demolish any building, highway, road, parking facility, railroad, excavation or other structure, project, development or improvement." (Bus. & Prof.

Code, § 7026.) The section 7031 bar attaches only to work that falls within that definition. (Phoenix Mechanical Pipeline, Inc. v. Space Exploration Technologies Corp. (2017) 12 Cal.App.5th 842, 852.) And where the Legislature "has not defined the term 'contractor' to include" a given activity, a court may not judicially expand the licensing law to reach it; that determination "is within the sole purview of the Legislature " (The Fifth Day, LLC v. Bolotin (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 939, 950.)

An automotive repair and paint shop is not a construction contractor. It is an "automotive repair dealer," defined as a person who, "for compensation, engages in the business of repairing or diagnosing malfunctions of motor vehicles"; and "repair of motor vehicles" expressly "includ[es] automotive body repair work." (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 9880.1, subds. (a), (k).) Automotive repair dealers are governed by the separate Automotive Repair Act. (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 9880 et seq.; see Vasquez v. Solo 1 Kustoms, Inc. (2018) 27 Cal.App.5th 84, 92.) Because section 7031 does not govern this dispute, it does not support dismissal of Rodriguez Chavero's complaint, and the motion fails on the sole ground asserted.

C. The Automotive Repair Act Presents Questions Not Resolvable on This Motion

Although section 7031 does not apply, the Automotive Repair Act contains provisions bearing on Rodriguez Chavero's ability to recover. A person required to be a registered automotive repair dealer "shall not have the benefit of any lien for labor or materials, including the ability to charge storage fees in accordance with applicable laws, or the right to sue on a contract for motor vehicle repairs unless the person possesses a valid registration." (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 9884.16, subd. (a).) An automotive repair dealer must also provide the customer a written estimate before commencing work. (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 9884.9, subd. (a).) A dealer who fails to comply with the estimate requirement may not recover for the work. (Vasquez, supra, 27 Cal.App.5th at pp. 92-95.)

These provisions do not entitle Clark to dismissal on the present record. Clark did not move under the Automotive Repair Act; his motion rests on section 7031. The application of sections 9884.16 and 9884.9, moreover, turns on disputed facts and on a pleading that may be superseded: whether Rodriguez Chavero was an owner or an employee in 2011; whether the

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF ALAMEDA

25CV140807: RODRIGUEZ CHAVERO vs CLARK 09/08/2026 Hearing on Motion to Dismiss CRS# 183152578195 in Department 518 operative agreement is the 2011 transaction or a separate May 2021 agreement formed after Rodriguez Chavero became a registered dealer; and whether any written-estimate requirement governs a storage arrangement as distinct from repair work. The Court cannot resolve these questions on the face of the complaint, and it expresses no view on their merits.

D. Dismissal With Prejudice Is Not Warranted

Rodriguez Chavero has moved for leave to amend to withdraw the breach theory based on the 2011 transaction and to plead a breach claim based on an alleged May 2021 agreement, together with a trespass to land claim. An amended complaint supersedes the original, which "ceases to perform any function as a pleading," and "the filing of an amended complaint moots a motion directed to a prior complaint." (State Compensation Ins. Fund v. Superior Court (2010) 184 Cal.App.4th 1124, 1130-1131; accord Sylmar Air Conditioning v.

Pueblo Contracting Services, Inc. (2004) 122 Cal.App.4th 1049, 1054.) The motion for leave to amend has not yet been granted, so the original complaint remains the operative pleading for present purposes. But the prospect of amendment reinforces that dismissal with prejudice is inappropriate now: the theory Clark attacks is the very theory Rodriguez Chavero seeks to withdraw, and leave to amend is liberally granted. Denial without prejudice allows the Court to address the operative pleading once the motion for leave to amend is resolved.

E. The Request for Sanctions Is Not Properly Before the Court

Clark's request for sanctions under Code of Civil Procedure section 128.7, raised for the first time in his reply brief, is not properly presented. A motion for sanctions under that section "shall be made separately from other motions or requests," and must be served but not filed unless the challenged matter is not withdrawn within the 21-day safe-harbor period. (Code Civ. Proc., § 128.7, subd. (c)(1).) A request embedded in a reply brief satisfies neither requirement. The Court therefore does not reach it.

CONCLUSION

The motion attacks the legal sufficiency of the complaint but relies on matters outside the pleadings, and it rests solely on a statute that does not govern automotive repair dealers. Dismissal with prejudice is not warranted on this record. Accordingly, the court orders as follows:

1. Defendant Hector Daniel Clark's Motion to Dismiss, construed as a motion for judgment on the pleadings, is DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.

2. The denial is without prejudice to Defendant's raising, by a properly noticed and supported motion directed to the operative pleading, any bar to recovery under the Automotive Repair Act, including Business and Professions Code sections 9884.16 and 9884.9. The Court expresses no view on the merits of any such motion.

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF ALAMEDA

25CV140807: RODRIGUEZ CHAVERO vs CLARK 09/08/2026 Hearing on Motion to Dismiss CRS# 183152578195 in Department 518 4. Defendant's request for sanctions under Code of Civil Procedure section 128.7, raised for the first time in the reply brief, is DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE to a separately noticed motion that complies with the requirements of that section.

5. Plaintiff's objections to the Declaration of Hector Daniel Clark are OVERRULED AS MOOT, the Court not having relied on the declaration in denying the motion.

6. Plaintiff's pending motion for leave to amend the complaint will be heard and decided on its own hearing date.

CASE MANAGEMENT AND FURTHER PROCEEDINGS

The Court makes the following observations and directions, which apply to all further proceedings in this matter. This case has been marked by motion practice disproportionate to the issues and the amount in controversy, including the several motions the Court has now resolved and motions previously denied. The Court finds that the litigation has become over-litigated and unduly burdensome, and that more meaningful, good-faith meet-and-confer efforts would likely reduce the motion practice going forward. Now that both parties are represented by counsel, the Court expects counsel and the parties to act reasonably, to cooperate in the discovery process, and to resolve disputes without court intervention wherever possible.

To that end, the Court orders as follows:

1. All further meet-and-confer efforts required by statute or rule shall be conducted by video conference (for example, Zoom or a similar platform) and shall be recorded. The Court will not consider any motion for which a meet-and-confer effort is a prerequisite unless the moving papers are accompanied by a declaration attesting to that effort.

2. For any further motion for which meet-and-confer is required, if a party contests the Court's tentative ruling, both counsel and the parties themselves shall appear in person, and not remotely, at the hearing on that motion. They shall also bring a copy of the meet-and-confer efforts.

PLEASE NOTE: Pursuant to California Rule of Court 3.1308, subdivision (a)(1), this tentative ruling will become the order of the Court unless it is contested before 4:00 PM on the court day preceding the noticed hearing.

To contest a tentative ruling, a party should do the following:

First, the party must notify Department 518, by email at Dept518@alameda.courts.ca.gov and copy all counsel of record and self-represented parties. The contesting party must state in the subject line of the email the case name, case number and motion.

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF ALAMEDA

25CV140807: RODRIGUEZ CHAVERO vs CLARK 09/08/2026 Hearing on Motion to Dismiss CRS# 183152578195 in Department 518

Second, the party shall log into the eCourt Public Portal, search for this case (e.g., by case number), select the case name, select the "Tentative Rulings" tab, click the "Click to Contest this Ruling" button, enter the party's name and a brief statement of the party's reason for contesting the tentative, and click "Proceed."

Please note the Court does not permit remote appearances for motions for summary judgment that are contested. If you contest a Motion for Summary Judgment, you must appear in person.

For all other motions (unless otherwise noted in the tentative ruling), Parties may appear via videoconference, using the Zoom.com website or application. TO CONNECT TO ZOOM: Department 518 is inviting you to a scheduled ZoomGov meeting.

Topic: Department 518's Personal Meeting Room

Join ZoomGov Meeting https://alameda-courts-ca-gov.zoomgov.com/j/16054307984

Meeting ID: 160 5430 7984

One tap mobile +16692545252,,16054307984# US (San Jose) +14154494000,,16054307984# US (US Spanish Line)

---

Dial by your location • +1 669 254 5252 US (San Jose)